[Cite as Morris v. Robinson, 2026-Ohio-3450.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
PATRICIA A. MORRIS, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 116159
v. :
RONALD J. ROBINSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 3, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-08-321597
Appearances:
Costanzo & Lazzaro, P.L.L., and Raymond J. Costanzo, for
appellant.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. “The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow
this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion.” State v. Priest, 2014-Ohio-1735,
¶ 1.
Appellant Ronald J. Robinson (“Husband”) appeals from the
judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, denying his motion to vacate a qualified domestic-relations order
(“QDRO”).1 After a thorough review of the facts and the law, we affirm.
I. Procedural History and Factual Background
Husband and appellee Patricia A. Robinson (“Wife”) were married on
October 14, 1998. On June 6, 2008, Wife filed a complaint for divorce in the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. On
October 30, 2008, the trial court granted the parties a divorce, effective
September 24, 2008, and incorporated into the divorce decree the terms of a
separation and property settlement agreement (“Separation Agreement”).
A. Separation Agreement and QDRO
The Separation Agreement addressed Husband’s pension with his
employer, the Plain Dealer Publishing Co., and stated in pertinent part:
The Husband’s interest in and to his Plain Dealer Publishing Co.
Pension Fund shall be divided between the parties, with the Wife
receiving one-half of the marital portion thereof by means of a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order to be prepared by the Wife’s
attorney. The Parties agree that the marital portion of this Pension
Plan is the Husband’s interest earned during the period of October 14,
1 Wife failed to file a responsive brief in this case.
We note that when an appellee
fails to file a brief, “App.R. 18(C) gives us the discretion to ‘accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues as correct and reverse the judgment if the appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain such action.’” In re S.M.T., 2012-Ohio-1745, ¶ 2 (8th Dist.), quoting App.R. 18(C). App.R. 18(C) does not, however, “impose a form of appellate default judgment where the court of appeals can reverse solely because the appellee failed to file a brief. Reversal is warranted only if the arguments in the appellant’s brief reasonably appear to support a reversal.” Id. at ¶ 3.
1998 through September 24, 2008. Husband shall retain all remaining
interests in said Plan not being transferred to the Wife herein.
The QDRO referenced in the Separation Agreement includes the
following relevant language:
1. Effect of This Order as a Qualified Domestic Relations Order: This
Order creates and recognizes the existence of an Alternate Payee’s right
to receive a portion of the Participant’s benefits payable under the
Advance Pension Plan (the “Plan”), a multi-employer defined benefit
pension plan that is qualified and maintained under applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”) and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), each as
amended to date.
7. Amount of Alternate Payee’s Benefit: This order assigns to the
Alternate Payee an amount equal to the actuarial equivalent of Fifty
Percent (50%) of the marital portion of the Participant’s accrued
benefit under the Plan. The Marital portion shall be that part of the
Participant’s accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage,
which, for this purpose shall be the period of October 14, 1998 through
September 24, 2008, inclusive, but shall include any subsequent,
retroactive increases in said accrued benefit thereafter approved by the
Board of Trustees of the Plan prior to the Alternate Payee’s benefit
commencement date hereunder.
(Emphasis in original.) The trial court retained jurisdiction with respect to the
QDRO “to the extent required to maintain its qualified status and the original intent
of the parties.”
Appellee is designated as the alternate payee (“Alternate Payee”) in
the QDRO. The QDRO was approved by both parties and their counsel without
objection and journalized on October 30, 2008.
Sixteen years later, on August 20, 2024, Husband filed a motion to
vacate qualified domestic relations order entered October 30, 2008 (“Motion to Vacate”). Husband alleged in the Motion to Vacate that the plan administrator
(“Plan Administrator”) implementing the QDRO “intended to commence benefits in
a manner that is in conflict with the final judgment entry of divorce, QDRO, the
parties’ original intent, statutory and case authority, and the Plan Administrator’s
own calculations.” Specifically, Husband asserted that
the Plan Administrator calculated the marital portion of the pension
by, (a) determining the amount of the accrued benefit at the start of the
marriage (October 14, 1998), (b) determining the amount of the
accrued benefit at [the] end of the marriage (September 24, 2008) and
(c) calculating the difference between the accrued benefit at the end of
the marriage and the amount of the accrued benefit at the beginning of
the marriage.[2]
According to Husband, the value of the marital portion of the accrued
benefit, and the resulting Alternate Payee portion of $735.74 per month, calculated
by using the Plan Administrator’s method — is wrong. Husband requested a
clarifying order assigning a different monthly payment to Wife, specifically “the sum
of $412.16 per month, being 50% of the marital portion of Defendant’s accrued and
now matured pension benefit . . . .” Husband indicated that he arrived at this
amount by using the “frozen coverture fraction method to calculate the value of the
pension plan earned during the term of the marriage.”3 Husband argued that the
2 This description of the formula used by the Plan Administrator is consistent with
the explanation given for the calculation of benefits in the Plan Administrator’s May 8, 2014 letter to Husband, which was admitted as an exhibit at the hearing on the Motion to Vacate.
3 The frozen-coverture method “requires the court to determine the value of the
pension account as if it were frozen on the divorce date,” and “‘calculates the value of the participant spouse’s retirement account had he or she retired on the same day the parties divorced, using the then-present base pay and years of service.’” Cook v. Cook, 2017-language used in the Separation Agreement and QDRO “suggests” the parties’
intention to use this method of calculation. Husband asserted that the language of
both the Separation Agreement and QDRO “indicate the parties’ intention to
preserve Defendant’s premarital separate property interest in the pension plan for
the sole benefit of the Defendant and share equally only in the value of the pension
plan that was earned during the term of the marriage.”
Wife filed a motion to dismiss the Motion to Vacate, and Husband
filed a brief in opposition.
B. Hearing
The magistrate held a hearing on June 4, 2025. Husband and Wife
stipulated to six exhibits presented by Husband, which included correspondence
between Husband and the Plan Administrator regarding the pension division.
During the opening colloquy with the court, Husband’s counsel
asserted that the division of property that is in the Separation Agreement and
incorporated into the judgment entry of divorce should be “enforced to exactly to
what it says.” He further explained that the QDRO was only issued to implement
that property division, but contended that it is “not necessary any longer . . . because
our information is that [Wife] took a lump sum. So our relief has to come from [the
Wife], not a clarifying — or an amended QDRO.” Counsel went on to state that if the
court agrees with Husband’s “calculation . . . she owes us money.”
Ohio-8848, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.), quoting Cameron v. Cameron, 2012-Ohio-6258, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).
In response, Wife made an oral motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Motion to Vacate should be dismissed because Husband was no longer seeking to
vacate the QDRO, as initially requested. The court allowed the case to move
forward, noting that the Motion to Vacate also included a request for reimbursement
from Wife “in the event that she was overpaid from the pension.”
The following testimony was presented at the hearing on Husband’s
Motion to Vacate. Wife and Husband were the only witnesses to testify. During
their testimonies, both Husband and Wife acknowledged signing and initialing all
pages of the judgment entry of divorce and the QDRO.
1. Wife’s Testimony
Wife testified that she was notified by the Plan Administrator in
approximately March 2024 that she would be receiving her proportionate share of
Husband’s pension. Wife explained that she was given the option to receive her
share as a monthly figure or a lump-sum payment. Wife testified that she elected to
take the lump sum, which was “[s]omewhere around $100,000.”
2. Husband’s Testimony
Husband testified that he started to work for the Cleveland Plain
Dealer in 1975. When he was close to retirement, he contacted Mr. Hnilo (“Hnilo”),
an individual who administered the company’s defined-benefit plan on behalf of
Advance Local, the Plan Administrator, to learn what his monthly pension would be
and how the pension would be divided. In March 2024, Husband learned what his
pension amount would be. Husband contacted Hnilo “voic[ing] objections to the amount.” Husband testified that he “believe[d] there [wa]s an error in the
calculation of the marital portion of the pension.” Specifically, Husband testified
that he believed that the “Plan Administrator shifted [Husband’s] premarital
interest, the increase in the premarital interest[,] to the marital portion . . . .”
Husband explained that an amount of $323 per month was shifted “from the
premarital to the marital.” Husband stated that he did not “consult with anybody to
come up with that number.”
Husband stated that based on the language in the Separation
Agreement, Wife was only supposed to share in part of the pension that was the
Husband’s interest earned during their approximately ten years of marriage, which
Husband calculated to be $412 (half of $824) per month. At the hearing, Husband
did not specify how his formula for calculating the marital portion of the pension
was different from the one used by the Plan Administrator.
The magistrate denied the Motion to Vacate. In denying the Motion
to Vacate, the magistrate found that
neither the divorce decree nor the QDRO specify a specific formula to
be used in determining the marital portion of the pension.
The Magistrate further finds that Mr. Robinson has not pointed to a
provision in the decree or QDRO that are ambiguous. Instead, he
argues that the Court should determine that the proper amount that
[the Wife] should receive is $412.16 because the Plan Administrator did
the calculation incorrectly.
The Magistrate finds that the decree does not divide the pension using
a coverture fraction, nor does it express use of a frozen coverture
fraction to divide the pension. As pointed out by the Plan
Administrator in Defendant’s Exhibit E the use of a coverture fraction
or some other methodology could not be use [sic] by the Plan
Administrator because the use of such methodology was neither
required nor permitted under the specific language of the QDRO.
The Magistrate finds that if the Court did what Mr. Robinson is
requesting, it would amount to a modification of the terms of the
division of property. R.C. 3105.17(I) does not permit the court to
modify the terms of a property division absent agreement of the parties.
The Magistrate further finds that the ambiguity is not found in the
language of the decree or the QDRO. The issue may be that beyond
defining the term of the marriage, the parties did not provide further
direction as to how the term of the marriage should be calculated within
the entirety of the [sic] Mr. Robinson’s years of service with the Plain
Dealer.
Husband filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On January 21,
2026, the trial court issued its judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision,
and issued its own opinion.
The trial court stated that while the Husband “claims there was an
ambiguity in the language of the parties’ Separation Agreement and QDRO . . . the
real issue is the calculation of the benefit, not the agreed upon language.” The court
further noted that it did not find the language in the document(s) that “suggests the
parties’ intention to use the frozen coverture fraction method to calculate the value
of the pension plan earned during the term of the marriage.”
The trial court found that the “Plan Administrator came up with the
monthly pension amount and Husband disputes the accuracy of that amount. Husband disagrees with the formula used by the Plan Administrator. Wife argues
that the Court cannot interpret what the math should be.”
The trial court further found that “there are no ambiguous terms in
the parties’ judgment entry and Separation Agreement,” noting that the Husband is
“requesting the Court fill in the gaps as to the method of calculating [the] formula
for his pension plan.” The court found that while it is permitted to “implement the
terms of the division of benefits,” it cannot “modify the terms of the property
division.”
Husband appeals, raising the following assignment of error:
The trial court erred in refusing to resolve the parties’ conflicting
interpretations of the phrase “earned during the term of the marriage”
incorporated in their agreement dividing Appellant’s defined benefit
pension plan and failing to enforce the decree.
II. Law and Analysis
Because the crux of Husband’s appeal is a challenge to the trial court’s
journal entry adopting the magistrate’s decision, we review the trial court’s decision
for an abuse of discretion. Butcher v. Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.),
citing O’Brien v. O’Brien, 2006-Ohio-1729, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). “The term ‘abuse of
discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
“Pension or retirement benefits earned during the course of a
marriage are marital assets and a factor to be considered in the division of property.” Wilson v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-6056, ¶ 5, citing Hoyt v. Hoyt, 53 Ohio St.3d 177, 178-179 (1990). When dividing pension and retirement benefits, a domestic relations
court enters a QDRO, which is an order that “creates or recognizes the existence of
an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all
or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan . . . .”
29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(L); see also Butcher at ¶ 9. That is, a QDRO is an order
in aid of execution on the property division ordered in the divorce decree dividing
retirement or pension assets. Id. at ¶ 9, citing McKinney v. McKinney, 142 Ohio
App.3d 604, 608 (2d Dist. 2001).
“A trial court cannot modify or amend a marital property division
incident to a divorce or dissolution decree, absent expressed consent by the parties.”
Butcher at ¶ 8, citing R.C. 3105.171(I). However, it has the “authority to clarify and
construe its original property division in order to effectuate its judgment.” Adkins
v. Bush, 2003-Ohio-2781, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.), citing Peterson v. Peterson, 1999 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3267, *4 (12th Dist. July 12, 1999).
“When parties dispute the meaning of a clause in their separation
agreement, a trial court must first determine whether the clause is ambiguous.”
Adkins at ¶ 26. This court has previously held that “[i]f the decree and separation
agreement are ambiguous regarding the division of . . . retirement and pension
accounts, the court can properly clarify their meaning without violating the
prohibition of R.C. 3105.171(I).” Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, at ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing
Gordon v. Gordon, 144 Ohio App.3d 21, 24 (8th Dist. 2001). If there is no ambiguity in the terms of the separation agreement, a “court may not clarify or interpret those
terms.” Butcher at ¶ 11, citing Adkins at ¶ 27.
A. Terms of Separation Agreement and QDRO
On appeal, Husband argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
resolve “the parties’ conflicting interpretations of the phrase ‘earned during the term
of the marriage . . . .’” In other words, Husband argues that the language in the
Separation Agreement and QDRO is ambiguous and should have been clarified by
the trial court. Husband also argues that this court should “find the Plan failed to
comply with the QDRO” by assigning an improper sum to Wife and “remand the
matter back to the trial court with instructions to enforce the assignment of benefits
to [Wife] consistent with the Court’s finding on remand.” The essence of Husband’s
appeal is that the Plan Administrator used an improper formula to calculate the
marital portion of the plan and that to remedy this error, the trial court should clarify
the “contested clause” — “earned during the term of the marriage.” We find
Husband’s argument to be unpersuasive.
The Separation Agreement defines the “marital portion” of the plan
as “Husband’s interest earned during the period of October 14, 1998 through
September 24, 2008.” The QDRO follows the language of the Separation
Agreement, noting that the marital portion of the pension plan “shall be that part of
[Husband’s] accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage . . . .” Husband
acknowledges that the QDRO aligns with the language of the Separation Agreement.
On appeal, Husband takes exception with the way the Plan
Administrator calculated the amount due Wife as having been “earned during the
term of the marriage.” Husband argues that the Plan Administrator incorrectly
interpreted the language in the QDRO in a way that determined “the marital portion
of his monthly benefit to be the increase in value of his accrued monthly benefit
from the date of his marriage on October 14, 1998 through the date of his divorce on
September 24, 2008, instead of the accrued monthly benefit he earned during the
term of the marriage.”4 (Emphasis added.)
The parties did not dispute the numbers included in the Plan
Administrator’s formula, including the years of service Husband worked for his
employer and the number of years the parties were married. They only dispute the
formula used to calculate the marital portion of Husband’s pension.
Husband argues that “[n]ormal rules of contract interpretation”
apply here. Kmet v. Kmet, 2019-Ohio-2443, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Keeley v. Keeley,
1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3139 (12th Dist. July 21, 1997). We agree. See id., citing id.
(“In interpreting a divorce decree that incorporates the parties’ separation
agreement, the normal rules of contract interpretation generally apply . . . .”).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the legal standards for
contract interpretation are well established, noting that “[w]e seek primarily to give
4 As noted, Husband asserted, in his Motion to Vacate, that the language in the
Separation Agreement and QDRO suggest the “parties’ intention to use the frozen coverture fraction method to calculate the value of the pension plan earned during the term of the marriage.” However, he does not explain his reasoning, or provide case law in support.
effect to the intent of the parties, and we presume that the intent of the parties is
reflected in the plain language of the contract.” Beverage Holdings, L.L.C. v. 5701
Lombardo, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-4716, ¶ 13, citing Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 11. “Common words will be given their ordinary meaning unless
manifest absurdity results or unless some other meaning is clear from the face or
overall contents of the agreement.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Anders, 2003-Ohio-3048,
¶ 34, citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978), paragraph
two of the syllabus.
“[I]f the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, we
enforce the terms as written, and we may not turn to evidence outside the four
corners of the contract to alter its meaning.” Beverage Holdings, L.L.C., at ¶ 13,
citing Galatis at ¶ 11. The Supreme Court has noted that “no clear standard has
evolved to determine the level of lucidity necessary for a writing to be ambiguous.”
State v. Porterfield, 2005-Ohio-3095, ¶ 11. However, courts have repeatedly held
that mere silence on an issue or a failure to address an issue does not create an
ambiguity where none otherwise exists. Earnest v. Earnest, 2023-Ohio-1803, ¶ 16
(5th Dist.); Keller v. Keller, 2018-Ohio-3141 (5th Dist.).
We find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the language
of the QDRO is unambiguous. The phrase at issue in the QDRO states that “[t]he
Marital portion shall be that part of the Participant’s accrued benefit earned during
the term of the marriage.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “accrued” as “accumulated over a period of time.”5 It defines “benefit” as “a payment or service
provided for under an annuity, pension plan, or insurance policy.”6 To “earn” is “to
receive as return for effort and especially for work done or services rendered.” 7
Therefore, the “accrued benefit earned” under a pension plan means the amount
that an employee is entitled to at a given moment in time. Other Ohio courts confirm
this understanding of the phrase, explaining that in the context of pension plans,
“‘accrued benefits’ refers to retirement benefits a party would be entitled to receive
as of a particular date . . . ”8 Cox v. Cox, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 227, *1, 9 (12th Dist.
Feb. 1, 1999). It stands to reason that the “accrued benefit earned during the term
of the marriage” is determined by subtracting the “accrued benefit earned” at the
beginning of the marriage from the “accrued benefit earned” at the end of the
marriage.
Although Ohio courts have acknowledged that varied approaches
exist in determining property division in this context, we have found no Ohio
authority addressing the precise language used here, calling for the division of the
5 Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ accrued (accessed Aug. 7, 2026) [https://perma.cc/VPR8-EX26].
6 Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ benefit (accessed Aug. 7, 2026) [https://perma.cc/5V2W-B8PB].
7 Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/earn
(accessed Aug. 14, 2026) [https://perma.cc/CG3T-DC34].
8 Other jurisdictions similarly hold that “‘accrual’ refers to the amount of benefits
to which an employee is entitled.” Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan, 826 F.Supp.2d 25, 28, fn. 2. (D.C. Dist. 2011); see also McDonald v. Pension Plan of the Nysa-Ila Pension Trust Fund, 320 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2003), citing 29 U.S.C. 1002(23)(A). “accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage.” See Hoyt, 53 Ohio St.3d
at 180 (explaining that “flat rules have no place in determining a property division”).
This language, however, aligns with what is known in the literature
and across other jurisdictions as the “accrual-of-benefits approach,” a recognized
method of dividing retirement plans at divorce. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Valuation,
Allocation, and Distribution of Retirement Plans at Divorce: Where Are We?, 35
Fam. L.Q. 469, 476 (Fall 2001). “Under this method, the accrued benefit at the date
of the marriage is subtracted from the accrued benefit at the date of the divorce to
arrive at the benefit to be divided.” Id. at 476 (describing the different approaches
to allocating pensions between former spouses, including the “accrual-of-benefits”
method); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 905 So.2d 1, 13 (Ala.App. 2004) (Murdock, G.,
concurring specifically) (describing the “accrual-of-benefits” approach as a
recognized method of determining the benefit to be divided); see also Marriage of
Swanson, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 2565, *14-18 (Mont.D.C., Feb. 28, 2003)
(describing the “accrual-of-benefits” approach to calculating the marital property
interest in a pension plan); Thomasi v. Thomasi, 181 Conn.App. 822, 832-833
(2018) (recognizing the various methods for calculating the “marital portion” of a
pension plan, including the “subtraction” method; the “accrual-of-benefits
approach” has also been called the subtraction method).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that
the disputed terms of the Separation Agreement and QDRO are unambiguous based
on the plain language of the documents. Moreover, when viewed through the lens of marital-property division, the terms used in these documents align with a
recognized methodology for allocating pension benefits.9
Finally, we note that the parties, through their attorneys, agreed to
the language in the QDRO that determined the “marital portion shall be that part of
the Participant’s accrued benefit earned during the term of the marriage . . . .” No
mention was made of any possible problems with the QDRO until 16 years later,
when Husband determined that he was dissatisfied with the amount going to Wife.
The substitution of another method of calculation or specific monthly amount to be
paid to Wife would be an expansion and modification of the agreement, which is
prohibited by R.C. 3105.171(I). See Butcher, 2011-Ohio-2550, at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
Husband has not demonstrated that the method used to calculate
Wife’s portion of the pension was inconsistent with the Separation Agreement and
QDRO. Nor has he demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to
Vacate the QDRO.
Husband’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellant pay the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
9 We also note that mere failure to include a formula for the division of marital
property, such as pension benefits, does not deem a separation agreement ambiguous. See Robins v. Robins, 2005-Ohio-4969, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR