IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CA-00413-SCT
WILLIE JEAN KNIGHTEN
v.
VITALCORE HEALTH STRATEGIES, LLC
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/01/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CAROL L. WHITE-RICHARD TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JIM WAIDE
HIAWATHA NORTHINGTON, II
JESSICA ROSHAUN McLAURIN
YANCE ALFRED FALKNER
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JIM WAIDE
RACHEL PIERCE WAIDE
YANCE ALFRED FALKNER
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: HIAWATHA NORTHINGTON, II
CHRISTINA MARIA SEANOR
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/03/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
EN BANC.
ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Willie Jean Knighten sued her former employer VitalCore Health Strategies, LLC,
alleging that she was wrongfully terminated for reporting a prison physician’s illegal activity
and refusing to participate in the illegal activity. VitalCore moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Knighten was terminated for reasons unrelated to her complaints and that she
failed to identify conduct that could subject the physician to criminal penalties under the
public-policy exceptions recognized in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So. 2d 603 (Miss. 1993). The circuit court granted VitalCore’s motion for summary judgment,
and Knighten appealed. After review, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In October 2020, VitalCore obtained the contract to provide healthcare services at
facilities operated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Knighten had worked at
the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman for approximately twenty-six years, both as
a state employee and for private healthcare providers serving inmates at the facility. Before
VitalCore assumed the contract, Knighten served as Health Services Administrator (HSA)
for Centurion, the prior healthcare contractor. VitalCore retained Knighten in the same
position when it took over operations. As HSA, Knighten did not provide medical treatment.
Instead, she was responsible for supervising nursing and physician staff, overseeing the
facility’s daily healthcare operations, and ensuring compliance with VitalCore’s contractual
obligations.
¶3. During 2021, Knighten became concerned that Dr. Collette Scott, a physician
employed by VitalCore at Parchman, was providing inadequate medical care to inmates and
may have been impaired by drugs while on duty. In April 2021, Knighten reported her
concerns to Dr. Ramon Singh, VitalCore’s chief medical officer, and recommended that Dr.
Scott be terminated. VitalCore did not act on that recommendation. In August 2021, Dr.
James Glisson, then VitalCore’s medical director, also reported concerns regarding Dr. Scott
to the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure. Although Dr. Scott was placed on
administrative leave for a brief period, she returned to work at the facility in September 2021.
2
Knighten continued to express concerns regarding Dr. Scott’s performance.
¶4. On January 3, 2022, Knighten received notice from VitalCore that her employment
would be terminated effective April 3, 2022. As basis for termination, VitalCore stated that
it intended to require all HSAs at its facilities to be registered nurses, and Knighten was not
a registered nurse.
¶5. Knighten filed suit on January 17, 2023, alleging that VitalCore and individual
defendants wrongfully terminated her employment and tortiously interfered with her
employment relationship. She contended that her termination was motivated by (1) her
refusal to participate in the denial of adequate medical care to prisoners and (2) her repeated
reports concerning Dr. Scott’s alleged failure to provide adequate patient care and Dr. Scott’s
possible drug use. Knighten further alleged that VitalCore sought to protect Dr. Scott despite
concerns about the quality of care being provided to inmates.
¶6. VitalCore denied those allegations. In its motion for summary judgment filed
February 20, 2025, VitalCore argued that Knighten, as an at-will employee, failed to satisfy
the requirements for her claim to succeed because she could not establish that she was
terminated for reporting unlawful conduct under McArn, which provides two narrow publicpolicy exceptions to the general rule of at-will employment. 626 So. 2d at 607. In response
to VitalCore’s motion for summary judgment, Knighten argued that her case fell squarely
within the exceptions recognized in McArn because her complaints regarding Dr. Scott
constituted reports of unlawful conduct.
¶7. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of VitalCore. In doing so, the
3
court reasoned that Knighten’s claim did not trigger either of the public-policy exceptions
listed in McArn because none of the complaints she classified as unlawful conduct carried
criminal penalties for providing negligent healthcare to inmates. Knighten appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8. This Court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Yazoo City v. Wright, 391 So. 3d 1161, 1165 (Miss. 2024). A party is entitled
to summary judgment if the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56(c).
¶9. This Court reviews the summary-judgment record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 212 So. 3d 58, 60 (Miss. 2017). The
nonmoving party, however, “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Mississippi Rule of
Civil Procedure 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” M.R.C.P. 56(e). “[A] motion for summary judgment should be denied unless the trial
court finds beyond any reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would be unable to prove any facts
to support his/her claim.” Wright, 391 So. 3d at 1165-66 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So. 2d 883, 886 (Miss. 2000)).
DISCUSSION
¶10. Since 1858, this Court has recognized the at-will-employment doctrine. See Butler
v. Smith, 35 Miss. 457, 464 (1858). Under the at-will-employment doctrine, employers may
fire employees “for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, excepting only reasons
4
independently declared legally impermissible.” Brandi’s Hope Cmty. Servs., LLC v.
Walters, 391 So. 3d 162, 166 (Miss. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
McArn, 626 So. 2d at 606). “When an employer fires an employee for a reason declared
legally impermissible, that employer is liable to the employee via a claim of wrongful
termination.” Id.
1. Knighten failed to show a genuine issue of material fact that she
reported illegal activity within the meaning of McArn.
¶11. In McArn, this Court carved out two narrow public-policy exceptions to Mississippi’s
employment-at-will doctrine, whether there is a written contract or not, allowing a tort action
for wrongful termination for either: (1) an employee who is discharged for refusing to
participate in an illegal activity or (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal
acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else. 626 So. 2d at 607.
¶12. The threshold question is whether Knighten presented a genuine issue of material fact
that she was discharged for refusing to participate in or for reporting illegal activity within
the meaning of McArn. In her complaint, Knighten alleged that she was terminated for
“refusing to participate in illegal activity—the denial of adequate medical care to
prisoners-patients.” In response to VitalCore’s motion for summary judgment, Knighten
further argued that she was terminated for reporting the “illegal act of [VitalCore] denying
the serious medical needs of prisoners or failing to provide adequate medical care because
of the drug addiction of the prison physician.” VitalCore contends that Knighten failed to
show a genuine issue of material fact that she refused to participate in or reported conduct
that is criminal in nature under McArn.
5
¶13. This Court has made clear that the “illegal activity” and “illegal acts” referenced in
McArn are limited to conduct that is criminal in nature. Wright, 391 So. 3d at 1166. “The
public policy exception protects an employee from being forced to choose between
committing a crime and losing his or her job.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Galle v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., 180 So. 3d 619, 623 (Miss. 2015)). Further,
“[a]pplicability of the exception does not require that a crime has already been committed,
but it does require that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties,
as opposed to mere civil penalties.” Id. at 1168 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Roop v. S. Pharms. Corp., 188 So. 3d 1179, 1185 (Miss. 2016)).
¶14. Here, Knighten argues that Dr. Scott’s alleged conduct is a public-policy concern and
violates Mississippi Code Section 47-5-23 (Rev. 2023), 18 U.S.C. § 242, and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 Mississippi Code Section 47-5-23 vests the
Mississippi Department of Corrections with the “exclusive responsibility for management
and control of the correctional system . . . and shall be responsible for the management of
affairs of the correctional system and for the proper care, treatment, feeding, clothing and
management of the offenders confined therein.” Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-23 (Rev. 2023).
This statute does not create a criminal offense or impose criminal penalties. Thus, it cannot
serve as basis for her McArn claim. See Wright, 391 So. 3d at 1168.
¶15. Knighten also claims the alleged conduct violates 18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 242
1
For the first time on appeal, Knighten argues that additional provisions of the United States Code and the Mississippi Code are implicated. It is well settled that this Court does not consider arguments presented for the first time on appeal. Stratton v. McKey, 384 So. 3d 499, 503 (Miss. 2024).
6
provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of
the United States . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned more than ten
years or both . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 242. To be sure, § 242 is a criminal statute that carries criminal penalties. To
establish a violation of § 242, however, the government must prove that the defendant acted
under color of law and willfully deprived another person of a constitutional right. § 242.
Knighten relies on Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251
(1976), to identify the constitutional right allegedly infringed. While Estelle recognizes that
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs may violate the Eighth
Amendment for purposes of civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a violation of the Eighth
Amendment does not, standing alone, establish a violation of § 242. Section 242 requires
proof that the defendant acted willfully in depriving another of a constitutional right.
¶16. In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945),
the Supreme Court explained that § 242’s willfulness requirement demands more than
negligence or inadvertence. Rather, the government must prove that the defendant willfully
deprived another of a constitutional right. Id. As the Supreme Court explained, this
requirement is satisfied by proof that the defendant acted with the “specific intent” to deprive
another of a constitutional right, including conduct undertaken “in open defiance or in
reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and
definite.” Id. at 103, 105; see also United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 821 (5th Cir. 1979)
7
(discussing the Screws Court’s interpretation of § 242). Thus, even assuming that conduct
amounting to deliberate indifference under Estelle could, in some circumstances, also violate
§ 242, Knighten was still required to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material
fact that the conduct she reported amounted to the willful deprivation of a constitutional right
as required by § 242.
¶17. Here, Knighten asserts that Dr. Scott neglected inmates by denying them adequate
medical care because of her alleged drug addiction. Knighten relies on testimony from Dr.
Glisson and nurse practitioner Miranda Shegog to support her claim. Dr. Glisson testified
that inmates complained Dr. Scott failed to pay attention to them, that he believed she was
mentally impaired while working, and that he suspected she was using alcohol or drugs.
Based on those concerns, he restricted her access to controlled substances and reported her
to the Mississippi State Board of Medical Licensure. Shegog likewise testified that Dr. Scott
failed to refill inmates’ medications and that she suspected Dr. Scott was “taking pills.”
Knighten’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, tends to show that Dr. Scott
was impaired by an alleged drug addiction and that her impairment resulted in deficient
medical care. But that evidence fails to show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Dr. Scott willfully deprived inmates of a constitutional right, which is required for criminal
liability under § 242.
¶18. In sum, Knighten identifies three sources of public policy: Mississippi Code Section
47-5-23, the Eighth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. § 242. Neither Section 47-5-23 nor the
Eighth Amendment criminalizes the alleged conduct. Although § 242 is a criminal statute,
8
Knighten’s summary-judgment evidence does not show a genuine issue of material fact that
Dr. Scott acted with the willfulness required by that statute. Accordingly, Knighten failed
to show a genuine issue of material fact that she was discharged for refusing to participate
in or for reporting illegal activity within the meaning of McArn.
2. Swindol does not expand McArn beyond criminal conduct.
¶19. Knighten alternatively argues that, even if the conduct she reported does not constitute
criminal conduct, her claim nevertheless falls within the public-policy exception recognized
by this Court in Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corp., 194 So. 3d 847 (Miss. 2016).
Specifically, Knighten contends that Swindol broadened McArn to encompass violations of
noncriminal statutes and other sources of public policy. Her reliance on Swindol is
misplaced.
¶20. In Swindol, this Court held that an employee who was discharged after exercising a
right expressly protected by Mississippi Code Section 45-9-55 could pursue a
wrongful-discharge claim. 194 So. 3d at 854. Section 45-9-55 specifically prohibits an
employer from establishing or enforcing a policy preventing an employee from transporting
or storing a firearm in a locked vehicle in the employer’s parking lot. Miss. Code Ann. §
45-9-55 (Rev. 2023). This Court concluded that permitting an employer to terminate an
employee for exercising a right expressly protected by that statute would undermine the
Legislature’s clearly stated public policy. Swindol, 194 So. 3d at 854-55.
¶21. Knighten seemingly interprets Swindol as broadly expanding McArn to encompass
any discharge allegedly implicating an important public policy, regardless of whether the
9
reported conduct is criminal in nature. This Court, however, expressly rejected that
interpretation in Walters, 391 So. 3d 162.
¶22. In Walters, this Court explained that Swindol was a statute-based wrongful-discharge
case, not an expansion of the common-law exception recognized in McArn. Walters, 391
So. 3d at 168-69. The Court emphasized that “McArn’s exceptions require illegal acts or
requests” and that “[t]he public policy behind the exceptions’ implementation is based on the
goal of preventing criminality.” Id. at 169. Thus, although a statutory cause of action may
exist independent of McArn, the common-law exception recognized in McArn remains
limited to circumstances involving conduct warranting criminal penalties. See also Wright,
391 So. 3d at 1166-68. Accordingly, Swindol does not relieve Knighten of her burden to
show a genuine issue of material fact that she was discharged for refusing to participate in
or for reporting conduct that is criminal in nature. See Wright, 391 So. 3d at 1166, 1168
(discussing each party’s burden on a summary-judgment motion). As discussed above,
Knighten failed to satisfy that burden. Because the conduct she reported does not show a
genuine issue of material fact that it constituted criminal conduct within the meaning of
McArn, VitalCore was entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
¶23. The public-policy exception recognized in McArn is a narrow exception to
Mississippi’s employment-at-will doctrine. To invoke that exception and survive summary
judgment, an employee must present evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact
that he or she was discharged for refusing to participate in or for reporting conduct that is
10
criminal in nature. Although Knighten identifies Mississippi Code Section 47-5-23, 18
U.S.C. § 242, and the Eighth Amendment as sources of public policy, neither Section
47-5-23 nor the Eighth Amendment impose criminal penalties. And while § 242 is a criminal
statute, Knighten failed to present evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact that the
conduct she reported amounted to the willful deprivation of a constitutional right required
by that statute. Further, Swindol does not expand McArn beyond its narrow
criminal-conduct requirement. Because Knighten failed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact that she was discharged for refusing to participate in or for reporting illegal
activity within the meaning of McArn, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of VitalCore.
¶24. AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN, P.J., GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN, BRANNING AND
WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. KING, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. TOLLISON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
11