IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-852
Filed 2 September 2026
Pender County, Nos. 23CR235898-700, 23CR234589-700
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIAM ANDREW BENSON
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 20 November 2024 by Judge
Ricardo Jensen in Pender County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
August 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Kayla D. Britt,
for the State-Appellee.
Johneric C. Emehel for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant William Andrew Benson appeals from judgments entered upon a
jury’s verdicts of guilty of two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense and two
counts of indecent liberties with a child. Defendant argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no error.
I. Background
Defendant was indicted for various sexual offenses on 20 May 2023, and the
case proceeded to trial on two counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense and two
STATE V. BENSON
Opinion of the Court
counts of indecent liberties with a child.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show: Defendant is the great-uncle
to Vanessa, who was approximately 12 years old in the fall of 2022 when she began
therapy.1 During a therapy session in January or early February of 2023, Vanessa
told her therapist she had dreamed Defendant had touched her inappropriately; she
wrote on a piece of paper that Defendant “touched her on her vagina, and stuck his
fingers inside of her and took them out and licked his fingers.” During her next
therapy session, Vanessa said that she had been afraid of telling her therapist the
truth, the allegations she made about Defendant were not a dream, and Defendant
had touched her inappropriately in real life. Vanessa’s therapist contacted her
parents, the Pender County Sheriff’s Office, and Pender County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”).
On 12 February 2023, a detective with the Pender County Sheriff’s Office
conducted a “controlled phone call” between Defendant and Vanessa, during which
Defendant did not know that the detective was listening, and Vanessa tried to get
Defendant to speak about the allegations. The call did not provide any relevant
information. The following day, Vanessa was forensically interviewed and medically
examined at the Carousel Center, a child advocacy center. Vanessa said that, when
she visited Defendant’s house, she would sleep in bed with Defendant and he would
1 We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the minor child.
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Opinion of the Court
“pull [her] underwear down and put his finger in [her] vagina and move it and then
he would lick his finger and put it back in [her] vagina.” She further said Defendant
touched her vagina on multiple occasions. Vanessa said it would last for around
thirty minutes and would stop when Defendant’s wife came into the bedroom or when
Defendant fell asleep. She then said Defendant touched her vagina at her house on
two separate occasions. Vanessa’s medical exam did not show any evidence of abuse.
The detective interviewed Defendant at his job on 14 February 2023.
Defendant admitted to touching Vanessa “from the outside” of her panties but denied
putting his fingers inside of her. When the detective asked Defendant if he “touched
her [p*ssy] lips,” Defendant said, “I guess.” Defendant admitted to touching Vanessa
“two to three times” and said it happened both at his home and Vanessa’s home. A
videotape of that interview was played for the jury.
The jury found Defendant guilty of both counts of first-degree statutory sexual
offense and both counts of indecent liberties with a child. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to an active term of 240 to 348 months’ imprisonment. Defendant
appealed.
II. Discussion
A. Notice of appeal
The State moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that
Defendant failed to properly notice appeal.
A “party entitled by law to appeal from a judgment” may “take appeal by . . .
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Opinion of the Court
giving oral notice of appeal at trial[.]” N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Oral notice of appeal
given “in open court immediately upon entry of the final judgment” complies with
Rule 4. State v. Graham, 287 N.C. App. 477, 481 (2023) (citations omitted).
After the trial court sentenced Defendant and orally entered judgment, defense
counsel stated, “[Defendant] did indicate that he would like to file a notice of appeal
with the [c]ourt.” The trial court responded, “Okay. Madam Clerk, please note the
defendant’s wish to appeal the judgment of this [c]ourt.”
The State argues that Defendant only “attempted” an oral notice of appeal in
open court and did not file a written notice of appeal. Defendant responds that the
record established his intent to appeal and steps taken to exercise his right to appeal.
Defendant nonetheless filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the event this Court
determined his oral notice to be deficient. See N.C. R. App. P. 21.
Because the transcript shows that Defendant’s oral notice of appeal was
sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, we deny the State’s motion to dismiss
and dismiss Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari as moot.
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel
Defendant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
three related aspects of his trial counsel’s performance: counsel’s decision to elicit
testimony regarding Defendant’s pending Brunswick County charges; counsel’s
request for a jury instruction permitting consideration of those charges under Rule
404(b); and counsel’s closing argument emphasizing that any alleged conduct
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Opinion of the Court
happened in the Brunswick County case rather than the Pender County case being
tried. Defendant argues that these errors individually and cumulatively resulted in
Defendant being denied effective assistance of counsel.
“A defendant challenging his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel must establish that his counsel’s conduct ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’” State v. McNeill, 371 N.C. 198, 218 (2018) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). To establish that counsel’s performance
was objectively unreasonable, the defendant must make two showings. Id.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “Cumulative errors lead to reversal when
taken as a whole they deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial
free from prejudicial error.” State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 426 (2009) (cleaned up).
This Court will decide a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
review “when the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required[.]”
State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 166 (2001) (citations omitted).
Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial because his counsel’s choice “to
introduce evidence of [his] arrest in Brunswick County on very similar sexual assault
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Opinion of the Court
charges involving [Vanessa]” “serves no admissible purpose and [was] highly
prejudicial to” Defendant. He argues it had the “effect of showing that [Defendant]
has the propensity and disposition to commit” the offenses.
Defendant makes similar arguments regarding his counsel’s request that the
trial court instruct the jury to use his pending charges for the Brunswick County
sexual assaults as Rule 404(b) evidence and his counsel’s closing argument that the
sexual assaults took place in Brunswick County and not Pender County. Defendant
argues his counsel’s actions “allow[ed] jurors to use [Defendant’s] arrest in Brunswick
County . . . to show that [he] had motive, knowledge, state of mind and opportunity
to commit [the offenses] . . . in Pender County” and that he was prejudiced by this
choice. He further contends his counsel’s choice in closing argument to “make venue
the central issue in this case” “lacked positive advocacy” and “was flawed factually
and legally.”
The record reflects that counsel pursued a deliberate strategy aimed at
narrowing the jury’s focus to whether the State had proven the Pender County
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Vanessa testified that Defendant touched her at
both his home in Brunswick County and her home in Pender County, and Defendant’s
recorded interview included his statements acknowledging touching that occurred in
both locations. Confronted with evidence suggesting repeated conduct in Brunswick
County, counsel sought to frame the jury’s task as determining whether the State
had met its burden in Pender County, while acknowledging that any alleged conduct
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Opinion of the Court
in Brunswick County would be addressed separately. Counsel explained to the trial
court that he wished to avoid jurors believing Defendant would “walk away from this”
if acquitted in Pender County and therefore intended to clarify that charges existed
elsewhere.
Although Defendant now characterizes this approach as harmful, our review
is guided by the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” State v. Lane, 271 N.C. App. 307, 319
(2020) (cleaned up). “Trial counsel are necessarily given wide latitude in these
matters [of trial strategy]. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not intended
to promote judicial second-guessing on questions of strategy . . . .” State v. Milano,
297 N.C. 485, 495-96 (1979) (cleaned up), overruled on other grounds by, State v.
Grier, 307 N.C. 628 (1983).
Here, counsel’s actions were components of a unified strategy: eliciting
testimony about the Brunswick County charges, requesting a limiting instruction to
guide the jury’s consideration of that evidence, and arguing that the jury should
distinguish between conduct alleged in the two counties. Viewed together, these
actions reflect an attempt to mitigate the impact of evidence suggesting repeated
conduct outside Pender County and to focus the jury on the State’s burden in the case
before it.
The trial court also conducted the following colloquy with Defendant before
closing arguments:
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Opinion of the Court
THE COURT: Okay. I think that we probably need to have
our Harbison inquiry. . . . All right. [Defendant], if you can
please stand real quick. Now, your attorney is obviously in
charge of trial strategy, and what he feels best with regard
to the strategy to present to the jury. Do you understand
that?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, he plans to mention certain
things you mentioned in your testimony here today. Some
of those things could be considered as admissions to at least
some of the elements regarding -- in either of these charges.
Do you understand that?
[DEFENDANT]: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. But as far as everything -- you are
maintaining your innocence with regard to all of the
charges -- that is first-degree statutory sex offense and
indecent liberties. Do you understand that?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And is that correct that you are maintaining
your innocence with regards to all the charges?
[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you are -- you’ve had a discussion with
your attorney with regard to him mentioning those things
to the jury that could be admissions to some elements with
regard to those charges?
[DEFENDANT]: I have.
THE COURT: Okay. And you’re okay with that particular
trial strategy of your attorney?
[DEFENDANT]: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let the record reflect
that I’ve discussed with the defendant the potential
Harbison issues that may come up during the defenses
closing statements.
While Defendant now argues that the colloquy was insufficiently detailed, the
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Opinion of the Court
record shows that Defendant knowingly agreed to counsel’s approach. Counsel did
not concede guilt to the Pender County offenses; rather, he argued that certain
statements made during Defendant’s interview were more logically connected to the
allegations in Brunswick County. This did not constitute a concession of guilt under
State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985), nor did it fall outside prevailing professional
norms.
Furthermore, even if counsel’s performance had been deficient, Defendant has
failed to show prejudice. The State presented substantial evidence of Defendant’s
guilt, including Defendant’s own recorded statements acknowledging that he touched
Vanessa “two to three times” and that such touching occurred both in Pender County
and in Brunswick County. Vanessa provided consistent accounts during therapy, a
forensic interview, and at trial. Although Defendant disputed the allegations at trial,
the jury was entitled to credit the State’s evidence.
On this record, Defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that
the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s challenged actions. McNeill,
371 N.C. at 219.
III. Conclusion
We conclude that Defendant has failed to meet his burden under Strickland;
the strategy employed by his counsel, to which Defendant agreed, reflects an attempt
to focus the jury on the State’s burden in the case before it. Moreover, given the
overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt, he cannot show any prejudice from his
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Opinion of the Court
counsel’s performance. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
NO ERROR.
Judges STROUD and GRIFFIN concur.
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