United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-1013
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Breyer,* Associate Justice,
Gelpí, Circuit Judge.
Marie L. Cortés-Cortés was on brief, for appellant.
Maarja T. Luhtaru, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E.
Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellees.
September 4, 2026
* Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. José Manuel González ("González"
or "Appellant") participated in a drug venture off the coast of
Puerto Rico. After being indicted, he pled guilty to four
drug-related counts and was ultimately sentenced to 135 months of
imprisonment. González now appeals his sentence, claiming that
it is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the
following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand
for further proceedings as described herein.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Because González pleaded guilty, "we draw the facts from
the undisputed sections of the presentence investigation report
(PSR) and the transcripts of the change-of-plea and sentencing
hearings." United States v. Burgos, 133 F.4th 183, 187 n.1 (1st
Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
González was born and raised in the Dominican Republic.
There, he worked as a fisherman and completed other odd jobs for
twenty-three years. That was, until 2022, when a Colombian
fisherman known as "El Negro" offered González $80,000 to
participate in a drug smuggling venture. González agreed and was
sent 3 million Colombian pesos to hold him over until the venture
began. Before his departure, González was provided with a
preprogrammed GPS which included the coordinates of his
destination, approximately twenty to thirty nautical miles
- 2 -southwest of Puerto Rico. He was informed that he would meet
another vessel at this destination and would drop off the
contraband there. On December 28, 2022, González, along with two
others, cast off from the shores of Venezuela (in a homemade
fiberglass vessel with the engines installed incorrectly) to carry
out their assignment. The vessel traveled slowly, at a speed of
fifteen knots, ultimately reaching its destination after three
days. But once the crew arrived at the coordinates, the vessel
which was set to meet them was nowhere to be found, so they
redirected their watercraft toward Puerto Rico.
On the morning of December 31, 2022, a Puerto Rico Police
Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Acción (FURA) aircraft spotted
Appellant's vessel navigating toward Puerto Rico. The FURA
aircraft alerted a FURA patrol boat which stopped Appellant's
vessel to further investigate. Soon thereafter, a U.S. Customs
and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations patrol vessel
arrived and boarded Appellant's vessel. After boarding, the
agents observed several burlap sack bales located in compartments
on the vessel. The full search revealed twenty-one burlap sacks
which all tested positive for cocaine, totaling 627 kilograms.
Upon questioning by the agents, González indicated that he was the
captain of the vessel. All three individuals aboard the vessel
and the contraband were subsequently transported to the FURA
station in Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico. González and his two colleagues
- 3 -were arrested that same day.
B. Procedural History
On January 11, 2023, a grand jury indicted González on
four counts including: Count One - conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms of or more of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine on board a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in
violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) & (b), 70506(b), and 21
U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii); Count Two - aiding and abetting each
other to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine
on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) & (b), 21 U.S.C.
§ 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; Count Three - conspiracy to
knowingly and intentionally import into the United States more
than five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing
a detectable amount of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952,
960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 963; and Count Four - conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), and 846. On August 29,
2023, González pled guilty to all four counts laid out in the
indictment by way of a straight plea.
The U.S. Probation Office filed González's Presentence
- 4 -Investigation Report ("PSR"), which calculated a total offense
level of 35 after considering both aggravating and mitigating
guideline adjustments. That included a two-level enhancement for
specific offense characteristics pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2Dl.l(b)(3)(C), because González had informed law enforcement at
the time of his arrest that he was the captain of the vessel. It
also included a three-level reduction for timely acceptance of
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E 1.1(a) and (b) and a two-level
reduction for no prior criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1.
Based on that total offense level and no prior criminal record,
the PSR calculated a guideline imprisonment range of 168 to 210
months and a term of supervised release of at least two years and
no greater than five years.
In its sentencing memorandum, the government did not
object to the PSR but proposed an additional two-level reduction
in offense level under U.S.G.G. § 5C1.2 because González met the
safety-valve requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) for non-violent
drug offenders. The government's recommendation calculated a
corresponding total offense level of 33 with a guideline sentencing
range of 135-168 months. Ultimately, the government argued that
a sentence of 135 months was appropriate.
González, for his part, enumerated four main objections
to the PSR in his memorandum. He objected to the captain
enhancement applied pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C) on the
- 5 -ground that being a "captain" requires "special skill" beyond
simply driving a sea vessel. He also argued that he played only
a minimal or minor role in the offense, thereby qualifying him for
an additional two-level decrease pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(17). He requested another two-level reduction pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(l8), which considers mitigating
circumstances, and objected to the imposition of the mandatory
minimum sentence in his case. Ultimately, González argued for a
total sentence of 84 months.
At sentencing, the district court agreed with the
government and imposed a sentence of 135 months of imprisonment
with 5 years of supervised release. González timely appealed to
this Court seeking review of his sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
"Our review of sentences imposed under the advisory
Guidelines is a two-step process: we first examine whether the
district court committed any procedural missteps and, if the
sentence is procedurally sound, we then ask whether the sentence
is substantively reasonable." United States v. Pantojas-Cruz, 800
F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation modified). We begin with a
discussion of whether González's sentence was procedurally
reasonable.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
In assessing procedural reasonableness, we employ a
- 6 -"multifaceted abuse of discretion standard," reviewing "factual
findings for clear error, the interpretation of the guidelines de
novo, and judgment calls for abuse of discretion." United States
v. Pérez-Vásquez, 6 F.4th 180, 204 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation
modified). Furthermore, "we will find an abuse of discretion only
when left with a definite conviction that no reasonable person
could agree with the judge's decision." United States v.
McCullock, 991 F.3d 313, 317 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation modified).
González alleges that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable
because the district court erroneously: (1) adopted and applied
the captain sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C),
and (2) failed to adopt the minor participant role adjustment under
the guidelines. For the following reasons, we find the first
argument unpersuasive. But the government concedes that vacatur
and remand are warranted on the second.
1. Captain Enhancement
González contends that the district court erred by
applying the captain enhancement over his objections. Drawing on
Judge Torruella's dissent in United States v. Trinidad, 839 F.3d
112, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2016), González argues that the sentencing
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(3)(C), whether for captain
or navigator, can only apply to "highly trained, skilled, and
sophisticated defendants who can operate aircraft, submarines, and
are on vessels that require officers." He argues that since the
- 7 -vessel driven in this case was a homemade fiberglass boat, the
level of skill and sophistication required to drive the vessel
does not rise to the level contemplated by the Sentencing
Commission. But nothing in the guidelines requires that the
provision applies only to "highly trained, skilled, and
sophisticated defendants," as Trinidad itself made clear in
addressing the term "navigator." 839 F.3d at 114-16; see also
United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 345-46 (1st Cir. 1997)
(applying captain enhancement to defendant who had acted as a
"pilot" where defendant did not possess special navigational skill
and had merely steered the vessel upon his master's instruction).
And González gives us no reason to think our analysis should differ
with respect to the word "captain."
Next, González argues that although he admitted to being
captain, the government did not make this allegation against him
at the change of plea hearing. But González does not explain why
that is relevant or otherwise question the basis for finding that
he did admit to being a captain.
González further argues that, unlike the defendant in
United States v. Carbajal-Váldez, 874 F.3d 778,784 (1st Cir. 2017),
he did not procure the vessel or take it to a loading point.
However, he does not explain why his failure to procure the vessel
should lead us to conclude he is therefore not a 'captain,' and we
do not see why a person must have procured the vessel to be its
- 8 -captain.
González contends that, in totality, the district court
placed too much weight on his admission of captaincy, but the
record shows otherwise. The district court found that, in
addition to that admission, González had maintained control of the
vessel (despite having two engines installed incorrectly), and
that he had responded to an inquiry by recruiters looking expressly
for boat captains. We therefore find that the district court did
not err in assigning González the captain enhancement.
2. Minor Participant Role
We continue with a discussion of whether González should
have been granted a minor participant role adjustment. "We review
the district court's mitigating role determination for clear
error." United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1038 (1st Cir.
1993) (citation modified). Section 3B1.2 of the Sentencing
Guidelines permits a court to decrease a defendant's offense by
two levels if he is deemed a minor participant. To qualify as a
minor participant, the defendant must be "less culpable than most
other participants in the criminal activity" but their role "could
not be described as minimal." U.S. Sent'g Guidelines Manual
§ 3B1.2 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2004). "A defendant who seeks a
mitigating role adjustment bears the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the downward
adjustment." United States v. Perez, 819 F.3d 541, 545 (1st. Cir.
- 9 -2016). "We have cautioned before that role-in-the-offense
determinations are notoriously fact-specific." United States v,
Arias-Mercedes, 901 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation modified).
"[A]bsent a mistake of law, battles over a defendant's
status . . . will almost always be won or lost in the district
court." United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1995).
At González's sentencing hearing, the district court did
not grant him a minor participant reduction. González asserts
that the district court erred by (1) not discussing relevant case
law in making its determination and (2) failing to conduct the
required five-factor analysis, enumerated in Application Note
3(C), to determine the applicability of the adjustment under
§ 3B1.2.
The government has filed a Rule 28(j) letter withdrawing
its arguments supporting the district court's ruling as to the
minor participant issue, and requesting that we vacate and remand
for the district court to reconsider that issue in light of our
recent decisions in United States v. Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611
(1st Cir. 2025), and United States v. Guzmán-Ceballos, 144 F.4th
1 (1st Cir. 2025). We see no reason to deviate from that course.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
González raises two substantive reasonableness
arguments: (1) that the sentence of 135 months imposed by the
district court creates a sentencing disparity with his
- 10 -co-defendants, and (2) that the district court failed to fully
consider González's compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (the
"safety valve" provision) and all mitigating factors.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
using a "highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." United
States v. Narváez-Soto, 773 F.3d 282, 288 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 234 (1st Cir.
2014)). Our deference to the sentencing court recognizes the
"superior coign of vantage" that it possesses. United States v.
Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Upon
considering "the totality of the circumstances," a sentence will
be considered substantively reasonable provided there "is a
plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result." Id. at
96 (citation omitted). In a case such as this one, where the
challenged sentence falls "within a properly calculated guideline
sentencing range" and is also a "bottom-of-the-range sentence,"
the Appellant faces "a heavy lift." United States v. Angiolillo,
864 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2017).
González first argues that he was unfairly sentenced to
135 months compared to his co-defendants who were each sentenced
to 108 months. We disagree. "Sentencing courts must consider the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct." United States v. Bishoff, 58 F.4th 18, 25 (1st Cir.
- 11 -2023) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)) (citation modified). While
this provision is primarily aimed at minimizing national
sentencing disparities, not those between co-defendants, we have
recognized that sentencing "similarly situated coconspirators or
codefendants to inexplicably disparate terms" may give rise to
"legitimate concerns." United States v. Candelario-Ramos, 45
F.4th 521, 526 (1st Cir. 2022) (citation modified); United States
v. Romero, 906 F.3d 196, 211 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation modified).
To successfully establish such a similarity between codefendants,
a defendant "must compare apples to apples." Bishoff, 58 F.4th
at 26 (citing United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 514
(1st Cir. 2005)). Consequently, a disparity claim may be
unsuccessful where the defendant "fail[s] to acknowledge material
differences between [his] own circumstances and those of [his]
more leniently punished codefendants." United States v.
Reyes-Santiago, 804 F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015) (citation
modified). Material differences may be "dissimilar criminal
involvement, criminal histories, or cooperation with the
government, to name just a few." Romero, 906 F.3d at 211–12; see
United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2013).
González's argument falls short because he failed to
establish how his circumstances are substantially similar to those
of his codefendants. For one, González entered into a straight
plea to all counts in the indictment, whereas his codefendants
- 12 -entered into plea agreements for Count One, resulting in varying
sentences. González's varied sentence can also be explained by
his receipt of the captain sentencing enhancement, which his
codefendants did not receive. Because González was the captain
of the vessel, he was significantly more involved in the drug
venture than his codefendants. Therefore, González's
distinguishable greater role in the venture and straight plea
demonstrate that his codefendants are not "appropriate
comparators" as required for a sentencing disparity claim to
prevail. See Bishoff, 58 F.4th at 26. González has therefore
failed to compare apples to apples.
As to González's second argument, he asserts that the
district court failed to weigh his compliance with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f) as a factor in favor of granting him a sentence below
120 months and failed to consider relevant mitigating factors
contained in the PSR as is required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The record before us, however, does not support these contentions.
In declaring González's sentence, the district court explicitly
acknowledged that González met the requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f). The district court stated that González was a
first-time offender with no known history of violent behavior or
substance abuse, thereby mitigating recidivism risks. With
respect to other mitigating factors outlined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), the district court verbally acknowledged González's
- 13 -age, level of education, employment, and financial status in its
decision. The district court also took care to read over "the
pre-sentence investigation report, the plea agreement, sentencing
memorandum, and objections to the pre-sentence investigation
report filed on behalf of Mr. González, the probation officer's
response to the objections, the Government's sentencing
memorandum . . . and arguments by counsel, arguments by the
Government, and Mr. González's allocution."
While the district court may not have explicitly
addressed all of González's mitigating factors, such as his health,
in its formal announcement of the sentence, we have stated that
"when explicating the sentence imposed, [a] court is not required
to address the sentencing factors, one by one, in some sort of
rote incantation. . . . It is enough for the court simply to
identify the main factors driving its determination." United
States v. Ruperto-Rivera, 16 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2021) (citation
modified). Furthermore, "we have warned against reading too much
into a district court's failure to respond explicitly to particular
sentencing arguments." United States v. Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d
566, 571 (1st Cir. 2016) (citation modified). We therefore find
no reason to think that the district court abused its discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for the district court to revisit the minor
- 14 -participant role adjustment.
- 15 -