UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DIXON LAW, et al.,
Petitioners,
v. Civil Action No. 26-1101 (JEB)
ERIC POWELL, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Should an arbitrator’s failure to disclose to the parties the fact that she was a co-signatory
on an amicus brief with one of the parties’ experts result in vacatur of the award? How about if
the amicus engagement occurred after she had made her merits ruling and she had early on
explained her professional relationship with the expert? Petitioners Dixon Law and Eric Dixon
(jointly “Dixon”) think so and thus seek to vacate an arbitral award in a legal-malpractice case
under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), and the District of Columbia Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, D.C. Code § 16-4423. Respondents Eric Powell and Richard Gray
think otherwise, and they have the better of the argument. The Court will thus confirm the
award.
I. Background
A. Malpractice Dispute
Respondents Powell and Gray hired Petitioners to assist in the sale of their clothing
company. See ECF No. 8-1 (Engagement Agreement) at 1. Specifically, they wanted Dixon to
ensure that they held a valid, perfected security interest that would protect their ability to collect
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on the purchase price. See ECF Nos. 5-1 (Declaration of Eric Powell), ¶ 2; 5-2 (Declaration of
Richard Gray), ¶ 2. In their telling, Dixon instead obtained collateral that was either valueless or
not properly perfected due in part to filing errors. See ECF No. 5-3, Exh. 5 (Summary Disp.) at
23–24; Powell Decl., ¶ 2; Gray Decl., ¶ 2. The buyer never paid up, see Summary Disp. at 12–
16, so Powell and Gray sued Dixon for professional negligence in federal district court in
Colorado, where they alleged a “substantial part” of the events transpired. See ECF No. 5-3
(Declaration of Peter W. Ito), ¶ 2; Powell v. Dixon Law, LLC, No. 24-3318, ECF No. 1
(Compl.), ¶ 22 (D. Colo. Nov. 27, 2024). Dixon then moved to dismiss based on the arbitration
clause in their agreement, and Powell and Gray acquiesced. See Ito Decl., ¶ 3; see also
Engagement Agreement, ¶ 14.
In January 2025, the parties began binding arbitration before the Washington, D.C.,
office of JAMS (formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services), consistent with
their contract. See Ito Decl., ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 4 (Dixon Am. Pet.), ¶ 12; Engagement
Agreement, ¶ 14. Dixon proposed appointing retired federal bankruptcy judge Joan N. Feeney as
arbitrator, and Powell and Gray agreed. See Ito Decl., ¶ 4; Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 12; ECF No. 5-3,
Exh. 2 (Appointment of Arbitrator).
After briefing and discovery, see ECF No. 5-3, Exh. 4 (Scheduling Order); Dixon Am.
Pet., ¶ 13, Judge Feeney granted summary disposition in favor of Powell and Gray, see Summary
Disp. at 40–49, and held an evidentiary hearing on the damages amount. See Ito Decl., ¶ 15. On
November 4, 2025, she entered an interim award of $758,554, plus reasonable attorney fees,
costs, and disbursements. See ECF No. 5-3, Exh. 6 (Interim Award) at 31. Per her instructions,
Powell and Gray then moved for those remaining sums plus interest. See ECF No. 8-5 (Mot. for
Fees, Costs, and Disbursements) at 16; id. at 14 n.6 (referring to separate motion for interest).
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On April 27, 2026, Judge Feeney issued a final award of (1) $758,554 in damages; (2) $554,000
for attorney fees; (3) $108,322.97 for costs and disbursements; (4) $213,132.28 in prejudgment
interest; and (5) post-judgment interest to accrue until payment of the award. See ECF No. 5-3,
Exh. 7 (Final Award) at 14–15. She later corrected the amount of costs, adjusting it down to
$108,042.12 (about $300 less) in an amended award dated May 5, 2026. See id., Exh. 9 (Am.
Final Award) at 15. The Amended Final Award totaled $1,633,728.40. Id.
B. Disclosure Dispute
What matters more than those sums are the disclosures that Judge Feeney made during
the proceedings. At the outset, she completed a JAMS disclosure form in which she noted that
“JAMS neutrals regularly engage” in professional activities and that it was possible that someone
“connected with this proceeding” had overlapped with her at such events. See ECF No. 5-3,
Exh. 3 (Disclosures) at 3. Later, upon learning at the preliminary status conference that Powell
and Gray had retained professor and retired bankruptcy judge Bruce A. Markell as an expert
witness, Judge Feeney disclosed that she had interacted professionally with him in the past. See
Ito Decl., ¶¶ 6–7; Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 16; ECF No. 5-3, Exh. 10-A (Declaration of Joan N.
Feeney), ¶ 1; see also Scheduling Order at 1 (memorializing disclosure). She also declined an
invitation to participate in an upcoming panel with Judge Markell in light of the pending
arbitration. See ECF No. 8-3 (Webinar Correspondence) at 2.
Months later, on November 5, 2025 — the day after she issued the interim award —
Judge Feeney received an email from a professor asking her and three other retired bankruptcy
judges to join a brief as “named party amici” in a consumer-bankruptcy case before the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Feeney Decl., ¶ 3. Only after she expressed interest did she learn that Judge
Markell might sign on, too. Id. At that point, Judge Markell notified Powell and Gray’s counsel
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about the brief. Id.; ECF No. 8-4 (Amicus Correspondence). He also informed the professor of
his role in the arbitration, copying Judge Feeney on the email. See Feeney Decl., ¶ 3.
In late December, Dixon discovered the submitted brief through a Google search. See
Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 23; see also ECF No. 8-7 (Mot. to Disqualify), Exh. 5 (Amicus Brief).
Petitioners soon moved to disqualify Judge Feeney, alleging that she had failed to disclose “her
work with Judge Markell on the amicus brief” while “preparing to rule on the $750,000 fee and
costs requests (including Judge Markell’s fees) this week.” Mot. to Disqualify, ¶ 16. A member
of the National Arbitration Committee (NAC) ultimately recommended denial of the Motion,
writing in his report that “[t]here was no material contact between Feeney and Markell, and
Feeney made robust disclosures about her relationship with Markell early in the case.” ECF No.
5-3, Exh. 10 (Chernick Report) at ECF pp. 161–64. NAC adopted his recommendation, see id. at
ECF p. 162, and Judge Feeney went on to issue the final award.
Both parties timely filed suits with this Court, which consolidated the cases. See Minute
Order of May 19, 2026. Not surprisingly, Dixon seeks vacatur under the FAA and the D.C.
RUAA, while Powell and Gray request confirmation under the same. See generally Dixon Am.
Pet.; ECF No. 6 (Powell Mot.); see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10 (providing for judicial confirmation
and vacatur of arbitral awards); D.C. Code §§ 16-4422 to -4423 (same); Engagement Agreement,
¶ 12 (“Judgment on the award may be entered by any court of competent jurisdiction.”).
II. Legal Standard
In enacting the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., Congress “replace[d] judicial indisposition to
arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring it and placing arbitration agreements on equal footing
with all other contracts.’” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008)
(quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)) (cleaned up).
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The FAA establishes “an alternative to the complications of litigation,” Revere Copper & Brass
Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and provides for
“expedited judicial review to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards.” Hall St. Assocs.,
552 U.S. at 578.
The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that “judicial review of arbitral awards is
extremely limited.” Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
1991). “Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an
appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts.” Id. (quoting United Paperworkers
Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)); see also Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc.,
454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2006). All that is required is a “fundamentally fair” arbitral
hearing, Lessin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 481 F.3d 813, 816 (D.C. Cir.
2007), which in turn “requires only notice, opportunity to be heard and to present relevant and
material evidence and argument before the decision makers, and that the decision makers are not
infected with bias.” Howard Univ. v. Metro Campus Police Officer’s Union, 519 F. Supp. 2d 27,
39 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 512 F.3d 716 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A party seeking vacatur under any of
the FAA’s four limited grounds, see 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), must therefore “clear a high hurdle.”
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010). The D.C. RUAA
likewise contemplates “extremely limited” judicial review. Umana v. Swidler & Berlin,
Chartered, 745 A.2d 334, 339 (D.C. 2000).
III. Analysis
Petitioners principally argue that Judge Feeney’s failure to disclose her participation in
the amicus brief alongside Judge Markell satisfies the standards for “evident partiality” under
both the FAA and the D.C. RUAA, justifying vacatur of the arbitral award. See Dixon Am. Pet.,
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¶¶ 44–50 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) and D.C. Code §§ 16-4423(a), -4412(a)(1)–(2)). Apparently as
part of their “evident partiality” argument, they add that the “sheer magnitude” of the fees award
“further undermines confidence in the neutrality and fairness of the proceedings.” Id., ¶ 51; see
also id., ¶ 52 (“The failure to disclose also deprived Petitioners of a fundamentally fair
proceeding.”). In addition, Petitioners contend that D.C. Code § 4412 — which establishes
specific disclosure obligations distinct from § 4423(a)’s rule against evident partiality —
independently warrants vacatur. See ECF No. 8 (Dixon Am. Opp.) at 17. They mention
“misconduct,” too, see Dixon Am. Pet., ¶¶ 44–45, which can serve as a separate ground for
vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) and D.C. Code § 16-4423(a). As they invoke that issue
“obliquely” at best, the Court will deem it forfeited. White v. Four Seasons Hotel & Resorts,
244 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017).
A. Evident Partiality
As an initial matter, Dixon’s Amended Petition overlooks Circuit precedent on the
standard for evident partiality under the FAA. Petitioners invoke 9 U.S.C. § 10(a), which
authorizes vacatur of an award “where there was evident partiality . . . in the arbitrators,” among
other narrow circumstances. See Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 45. Relying on language from the majority
opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968),
Dixon argues that § 10(a) requires arbitrators to disclose any dealings that might “create an
impression of possible bias.” Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 46 (quoting Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S.
at 149). But the D.C. Circuit — citing the rule of Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)
— has instead applied the “narrower” standard advanced in the concurrence, under which
arbitrators have a duty to disclose only “significant interests in the parties,” Republic of
Argentina v. AWG Grp. LTD., 894 F.3d 327, 334 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2018), and challengers bear
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the burden of presenting “specific facts that indicate improper motives on the part of the
arbitrator.” Id. at 335; see Andresen v. Intepros Fed., Inc., 2024 WL 4164660, at *46 (D.D.C.
Sep. 12, 2024) (restating D.C. Circuit rule and rejecting alternative “reasonable person” test).
That is a “steep slope to climb” for challengers. Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 335.
True, an arbitrator who has a sporadic but lucrative business relationship with a party must
disclose that interest, on pain of potential vacatur. Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 146,
150. But she need not disclose “trivial” interests, even assuming that she has “full knowledge”
of them. Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 335. The D.C. Circuit has accordingly upheld
awards in cases where the arbitrator’s former law firm represented a party in an unrelated matter,
id. (discussing Al-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 682–84 (D.C. Cir. 1996)), and where the
arbitrator sat on the board of a company with large passive investments in a party to the
arbitration. Id. at 335–36. Evident partiality requires more.
The Court must acknowledge that it harbors some doubt that the D.C. Circuit in Republic
of Argentina properly characterized the holding of Commonwealth Coatings, given that the
concurring Justices in the latter case joined the Court’s opinion and did not purport to disagree
with it. See Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S at 150–52 (White, J., concurring) (joining Justice
Black’s opinion for the Court along with Justice Marshall and reframing rather than rejecting
majority’s standard); but see Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 334 (stating that “the Justices
could not agree on a single rationale” and calling Justice Black’s opinion a “plurality opinion”).
Dixon, however, does not advance that argument, and whatever test applies, the Court retains
discretion under the FAA to determine whether vacatur is proper. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)
(providing that reviewing court “may make an order vacating the award . . . where there was
evident partiality”) (emphasis added).
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The answer here is clear: Petitioners have not met their burden under either test. The
Court focuses its analysis on the D.C. Circuit standard while making clear that Petitioners would
not prevail under the majority’s rule in Commonwealth Coatings either.
First, the closest Petitioners come to alleging improper motive, as required by the D.C.
Circuit, is in claiming that one of Judge Feeney’s opinions “denigrat[ed] the opinions of
Petitioners’ expert in an unprofessional fashion,” Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 20 — but the relevant text
belies that characterization. See Summary Disp. at 47–48. In any event, an arbitrator’s
ostensibly “dismissive tone” is “insufficient evidence” of evident partiality. Andresen, 2024 WL
4164660, at *43.
Their better argument is that Judge Feeney had significant undisclosed interests in a
party, but that one does not hit the target either. Even assuming that dealings with experts can
qualify as “significant interests in the parties,” Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 334 (emphasis
added), Judge Feeney orally disclosed her professional acquaintance with Judge Markell as soon
as she learned of his involvement in the arbitration. While the parties dispute the details,
compare Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 16 (stating Judge Feeney disclosed that she “may have spoken with
[Judge Markell] at a conference”), with Powell Decl., ¶ 7 (casting Dixon’s description as
“misleading” and Judge Feeney’s disclosure as “clear and unequivocal”), Judge Feeney told
NAC under penalty of perjury that she “immediately disclosed” that she knew Judge Markell,
had participated in a webinar with him, was part of the same bankruptcy-related professional
associations, and saw him regularly at national conferences. See Feeney Decl., ¶ 1; see also
Powell Decl., ¶ 5 (stating that arbitrator disclosed she knew expert professionally and had
recently participated in panel with him); Gray Decl., ¶ 5 (same). At the time, Petitioners lodged
no objections. See ECF No. 5 (Powell Opp.) at 2 (noting Dixon’s counsel told Judge Feeney that
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Petitioners had no issues); Dixon Am. Opp. at 4 (not disputing this); see also Feeney Decl., ¶ 1
(“I asked counsel if they had any issue with my serving as arbitrator and recall counsel to
[Dixon] stated that they did not.”).
Even if Judge Feeney had not made such detailed disclosures, her relationship with Judge
Markell — including their joining the same amicus brief — would not warrant vacatur for
evident partiality. Mere professional acquaintance gives rise to a “trivial interest,” if any, which
is not sufficient to demand disclosure. Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 335; Feeney Decl., ¶ 1
n.1 (stating that most bankruptcy judges know each other and that she has “never socialized with
Professor Markell”); cf. Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 334 (framing some “business
relationship[s]” with money at stake as “trivial”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The amicus brief, moreover, did not transform what was at most a trivial interest into a
significant one. Indeed, if an arbitrator’s membership on the board of a company that had
invested more than two billion dollars in a party was not enough for the D.C. Circuit, see
Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d at 334, then an arbitrator’s and expert’s signatures on an amicus
brief authored by someone else and signed by six people is not enough here. Judges Feeney and
Markell say they did not even discuss the brief’s substance, much less collaborate on it. See
ECF No. 5-4 (Declaration of Bruce A. Markell), ¶¶ 15–16 (stating arbitrator and expert had “no
direct one-on-one communication” about the brief, “did not collaborate directly” on it, and “did
not discuss the content”); Feeney Decl., ¶ 3 (similar). Because the bare act of joining an amicus
brief creates neither a “significant interest[]” in a co-signatory, Republic of Argentina, 894 F.3d
at 334, nor an “impression of possible bias” such that the joiner “might reasonably be thought
biased” in favor of a co-signatory, Commonwealth Coatings, 393 U.S. at 149–150, Petitioners’
arguments based on evident partiality — and fundamental fairness generally — come up short.
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Dixon also misconstrues the D.C. RUAA’s parallel provision. Mirroring the FAA, albeit
in mandatory terms, D.C. Code § 16-4423(a) provides that a court “shall vacate an award made
in the arbitration proceeding if” there was “[e]vident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral arbitrator.” Dixon erroneously suggests — drawing on language from a different
provision discussed in more detail below, see D.C. Code § 16-4412 — that D.C.’s test for
“evident partiality” is whether an undisclosed relationship “would lead a reasonable person to
question the arbitrator’s impartiality.” Dixon Am. Pet., ¶ 47. In fact, however, D.C. courts ask
whether a relationship “give[s] rise to a sense of loyalty to one side of the dispute” or is “so
intimate — personally, socially, professionally, or financially — as to cast serious doubt on an
arbitrator’s impartiality.” C.R. Calderon Constr., Inc. v. Grunley Constr. Co., 257 A.3d 1046,
1056 (D.C. 2021) (cleaned up); see also id. (“[C]lose personal relationships are much more
problematic than professional interconnections.”). As with the D.C. Circuit standard, challengers
must show “specific facts” that “indicate improper motives on the part of the arbitrator.”
Umana, 745 A.2d at 340 (quoting Celtech, Inc. v. Broumand, 584 A.2d 1257, 1259 (D.C. 1991)).
Because Dixon has not done so here, and because signing an amicus brief does not by itself
create a “sense of loyalty” to a co-signatory, Calderon, 257 A.3d at 1056 (cleaned up), vacatur
for evident partiality is neither required nor appropriate under the D.C. RUAA. Any further
substantive review is beyond the scope of this Court’s “extremely limited” role under both
federal and D.C. law. Kanuth, 949 F.2d at 1178; Umana, 745 A.2d at 339.
B. D.C. Code § 16-4412
To the extent that Petitioners have adequately invoked D.C. Code § 16-4412 as an
alternative ground, that argument founders, too. The provision states, in pertinent part, that a
prospective arbitrator must make a “reasonable inquiry” and “disclose . . . any known facts that a
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reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator,” including an
“existing or past relationship with . . . a witness.” Once appointed, arbitrators have a continuing
obligation to disclose such information. See § 16-4412(b). If they disclose it and a party objects,
or if they fail to disclose it entirely, a court “may” vacate an award. See §§ 16-4412(c)–(d).
In this context, then, the Court has discretion to determine whether an “existing or past
relationship . . . with a witness” should result in vacatur. See §§ 16-4412(a)(2), (b)–(d); see
Calderon, 257 A.3d at 1053 (“The statute describes in general terms disclosures that should be
made, but it also makes clear that some failures to disclose will not require the court to vacate the
award.”). As described above, Judge Feeney’s initial disclosures put Dixon on notice that she
had interacted with Judge Markell in professional settings. The judges’ independent decisions to
sign onto the amicus brief did not step up their relationship so significantly as to require a
supplemental disclosure, particularly given that they did not author the brief, collaborate on it, or
discuss its content. While disclosure might still have been wise, Judge Feeney’s silence no more
warrants vacatur under D.C. Code § 16-4412 than it does under the evident-partiality provisions
of the FAA and the D.C. RUAA.
Confirmation of the award is therefore required. Under the FAA, a court reviewing an
arbitral award “must” confirm it “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected” as
prescribed by the statute. See 9 U.S.C. § 9. Similarly, the D.C. RUAA provides that a court
“shall issue a confirming order unless the award” is modified, corrected, or vacated pursuant to
the Act. See D.C. Code § 16-4422. Because the Court will deny the Petition to Vacate, it will
grant Respondents’ Motion to Confirm.
* * *
As to Respondents’ other requests, see Powell Opp. at 40–42, 44, the Court will exercise
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its discretion under the D.C. RUAA not to award attorney fees and costs incurred after entry of
the final award. Respondents invoke D.C. Code § 16-4225(c), which provides that a court “may
add reasonable attorney’s fees . . . incurred” by the prevailing party in a contested judicial
proceeding following arbitration. See also D.C. Code § 16-4225(b) (similar for costs). The
decision “depends on equitable considerations and is committed to the trial court’s sound
discretion”; relevant factors include “the potential merit of the losing party’s arguments and the
losing party’s motivation in making those arguments.” Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hagenberg,
167 A.3d 1218, 1233–34 (D.C. 2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To be sure,
Petitioners have arguably made mountains out of molehills. Even so, their argument that Judge
Feeney should have disclosed the amicus brief is not utterly meritless and does not appear to
have been made in bad faith. The Court will therefore decline to award fees and costs beyond
those already reflected in the arbitral award.
It will, however, grant pre-judgment interest “consistent with the underlying arbitration
award.” Cont’l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 932 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164
(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 603 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also LLC SPC Stileks v. Republic of
Moldova, 985 F.3d 871, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (following this approach without expressly
adopting it); Burlington Ins. Co. v. Okie Dokie, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 147, 159 (D.D.C. 2005)
(“[C]ourts usually award prejudgment interest absent some justification for withholding such an
award.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The arbitrator awarded prejudgment interest “in
accordance with the provisions of Colorado law,” so this Court will order that Petitioners pay
Respondents the interest that has accrued from the date of the Final Award (not the Amended
Final Award, which adjusted only costs) to this day pursuant to C.R.S. § 5-12-102(1)(b), at the
rate of eight percent, compounded annually. See Final Award at 14–15; Am. Final Award at 14–
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15. In addition, this Court will award post-judgment interest at the rate specified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961. See Archirodon Constr. (Overseas) Co. v. Gen. Co. for Ports of Iraq, 2024 WL 341066,
at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2024).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Dixon’s First Amended Petition to Vacate
the Arbitration Award and grant Powell and Gray’s Motion to Confirm the Amended Arbitration
Award. It will also order Powell and Gray to submit an interest calculation and an updated
proposed form of judgment.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: September 2, 2026
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