In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00022-CV
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF JASPER WAYLON THOMAS
On Appeal from the 115th District Court
Upshur County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25-230-DCCV-00070
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jasper Waylon Thomas was civilly committed for treatment and supervision after being
adjudicated as a sexually violent predator by an Upshur County jury. On appeal, Thomas argues
that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury to presume that Thomas was not a
sexually violent predator.
We overrule Thomas’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
Thomas is a repeat sexually violent offender. Thomas was convicted of indecency with a
child in 1994 and placed on ten years’ deferred adjudication. Thomas violated those terms when
he was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child in 2001. He was sentenced to twentyfive years’ imprisonment. Thomas was released on parole in 2022, only to again violate his
terms of supervision by being alone with children and by failing to attend “sex-offender
treatment.” He was reincarcerated and is set to discharge his sentence by January 2027.
The State petitioned to have Thomas declared a sexually violent predator and committed
for treatment and supervision pursuant to Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, the
Sexually Violent Predators Act. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001–.209. At
trial, the State presented evidence from Dr. Darrell Turner, a forensic psychologist, who
reviewed Thomas’s file and met with Thomas briefly for two interviews. Turner testified that he
believes that Thomas has a behavioral abnormality that makes Thomas likely to reoffend
sexually. Thomas, testifying on his own behalf, claimed both that he regretted his wrongful
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actions and maintained his innocence and that the children made all of the sexual advances
towards him.
After the parties rested, the trial court reviewed the proposed jury instructions. The trial
court struck Thomas’s ninth instruction of the jury charge and used the rest of Thomas’s
instructions as the jury charge. Although the proposed jury charge containing the ninth
instruction is not in the record, the reporter’s record shows that the struck portion stated that
“Jasper [Thomas] is presumed not to be a sexually violent predator.”
In his brief, Thomas further describes what he requested as a “typical instruction,” such
as what was requested in an unrelated case, In re Commitment of Rozalez. See In re Commitment
of Rozalez, No. 11-24-00010-CV, 2026 WL 246985 at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 30, 2026,
no pet.) (mem. op.). In In re Commitment of Rozalez, the suggested instruction read,
“[Appellant] is presumed not to be a sexually violent predator. The allegation by the State that
the [Appellant] is a sexually violent predator creates no inference that he is a sexually violent
predator at his trial.” Id. (first alteration in original).
The jury did not receive that instruction, but rather received the following instructions
regarding the burden of proof:
The burden of proof in this case rests upon the State throughout the trial and never
shifts to [Thomas]. The State has the burden of proving that [Thomas] is a
sexually violent predator and it must do so by proving this beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is not required that the State prove this beyond all possible doubt. It is
required that the State’s proof exclude all reasonable doubt concerning whether or
not [Thomas] is a sexually violent predator.
In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not [Thomas] is
a sexually violent predator after considering all the evidence before you and these
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instructions, you will say by your verdict that [Thomas] is not a sexually violent
predator.
Thomas was found to be a sexually violent predator by the jury and was ordered civilly
committed. Thomas appeals over the struck jury instruction.
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s refusal to submit a jury instruction under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012); In re Commitment of Williams, 539
S.W.3d 429, 444–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). “A trial court may refuse
to give a requested instruction or definition that is not necessary to enable the jury to render a
verdict, even if the instruction or definition is a correct statement of the law.” In re Commitment
of Renshaw, 598 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (quoting In re
Commitment of Stuteville, 463 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied)).
The trial court’s judgment should not be reversed “for a charge error unless the error ‘probably
caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or “probably prevented the [appellant] from
properly presenting [his] case” on appeal. Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 687 (quoting TEX. R. APP. P.
61.1 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a))); see In re Commitment of Williams, 539 S.W.3d at 444.
III. Analysis
Thomas argues that, although civil commitments are civil in nature, they carry loss of
liberty implications and standards of proof akin to a criminal proceeding. Therefore, Thomas
reasons that the trial court should submit to the jury explanatory instructions to clarify the
presumption of his status of not being a sexually violent predator.
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Our sister courts have reviewed this argument and “have held that it is not error to refuse
to submit the instruction that [Thomas] requested.” In re Commitment of Rozalez, 2026 WL
246985, at *9. The First Court of Appeals determined that the trial court does not abuse its
discretion by refusing to give an instruction about a presumption that is not mandated by either
statute or caselaw. In re Commitment of Jarvis, No. 01-23-00555-CV, 2025 WL 594620, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Commitment of
Pearson, No. 07-23-00208-CV, 2023 WL 8248052, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo, Nov. 28, 2023,
no pet.) (mem. op.)). As noted by the Second Court of Appeals, “[s]imply, a trial court does not
abuse its discretion by refusing an instruction that the jury apply a presumption mandated solely
by Appellant’s concept of fairness but not by the law.” In re Commitment of Shield, No. 02-24-00497-CV, 2025 WL 1271928, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2025, pet. denied) (mem.
op.). Further, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has held that an instruction stating that the State
carries the burden is sufficient, and that an additional “presumption” instruction is not required
because it reiterates the same concept. In re Commitment of Mueller, No. 14-23-00044-CV,
2023 WL 8943743, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 28, 2023, pet. denied) (mem.
op.).
Here, we agree and conclude that the jury instructions given by the trial court were
sufficient without the additional language requested by Thomas. The jury instructions state,
“The State has the burden of proving that [Thomas] is a sexually violent predator and it must do
so by proving this beyond a reasonable doubt.” That instruction properly signaled that the
sexually violent-predator status must be proven and is therefore not presumed. It explains
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clearly that the State carried the burden of proof under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
Thomas’s requested instruction would have reiterated the same concepts already contained in
this language. For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
give additional instruction that Thomas was presumed not to be a sexually violent predator.
We, therefore, overrule Thomas’s sole point of error.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: July 30, 2026
Date Decided: August 27, 2026
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