UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOHN XAVIER GEORGE ANAYA, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 25-1253 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 34, 45
:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND COMPLAINT
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff John Xavier George Anaya (“Mr. Anaya”), proceeding pro se, filed suit against
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”). Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1. Mr. Anaya seeks to compel the DOJ, and its constituent
agencies, to investigate and prosecute officials, judges, and employees from Napa County,
California for purported unlawful disclosure of his identity as a Confidential Human Source
(“CHS”), and for purported retaliation after he came forward with allegations of widespread
corruption across the county. Id. at 15–16. Mr. Anaya then filed an Amended Complaint, which
the Court construes as a motion seeking leave to amend, alleging that the DOJ had also failed to
enforce a number of federal criminal statutes. Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 34. The DOJ moves to
dismiss Mr. Anaya’s original Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
because Mr. Anaya has failed to establish an entitlement to mandamus relief, or in the
alternative, that Mr. Anaya has failed to state a cognizable claim under the APA, or any other
statute in his complaint. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5–6, ECF No. 45.
The Court agrees. First, Mr. Anaya has failed to establish that the Government owes him
a clear duty to act, both under the Mandamus Act and the APA, and therefore such claims must
be dismissed. Second, even though the Court construes Mr. Anaya’s filing of his Amended
Complaint as seeking leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), it, too,
must be dismissed, as it is futile.
II. BACKGROUND
Mr. Anaya claims to be a former CHS. Compl. at 9. He claims to have provided
information for a number of federal agencies before being deactivated in 2010. Id. Mr. Anaya
believes his past activities as a CHS put him in a uniquely vulnerable position, open to retaliation
by criminal groups. Id. Mr. Anaya contends that his spouse, along with government agencies and
non-profits in Napa County, conspired to suppress his complaints of corruption within the county
and then retaliated against him. Id. at 9–11. Mr. Anaya’s complaints of impropriety include the
hiring of his wife, Jessica Marie Lopez Anaya, a former case manager for a halfway house in San
Diego, who he alleges has close ties with criminal groups in California and Mexico. Id. at 11–12.
He alleges that county officials have willfully ignored Mrs. Lopez Anaya’s criminal associations
and conspired to expose his identity as a CHS, placing him in danger, and depriving him of
custody of his son. Id. at 14–15.
Mr. Anaya’s Complaint expresses his frustration with the lack of investigative and
prosecutorial work done on the part of local and federal law enforcement. Id. at 15. He asks this
Court to compel the DOJ to enforce certain federal statutes (i.e., the Privacy Act, the False
Claims Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 1513) under the Mandamus Act and the APA. Compl. at 1–2; Am.
Compl. at 1. In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Anaya also seeks that the DOJ enforce alleged
violations of numerous other federal criminal statutes. Am. Compl. at 1.
2
He filed various miscellaneous motions with this Court after the original filing of his
complaint in April 2025.1 Thereafter, in April 2026, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act or the federal-question
statute, or alternatively, that Mr. Anaya failed to state a claim under the APA. Def.’s Mot.
Dismiss at 5–6. The motion is now ripe for this Court’s consideration.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff “bears the burden of
establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Gammill v. United States Dep’t of
Educ., 989 F. Supp. 2d 118, 120 (D.D.C. 2013). “In evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court may consider materials outside the pleadings but must accept all of the factual allegations
in the complaint as true.” Turboven Co. v. Smith, 811 F. Supp. 3d 176, 180 (D.D.C. 2025)
(citation modified).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The alleged factual statements are presumed to be true. See
Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
1
See Pl.’s Mot. for Declaratory J., ECF No. 12 (withdrawn); Pl.’s Mot. to Seal Case, ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, ECF No. 16; Pl.’s Mot. for Inj., ECF No. 17; Pl.’s Mot. to Seal Case, ECF No. 18; Pl.’s Mot. for Misc. Relief, ECF No. 23; Pl.’s Mot. for Misc. Relief, ECF No. 24; Pl.’s Mot. to Withdraw, ECF No. 28; Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File, ECF No. 29; Pl.’s Mot. to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 30; Pl.’s Mot. to Consolidate Cases, ECF No. 35; Pl.’s Mot. to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 38; Pl.’s Mot. for Inj., ECF No. 40; Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, ECF No. 42; Pl.’s Mot. to Take Judicial Notice, ECF No. 52; Pl.’s Mot. Leave to File, ECF No. 53; Pl.’s Mot. for Order, ECF No. 61.
3
that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is
facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that “allow[s] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Hurd v. D.C.,
Gov’t, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798
F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Williams v. Wilkie, 320 F.
Supp. 3d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mr. Anaya’s Complaint
Mr. Anaya brings this action under the Mandamus Act and the APA to compel the
Government to investigate and prosecute local officials, judges, prosecutors, and law
enforcement in Napa County, California. Compl. at 14–15. He claims to be a former CHS,
alleging that Napa County personnel have retaliated against him, and that the federal
Government has failed to intervene and prevent this purported retaliation. Id. at 2, 9–10.
Similarly, he asserts that the Government has delayed in “addressing CHS safety concerns” in
violation of the APA. Id. at 2. The Government, on the other hand, asserts that the Complaint
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Mr. Anaya fails to establish the threshold
requirements for mandamus relief, or, in the alternative, that his APA claim should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim because he has not alleged that the Government has a clear duty to act.
Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5–6. The Court agrees. Because government agencies have broad
prosecutorial discretion, Mr. Anaya has failed to establish that the Government owes him a clear
duty to enforce certain federal statutes, investigate alleged violations thereof, and prosecute any
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violations found, thereby failing one of the threshold requirements for mandamus relief. Mr.
Anaya’s APA claim fails for the same reason.
1. Mr. Anaya’s Mandamus Claim
First, Mr. Anaya has not shown an entitlement to the writ of mandamus. The Mandamus
Act allows district courts to entertain suits seeking to compel an officer or employee of the
United States, or any of its agencies, to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A
district court may grant mandamus relief if “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the
defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no adequate remedy available to the plaintiff.”
In re Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation modified).
“These three threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a court must dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir.
2016). “Even when the legal requirements for mandamus jurisdiction have been satisfied,
however, a court may grant relief only when it finds compelling equitable grounds.” Id. (quoting
In Re Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d at 10).
Here, Mr. Anaya has not shown that the Government owes him a “clear and certain duty
to act.” West v. Jackson, 538 F. Supp. 2d 12, 22 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing N. States Power Co. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “Mandamus is only available where
‘the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory and clearly
defined.’” Id. (quoting 13th Reg’l Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 654 F.2d 758, 760 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)). “A ministerial duty is one that admits of no discretion, so that the official in question
has no authority to determine whether to perform the duty.” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 977
(D.C. Cir. 1996). And there is a presumption that an agency’s refusal to take enforcement steps is
discretionary and not reviewable by the judiciary. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985);
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see also Kidwell v. F.B.I., 813 F. Supp. 2d 21, 28 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing plaintiffs’
Mandamus claim against the FBI and DOJ because the agencies’ decisions not to investigate or
prosecute alleged crimes were committed to their discretion). That presumption can be rebutted,
however, “where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in
exercising its enforcement powers.” Chaney, 470 U.S at 833.
Mr. Anaya appears to argue that, under the Privacy Act, the False Claims Act, and 18
U.S.C. § 1513(e), the Government has an obligation to safeguard CHS-related information from
disclosure by third parties and to prevent third-party retaliation against CHSs.2 See Compl. 2–4.
None of these statutes, however, place a clear duty on the Government to do so.
a. Privacy Act3
The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, “regulate[s] the collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of information,” maintained by federal agencies. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618
(2004). “The Act gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their records.” Id. Section
552a(i) imposes criminal penalties for violations of the Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i). Any officer
or agency employee “shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined” if that individual (1) willfully
discloses protected records, (2) willfully maintains a system of records in violation of the notice
2
Mr. Anaya does not allege that the DOJ or any other agency disclosed any information that revealed his status as a former CHS. Rather, he appears to argue that the Government should be prosecuting third parties for purportedly revealing such information.
3
Mr. Anaya also bases his claim on the Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”), alleging that these principles require “data minimization, use limitation, and security safeguards to prevent harm to individuals.” Compl. at 4. The FIPPs, however, originated as recommendations in a report from an advisory committee of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Congress relied on these principles when drafting the Privacy Act. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Off. of Privacy and Civil Liberties, Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/introduction (last visited June 20, 2026). Because the FIPPs are not independent, enforced policies, Mr. Anaya’s arguments for relief under the FIPPs are necessarily subsumed into his Privacy Act claims.
6
requirements under subsection (e)(4), or (3) knowingly and willfully obtains any records under
false pretenses. Id. This language, however, does not overcome the presumption of prosecutorial
discretion on behalf of the Government. That is, it provides no guidelines for an agency to follow
in deciding whether to initiate enforcement activity. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833. Rather, the
statute outlines what Congress considers to be a violation of the Act and indicates what
punishment is appropriate for such violations. Nor is there any other language within the Act that
provides a meaningful standard for judging the agency’s abuse of discretion. See id. at 830
(holding that “[judicial] review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have
no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion”). Therefore,
Mr. Anaya has not rebutted the presumption that enforcement decisions concerning the Privacy
Act are committed exclusively to the agency’s discretion. 4
b. False Claims Act
The False Claims Act imposes civil liability on “any person who . . . knowingly presents,
or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the
government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). The Act also imposes liability for retaliating against
certain individuals who attempt to assist in stopping violations of the Act. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(h). It further provides that the “Attorney General diligently shall investigate a violation
under section 3729,” and “[i]f the Attorney General finds that a person has violated or is
violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action . . . against the person.” Id.
§ 3730(a) (emphasis added).
4
Moreover, the Privacy Act does not govern the actions of third parties. As noted, infra p. 11, Mr. Anaya fails to allege that any government agent or employee unlawfully disclosed his information; rather, he alleges only that third parties have done so.
7
According to Mr. Anaya, he has “insider information” related to the practice of local
Napa County non-profit organizations; he asserts that such organizations are “working in tandem
to manipulate funding from grants by abusing the machinery of justice” and “extorting money
out of victims by erroneous and malicious acts” such as “stack[ing] the jury.” Compl. at 9–10.
But such allegations are insufficient as they “tender naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement,” and are thus not entitled to the usual presumption of truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other words, Mr. Anaya has not plausibly alleged that any entity or
individual has violated the False Claims Act such that the Government was required to
“diligently . . . investigate” any such violations. § 3730(a).
Regardless, the False Claims Act’s statutory language does not overcome the
presumption that enforcement decisions under the Act are committed to agency discretion. In
Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., another court in this District considered whether
the Government’s decision about whether to proceed in qui tam actions brought under the False
Claims Act was an action committed to agency discretion. 968 F. Supp. 2d 176, 183 (D.D.C.
2013), aff'd, No. 1:12-CV-01246-JDB, 2014 WL 2178705 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2014). The
plaintiff there had provided the Government with, in the plaintiff’s view, indisputable evidence
that a third party had committed fraud against the federal government. Id. at 182. The plaintiff
argued that federal agencies could not lawfully fail to act in qui tam actions filed by the plaintiff,
either by intervening pursuant to the False Claims Act or taking other appropriate action. Id.
Relying on Chaney, the court held that the Government’s decision not to prosecute or
enforce the False Claims Act was not reviewable under the APA. Id. The court explained that
multiple provisions of the Act afforded the Government prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 183
(citing § 3730(a) (“[T]he Attorney General may bring a civil action.” (emphasis added)); and 31
8
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (“The Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the action.”
(emphasis added)). Therefore, even if the government had made “an affirmative finding that a
False Claims Act violation had occurred or was occurring,” the Act “did not require the
government to bring a civil action itself.” Id.; see also Borzilleri v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms.,
24 F.4th 32, 43 (1st Cir. 2022) (“It would be odd to have courts micromanage government
investigations when [the False Claims Act] also provides that the government ultimately has
discretion whether to pursue any false claims that it identifies through those investigations.”).
Mr. Anaya’s mandamus claim premised on the Act thus fails. Mr. Anaya has not plausibly
alleged a violation of the Act nor is there a nondiscretionary duty requiring the Government to
bring a False Claims Act enforcement action.
c. 18 U.S.C. § 1513
Section 1513 “provid[es] for criminal sanctions for retaliation against anyone giving
truthful information to law enforcement officers relating to the commission of any federal
offense.” Garvey v. Admin Rev. Bd., United State Dep’t of Lab., 56 F.4th 110, 117 (D.C. Cir.
2022). Section 1513(e) states that violators “shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 10
years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e). The statute thus defines prohibited conduct and prescribes the
penalties that may be imposed upon conviction. It does not, however, direct the Government to
investigate every alleged violation or initiate a prosecution upon receiving a complaint or
determining that a violation has occurred. That is, § 1513(e) supplies no meaningful standard
against which a court may assess the Government’s enforcement decisions and therefore does not
overcome the presumption that prosecutorial decisions are committed to agency discretion. See
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830–33; see also Cassaday v. Verizon Inc., No. 25-CV-9251 (LTS), 2025
WL 3282299, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025) (dismissing plaintiff’s § 1513 claim because
9
“prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions”). Because Mr. Anaya has
not plausibly alleged that § 1513(e) imposes a clear duty on the Government to investigate or
prosecute alleged violations, it cannot support mandamus relief.
***
In sum, none of the statutes Mr. Anaya invokes—the Privacy Act, the False Claims Act,
or 18 U.S.C. § 1513—provides a meaningful standard that constrains the Government’s
enforcement discretion in this matter. The presumption of prosecutorial discretion therefore
remains unrebutted, and the Government owes Mr. Anaya no clear, nondiscretionary duty to
investigate or prosecute the alleged violations contained in the Complaint. Absent such a duty,
Mr. Anaya cannot satisfy a threshold requirement for mandamus relief, and his claim must be
dismissed.
2. Mr. Anaya’s APA Claim
Second, Mr. Anaya’s APA claim fails for essentially the same reason as his mandamus
claim. He alleges that the Government has unreasonably delayed “addressing CHS safety
concerns,” Compl. at 2, in violation of § 555(b) of the APA, which requires agencies to conclude
matters presented to them “within a reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b); see also Compl. at 2.
The APA authorizes courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). But “the governing standards under § 706(1) of the APA and the
Mandamus Act are essentially the same.” Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Mnuchin,
No. 20-cv-01136 (APM), 2020 WL 2331774, at *4 (D.D.C. May 11, 2020) (citation modified);
see also Ramirez v. Blinken, 594 F. Supp. 3d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2022) (“The standards for
challenging agency inaction under the APA and the Mandamus Act are the same.”).
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Accordingly, relief under § 706(1) is available only where an agency has failed to take a discrete
action that it is legally required to take. Arabzada v. Donis, 725 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2024).
As explained above, neither the Privacy Act, the False Claims Act, nor 18 U.S.C. § 1513
imposes a nondiscretionary duty on the Government to investigate5 or prosecute the alleged
violations in Mr. Anaya’s Complaint. Because those statutes do not require the Government to
take the discrete enforcement action Mr. Anaya seeks to compel, he cannot state a claim under
§ 706(1). His APA claim therefore must be dismissed.
3. Mr. Anaya’s Claim under the Privacy Act
Finally, to the extent Mr. Anaya asserts an independent claim under the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a, that claim also fails. As noted, “[t]he Privacy Act of 1974 . . . contains a
comprehensive and detailed set of requirements for the management of confidential records held
by Executive Branch agencies.” F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 287 (2012). The Act authorizes
an aggrieved individual to bring a civil action against an agency for certain violations. See 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). But to state a claim for damages under the Privacy Act, “a plaintiff must
plead actual—that is, pecuniary or material—harm.” Wellborn v. IRS, 218 F. Supp. 3d 64, 82
(D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified). Conclusory allegations are insufficient; rather, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege calculable damages resulting from the alleged violation. Id.
Mr. Anaya has not done so. He does not allege facts showing that the Government
unlawfully disclosed records protected by the Privacy Act, nor does he plausibly allege that he
suffered actual, pecuniary harm as a result of any such disclosure. Although he references that he
5
As to the False Claims Act specifically, the Complaint does not plausibly allege a violation of the Act such that the Government was required to “diligently . . . investigate” that conduct. See supra pp. 7–8. And, in any event, “the truth or falsity of [the] allegations do not curtail the discretion of the government to decide how to enforce the False Claims Act.” Davis, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
11
has been “bankrupted,” he does not allege facts connecting that injury to any purported Privacy
Act violation. Compl. at 15. Accordingly, he has failed to state a claim for damages under the
Act.
Nor is injunctive relief available. The Privacy Act authorizes injunctive relief only in two
limited circumstances: actions to amend agency records and actions to obtain access to agency
records. Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Organizations v. Dep’t of Lab., 778 F. Supp. 3d
56, 79 (D.D.C. 2025). Mr. Anaya seeks neither form of relief. Accordingly, to the extent the
Complaint asserts an independent claim under the Privacy Act, that claim must be dismissed.
B. Mr. Anaya’s Amended Complaint
Lastly, the Court turns to Mr. Anaya’s Amended Complaint. Courts must construe pro se
filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court will therefore
interpret Mr. Anaya’s filing of the Amended Complaint as any necessary motion seeking leave to
amend the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
However, the Court denies Mr. Anaya’s motion because he fails to defeat the
presumption of prosecutorial discretion. The arguments made by the Government in its original
motion to dismiss apply equally here. Mr. Anaya’s Amended Complaint suffers from the same
fundamental deficiency as his original pleading. Although he has abandoned his APA claim, he
continues to seek mandamus relief based on the assertion that several federal criminal statutes—
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349, 1513(e), 2339B, and 1621—impose a mandatory duty on the
Government to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of those statutes. Pl.’s Am. Compl. at
1. The Court has already rejected that theory as to § 1513(e), concluding that its language does
not overcome the presumption of prosecutorial discretion in this matter. See supra pp. 9–10. The
remaining statutes are no different.
12
Those statutes criminalize certain conduct and impose certain forms of punishment. See
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (prohibiting the use of the mail to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud and
imposing a term of imprisonment and/or a fine); id. § 1343 (prohibiting wire fraud and imposing
a term of imprisonment and/or a fine); id. § 1349 (prohibiting attempts and conspiracies to
commit certain fraud offenses); id. § 1621 (prohibiting perjury and imposing a term of
imprisonment and/or a fine); id. § 2339B (prohibiting knowingly providing material support or
resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization and imposing a term of imprisonment
and/or a fine). But none contains mandatory language requiring the Government to bring an
enforcement action under specified circumstances.6
The presumption of prosecutorial discretion thus remains unrebutted. See Chaney, 470
U.S. at 835; Wood v. Herman, 104 F. Supp. 2d 43, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2000). Therefore, Mr. Anaya’s
Amended Complaint would be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Mandamus Act because it, too, does not show that the DOJ owes Mr. Anaya a clear duty to act.
The Court thus declines to grant Mr. Anaya’s leave to amend.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 45) is GRANTED;
and the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 34) is DENIED. All other remaining
pending motions (ECF Nos. 15–18, 23–24, 28–30, 35, 38, 40, 42, 52–53, 61–62) are DENIED
6
Although § 2339B(e) states that “[t]he Attorney General shall conduct any investigation of a possible violation of this section,” § 2339B(e), the Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege any such “possible violation”—that is, allegations that a person or entity “knowingly provide[d] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[ed] or conspire[d] to do so,” § 2339B(a)(1). See Am. Compl. at 9–10 (stating in general, conclusory terms that Napa County officials supported the Sinaloa Cartel); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and a complaint does not suffice “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (citation modified)).
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AS MOOT. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued.
Dated: September 2, 2026 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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