Supreme Court of Florida
Nos. SC2026-1234, SC2026-1236, & SC2026-1281
DANIEL O. CONAHAN, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. SC2026-1282
DANIEL O. CONAHAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
September 3, 2026
TANENBAUM, J.
Daniel Conahan received a death sentence for murdering
Richard Montgomery. Governor DeSantis signed a warrant on
August 11, 2026, and Conahan’s execution was set for September 10, 2026. Conahan appeals from court orders summarily denying
his third and fourth successive motions for post-conviction relief
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and from an
order summarily denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing
filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. He also
requests a stay of execution and has petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.;
see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla.
1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over
sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types
of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). For the reasons
set out below, we affirm the summary denials of post-conviction
relief, deny Conahan’s request for a stay of execution, and deny him
any relief on his habeas petition.
I
The underlying facts of this case are as follows. Sometime in
the evening of April 16, 1996, Montgomery informed some friends
that he was going out to make a few hundred dollars but would
return soon. He did not tell the friends, but he did tell his mother,
that someone had offered him $200 to pose for nude pictures. He
-2-also mentioned, though without identifying Conahan as the offeror,
that he had recently met a Daniel Conahan who lived in Punta
Gorda Isles and was a nurse at a medical center, all of which
accurately described Appellant/Petitioner, Conahan.
The next day, April 17, Montgomery was found dead in a
remote, heavily wooded area. He was nude, his genitalia had been
removed, and he had visible signs of trauma to the neck, waist,
wrists, and back. His body was covered in carpet padding, and
deputies found a rope on top of a nearby trash pile. They also
found human remains from other, unidentified decedents around
the scene. Of note, a K-9 showed unusual interest in a portion of a
tree that looked somewhat flattened and worn down.
An autopsy showed that Montgomery had died from
strangulation. The marks along his neck, chest, and wrists were of
similar width and were consistent with marks that would be left on
an individual who had been tied to a tree. Those marks did not
extend to his back, but Dr. Imami, who prepared the autopsy
report, agreed that the distinct marks on his back were also
consistent with his having been tied to a tree.
-3-In 1994, Conahan carried out an eerily similar assault on
another victim, Stanley Burden,1 who physically resembled
Montgomery and, like Montgomery, was a high school drop-out who
had difficulty maintaining steady income. Conahan approached
Burden and offered to pay him between $100 and $150 to pose for
nude photographs. After Burden agreed, Conahan drove him to the
woods, where Conahan laid out a tarp and took multiple pictures
on a Polaroid camera. Conahan then took out a package of
clothesline so that he could take “bondage” pictures. Conahan
asked Burden to get close to a nearby tree, draped the clothesline
over Burden, then suddenly snapped the rope tightly around
Burden and tied him to the tree, at which point Conahan proceeded
to perform oral sex on Burden before attempting to sodomize him.
After failing to sodomize Burden, Conahan hit him in the head and
attempted to strangle him with the rope for thirty minutes.
Frustrated, Conahan asked Burden why he would not die and
eventually left the scene with Burden still tied to the tree.
1. The details of this assault were presented at trial under the Williams rule. See Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959); § 90.404(2), Fla. Evid. Code.
-4-Based on the similarities in Burden’s and Montgomery’s cases,
law enforcement launched an undercover investigation of Conahan,
during which Conahan twice offered money to an undercover officer
in exchange for sexual favors. This included an offer of $150 if the
undercover officer posed for nude pictures. Law enforcement also
obtained paint samples from Conahan’s father’s car, which
Conahan sometimes used. Analysts found that the paint samples
from the car were indistinguishable from a paint chip that was
found on Montgomery’s body. Law enforcement also found that, on
the evening of April 16, 1996, Conahan’s credit card was used to
purchase clothesline, Polaroid film, pliers, and a utility knife from a
Punta Gorda Walmart. Security photos showed that just minutes
later, Conahan withdrew cash from a nearby ATM. No items
recovered from the crime scene contained Conahan’s DNA. All of
this evidence was presented at Conahan’s bench trial. 2 The trial
court found and adjudicated Conahan guilty of first-degree
premeditated murder and kidnapping.
2. Conahan waived his right to a jury for the guilt phase of his trial.
-5-At the penalty phase of Conahan’s trial, Dr. Huser, a medical
examiner, testified that killing a person by ligature strangulation
would require one to apply pressure for an extended length of time.
She also stated that to be killed by strangulation would be
terrifying. She also opined that Montgomery’s ligature injuries had
all been sustained before he died, which differed from Dr. Imami’s
opinion that some of the injuries were post-mortem, noting that it
defied common sense for Conahan to have restrained Montgomery
after he died.
The jury recommended a death sentence on the murder
conviction by a twelve-to-zero vote. The trial court agreed and
sentenced Conahan to death.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Conahan’s convictions and
sentences, including the death sentence. Conahan v. State, 844
So. 2d 629, 643 (Fla. 2003). For post-conviction timeliness
purposes under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, finality
occurred when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
review on October 6, 2003. See Conahan v. Florida, 540 U.S. 895
(2003).
-6-Since then, Conahan has asserted multiple unsuccessful
collateral challenges to both the judgment and death sentence, in
both state and federal courts. See Conahan v. State, 118 So. 3d
718 (Fla. 2013) (affirming denial of Conahan’s initial motion for
post-conviction relief and denying habeas relief); Conahan v. State,
2017 WL 656306 (Fla. Feb. 17, 2017) (affirming denial of Conahan’s
first successive motion for post-conviction relief); Conahan v. State,
258 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2018) (affirming summary denial of
Conahan’s second successive motion for post-conviction relief);
Conahan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:13-cv-428-JES-KCD, 2023
WL 2648168 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2023) (denying habeas relief);
Conahan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 2950845 (11th Cir. May
31, 2024) (denying Conahan’s motion for a certificate of
appealability); Conahan v. Dixon, 145 S. Ct. 1195 (2025) (denying
Conahan’s petition for writ of certiorari); see also Lightbourne v.
McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 2007) (denying class petition, which
Conahan had joined, challenging the constitutionality of Florida’s
lethal injection procedures); Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529 (Fla.
2014) (denying class petition, which Conahan had joined,
challenging the constitutionality of the Timely Justice Act of 2013).
-7-On February 3, 2023, Conahan filed a third successive rule
3.851 motion for post-conviction relief, which the trial court
summarily denied on July 14, 2026. Meanwhile, on January 17,
2025, Conahan filed his rule 3.853 motion for post-conviction DNA
testing, which remained pending until after the death warrant was
signed on August 11, 2026. He appealed the summary denial of his
third successive rule 3.851 motion on August 7, 2026. Governor
DeSantis set Conahan’s execution for September 10, 2026, and the
trial court denied Conahan’s rule 3.853 motion the day after the
warrant was signed, on August 12, 2026. Conahan appealed that
denial order on the same day.
Meanwhile, Conahan moved this court to extend the time set
by our post-warrant schedule governing post-conviction
proceedings, in the light of his two contemporaneous appeals. After
we denied that motion, Conahan filed a fourth successive motion
for post-conviction relief and a motion to stay execution in the trial
court. Conahan then moved to amend his fourth successive
motion, which request the trial court denied. The trial court then
summarily denied the rule 3.851 motion and the motion to stay in a
single order, and Conahan appealed that order and moved, now in
-8-this court, to stay his execution. Conahan also filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in this court. His three appeals have been
consolidated, and we now address those appeals, his motion to
stay, and his writ petition.
II
Starting with the appeals from the denials of Conahan’s third
and fourth successive rule 3.851 motions, the trial court has the
authority to summarily deny a motion for post-conviction relief if
either the motion fails to sufficiently “allege factual elements
sufficient to constitute a basis for the collateral relief sought” or
“the record conclusively shows no entitlement to relief.” State v.
Weeks, 166 So. 2d 892, 897 (Fla. 1964) (internal quotations
omitted); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B); see also State v. Reynolds,
238 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1970) (holding that the trial court “may
make a summary disposition” when it determines that the motion
either “is defective in form or substance and insufficient to state a
prima facie case entitling the prisoner to relief” or “appears to be
sufficient, but the files and records in the case conclusively refute
the allegations or otherwise conclusively preclude relief”);
Muhammad v. State, 426 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1982) (“If the motion
-9-and the record and files of the case conclusively show that the
movant is not entitled to relief, the motion may be denied without
an evidentiary hearing.”).
In reviewing the trial court’s summary denials, we must treat
the defendant’s “allegations as true except to the extent that they
are conclusively rebutted by the record.” Harich v. State, 484
So. 2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 1986); see also Tompkins v. State, 994
So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim.
Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden.”
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000). “We must
examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and, if so,
determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.” Id.
Applying these principles here, we conclude that the trial court’s
summary denials of Conahan’s successive rule 3.851 motions were
not error meriting any appellate relief.
Both successive rule 3.851 motions hinge on claims of newly
discovered evidence. The “newly discovered evidence” supporting
the third successive motion consists of reports prepared by wouldbe forensic experts who reviewed the autopsy report, the paint
- 10 -evidence, and the fiber evidence from trial on Conahan’s request.
The “newly discovered evidence” supporting the fourth successive
motion consists of a consensus study report documenting
“concerns” with the “Medicolegal Death Investigation System,”
though Conahan’s actual argument simply amounts to his belief
that the State’s experts’ testimony contained “elements of bias.”
The problem with both successive motions is thus clear: although
the reports cited are new, the evidence is not.
To overcome the one-year time limit on rule 3.851 motions by
reason of newly discovered evidence, the motion must allege that
“the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown . . . and
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). Furthermore, any successive
motion for post-conviction relief “must be dismissed” if “there was
no good cause for failing to assert those grounds in a prior motion.”
See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2). There is no reason why Conahan or
counsel could not have, through the exercise of due diligence, dug
into and challenged back in 2003 the autopsy report, the fiber
evidence, or the paint evidence that they ultimately challenged in
Conahan’s third successive rule 3.851 motion, almost twenty years
- 11 -after his death sentence became final.
Likewise, there is no reason why Conahan could not have
argued in a timely post-conviction motion that the State’s experts’
testimony included “elements of bias.” Everything Conahan has
cited to from the consensus study report to support his argument is
a basic, commonsense principle that any lawyer exercising due
diligence could have applied to an analysis of the State’s experts’
testimony, such as the principle that an expert’s testimony should
not be “overly influenced by nonscientific information.” In sum,
nothing in the report was necessary to the argument Conahan
raised in his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion. See Schwab v.
State, 969 So. 2d 318, 325 (Fla. 2007) (noting that this court “has
not recognized [] ‘new research studies’ as newly discovered
evidence”); Sliney v. State, 362 So. 3d 186, 189 (Fla. 2023) (finding
that an updated scientific consensus did not constitute newly
discovered evidence where the operative facts had “long been
available”). Moreover, the report is from a study on deaths of
individuals while incarcerated or in police custody—it is hardly
related to the expert testimony in this case, which centered on the
murder of a civilian that took place in the woods.
- 12 -That said, Conahan’s main argument on appeal, which he also
raised in his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion, is that the thirtyday period between the signing of the death warrant and the
execution date is not long enough for him to fully investigate and
litigate both his pre-warrant and post-warrant claims, which, he
asserts, is a violation of his due process rights. Beyond that,
Conahan contends that the trial court unnecessarily shortened the
time period for him to present his claims in that court, mostly by
making his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion due three days
earlier than it would have been due under the State’s proposed
post-warrant schedule. To bolster that argument and as a separate
basis for relief, Conahan also alleges that the trial court erred in
denying his request to amend his fourth successive rule 3.851
motion as untimely.
Turning first to the amendment request, allowing Conahan to
amend his motion would not have helped him because the
argument he sought to add would have been procedurally barred for
the same reason the arguments he actually made were barred:
Conahan failed to establish that the “newly discovered evidence”
underlying his amendment request could not have been found by
- 13 -the exercise of due diligence or that there was some other good
cause for him not to have raised the argument sooner. See Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A), (e)(2). And he makes no attempt to do so on
appeal. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to
amend.
As for the due process argument itself, a “motion to vacate
judgment of conviction and sentence,” which is what Conahan titled
his fourth successive rule 3.851 motion, is not the proper vehicle
for bringing such a claim. That is because procedural defects in
carrying out a sentence give no reason to vacate the sentence (or
the underlying judgment). At best, Conahan’s due process
argument could be construed as further elaboration on his motion
to stay. That said, the argument lacks merit. We have repeatedly
stated that expedited warrant proceedings do not constitute a
violation of due process. See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 422 So. 3d
107, 118–19 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 402 (2025); Jones v.
State, 419 So. 3d 619, 625 (Fla.) (citing multiple cases that
concluded the same), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025). And this is
so even when claims were pending at the time the warrant was
signed. See Hutchinson v. State, 416 So. 3d 273, 279–80 (Fla.), cert.
- 14 -denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980 (2025). All due process requires is notice
and an opportunity to be heard. See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1,
27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993));
Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Roberts, 2 Fla. 102 (1848). As we found
decisive in Jones, Conahan “has not identified any matter on which
he was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 419 So. 3d
at 625.
Conahan contends that having more time post-warrant would
have enabled him to raise additional claims, noting that he had only
six hours to file public records requests under section 27.7081,
Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852.
Conahan does not identify what those additional claims might have
been, and, more crucially, ignores the fact that he had almost
twenty-three years before the warrant was signed to file any rule
3.852 requests and raise any claims. See Glock v. Moore, 776
So. 2d 243, 254 (Fla. 2001) (recognizing that defendants ought to
show good cause for waiting until after the death warrant is signed
to make public records requests); Sims v. State, 753 So. 2d 66, 70
(Fla. 2000) (explaining that rule 3.852 is “not intended to be a
procedure authorizing a fishing expedition for records”). Conahan
- 15 -cannot wait over two decades and then complain that he has not
had enough time to investigate possible additional bases to
challenge his conviction and sentence. Indeed, he has challenged
them multiple times. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did
not err in denying him relief on his due process claim.
III
Apart from the due process challenge to the denials of the
successive rule 3.851 motions, Conahan focuses his appeal on the
trial court’s denial of his rule 3.853 motion. In that motion,
Conahan asked to test five different items for DNA. The items were
all tested before trial, none were found to contain Conahan’s DNA,
some were found to contain DNA from a contributor other than
Conahan or Montgomery, and these facts were presented at trial.
Now, Conahan argues that advances in DNA science would enable
the third-party contributor to be identified. For purposes of a rule
3.853 motion, the difference between “someone other than
Conahan” and “a specific named individual other than Conahan” is
narrow, to put it mildly.
To grant a rule 3.853 motion, the trial court must find “a
reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted
- 16 -or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had
been admitted at trial.” See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C);
§ 925.11(2)(f)3., Fla. Stat. There is no reasonable probability that
knowing the identity of the third-party contributor would have
changed any aspect of the outcome. And as the trial court noted in
its order denying the rule 3.853 motion, Montgomery’s body was
found in an open area commonly used as a trash dump, so it
“should not, therefore, be surprising that the victim’s hair might
carry random DNA.” The same goes for the two cigarette butts
found at the scene, which contained neither Conahan’s nor
Montgomery’s DNA but did contain a third party’s DNA.
That leaves the two sets of Montgomery’s fingernail clippings,
which contained only Montgomery’s DNA. Conahan argues that
advances in DNA testing may show traces of another contributor’s
DNA. As the trial court pointed out, this argument rests entirely on
the purely speculative notion that Montgomery clawed at his
attacker during the murder. The burden was on Conahan to show
a reasonable probability that his requested DNA testing would
exonerate him or lessen his sentence. See Scott v. State, 46 So. 3d
529, 533 (Fla. 2009). Conahan offered nothing except that maybe
- 17 -someone else’s DNA would be found on Montgomery’s fingernails.
This was not enough to carry his burden. We thus find that
Conahan’s rule 3.853 motion was properly denied.
IV
Lastly, we turn to Conahan’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The petition is essentially an attempt by Conahan to
relitigate the entire case, repeating factual claims from his
previously denied rule 3.851 motions and insisting that this court
must ignore procedural barriers and its own prior decisions
because failing to ignore them would result in a “manifest
injustice.” Conahan asserts that he has been denied meaningful
appellate review, which the procedural history of this case flatly
refutes. See Conahan, 844 So. 2d 629; Conahan, 540 U.S. 895;
Conahan, 118 So. 3d 718; Conahan, 2017 WL 656306; Conahan,
258 So. 3d 1237; Conahan, 2023 WL 2648168; Conahan, 2024 WL
2950845; Conahan, 145 S. Ct. 1195. Conahan insists that he is
nevertheless entitled to what would essentially be another direct
appeal so that his various post-conviction claims can be considered
in the aggregate, ignoring the axiomatic fact that a litigant “is not
- 18 -entitled to two appeals.” See Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642
(Fla. 1958).
We have been clear: “[h]abeas corpus is not a second appeal
and cannot be used to litigate or relitigate issues which could have
been, should have been, or were raised on direct appeal.” Breedlove
v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1992) (citing Porter v.
Dugger, 559 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1990); Clark v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d 192
(Fla. 1990)). Conahan asserts that there is a “manifest injustice”
exception to this principle. He cites cases where we recognized
such an exception to res judicata, collateral estoppel, and “law of
the case” doctrines, but they are distinguishable as arising in nonhabeas contexts.
Still, it is true we have acknowledged a “manifest injustice”
exception to a habeas petition’s being otherwise procedurally
barred. Cf. Walls v. State, 423 So. 3d 865, 876 (Fla.) (considering
and rejecting argument that enforcing procedural bar to habeas
petition would result in “manifest injustice” (citing prior decisions)),
cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1436 (2025). Conahan claims the “manifest
injustice” that would result from our not lifting the procedural bar
here is the execution of a defendant professing his innocence. But
- 19 -he fails to recognize that such an exception could justify ignoring all
procedural bars and allowing never-ending litigation in virtually
every capital case. Rather than point to some recent, exceptional
development that might excuse the procedural bar, Conahan simply
disagrees with the trial court’s and this court’s decisions on his
various post-conviction motions and appeals. This cannot be the
sort of “manifest injustice” over which we will consider a habeas
petition as a second appeal, lest the exception swallow the rule.
The fact is that Conahan has filed five rule 3.851 motions, one
rule 3.853 motion, seven appeals in this court (including the three
that have been consolidated here), a habeas petition, and four
filings in federal court in the over twenty-six years since he was
sentenced. We cannot conclude that it is a manifest injustice to
deny him another chance to rehash everything he has already
litigated in the past two and a half decades. Conahan’s habeas
petition is thus procedurally barred. See id. at 876–77 (rejecting
“manifest injustice” claim because a review of the record and
precedent left the court “confident in the propriety of the sentence
imposed”).
- 20 -Moreover, even if the petition were not procedurally barred, it
lacks merit. In addition to the various issues we already found
meritless in Conahan’s earlier appeals, Conahan focuses heavily on
the evidence referenced in his third successive rule 3.851 motion:
the fiber evidence, the paint evidence, and Dr. Huser’s testimony.
As to the fiber evidence, the State argued at trial that hundreds of
fibers found at the murder scene linked Conahan to the crime,
while Conahan argues that only five fibers could have linked him to
the crime. To the extent that we grant Conahan’s assertion that the
State greatly exaggerated the weight of the fiber evidence, the
relative absence of fibers linking Conahan to the crime would not
establish his innocence. It also would not undermine the case for
his guilt so as to create a reasonable possibility of a different
outcome. The paint evidence is even less availing, with Conahan
acknowledging that the paint chip found at the scene matched all
four layers of paint on his father’s car but emphasizing that the
chip could have matched any car that happened to have the same
four layers of paint. Lastly, Conahan dwells on the fact that Dr.
Huser stated that her testimony was partly based on “common
sense,” ignoring the fact that the jury heard this very admission and
- 21 -still unanimously recommended the sentence of death. Conahan
may feel that the jury gave too much weight to Dr. Huser’s
testimony, but it is not as if the jury did not do so with eyes open; it
is not this court’s role to substitute its judgment on the weight of
the evidence for that of the factfinder. See Holstun v. Embry, 169
So. 400, 405–06 (Fla. 1936).
Montgomery was bound and strangled to death in the woods
shortly after telling his friends that he was going out to make a few
hundred dollars. Burden’s testimony, which the factfinder found to
be credible despite knowing about the challenges posed by
Conahan, established that Conahan had offered him a little over a
hundred dollars in exchange for nude photographs, taken him to
the woods, bound him, and attempted to strangle him. Burden’s
testimony was corroborated by the testimony of an undercover
officer whom Conahan had approached in the same manner. It was
corroborated by Burden’s open court presentation of his scars from
the assault. And it was corroborated by visible marks on a tree that
corresponded with Burden’s injuries.
Other evidence, which Conahan does not attack, established
that he purchased clothesline and Polaroid film—the same
- 22 -materials he used during the attack on Burden—and withdrew cash
from an ATM mere hours before Montgomery’s murder. Finally, Dr.
Huser concluded, based on Dr. Imami’s autopsy report, that
Montgomery died by strangulation. She opined, based on her
medical expertise, that a person would have to strangle another for
a significant length of time to kill him. Moreover, the conclusion
that Montgomery struggled was based not only on Dr. Huser’s
testimony but Dr. Imami’s, as he agreed with the State that the
markings on Montgomery’s back were consistent with his having
struggled against a tree. Conahan has offered no alternative
explanation for how those markings got there, and a K-9’s unusual
interest in a worn-down portion of a nearby tree further supported
the State’s theory of what occurred. Moreover, in the light of all of
that, the paint chip exactly matching all four layers of paint on
Conahan’s father’s car, which Conahan used, is noteworthy. In
sum, even when accounting for Conahan’s arguments, there is no
reasonable possibility that he could have been found innocent or
that the aggravators would not have applied. But this is beside the
point, as Conahan’s repetitious and untimely claims are
procedurally barred. He has shown no entitlement to habeas relief.
- 23 -V
On all the reasoning just set out, we affirm the trial court’s
summary denials of Conahan’s third and fourth successive motions
for post-conviction relief and of his motion for post-conviction DNA
testing, deny him a stay of his execution, and deny him any relief
under habeas.
No oral argument is necessary, and no motion for rehearing
will be considered. The mandate shall issue immediately.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
BARRIOS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County,
Lisa S. Porter, Judge
Case No. 081997CF0001660001XX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Suzanne Keffer, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Brittney Lacy, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Yiitsodirah Final, Staff Attorney, Office of Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Timothy A. Freeland, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, and Suzanne Glickman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
- 24 -for Appellee/Respondent
- 25 -