Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 2, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D26-0791
Lower Tribunal No. 21-15424 D002
S.C.T.A., a Grandmother,
Appellant,
vs.
Department of Children and Families, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos Guzman, Judge.
Young Center for Immigrant Children's Rights and Gregory L. Smith (New York, NY), and Jane M. Liu (Chicago, IL), Carlton Fields, P.A., and Joseph H. Lang, Jr., and Jason T. Long (Tampa), for appellant.
Sarah Todd Weitz, and Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, and Laura J. Lee (Tallahassee), for appellee the Guardian ad Litem; Karla Perkins, and Stephanie C. Zimmerman (Bradenton), for appellee Department of Children and Families.
Before MILLER, LOBREE, and GOODEN, JJ.
MILLER, J.
UPON APPELLEES’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS APPEAL
Appellees, the Department of Children and Families and the Guardian
ad Litem, have moved to dismiss an appeal filed by appellant, S.C.T.A., the
paternal grandmother of six-year-old I.D.T.M. Appellees assert alternative
grounds for dismissal, all of which focus on the justiciability of the underlying
appeal. We deny the requested relief.
I
I.D.T.M. was born in Honduras in May 2020. After his birth, he resided
with S.C.T.A. and his parents. In November 2020, the family fled Honduras,
purportedly to escape targeted violence. They settled in Mexico.
In May 2021, I.D.T.M.’s mother took him to the United States. When
I.D.T.M.’s father attempted to join them, he was detained and deported to
Honduras.
Three months later, the Department obtained custody of I.D.T.M. By
the end of the year, the circuit court terminated both parents’ parental rights
and placed I.D.T.M. with paternal relatives in Florida. S.C.T.A. traveled to
the United States seeking to obtain custody of I.D.T.M. She rented an
apartment complying with the Department’s home study requirements and
submitted an adoption application. Meanwhile, the Department moved
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I.D.T.M. to nonrelative foster care, and his caregivers filed an adoption
application.
The Adoption Applicant Review Committee (“AARC”) reviewed the
competing adoption applications. In June 2025, despite finding that S.C.T.A.
was fit to adopt her grandson, AARC recommended that the Department
deny her application and instead grant that of the nonrelative caregivers.
The following month, the Department formally denied S.C.T.A.’s application.
In August 2025, S.C.T.A. timely moved for review under section
39.812(4)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2025), in the circuit court, alleging that the
Department deviated from its own policies by applying an obsolete version
of chapter 65C of the Florida Administrative Code in denying her application.
She specifically contended the Department refused to consider her
“preferred relative” status in weighing the respective adoption applications.
This factor was statutorily barred from consideration at the inception of
AARC’s review but required for consideration before the Department denied
S.C.T.A.’s application. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(c) (eff. June
10, 2025) (“Relative. Consideration must be given to whether an applicant
is a relative as defined in s. 39.01, F.S.”); § 39.01(76), Fla. Stat. (2025) (the
term “relative” includes grandparents).
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In November 2025, the circuit court conducted a two-day evidentiary
hearing on S.C.T.A.’s review motion. Three months later, the court rendered
a written order denying the motion. S.C.T.A. timely moved for rehearing,
contending that the order failed to address the fundamental issue of whether
the Department disregarded its own policies in reviewing and denying her
adoption application. S.C.T.A. further raised constitutional challenges to the
scope of judicial review afforded under section 39.812(4)(b), as amended as
of July 1, 2024, which eliminated the right to full judicial review of
administrative action under chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
On March 18, 2026, the circuit court denied rehearing. Before the
permissible appellate window lapsed, the trial court finalized the nonrelative
caregivers’ adoption of I.D.T.M. without first providing notice to S.C.T.A.
S.C.T.A. timely appealed the denial of her review motion to this court and
separately filed a petition in the circuit court seeking to vacate the adoption.
That petition remains pending.
II
A
The Department contends the appeal is moot because I.D.T.M. has
been adopted by his nonrelative caregivers. It posits that though section
39.013(2), Florida Statutes (2025), confers jurisdiction on the circuit court
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when an initial shelter, dependency, or termination of parental rights petition
is filed or a child is taken into custody, section 39.812(4), Florida Statutes,
divests the court of that jurisdiction upon the finalization of an adoption. See
id. (“The court shall retain jurisdiction over any child placed in the custody of
the department until the child is adopted.”). We are not persuaded that the
mere fact that the adoption was finalized during the appellate window stands
as an impenetrable barrier to further review.
The Florida Supreme Court has “defined an issue as moot when the
controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have
no actual effect.” Casiano v. State, 310 So. 3d 910, 913 (Fla. 2021) (quoting
Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). And here, there remains pending a parallel proceeding to nullify
the adoption. Irrespective, it is long-established that an exception to
mootness arises where an appeal raises a question of great public
importance, the issue is likely to recur yet evading review, or collateral legal
consequences affecting the rights of a party stem from the decision. See
Godwin, 593 So. 2d at 212. In these proceedings, S.C.T.A. has raised a
colorable claim that the Department deviated from longstanding, binding
legal principles and the public policy of this state in adversely deciding her
application, curtailing her right to due process by stymieing her access to
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judicial resources, and finalizing the competing adoption petition without
affording her notice, and, in so doing, created a scenario wherein she is now
deprived of any opportunity to even engage in visitation with her grandson.
In our view, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy the exception. See
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 690 So. 2d 689,
691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“The agency must apply the law in effect at the
time it makes its final decision.”); E.J. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 219 So. 3d
946, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Florida follows the general rule that ‘a change
in a licensure statute that occurs during the pendency of the application for
licensure is operative as to the application, so that the law as changed, rather
than as it existed at the time the application was filed, determines whether
the license should be granted.’” (citations omitted)); see also § 39.5085, Fla.
Stat. (2025) (establishing the Relative Caregiver Program and recognizing
unique role of supporting relatives); Fla. Admin. Code R. 65C-16.002(5)(c)
(eff. June 10, 2025) (“Consideration must be given to whether an applicant
is a relative as defined in s. 39.01, F.S.”); R. 65C-16.002 (eff. July 20, 2023–
June 9, 2025) (“Cultural values and traditions are more likely to be passed
on to those who have a shared history with extended family. Consideration
must be given to the quality of the relationship with a relative seeking to adopt
a child. Some children will already know and trust the relative seeking to
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adopt. If not, the willingness of the relative to participate in pre-placement
activities to promote the development of a relationship must be
considered.”); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 429 So. 2d 699, 703–04
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (“[T]he strong public policy which exists in this state in
favor of the natural family unit” and “the strong public policy of this state
which favors the establishment and continuity of family units” (citation
omitted)), approved, 460 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1984); LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So.
3d 570, 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (recognizing Florida’s “strong public policy
in favor of the natural family unit”).
B
Invoking section 39.812, Florida Statutes, the Department further
contends that S.C.T.A. lacks standing to pursue her appeal. Section
39.812(4)(b)3. provides, in relevant part, “[a] denied applicant only has
standing under this chapter to file a motion to review the department’s denial
and to present evidence in support of such motion.” But the statute further
states, “[s]uch standing is terminated upon the entry of the court’s order.” Id.
We must harmonize these provisions with the constitutional right of the
people of our state to seek review of final judgments or orders from the trial
courts. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (“District courts of appeal shall have
jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final
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judgments or orders of trial courts . . . .”); Bain v. State, 730 So. 2d 296, 299
(Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (“[A]ll final orders are appealable as a matter of right.”);
Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress
of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay.”); see also In re J.B., 101 So. 3d 407, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“When
jurisdiction exists under the constitution, the legislature cannot impose a
limitation on that jurisdiction.” (citing State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 664
(Fla. 2000))); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla.
2005) (“While we review decisions striking state statutes de novo, we are
obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to
construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever
possible.”); Gray v. Cent. Fla. Lumber Co., 140 So. 320, 323 (Fla. 1932) (If
a statute “admits of two interpretations, one of which would lead to its
constitutionality and the other to its unconstitutionality, the former rather than
the latter must be adopted.”). In this context, the review that occurred below
was evidentiary in nature. The trial court therefore served in a factfinding
rather than a purely appellate capacity.1 In light of this posture and the
1
See § 39.013(4), Fla. Stat. (“[I]f the court has terminated jurisdiction, the order may be subsequently modified by a court of competent jurisdiction in any other civil action or proceeding affecting placement of, access to, parental time with, adoption of, or parental rights and responsibilities for the same minor child.”); but see C.V. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. Servs., 19 So.
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aforementioned constitutional guarantees, we do not construe the language
of the statute as compromising our own jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 1, Fla.
Const. (“The judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts
of appeal, circuit courts and county courts.”); Progressive Select Ins. Co. v.
Bunsee, 380 So. 3d 1287, 1289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (Tanenbaum, J.,
dissenting) (“Finality instead must refer to the conclusive exercise of judicial
power on a claim . . . .”). And regardless, S.C.T.A. has, at a minimum, raised
a plausible claim of entitlement to relief in certiorari. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3),
Fla. Const. (“A district court of appeal may issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and other writs necessary to the
complete exercise of its jurisdiction.”).
C
We similarly reject the additional argument that section 63.182(1),
Florida Statutes bars this appeal. That statute of repose extinguishes actions
“to vacate, set aside, or otherwise nullify a judgment of adoption or an
underlying judgment terminating parental rights.” § 63.182(1), Fla. Stat. This
appeal challenges only the order denying the motion for review under section
3d 381, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (grandparents “are not parties and do not have standing to appeal” certain placement orders).
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39.812(4), not the adoption judgment itself. The statute is therefore
inapplicable.
In closing, we are mindful of the lauded interest in achieving
permanency for I.D.T.M. See §39.621(1), Fla. Stat. (“Time is of the essence
for permanency of children in the dependency system.”); S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Child. & Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 782–83 (Fla. 2016) (“[T]here is a strong
policy incentive in achieving permanency for children in care as quickly as
possible.”). We therefore separately impose an expedited briefing schedule.
Motions denied.
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