NUMBER 13-24-00495-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CHRISTOPHER GARCIA Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 377TH DISTRICT COURT
OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West
Appellant Christopher Garcia appeals his convictions for assault of a family
member and unlawful restraint. By a single issue, appellant argues the trial court violated
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
admitting the complainant’s prior statements. We affirm because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it allowed the State of Texas to admit the complainant’s out-ofcourt statements under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, an exception to the
Confrontation Clause. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
The State brought three counts against appellant by indictment: (1) possession of
a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more
but less than four grams; (2) assault of a family member with a previous conviction; and
(3) unlawful restraint by exposure to substantial risk of serious bodily injury. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(c); TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a), (b)(2)(A);
20.02(c)(2)(A). Appellant pled true to an enhancement paragraph alleging he previously
committed two felony offenses. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(d).
Appellant only challenges his convictions on counts two and three. As to count two,
the State alleged that on October 27, 2023, appellant assaulted his girlfriend, Amanda
Garza. It specifically alleged that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 1 caused
bodily injury to Garza by pulling her hair, striking her head against a hard surface, or
causing the door of a motor vehicle to strike her leg. As to count three, the State alleged
that on October 27, 2023, appellant intentionally or knowingly by force, intimidation, or
deception, restrained Garza without her consent and recklessly exposed her to a
substantial risk of serious bodily injury by moving her from one place to another.
1 The State’s indictment charges appellant in the conjunctive, while Section 22.01 provides the
mens rea in the disjunctive. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). Nevertheless, the jury charge accurately lists the mens rea in the disjunctive.
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B. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Hearing
The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the
admissibility of Garza’s out-of-court statements under the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49. The State specifically sought to
introduce and admit Garza’s out-of-court statements to Officer Miguel Cornier regarding
the incident.
The State’s first witness was Cornier, a police officer with the Victoria Police
Department (VPD). Cornier testified that he was one of the responding officers to the
underlying assault, and he obtained a statement from Garza. Garza told Cornier that
during the assault, appellant stated, “I will f[***]ing kill you, b[****].” He drove her in his
vehicle to “a boat ramp,” parked, and stated, “This is what you wanted, right? I’m going
to kill you here.” Garza said appellant “started fumbling through the vehicle, as if he was
searching for something,” and she was concerned appellant had a knife. When attempting
to get her out of his vehicle, appellant stated, “You think I did Jose wrong. Nobody will find
you here.”2 Eventually, appellant took Garza back to her home but remained in the area
for a time before taking off. Cornier testified that Garza appeared “uneasy or fear[ful].”
After Cornier’s testimony, the State offered, over the defense’s objection, the jail
call between appellant and Garza. 3 At the beginning of call, appellant tells Garza he loves
her and she has “got to get him out of here.” She then asks, “Why did you do all this?”
and he responds, “Baby I didn’t do nothing. I just trying to f[***]ing get away and they hurt
2 The identity of “Jose” was never established.
3 Appellant contends in his appellate brief that the jail call was actually between him and his wife,
Jessica Garcia. However, appellant never challenged the authentication of the jail call, nor did he dispute the identity of the woman whose voice is heard on the call.
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me.” Later, Garza tells appellant “a mandatory protective order is in place for us”; and
“[inaudible] is calling me too asking for you, Leo, everybody. Your mom won’t even give
me the car. . . . Baby Joe came and dropped off all my shit.” Finally, near the end of the
call, appellant tells Garza, “They didn’t have no probable cause to search my vehicle, they
searched my vehicle, that’s thrown out”; “They’re going to drop all this shit because they
did everything wrong”; and “[W]hen I get out of here baby we’re moving, okay?”
Next, the State called appellant’s wife, Jessica Garcia. Jessica testified that she
and appellant began seeing each other in July or August 2023 and got married in May
2024; however, at the time of trial they were going through a divorce. She later testified
they were not in a relationship before he was incarcerated. She confirmed, however, that
Garza was appellant’s girlfriend at the time of the offense, and she knew Garza through
appellant. She further testified her son was a friend of Garza. While appellant was
released on bond, Jessica contacted the police fearing appellant would harm Garza. She
explained appellant told her “he wasn’t going back to prison because he didn’t do it and
that he had went to Cuero[, Texas] to get something to harm [Garza] with and—because
he was staking out places that she was at.” Jessica clarified that appellant obtained a gun
in Cuero, and she took his statements seriously.
The State next called two detectives from the VPD. Detective Amanda Caughey
stated that she was made aware of appellant’s threats regarding Garza. Caughey said an
officer went to Garza’s residence and spoke with Garza’s mother who informed him Garza
“was staying with a Nicolas Escobar[, her boyfriend,] in Telferner.” Caughey said VPD
attempted but failed to contact Garza in Telferner. Detective Justin Garcia testified he also
attempted to make physical contact with Garza by visiting multiple possible addresses to
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no avail. Detective Garcia did, however, obtain Garza’s phone number, and she told him
she was staying at a shelter. Garza was not at the shelter prior to trial, and law
enforcement could not locate her at any of her last known residences. On crossexamination, Detective Garcia said he informed Garza about the importance of appearing
in court and testifying, and “she knew she was supposed to be here.” The following
exchange then occurred:
[Detective Garcia]: I mentioned, you know, that it was very important that
she come and testify. She mentioned okay, that she
had been threatened, but . . . she didn’t specify who
made the actual threats. I didn’t go into that with her.
[Defense Counsel]: Did she relay to you that she wasn’t here because of
those threats?
[Detective Garcia]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: So we don’t know why she’s in the wind?
[Detective Garcia]: I don’t know.
Lastly, the State called Nora Kucera, a pre-trial services coordinator. She testified
she was assigned to supervise Garza after her arrest in 2022, wherein the trial court
ordered Garza to wear an ankle monitor. 4 Kucera alleged Garza violated the terms of her
release by removing the ankle monitor. Kucera also stated she did not believe Garza
would cooperate in any case she was involved in and would not appear if subpoenaed.
Prior to its ruling, the trial court took judicial notice of its record, stating: “The Court
takes judicial notice of the Court’s file, . . . [and] the pre-indictment case SA102-312529,
where [appellant] was advised that there was a bond condition. He was not to have any
contact with Amanda Garza. It was filed on October 30[], 2023, at 10:44 [a.m.].”5 The trial
4 The record does not reveal what offense Garza was arrested for.
5 This order does not appear in the appellate record.
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court then sustained the State’s motion and made a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing,
allowing admission of Garza’s out-of-court statements to Officer Cornier.
The jury found appellant guilty on all three counts and sentenced him to
imprisonment for life for each count. Appellant appealed counts two and three, assault of
a family member and unlawful restraint. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
discretion, and we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). A trial court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably without reference to any
guiding rules or principles. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The clause “protects a defendant’s right of crossexamination by limiting the prosecution’s ability to introduce statements made by people
not in the courtroom.” Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 784 (2024). Forfeiture by
wrongdoing is a long-recognized equitable exception to the Confrontation Clause, which
extinguishes confrontation claims. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 117 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)). “The doctrine is
based on the principle that ‘any tampering with a witness should once [and] for all estop
the tamperer from making any objection based on the results of his own chicanery.’”
Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting Gonzalez, 195
S.W.3d at 117). The doctrine is codified in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article
38.49. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49.
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To establish forfeiture of wrongdoing, the State must show by a preponderance of
the evidence: “(1) that the declarant-witness is unavailable, (2) that the defendant
engaged in wrongful conduct, (3) that the wrongful conduct procured the unavailability of
the witness and (4) that the defendant intended to procure the unavailability of the
witness.” Brown v. State, 618 S.W.3d 352, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting State v.
Cox, 779 N.W.2d 844, 851 (Minn. 2010)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.49(c)
(providing that forfeiture by wrongdoing must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence). As to the third requirement, “procurement or causation need not be proven
directly, but may be established by inference.” Brown, 618 S.W.3d at 357. The State is
also not required to show the defendant’s “sole intent was to wrongfully cause the
witness’s or prospective witness’s unavailability,” that the defendant’s actions “constituted
a criminal offense,” or that “any offered statements are reliable.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 38.49(d).
At an Article 38.49 hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and the evidence.
See id. art. 38.49; Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). When, as
here, the trial court does not issue findings of fact, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the court made findings that are
supported by the record. Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
III. DISCUSSION
By his sole issue, appellant argues the trial court violated his Confrontation Clause
rights when it admitted Garza’s out-of-court statements because the State failed to prove
forfeiture by wrongdoing applies to this case. As stated above, the State was required to
show (1) Garza was unavailable, (2) appellant “engaged in wrongful conduct,” (3) such
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wrongful conduct procured Garza’s unavailability, and (4) appellant “intended to procure”
Garza’s unavailability. See Brown, 618 S.W.3d at 356. It is undisputed that Garza was
unavailable to testify. As to the remaining factors, the trial court had before it the following:
• According to Cornier, who spoke with Garza, appellant verbally threatened to kill
her at least three times during the underlying assault. Garza sustained injuries,
and after appellant eventually dropped her off at her mother’s house, he remained
outside the residence for some time. Cornier testified Garza appeared afraid.
• Jessica testified that while appellant was out on bond, he told her that he
purchased a weapon to harm Garza because “he wasn’t going to go back to
prison.” She further testified the weapon was a gun, and appellant appeared
serious. She informed officers of his statements that same day.
• Detective Garcia obtained Garza’s phone number and contacted her the week
before trial. In the phone call, he told her “she was needed for trial,” and in
response, Garza mentioned “that she had been threatened.”
• The jail call between appellant and Garza wherein Garza mentioned a protective
order was in place, and appellant stated, among other things, that he would be
getting out of jail because the charges would be dropped.
• An order in case number SA102-312529, issued in the morning on the day of the
jail call, provided that as a condition of his release on bond, appellant shall have
no contact with Garza.
Though Garza did not specify who threatened her, and detectives did not know
why she was not at trial, we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s
ruling. See Weems, 493 S.W.3d at 577; see also Hickerson v. State, No. 14-24-00699-8
CR, 2026 WL 538741, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 26, 2026, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“When assessing evidence regarding acts
alleged to have procured a witness’s unavailability, we draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the trial court’s ruling.”). From the evidence above, the trial court could reasonably
infer that appellant threatened Garza, he intended to procure her unavailability so she
would not testify against him, and she was unavailable at trial because of appellant’s
threats. See Mohsin v. State, 691 S.W.3d 193, 206–07 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. ref’d)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion for
forfeiture by wrongdoing in part because of appellant’s extensive history of domestic
violence against the complainant and evidence appellant violated the complainant’s
emergency protective order when he communicated with her from jail); see also McGee
v. State, No. 05-17-01445-CR, 2019 WL 2004059, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 7, 2019,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (providing that forfeiture by wrongdoing
does not require “[a] direct threat or demand from the defendant to the witness to avoid
service or not appear in court”); cf. Khan v. State, No. 02-22-00069-CR, 2024 WL
3458073, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (holding the trial court abused its discretion when it found forfeiture by
wrongdoing because the record merely showed the appellant made threats to the
complainant before the underlying crime).
Appellant argues the State failed to show he caused or procured Garza’s
unavailability. He contends there is no evidence the threat he made to Jessica regarding
Garza was ever communicated to Garza prior to trial. As stated above, however, the
procurement or causation requirement “may be established by inference.” See Brown,
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618 S.W.3d at 357; Mohsin, 691 S.W.3d at 206. Further, a “direct threat” is not required
to prove that the defendant caused the witness to be unavailable. See Mohsin, 691
S.W.3d at 204 (“A direct threat or demand from the defendant to the witness to avoid
service or not appear in court is not required. What is required is that the defendant
procured the witness’s absence through wrongdoing.” (quoting McGee, 2019 WL
2004059, at *7)); see also Byrd v. State, No. 07-20-00234-CR, 2022 WL 2719060, at *7
(Tex. App.—Amarillo July 13, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding forfeiture by wrongdoing and
admitting complainant’s out-of-court-statements even though “there [wa]s no evidence of
a direct threat or command from” appellant to the complainant); Espinoza v. State, No.
05-17-00547-CR, 2018 WL 6716619, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 21, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (same where there was “no evidence of a direct
threat or command from appellant to [the complainant] to avoid service or not appear in
court,” and the record was otherwise “replete with evidence that this is precisely the
outcome appellant intended”). Moreover, the trial court heard that (1) Jessica knew Garza
in part because Garza was her son’s friend, (2) VPD officers, while failing to make contact
with Garza about the threats, made contact with Garza’s mother, and (3) the jail call
showed appellant’s family contacted Garza about appellant. Thus, the trial court could
reasonably infer Garza received appellant’s threat when she told an officer that she had
been threatened. See Mohsin, 691 S.W.3d at 204; see also Byrd, 2022 WL 2719060, at
*7; McGee, 2019 WL 2004059, at *7; Espinoza, 2018 WL 6716619, at *13.
From this evidence, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
granted the State’s motion to admit Garza’s out-of-court statements under the doctrine of
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forfeiture by wrongdoing. Consequently, we conclude appellant’s confrontation claim is
barred. See Gonzalez, 195 S.W.3d at 117. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JON WEST
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the
31st day of August, 2026.
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