In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
NO. 09-26-00013-CR
MICAHEL WAYNE LOWMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24-07-10974
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this accelerated appeal, Michael Wayne Lowman appeals the trial court’s
decision to deny bail pending appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(g).
A grand jury indicted Lowman for stalking, a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 42.072(b).1 Lowman pleaded “not guilty” to the charge, but a jury
found him guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment. The jury then assessed
1
This Court issued a separate opinion in this case related to the underlying crime under cause number 09-25-00152-CR.
1
punishment at fifty-four months of incarceration, and the trial court sentenced
Lowman in accordance with the jury’s verdict.
Lowman filed a pro se motion for new trial. On August 6, 2025, Lowman sent
the trial court a pro se written request for the trial court to set a bond pending his
appeal. On September 25, 2025, Lowman filed a pro se Application for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. On November 21, 2025, Lowman’s appellate counsel filed a Motion
for Reasonable Bail Pending Final Determination of Appeal. On December 1, 2025,
the trial court held a hearing on Lowman’s motion. The same day, the trial court
signed an order denying Lowman’s motion. Lowman timely appealed the trial
court’s order denying bail on appeal.
On appeal, Lowman argues the trial court committed reversible error in
denying bail pending his direct appeal by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on
his motion, relying on two dismissed charges when concluding that he was likely to
commit an offense while on bond, and relying on the judge’s recollection from the
trial seven months earlier. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s decision regarding appeal bonds under an abuseof-discretion standard of review. Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981). An appellate court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court, but we ask whether the trial court’s decision was made without reference
2
to any guiding rules or principles of law, or in other words, whether it was arbitrary
or unreasonable. See Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). If the trial
court’s decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we must uphold the
decision of the trial court even if we would have reached a different result.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
Analysis
First, Lowman argues the trial court committed reversible error by failing to
hold an “evidentiary hearing on bond pending appeal” in violation of his due process
rights under the Texas and United States Constitutions.
The primary objective of an appeal bond is to secure the appellant’s
apprehension if that appellant’s conviction is subsequently affirmed. Ex parte
Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Convicted felons are not
guaranteed the right to bail under the Texas Constitution. See Ex parte Lowe, 573
S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 11. Article
44.04(b) renders a convicted felon ineligible for bail pending appeal where
punishment of more than ten years of confinement has been assessed, or the
conviction is for an offense listed under article 42A.054(a).2 See Tex. Code Crim.
At the time of Lowman’s trial, stalking was not an offense listed under
2
42A.054(a). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(b).
3
Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(b). When the assessed punishment for a felony conviction is
ten years or less, the trial court has discretion to modify bail, set a reasonable bail,
deny bail, revoke existing bail, or impose reasonable conditions on bail. Id. art.
44.04(c), (d).
In determining what constitutes reasonable bail on appeal, the trial court
considers factors including the length of the sentence, the nature of the offense, the
appellant’s work record, family ties, length of residency, appellant’s ability to make
bail, appellant’s prior criminal record and conformity with previous bond conditions,
and any aggravating factors in the offense. Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849-50.
The trial court may also deny bail altogether if there is good cause to believe that the
defendant would not appear when his conviction became final or is likely to commit
another offense while on bail. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(c).
Because Lowman was sentenced to fifty-four months in prison and his
conviction did not involve offenses listed in article 42A.054(a) at the time of his
trial, he was eligible for bail pending his appeal. Cf. art. 44.04(b). Nevertheless, the
trial court had discretion to deny bail if the trial court believed that Lowman would
not appear when the conviction became final or that Lowman would be likely to
commit another offense while on bail. See id. art. 44.04(c).
On appeal, Lowman argues that the trial court denied him due process by
“refus[ing] to hold a hearing on bond even though Appellant was statutorily eligible
4
for bond pending appeal.” Lowman argues that he was denied constitutional due
process for lack of hearing.
The record in this cause includes a reporter’s record for an “Appellate Bail
Hearing” which was held on December 1, 2025. In the hearing, the following
exchange occurred:
THE COURT: This is The State of Texas v. Michael Wayne Lowman,
Cause No. 24-07-10974. Good afternoon, Mr. Lowman. Your attorney
is asking for a hearing on a possibility of an appeal. It’s my
understanding this case is on appeal, and the Court of Appeals -- Go
ahead and tell me where this case is at.
[APPELLATE COUNSEL]: I was appointed to do an appeal on this
case. My brief is pending. We have a new turn-in date about 28 days
out. During the interim, we filed a motion under 44.04 of the Code to
have an appellate bond set. My motion references that Code section.
Mr. Lowman has never failed to appear in this court on any motions.
He will return to appear for any settings that this Court deems
appropriate. We are asking for a reasonable bond to be set in this case
and -- so that he can be out and function.
He has a child he would like to be helping raise; child support issues
that he would like to be able to meet. He has family members that would
support him, and we are asking we have a full-blown hearing set for
bond setting so we can accomplish that and have a reasonable bond set.
THE COURT: Your request for a hearing is denied.
We have had numerous bond hearings on this case. Because a jury
convicted him and sentenced him to prison, I do not believe he’s
entitled to a bond.
Furthermore, I do think that -- I sat through the entire trial and there
was numerous witnesses and evidence presented by the State that other
crimes were committed, that the protective order was violated. It’s my
5
understanding the State was going to dismiss the violation of protective
order because he was convicted on this one --[THE STATE]: That’s correct, Judge.
THE COURT: -- but it was not dismissed for a lack of evidence. We
heard evidence of that during the main-body trial.
Does the State have a response to place on the record?
[THE STATE]: I would place on the record . . . the offense, that is
stalking, that this defendant was convicted of has repetitive behavior
and the evidence presented in trial indicates that this defendant is likely
to commit another offense and with that, I would ask the Court deny his
bail.
THE COURT: I will make that finding that he is likely to commit
another offense. Request for a hearing, sir, is denied.
[APPELLATE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge.
We review a trial court’s decision on bail pending appeal for an abuse of
discretion. See Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d at 511. On the record before us we
conclude that Lowman received both a notice and a hearing on his motion for bail
pending appeal. The record includes the reporter’s record from the “Appellate Bail
Hearing[,]” and Lowman’s appellate attorney was present, did not object, and
declined to put forth evidence or additional argument. See Smith v. State, 993 S.W.2d
408, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the
defendant “waived his due process contention by actively participating in the hearing
without a single objection[.]”); see also Shah v. State, 403 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex.
6
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (holding that failing to object waives the
appellant’s due process argument); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
To the extent that Lowman intended to challenge the trial court’s denial of
bail on the merits, we conclude that the issue is inadequately briefed, and we decline
to address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i); Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166,
180 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“It is incumbent upon Appellant to cite specific legal
authority and to provide legal arguments based upon that authority.”); see also Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04 (outlining the requirements for “Bond Pending
Appeal”). We overrule Lowman’s issues and affirm the trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on August 27, 2026
Opinion Delivered August 31, 2026
Do Not Publish
Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.
7