In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-26-00095-CV
APPROXIMATELY $319,925.00 UNITED STATES CURRENCY, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Carson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 12929, Honorable Dale A. Rabe, Jr., Presiding
August 27, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
This appeal arises from an asset forfeiture proceeding filed by the State of Texas
under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. By his two issues, Oscar
Menjivar, the real party in interest, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the State’s
civil forfeiture action. We reverse and render.
BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2022, at approximately 11:30 a.m., Texas Department of Public
Safety Trooper Darrin Bridges was on routine patrol westbound on Interstate 40 in Carson
County when he stopped a vehicle for traveling 78 miles per hour in a 75-mile-per-hour
zone. The driver, Hector Menjivar, was the vehicle’s sole occupant. He produced a
California driver’s license and a rental agreement showing the vehicle had been rented in
Columbus, Ohio, on November 1, 2022, and was due to be returned in Los Angeles on
November 3. Trooper Bridges observed that the vehicle had a “lived-in” appearance, with
fast-food and convenience-store trash inside, and that Hector appeared more nervous
than the average person during the stop.
Hector told the officer that he had flown from Los Angeles to Columbus on October
31, rented the vehicle the following morning to drive back, and had been in Columbus for
approximately sixteen hours before beginning the return trip. He explained that he had
gone to visit friends and family and did not like flying. Trooper Bridges issued a warning
for the speeding violation but inquired whether Hector had “guns, drugs, or large sums of
U.S. currency” in the vehicle. Hector responded that he had $13 in cash and had used
credit cards for his travel expenses. He did not consent to a search of the vehicle.
Trooper Bridges then detained Hector and requested a canine unit. Investigator
Danny Dawson responded with a narcotics-detection dog, which alerted during a free-air
sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. Officers then searched the vehicle’s rear cargo area
and found a duffel bag secured with a small lock and a sack containing a cardboard box.
A locked safe was inside the cardboard box. Hector stated he did not have the
combination or key to either the lock or the safe. Investigator Dawson cut open the duffel
2
bag and found four vacuum-sealed bundles of currency. No drugs or drug paraphernalia
were found in the vehicle at any time. Hector was arrested for money laundering.1
Upon returning to their facility, officers arranged a luggage line of five boxes, and
the narcotics dog alerted only to the box containing the seized currency. The officers
were also able to open the safe, which contained fifteen additional vacuum-sealed
bundles of money. The currency totaled approximately $319,925, with no accompanying
bank slips. Trooper Bridges deposited the seized funds into an asset-forfeiture account.
Hector was served notice of the forfeiture proceedings. He answered, but he did
not receive notice of subsequent proceedings. The State then sought a default judgment,
but this was set aside on Hector’s motion. Oscar Menjivar, Hector Menjivar’s brother and
employer, and the claimant to the currency, joined in the proceedings.
On December 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the forfeiture.
Trooper Bridges testified at trial, and the State also admitted photographs of the vehicle
and its contents as evidence at trial. According to Trooper Bridges, based on his
experience in money laundering cases, he believed the currency was illegal proceeds
from drug activities. This was largely based on Hector’s described travel pattern (a sameday round trip after only sixteen hours in Columbus), the vehicle’s observable condition,
Hector’s nervous demeanor, and the canine alert. He also testified that Interstate 40 is a
known corridor for transporting drugs and money.
On cross-examination, he admitted that the various issues taken in isolation would
not indicate someone was engaging in money laundering or drug trafficking. However,
1 TEX. PENAL CODE § 34.02.
3
Trooper Bridges also indicated that while the totality of the circumstances led him to
believe he had probable cause to search the car, he did not have any other evidence
related to the fact that this was “drug currency.” He further acknowledged that his
investigation did not identify a specific criminal offense to which the currency was
connected. He was not aware of any other criminal investigation carried out by the State.
Oscar Menjivar testified for the defense at trial. Oscar testified that he operated a
trucking, warehousing, and real estate business in which it is common for him to carry
substantial amounts of cash and maintain several bank accounts. According to Oscar,
Hector was his employee and had been sent to look for used trucks and equipment for
the company’s fleet, including in the Dallas area, and he had given Hector the $319,925
for that purpose. He further testified that the funds came from various sources within his
business operations. While he did not further specify their origin or produce supporting
records, Oscar specifically denied that his other sources were involved with drug
trafficking. On cross-examination, he testified that there was no specific “target” for
Hector to acquire with the currency while Hector was in Texas. He also indicated he was
not sure how Hector flew with the safe or what route Hector took while driving back to Los
Angeles, California. On redirect, he reiterated that the money was part of his legitimate
business proceeds.
After closing arguments, the trial court found that the seized currency was
contraband subject to forfeiture under Chapter 59. The trial court entered an Amended
Final Judgment on December 11, 2025. On January 12, 2026, Oscar filed a motion to
vacate or alternatively to modify this judgment. In his motion, he raised the legal
sufficiency argument related to the judgment. The trial court did not vacate the judgment
4
on Oscar’s no-evidence grounds, but on January 22, 2026, the trial court signed a Second
Amended Final Judgment modifying the judgment. Oscar Menjivar, as claimant for the
currency, timely filed a notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS
By his two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the
judgment. He claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support forfeiture because the
State failed to present a specific offense and evidence connecting the property to criminal
activity. He also claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support probable cause to
seize the currency.
Standard of Review
A forfeiture proceeding under Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
is a matter of civil law. 2000 GMC Sierra Truck v. State, No. 07-16-00356-CV, 2018 Tex.
App. LEXIS 5575, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.05(a), (b). The proceeding is an action in rem against
contraband, which is subject to seizure and forfeiture. State v. Silver Chevrolet Pickup,
140 S.W.3d 691, 692 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); see State v. Ten Thousand Two Hundred
Fourteen Dollars ($10,214.00), No. 07-18-00306-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 1, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op). As applicable here, contraband
means property of any nature that is used or intended to be used in the commission of
any crime articulated in Article 59.01. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.01(2). In
addition to all the other felony offenses related to controlled substances, any felony under
Chapter 34 of the Penal Code (Money Laundering) falls within the definition of
5
contraband, making property used or intended to be used in money laundering subject to
seizure and forfeiture. A person commits money laundering if he knowingly transports
the proceeds (cash) of criminal activity. TEX. PENAL CODE § 34.02(a)(1). “Criminal
activity” is defined as any offense that is “classified as a felony under the laws of this
state.” Id. § 34.01(1)(A).
“In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law have the same weight as a jury verdict.” Stevens v. Avent, No. 07-20-00265-CV,
2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 961, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citing Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994)). A trial court’s finding
cannot stand if it rests on no more than a scintilla of evidence or requires the factfinder to
guess between competing inferences. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 813–14
(Tex. 2005). Under a legal sufficiency standard, we consider all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every reasonable inference in that
party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not
disregard that evidence. Id. at 827.
Issue 2–Probable Cause to Seize
Appellant’s second issue is related to probable cause for seizing the property, but
this probable cause analysis is intertwined with the overarching forfeiture analysis forming
the basis of Appellant’s first issue. In the context of a civil forfeiture proceeding, the State
must establish probable cause exists for seizing the property. $10,214.00, 2020 Tex.
App. LEXIS 2742, at *6 (citations omitted). Probable cause in this context is a reasonable
belief that a substantial connection exists between the property and the criminal activity
defined by the statute. Id. This is accomplished when the State proves that it is more
6
reasonably probable than not that the seized currency was either intended for use in, or
derived from, a violation of the offenses listed in the forfeiture statute. State v. $5,500 in
U.S. Currency, 296 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). As our written
opinion must address every issue raised and necessary to the disposition of the appeal,2
we assume, arguendo, the officers had probable cause to seize the cash involved in this
controversy.
Issue 1–Intent to Use Currency in the Commission of a Statutorily Defined Offense
Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support forfeiture,
arguing the State failed to present a specific offense and evidence connecting the
property to criminal activity. We agree.
In addition to complying with the procedural requirements of Article 59.04, the
State’s only burden in a forfeiture case is proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the property in question is subject to forfeiture, which includes proving probable
cause in the civil forfeiture context. State v. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator, 494 S.W.3d
690, 701 (Tex. 2016); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.04 & 59.05(b); $10,214.00, 2020
Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6. This analysis requires the State to prove a substantial nexus
or connection between the property to be forfeited and a statutorily defined criminal
activity, which may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Id. A final conviction for an
underlying offense is not a requirement for forfeiture. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
59.05(d). But the State may not seize property based on mere suspicion, and it must
prove that the money was used or intended to be used in the commission of a defined
2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
7
criminal activity. One (1) 2004 Lincoln Navigator, 494 S.W.3d at 701; see TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 59.04 & 59.05(b); $10,214.00, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *6.
The narrow question before us is whether the trial court’s conclusion—that the
$319,925 in Hector’s vehicle was the proceeds of an unnamed criminal activity—was
warranted by the cumulative force of all the circumstantial evidence. Generally, the
analysis in similar cases is fact specific. Both civil forfeiture and criminal money
laundering cases are instructive as to what kind of evidence is relevant to show a nexus
between money and drug dealing. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). Utilizing this framework, in support of a nexus between Appellant’s currency
and criminal activity, the State points to evidence of the following: (1) the substantial
amount of money; (2) the packaging of the currency; (3) a trained drug dog’s open-air
alert; (4) the dog’s alert on the package in the luggage line; (5) suspicious activity
consistent with drug trafficking; (6) testimony of an officer’s beliefs; (7) Appellant’s denial
of knowledge of the currency; and (8) the inability to establish the specific origin of the
currency. Civil forfeiture jurisprudence has produced clear standards for evaluating these
evidentiary categories.3 However, here, while we can evaluate the State’s evidence and
3 See, e.g., $10,214.00, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2742, at *7 (possession of large amounts of
currency, standing alone, fails to show any nexus to a defined criminal activity) (citing Approximately $31,421.00 v. State, 485 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied)); $27,920.00 in United States Currency v. State, 37 S.W.3d 533, 535 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (“although drugs may be illicit, possessing large sums of cash alone is licit.”); see also Deschenes v. State, 253 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (traveling a particular route amounts to “mere conjecture” of criminal activity); Id., 253 S.W.3d at 384 n.19 (a positive alert by a canine to the presence of drugs does not evidence that the currency was used in connection with a drug deal); Id. at 385 (the mere fact that a person’s actions match a drug courier profile and that person is carrying a large amount of money that might be involved in some illegal activity is insufficient to establish probable cause to justify forfeiture); Id. at 383, n.10 (a number of courts have observed that nervousness is of minimal probative value, given that many, if not most, individuals can become nervous or agitated when detained by police officers).
8
the totality of the circumstances utilizing the respective standards articulated in case law,
we are still left with suspicions on what criminal activity occurred.
Plaintiff’s Original Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture does not articulate a
specific criminal activity, but rather, the State’s pleading includes the entire laundry list of
felonies and misdemeanors outlined in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 59.01. However, in
the Affidavit of the Seizing Officer attached to the original pleading, Trooper Bridges
observed “many indicators of criminal activity,” and this affidavit also specifically mentions
that Hector was arrested for money laundering. The record also indicates that based on
his experience in money laundering cases, Trooper Bridges believed the currency was
illegal proceeds from “drug activity” at the time of its seizure. However, the State does
not articulate what drug activities were suspected, investigated, or observed.
Notably absent from the State’s case is credible evidence involving any specific
“drug activity.” The State failed to present evidence of a controlled substance transaction,
sale, or delivery at or around the time Hector was arrested for money laundering. No
drugs, drug residue, or drug paraphernalia were found in the vehicle or on Hector’s
person. The State did not present evidence on which narcotics could have been identified
by the dog alert or any lab results identifying a controlled substance on the currency. The
State did not present any evidence regarding Hector’s involvement in drugs or drugrelated activities. Without evidence of an underlying felony, the State also failed to
present evidence of the crime of money laundering. Furthermore, Hector made no
admissions related to the source of the money, other than it being from his brother.
Furthermore, at trial, Oscar’s testimony specifically contradicted the State’s evidence and
the officer’s suspicions of the source of the money and its nexus to drug activity.
9
The trial court as factfinder may draw any and all inferences from the totality of the
circumstances shown by the evidence, but reaching the conclusion that the seized funds
were contraband without proof of criminal activity, as articulated in Article 59.01, requires
us to impermissibly stack inference upon inference. See Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106
S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2003) (“[S]ome suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only
more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence.”). Evidence that a defendant
had the means to commit an offense is not evidence that he committed that offense. See
Deschenes, 253 S.W.3d at 385, n.23 (citing U.S. v. $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th
Cir.1994)) (such evidence not credible, speculative). In sum, nothing more than surmise
or suspicion supports the conclusion that the money was used in connection with criminal
activity or that Hector intended to use it in that way. Accordingly, the State did not meet
its burden, and the evidence is legally insufficient to support forfeiture. We sustain
Appellant’s first issue.
CONCLUSION
Having sustained Appellant’s first issue, we reverse the judgment of the trial court
and render judgment that the State take nothing and that the State return the proceeds
to Oscar Menjivar, the real party in interest.4
Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice
4 Appellant requests in its prayer, in the alternative, that we remand for a determination of “pre- and
post-judgment interest.” Appellant does not, however, brief its entitlement to such interest or provide argument or authority supporting that request. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Nor does the record before us reflect that Appellant requested such interest from the trial court. Accordingly, we decline to address the unbriefed issue or remand for its determination and instead render judgment as set forth herein.
10