FILED
Sep 03 2026, 9:29 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Daniel Romero,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
September 3, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-3277
Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court
The Honorable Karin A. McGrath, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
43D01-2412-F1-000746
Opinion by Judge Felix
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 1 of 21
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Shortly after they broke up, Daniel Romero smashed through his ex-girlfriend
Latasha Ibarra’s front door, carrying a large wrench and a handgun. Romero
swung the wrench at Ibarra then struck her friend Miguel Cardoso on the head
with the handgun before shooting him in the shoulder. After Ibarra’s child
testified at trial, one of the jurors realized she worked at the child’s school; after
examining the juror, the trial court denied Romero’s motions to remove her and
for a mistrial. Romero was convicted of burglary resulting in serious bodily
injury and sentenced to 35 years of incarceration. Romero now appeals, raising
three issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Romero’s
motions to remove a juror and for a mistrial;
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Romero’s
conviction; and
3. Whether Romero’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B).
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In December 2024, Romero and Ibarra ended a five-year romantic relationship.
During the relationship, Romero lived with Ibarra and her two children in
Ibarra’s home in Warsaw, Indiana. After Romero and Ibarra broke up,
Romero moved out of Ibarra’s home, and Ibarra “changed the locks the same
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 2 of 21
day.” Tr. Vol. II at 175. Given the length of the relationship, Romero was
“like a father figure” to Ibarra’s two children, Tr. Vol. III at 31, so when they
began missing him after the breakup, Ibarra arranged for them to see Romero.
[4] At approximately 4:30 p.m. on December 21, Romero picked up Ibarra and her
children, 11-year-old O.I. and 12-year-old A.I. (collectively, the “Children”).
Romero drove Ibarra to work, then brought the Children to his parents’ house
where he was living at the time to stay the night. At approximately 9:00 p.m.,
Ibarra left work and went home. Ibarra’s friend Miguel Cardoso drove his
vehicle to her home shortly thereafter to eat dinner and watch television.
Throughout the night, Romero was “blowin[g] up” Ibarra’s phone, Tr. Vol. II
at 233, and she was not responding.
[5] Between 12:20 a.m. and 12:32 a.m. on December 22, Romero called Ibarra
nine times and sent her two text messages. At 12:23 a.m., Romero texted
Ibarra, “I new you are whit some one that’s why you don’t answer good
played,” Tr. Vol. IV at 18 (errors in original). At 12:29 a.m., Romero texted
Ibarra, “Answer the phone you scared,” id. (errors in original).
[6] Sometime before 12:42 a.m., Romero woke up O.I. and told her they were
“gonna [sic] pick up [her] mom from work,” Tr. Vol. II at 133. Romero began
“driving very fast and [O.I.] couldn’t put on [her] seatbelt.” Id. at 134. Romero
drove to Ibarra’s house, “hit [the] brakes fast,” id. at 186, approached the house
with a “wrench in his hand[,] and he broke in . . . the door,” id. at 134. Ibarra
“knew who it was” when she heard the brakes, so she “tried to run to the door
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 3 of 21
to block it”; however, she “didn’t even get a chance to block the door even
though it was locked. It was kicked in on [her].” Id. at 187. When Romero
entered through the broken door, he said, “How could you do this to me
b[*]tch,” id. at 189, and tried to hit Ibarra with the wrench. Romero dropped
the wrench, and said, “I’ll kill him,” before he pulled out his handgun and hit
Cardoso in the head with it. Id. at 219. After Cardoso fell on the couch
“drippin[g] blood,” id. at 219–20, Romero “racked” the handgun and shot him
in the shoulder, id. at 221. After shooting Cardoso, Romero “looked at [Ibarra]
and said[,] ‘Look at what you made me do.’” Id. at 189. Romero then left the
home after pointing the handgun at Ibarra for “a good thirty seconds.” Id.
[7] From Romero’s vehicle, O.I. could hear Ibarra screaming and a gun firing.
When Romero returned to the vehicle, he “started driving kind of fast” and told
O.I. he had “accidentally shot someone.” Tr. Vol. II at 136. Romero drove to
his brother’s house to “cut off his hair” and change clothes, id. at 137, before
returning to his parents’ residence.
[8] Meanwhile, at 12:42 a.m., Ibarra called 911 requesting an ambulance for
Cardoso. When first responders arrived, they transported Cardoso to a local
hospital; he was later airlifted to a second hospital. Law enforcement officers
located an unfired round on Ibarra’s living room floor, and a large wrench
“[c]apable of inflicting serious bodily injury,” id. at 250, “just inside the front
door,” id. at 243.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 4 of 21 [9] The State filed multiple charges against Romero; however, by the trial date, the
State pursued only charges of burglary as a Level 1 felony1 and burglary as a
Level 2 felony2. Romero’s version of the above events was that he and O.I.
were “worried” about Ibarra and wanted to “check on [her] to make sure that
she’s okay and to see if she has made it home” from work. Tr. Vol. III at 36.
Romero denied texting Ibarra about her being scared and his knowing she was
with someone else. Id. at 47. Romero admitted that he “grabbed [his] gun and
. . . put it in [his] waist with [his] holster” before driving to Ibarra’s house. Id. at
36. He claimed that when he arrived at Ibarra’s house, he saw Ibarra and
Cardoso on the couch and “felt betrayed,” so he “pushed the door open to
confront them.” Id. at 39. Romero denied bringing the wrench to the door
with him and claimed that his “gun came out of [his] holster” when Cardoso
kicked him, knocking the magazine out. Id. at 40. According to Romero, he
and Ibarra “both went for the gun,” they “had a tussle,” and the “gun went off”
during the “tussle.” Id.
[10] Warsaw Police Department Lieutenant Ryan Coble testified on rebuttal that
“[w]hen [he] located the firearm within [Romero’s] truck, the gun was
chambered. If the magazine was dislodged at the time of firing, it would not
have cycled the additional round so, therefore, the gun would not have been
chambered when [he] located it.” Tr. Vol. III at 62. Lieutenant Coble had
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(4)(B).
2
I.C. § 35-43-2-1(3)(A).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 5 of 21
previously testified during the State’s case-in-chief that he had “never known a
round to . . . expel from a magazine upon dropping,” and “if a magazine is
seated into a gun[,] the only way to expel a round is to either fire . . . the gun or
rack[] the slide which will then expel . . . the one round unspent.” Id. at 20.
[11] The jury found Romero guilty as charged. The trial court entered a conviction
on the Level 1 felony and sentenced Romero to 35 years of incarceration. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Romero’s
Motions to Remove a Juror and for a Mistrial
[12] Romero asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions
to remove a juror and for a mistrial. At trial, O.I. testified about Romero
waking her up and driving “very fast” to Ibarra’s house. Tr. Vol. II at 134. O.I.
also testified that she saw Romero holding a wrench as he approached the
house. Following O.I.’s testimony, Juror 24 notified the trial court that
“although she did not recognize [O.I’s] name when [the trial court] read
through the potential list of witnesses, once [O.I.] took the stand[,] she thought
she recognized her as a child that she has seen” in the school where the juror
worked. Id. at 167. As a result, the trial court held a hearing outside the
presence of the other jurors. Both the State and Romero’s counsel questioned
Juror 24 about the nature of her relationship with O.I. and her ability to remain
impartial. Juror 24 disclosed that she worked in O.I.’s “classroom with other
kids” as a skills coach, id. at 168, but she had no relationship nor had ever
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 6 of 21
spoken directly with O.I., id. at 169. Juror 24 denied that she “might give
[O.I.’s] testimony greater weight than anyone else’s” because she worked in
O.I.’s classroom. Id. at 169.
[13] Thereafter, Romero moved to have Juror 24 removed and claimed that he
would have used a peremptory strike against her if he had known she worked in
O.I.’s classroom. The trial court denied Romero’s motion, explaining in
relevant part, “The most important question asked was whether or not this juror
would give any greater weight to this witness’s testimony because of the fact
that she sees her in the classroom and she definitively said no”; “I don’t have
any basis to believe this juror can be anything but the unbiased and impartial
juror that we expect her to be and all of our jurors to be.” Id. at 171. Romero
then moved for a mistrial, arguing, “I think it could be prejudicial to my client
even though [Juror 24] stated she could be fair and impartial.” Id. The trial
court denied that motion.
[14] Romero’s motions were based on his belief that the jury was tainted by Juror
24’s “undisclosed classroom relationship” with O.I. Appellant’s Am. Br. at 32.
We review for an abuse of discretion both a trial court’s decision on whether to
excuse a juror and whether to declare a mistrial. Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d
232, 238 (Ind. 2000) (citing Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 55 (Ind. 1998));
Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 936 (Ind. 2014) (citing Gregory v. State, 540
N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind. 1989)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s
decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Jennings v. Smiley, 249 N.E.3d
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 7 of 21
1071, 1075 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015)),
reh’g denied (Mar. 25, 2025).
[15] Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution enshrines a defendant’s right to
an impartial jury. “[C]ourts have a duty to ensure an impartial jury,” but
“jurors need not be absolutely insulated from all extraneous influences.”
Ramirez, 7 N.E.3d at 936 (quoting Caruthers v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1016, 1021
(Ind. 2010)). Biased jurors must be dismissed. Caruthers, 926 N.E.2d at 1020
(citing Joyner, 736 N.E.2d at 232). “A juror’s bias may be actual or implied, but
a court must remove a juror for implied bias—that is, regardless of actual bias—
only where a relationship exists between the juror and one of the parties.” Id.
(citing Joyner, 736 N.E.2d at 238). A constitutionally unbiased juror “is one
who is able and willing to lay aside his or her prior knowledge and opinions,
follow the law as instructed by the trial judge, and render a verdict based solely
on the evidence presented in court.” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind.
2012).
[16] Romero specifically argues that (a) the “classroom relationship . . . created an
unacceptable risk of implied bias,” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 32, and (b) the nondisclosure deprived him of the use of a peremptory strike. We address each
argument in turn.
a. Implied Bias
[17] Romero contends that we should infer that Juror 24 was impliedly biased based
on her “professional proximity” to O.I. Appellant’s Am. Br. at 33. It is true
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 8 of 21
that “when a juror has some connection to the case,” bias may be inferred. Lee
v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Ind. 2000) (citing Threats v. State, 582 N.E.2d
396, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)). In such cases, the trial court should analyze the
potential bias by weighing “the nature and extent of the relationship versus the
ability of the juror to remain impartial.” Id. (quoting McCants v. State, 686
N.E.2d 1281, 1284–85 (Ind. 1997)).
[18] Romero does not claim a close relationship existed between Juror 24 and O.I.—
nor could he. Instead, Romero asserts that Juror 24’s “professional role . . . as a
skills coach with children involving behavioral, ADHD, autism, or DCS-related
needs,” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 37, “created a special risk that she would view
[O.I.] through a protective or professional lens rather than as a neutral fact
witness,” id. at 38. This is pure speculation. The relationship between Juror 24
and O.I.—assuming it qualifies as such—was attenuated and limited. See Alvies
v. State, 795 N.E.2d 493, 500–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a casual or
attenuated relationship has a limited potential for bias), trans. denied. Juror 24
and O.I. were not related and had never even had a casual conversation with
one another. Here, the trial court weighed this casual-at-best relationship
against Juror 24’s assurance that she would remain impartial and determined
that it did not “have any basis to believe this juror can be anything but the
unbiased and impartial juror that we expect her to be and all of our jurors to
be.” Tr. Vol. II at 171. This determination was not illogical or arbitrary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 9 of 21
b. Non-Disclosure
[19] Romero argues that Juror 24’s non-disclosure during voir dire that she worked
in O.I.’s classroom with other children prejudiced him by depriving him of the
use of a peremptory challenge.3 “Generally, proof that a juror . . . lied during
voir dire entitles a defendant to a new trial.” Loehrlein v. State, 158 N.E.3d 768,
771 (Ind. 2020) (quoting State v. Dye, 784 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. 2003)). An
“innocent non-disclosure” may also entitle a defendant to a new trial if the juror
“failed to answer honestly a material question” and the “correct response would
have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Dye, 784 N.E.2d at 473.
“A defendant seeking a new trial because of juror misconduct must show two
things: 1) gross misconduct; and 2) that the gross misconduct probably harmed
the defendant.” Loehrlein, 158 N.E.3d at 771 (quoting Dye, 784 N.E.2d at 473).
[20] Romero claims that Juror 24’s late disclosure that she worked in O.I.’s
classroom kept him from striking her as a juror due to bias.4 Although bias
against a defendant is a valid good cause challenge, Ind. Code § 35-37-1-5, we
have already concluded that Romero failed to prove Juror 24 was biased.
3
Romero cites to this court’s opinion in Loehrlein v. State, 142 N.E.3d 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), which
reversed a conviction due to juror non-disclosure. That appellate opinion was vacated by the Indiana
Supreme Court when it granted transfer. Loehrlein v. State, 149 N.E.3d 602 (Ind. 2020). On transfer, the
Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the juror’s non-disclosure did not probably harm the defendant, so it
affirmed his convictions. Loehrlein v. State, 158 N.E.3d 768, 774 (Ind. 2020).
4
Romero does not include the juror questionnaire in his appendix, so it is unclear what Juror 24 was
specifically asked about the nature of her work. During voir dire, Juror 24 did not recognize O.I.’s name
when the trial court read the list of potential witnesses, and there were no questions directed at Juror 24 about
the nature of her work.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 10 of 21
Accordingly, there was no “valid basis” to challenge Juror 24 for cause. See
Dye, 784 N.E.2d at 473.
[21] Based on the record and briefing before us, we cannot say that Juror 24 was
biased or that there was a valid basis to remove her for cause, so the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Romero’s motion to remove Juror 24.5
Romero nevertheless argues that he suffered prejudice by not being able to use a
peremptory challenge. In making this argument, Romero relies on cases
analyzing gross misconduct and striking jurors for cause. Romero cites to no
authority that has concluded that the loss of the use of a peremptory challenge
following a juror’s non-disclosure is a sufficient reason to reverse a conviction.
Nor is it clear from the record whether he, in fact, had any peremptory
challenges remaining. For these reasons, we conclude Romero has not supplied
cogent reasoning on this issue. See Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring cogent
reasoning). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Romero’s
motion for a mistrial. See Joyner, 736 N.E.2d at 239 (concluding the lack of bias
supported the trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial). Moreover, on
appeal, Romero does not argue that Juror 24’s innocent delayed disclosure
amounted to gross misconduct, and we do not have any reason to believe that
5
Romero also asserts that the trial court’s questioning of Juror 24 was too limited and failed to “adequately
test the risk of implied bias.” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 35. Romero was given the opportunity to question
Juror 24 at trial and did not object that the trial court’s examination of her was too limited. It is well
established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally waived. Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. Ind.,
Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991)). Accordingly, we
decline to address Romero’s appellate argument on the depth of the trial court’s questioning of Juror 24.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 11 of 21
Juror 24’s conduct probably harmed him. Accordingly, Romero is not entitled
to a new trial. See Loehrlein, 158 N.E.3d at 771 (quoting Dye, 784 N.E.2d at
473).
2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Romero’s
Conviction
[22] Romero argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support
his conviction for burglary as a Level 1 felony. Our standard of review for such
a claim is as follows:
“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is
substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element
of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” HanczBarron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis
v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews
only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is
shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State,
226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
[23] In order to convict Romero as charged of burglary under Indiana Code section
35-43-2-1(4), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Romero
broke and entered Ibarra’s dwelling “with intent to commit a felony . . . in it,”
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 12 of 21
and such breaking and entering resulted “in serious bodily injury to” Cardoso.
Romero argues that the State did not prove that (1) he was armed with a deadly
weapon when he broke in, (2) he intended to commit a felony when he broke
into Ibarra’s home, and (3) the burglary itself resulted in Cardoso’s injury. We
address each argument in turn.
[24] First, Romero claims there was insufficient evidence that he was armed with a
deadly weapon during the burglary because the evidence was “internally
uncertain.” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 20. A “deadly weapon” includes a “loaded
or unloaded firearm” or a “weapon, device . . . or other material that in the
manner it . . . is used . . . is readily capable of causing serious bodily injury6.”
I.C. § 35-31.5-2-86(a). Whether a weapon is “deadly” is a fact-sensitive inquiry
in which the factfinder considers the “description of the weapon, the manner of
its use, and the circumstances of the case.” Grogg v. State, 156 N.E.3d 744, 749
(Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Geason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012)), trans. denied.
[25] The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show
that Romero “grabbed [his] gun and . . . put it in [his] waist with [his] holster”
before driving to Ibarra’s house. Tr. Vol. III at 36. Romero also carried a large
wrench—approximately 17 inches long—up to Ibarra’s door, broke down
6
“Serious bodily injury” is “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes” (1) “serious
permanent disfigurement,” (2) “unconsciousness,” (3) “extreme pain,” (4) “permanent or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ,” or (5) “loss of a fetus.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 13 of 21
Ibarra’s door, and swung the wrench at Ibarra like a weapon. Considering the
size of the wrench and Romero’s manner of using it, the jury could reasonably
conclude the wrench was a deadly weapon under the circumstances of this case.
[26] To the extent Romero is arguing the State failed to prove he was armed with
both deadly weapons when he broke into the house, this is a clear request to
reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we will not do, see
Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). The evidence
supporting the verdict includes the following: Romero testified that he put his
firearm in his holster before driving to Ibarra’s home; Ibarra testified that
Romero pulled out his handgun from his waistband; O.I. testified that Romero
approached the house with what she believed was a wrench; Cardoso testified
that when Romero broke in, he had a large wrench; Ibarra testified that the
wrench was not at her house before Romero broke in. The jury could have
reasonably inferred that Romero was armed with both deadly weapons when he
broke and entered into Ibarra’s home.
[27] Second, Romero claims that the State failed to demonstrate that he intended to
commit battery with a deadly weapon when he broke and entered Ibarra’s
home. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the
conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).
“Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an
admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the
reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial
evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite
knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Stubbers
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 14 of 21
v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.
As such, “[k]nowledge or intent may be proven by the
defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which
such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id.
Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1091–92 (alteration in original).
[28] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict
show that Romero was “blowin[g] up” Ibarra’s phone. Tr. Vol. II at 233.
Romero texted Ibarra, accusing her of being with someone else and of being
“scared” to answer her phone. Tr. Vol. IV at 18. Getting no response from
Ibarra, Romero armed himself with a handgun before driving so quickly to
Ibarra’s house that O.I. could not fasten her seatbelt. When Romero arrived at
Ibarra’s house, he saw Cardoso’s vehicle in the driveway, so he walked up to
the front door, carrying a large wrench “[c]apable of inflicting serious bodily
injury,” Tr. Vol. II at 250. Romero tried to hit Ibarra with the wrench as soon
as he smashed through the front door. Romero then said, “I’ll kill him,” before
striking Cardoso in the head with the handgun and shooting him in the
shoulder. Id. at 219. Romero nevertheless claims that there is no evidence of
intent other than “a later, chaotic, and unexplained shooting.” Appellant’s
Am. Br. at 18. Again, we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness
credibility on appeal, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783). The jury could have reasonably inferred that Romero broke
and entered Ibarra’s home armed with deadly weapons, intending to commit
battery with a deadly weapon.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 15 of 21 [29] Last, Romero contends the State failed to prove that Cardoso’s serious bodily
injuries were the result of the burglary. Specifically, Romero claims the State
failed to “establish how the shot occurred, who was where when it was fired,
whether the firearm was intentionally discharged, or whether the serious injury
resulted from the burglary itself rather than an intervening struggle or accidental
discharge during a confrontation.” Appellant’s Am. Br. at 19. Romero’s
arguments on appeal are essentially requests for us to credit his version of the
events over the version presented by the State’s witnesses. Romero’s
opportunity to make such an argument occurred during trial. We have already
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove Romero intended to
commit battery with a deadly weapon when he broke and entered Ibarra’s
home, and Romero does not dispute Cardoso’s injuries were serious. Thus, a
reasonable jury could find that Cardoso’s injuries were the result of the
burglary. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the State presented sufficient
evidence to support Romero’s conviction.7
3. Romero’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
[30] Finally, Romero argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
and should be revised.8 The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to
7
Romero also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of
burglary as a Level 2 felony. Because we have concluded the State presented sufficient evidence to support
Romero’s conviction for burglary as a Level 1 felony and because the trial court entered a conviction on only
the Level 1 felony, we do not address Romero’s claims as to the Level 2 felony. See Stubbers v. State, 190
N.E.3d 424, 431 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 196 N.E.3d 685 (Ind. 2022).
8
As part of his Appellate Rule 7(B) claim, Romero seemingly challenges the weight the trial court placed on
certain aggravators and mitigators. See Appellant’s Am. Br. at 25, 29. “Because the trial court no longer has
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 16 of 21
independently review and revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Tillett v.
State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6), reh’g
denied (July 9, 2026). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule
7(B). The defendant must produce compelling evidence that the sentence is
inappropriate based on the nature of the offense, the defendant’s character, or
both. Id. (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)); Lane v.
State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215,
219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).
[31] Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366
(quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). “[W]e are not
limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.” Brown v.
State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). Considering the trial court’s wide discretion
on sentencing matters, only “exceptional cases” warrant sentence revisions,
Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 856 (Ind.),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024)).
[32] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without
regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State,
any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence,
unlike the pre-Blakely statutory regime, a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in
failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007) (citing Jackson v.
State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Ind. 2000); Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1073–74 (Ind. 1996)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 17 of 21
868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense,
we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer,
868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Romero was convicted of and sentenced on one
Level 1 felony. “[A] person who commits a Level 1 felony . . . shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the
advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b) (emphasis added).
On his Level 1 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Romero to 35 years
executed at the Indiana Department of Correction.
[33] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor
we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the
offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’
offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.”
T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway
v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26,
2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint,
regard, and lack of brutality.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson v.
State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).
[34] Romero woke up 11-year-old O.I., who was staying at his house, to speed over
to Ibarra’s house because he suspected Ibarra was with another man. Romero
smashed through the front door, tried to hit Ibarra with a wrench, struck
Cardoso in the head with a handgun, and shot Cardoso after he fell onto the
couch. Cardoso’s shoulder will “[n]ever” be the same again, Tr. Vol. II at 223;
he had undergone two surgeries by the time of trial and will need more in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 18 of 21
future. O.I. could hear her mother screaming in the house from Romero’s
vehicle, and since that night, she has suffered from anxiety; she “pulls her hair
out,” is startled by “[l]oud noises,” and “the dark terrifies her.” Appellee’s
App. Vol. II at 42. Romero nevertheless argues that the nature of the offense
warrants revision because despite Cardoso’s “injury, [O.I.’s] trauma, and
multiple victims[,] . . . the case resulted in one conviction and one sentence.”
Appellant’s Am. Br. at 25. Regardless of the number of convictions, the fact
remains that Romero shot Cardoso and caused significant emotional damage to
others.
[35] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad
consideration of a defendant’s qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing
Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or
persistent examples of good character,” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting
Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).
[36] Romero has one prior adult conviction for possession of paraphernalia. In
2017, Romero was charged with residential entry and criminal mischief, and he
successfully completed pre-trial diversion, resulting in the charges being
dismissed. While participating in that pre-trial diversion program, Romero was
charged with possession of marijuana; this charge was dismissed as well
following successful completion of another pre-trial diversion program.
Romero argues that his minimal criminal history, steady employment, family
support, and church involvement support revising his sentence because his
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 19 of 21
“character evidence weighs strongly toward a lower sentence.” Appellant’s
Am. Br. at 28. While these qualities may be commendable, they are not so
substantially virtuous or indicative of persistent examples of good behavior as to
outweigh the nature of Romero’s offense.
[37] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that Romero has produced compelling
evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders
his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 119. Romero’s sentence is
not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).
Conclusion
[38] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Romero’s motions
to remove a juror and for a mistrial, the State presented sufficient evidence to
support Romero’s conviction, and Romero’s sentence is not inappropriate. We
therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[39] Affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Nikos C. Nakos
Nakos Law Office
Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 20 of 21 Brandyn L. Arnold
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CR-3277 September 3, 2026 Page 21 of 21