NUMBER 13-26-00466-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE ATTUNE INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC,
TWFG INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC, AND
SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca1
By petition for writ of mandamus, relators Attune Insurance Services, LLC (Attune),
TWFG Insurance Services (TWFG), and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. 2
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”); id. R. 47.4 (explaining the differences between opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 The petition for writ of mandamus identified the relators as Attune Insurance Services, LLC,
Blackboard Insurance Company, American International Group, TWFG Insurance Services, LLC, and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. However, relators’ reply brief informs us that Blackboard (Sedgwick) assert that the trial court 3 abused its discretion by consolidating two dissimilar
cases less than thirty days before trial, and they lack an adequate remedy by appeal to
address this error. We agree, and we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 5, 2022, real parties in interest Dr. Lena Speck Hopkins, individually
and on behalf of Speck Hopkins Management, LLC d/b/a Speck Hopkins MD (Speck
Hopkins) filed suit against various defendants, including relators, in the 107th District
Court of Cameron County, Texas, after a fire damaged a building owned by Speck
Hopkins and in which Dr. Hopkins operated her medical practice. According to the real
parties’ petition, the Harlingen Fire Department determined that the fire was caused by a
defective laptop; however, a consulting group hired by relators disagreed, determining
that the fire was caused by an unattended lit candle. The real parties filed suit against the
companies that designed, manufactured, marketed and sold the laptop for causes of
action sounding in product liability. According to the petition for writ of mandamus, these
defendants “have reportedly all settled and are no longer participating in the underlying
lawsuit.” As relevant to this original proceeding, the real parties also filed suit against
various defendants, including relators, on grounds relating to insurance coverage for the
fire (the insurance case). On May 29, 2025, the real parties, joined by Jeffelyn
Investments, Ltd. as another owner of the building, filed a third amended petition against
relators alleging contractual and extracontractual claims including breach of the insurance
Insurance Company and American International Group “have reportedly resolved their differences” with the real parties in interest. We revise the identity of relators accordingly. See id. R. 52.1, 52.2.
3 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number 2022-DCL-03817 in the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Benjamin Euresti Jr. See id. R. 52.2.
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policy, common-law bad faith, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA) and Texas Insurance Code, fraud, negligence, conspiracy, and joint enterprise.
The real parties sought to recover actual damages, treble damages, and punitive
damages.
On November 24, 2025, Amur Equipment Finance, Inc. (Amur) filed suit against
Lena Speck Hopkins MD PA (MD PA) and Dr. Hopkins in the County Court at Law
Number 2 of Cameron County, Texas (the debt case). Amur alleged that it sold MD PA
equipment, and MD PA had defaulted on the account and currently owed Amur the sum
of $177,210.03. Amur alleged that Dr. Hopkins served as the guarantor on the account
but had declined to pay the debt. 4 The equipment finance agreement attached to Amur’s
petition describes the equipment as “TruSculpt iD System & Accessories.”
Amur alleged causes of action against Dr. Hopkins and MD PA for sworn account,
breach of contract, open account, breach of security agreement, breach of the guaranty
agreement, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Amur sought to recover the amount
currently due on the account plus interest and attorney’s fees. In this lawsuit, Dr. Hopkins
and MD PA filed a third-party petition against relators and others based on the same
claims that Dr. Hopkins, Speck Hopkins, and Jeffelyn made against relators in the
insurance case. They later filed a first amended third-party petition reiterating and
expanding on these same allegations.
On March 25, 2026, in the insurance case, Dr. Hopkins, Speck Hopkins, and
Jeffelyn filed a motion to consolidate the insurance case and the debt case. These real
4 The equipment finance agreement was executed between LeasePoint Funding Group, LLC (LeasePoint) and MD PA, and an unconditional guaranty was executed on the same date between LeasePoint and Dr. Hopkins individually. LeasePoint assigned its rights under these agreements to Amur.
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parties asserted, in relevant part, that the “bad faith conduct” of the relators, including
their failure to pay their claim under the relevant insurance policy, had “resulted in past
and ongoing damages.” The real parties alleged that:
Given [real parties’] complete loss of [the medical practice] for nearly two
months, and subsequent operations at a diminished capacity, they
experienced significant losses in operating income. Struggling to make
ends meet—and with the lack of income derived from seeing patients—[real
parties] were left in the unenviable position of being unable to pay financing
notes for medical equipment that was used in their practice and ruined by
the January 20, 2022, fire. Timely and complete payment would have
mitigated those damages.
The real parties noted that they had asserted a third-party petition against relators
“asserting the same claims and arising from the same facts” in the debt case. They
requested the trial court to consolidate the two cases because:
both actions: 1) arise from the same January 20, 2022, fire at [real parties’]
medical facility; 2) involve the same insurance policy and claim handling,
and the consequences thereof; 3) assert identical or substantially similar
causes of action against the same [relators]; and 4) require the same
witnesses, documents, and potential expert testimony.
Relators filed responses in opposition to the motion to consolidate, as did “non-party”
Amur, and the real parties filed a reply thereto. On May 19, 2026, the trial court held a
hearing on the motion to consolidate, and on May 27, 2026, the trial court granted the
motion. At that time, the insurance case was set for trial on June 22, 2026.
This original proceeding ensued. By two issues, relators assert that: (1) the trial
court abused its discretion by consolidating two dissimilar cases—a debt collection case
and an insurance “bad faith” case arising from different contracts between different
parties—less than thirty days before trial; and (2) they lack an adequate remedy by appeal
to address this error. The Court ordered the real parties to file a response to the petition
for writ of mandamus, and Dr. Hopkins, Speck Hopkins, Jeffelyn, and MD PA duly filed a
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response. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.8(b). Relators have filed a reply thereto.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. In re Allstate Indem. Co.,
622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840
(Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that: (1) the trial court
abused its discretion; and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re USAA
Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex.
1992) (orig. proceeding). “The relator bears the burden of proving these two
requirements.” In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
III. CONSOLIDATION
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure “permit and govern the joinder, consolidation,
severance, and separate trials of both claims and parties, as necessary to promote the
efficient and just resolution of legal disputes.” Boeing Co. v. Sw. Airlines Pilots Ass’n, 716
S.W.3d 140, 154 (Tex. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1616 (2026). These rules allow trial
courts to “avoid prejudice, do justice, and increase convenience.” Id. at 155 (quoting Sealy
Emergency Room, L.L.C. v. Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of Am., L.L.C.,
685 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. 2024). Trial courts have “broad discretion” regarding these
procedural matters; however, this discretion is not “unlimited.” Womack v. Berry, 291
S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. 1956) (orig. proceeding); see Boeing Co., 716 S.W.3d at 154.
Consolidation “involves merging separate suits into a single proceeding under one
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docket number.” H.K. Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see In re Marshall, No. 14-24-00672-CV, 2025 WL 719838, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 6, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem.
op.). “After consolidation all issues of law and fact are merged.” Amir-Sharif v. Cadieux,
No. 05-14-01055-CV, 2015 WL 1346154, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 25, 2015, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 174(a) governs the consolidation of actions
and provides:
Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(a). “The central and primary requirement for consolidation of actions
as directed by rule 174(a) is that there must exist common issues of law or fact in both
cases.” In re Gulf Coast Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d 787, 795 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,
orig. proceeding); see In re Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc., No. 01-18-00825-CV, 2019 WL 2376120, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 6, 2019, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.). “The trial court may consolidate actions that relate to
substantially the same transaction, occurrence, subject matter, or question.” In re Gulf
Coast Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d at 794; see In re All Repair & Restoration, No. 14-23-00605-CV, 2024 WL 1792802, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 25, 2024, orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.). “The actions should be so related that the evidence
presented will be material, relevant, and admissible in each case.” In re Gulf Coast Bus.
Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d at 794; see A. P. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No.
03-23-00089-CV, 2023 WL 3956859, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin June 13, 2023, pet.
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denied) (mem. op.).
Consolidation is improper “if the parties and issues differ.” H.K. Dev., 229 S.W.3d
at 439. “Courts must balance the judicial economy and convenience that may be gained
by consolidation against the possibility that consolidation may cause delay, prejudice, or
jury confusion.” In re Shell Oil Co., 202 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006,
orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Woodard, No. 12-16-00032-CV, 2016 WL
1731473, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 29, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem op.). In other
words, the trial court must balance the judicial economy and convenience that may be
gained by consolidation against the risk of an unfair outcome. In re Marshall, 2025 WL
719838, at *2. The trial court abuses its discretion if it incorrectly resolves the relatedness
issue, or if it consolidates cases and the consolidation results in prejudice to the
complaining party. Id.; In re Gulf Coast Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d at 794.
IV. ANALYSIS
As noted, relators assert that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating
dissimilar cases less than thirty days before trial, and they lack an adequate remedy at
law to address this error. Relators contend, inter alia, that the cases do not meet the
requirements for consolidation, consolidation will cause prejudice and jury confusion, and
consolidation deprives relators of their due process right to forty-five days’ notice of the
trial date. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 245. In contrast, the real parties assert that the two cases
share common questions of law and fact, and relators did not demonstrate that they would
suffer prejudice because of consolidation. The real parties further argue that relators
possess an adequate remedy by appeal.
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A. Common Questions of Law and Fact
We examine whether the two cases involve common questions of law or fact. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(a). In the insurance case, Dr. Hopkins, Speck Hopkins, and Jeffelyn
have sued relators based on claims relating to an insurance policy. These parties have
sued relators for negligence in failing to obtain appropriate insurance coverage and failing
to pay the insurance claim. Their causes of action include negligent misrepresentation,
fraud, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, unfair or deceptive insurance
practices, violations of the DTPA and Insurance Code, breach of contract, conspiracy,
vicarious liability, and joint enterprise. The relevant evidence in this case would include
the insurance policy and its terms, the claim for property damage due to fire, and
documents or testimony regarding any representations regarding coverage.
In the debt case, Amur has filed suit against Dr. Hopkins and MD PA based on
their alleged failure to make payments under an equipment finance agreement and
personal guaranty. Amur’s causes of action against these parties include suit on a sworn
account, breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. The pertinent
evidence in this case would include the equipment finance agreement and testimony or
documentary evidence regarding the amounts paid and yet to be paid on that agreement.
The real parties in this case, Dr. Hopkins and MD PA, have filed a third-party petition
against relators based on the same allegations that Dr. Hopkins, Speck Hopkins, and
Jeffelyn made against them in the insurance case.
Excluding any consideration of the third-party petition filed in the debt case, we
would determine that the insurance case and the debt case do not relate to substantially
the same transaction, occurrence, subject matter, or question. See In re Gulf Coast Bus.
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Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d at 794–95. As discussed above, the insurance case is founded
on an insurance policy; the debt case is founded on an equipment finance agreement.
The causes of action in the two cases are different, as are the underlying facts, as is the
evidence pertinent to the cases. And, except for Dr. Hopkins, the parties in the two cases
are different.
We turn our attention to the effect of the third-party petition filed by Dr. Hopkins
and MD PA against relators in the debt case, which replicates those claims made by Dr.
Hopkins, Speck Hopkins, and Jeffelyn against relators in the insurance case. Leaving
aside the merits of the third-party petition, we determine that the third-party petition, on
its face, concerns the same facts and issues as in the insurance case. While there is
some overlap between the two cases by virtue of the third-party petition, we would
conclude that the two cases are fundamentally dissimilar. See id. Thus, the trial court
abused its discretion by determining that the cases were related sufficiently to merit
consolidation. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 174.
B. Delay, Prejudice, and Jury Confusion
In any event, even if we were to accept the real parties’ assertion there are
commonalities between the insurance case and the debt case as required by Rule 174(a),
we determine that any convenience potentially obtained by consolidation is outweighed
by the substantial differences in each case and the risk of an unfair outcome because of
delay, prejudice, or jury confusion. See In re Gulf Coast Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d at
796.
In terms of prejudice, Attune’s response to the motion to consolidate stated in
relevant part that:
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In this case, consolidation would result in unacceptable prejudice and
injustice. It would allow Speck Hopkins to suggest that Attune and the other
[relators] are somehow responsible for Speck Hopkins’ breach of its
Equipment Financing Agreement with Amur, the plaintiff in the county court
case, even though the [relators] were not parties to that contractual
agreement and were not even made aware of that agreement until after this
lawsuit was filed. And even if that were proper, it would be tremendously
confusing for the jury to hear two different types of disputes—debt collection
and insurance bad faith—in one trial. In order to avoid prejudice and
injustice and juror confusion, this Court should deny [the real parties’]
Motion to Consolidate.
. . . [C]onsolidation should also be denied because it is very likely to
delay the trial of this case, which is currently set for June 22, 2026. Amur
only filed the county court at law case last year and is entitled to discovery
before going to trial. That will not be possible under the Agreed Amended
Scheduling Order in this case, which includes a discovery deadline of June
10 (less than one month away). Additionally, one of the Third-Party
Defendants in the Amur case, TWFG, has not even been served in that
case yet.
Sedgewick’s and TWFG’s responses reiterate these same arguments regarding juror
confusion and prejudice. Amur’s response stated in relevant part that:
Consolidation of these unrelated cases would not promote judicial
economy. Instead, it would inject a straightforward county court debt action
into a complex years-long insurance dispute involving unrelated parties,
unrelated contracts, substantially different factual and legal issues, and
substantially different evidence. The insurance litigation has already been
pending for several years, whereas Amur’s contract claims are likely
capable of prompt and efficient resolution independent of the district court
claims against Defendants. Consolidation would therefore result in
unnecessary delay, increased expense, time, and create a risk of prejudice.
The real parties take the contrary position. They contend that there is no risk of jury
confusion because, “This is an insured’s claims arising from one fire, consolidated with
the single collection action that the same conduct allegedly produced. There are no
strangers’ claims to aggregate and no unrelated injuries to confuse.” They further assert
that “the trial court considered prejudice and found none” because its order includes the
express finding that the parties would not be prejudiced by the consolidation and that “the
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judicial economy and convenience resulting from the consolidation would greatly
outweigh the prejudice, if any, that could result.” As noted by the real parties, the
appealing party must demonstrate actual prejudice. See In re Gulf Coast Bus. Dev. Corp.,
247 S.W.3d at 795; see also B. D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00118-CV, 2020 WL 5100641, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2020, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
We agree with relators. In short, the record shows that consolidation has
affirmatively resulted in delay and would likely cause prejudice and jury confusion. In re
Shell Oil Co., 202 S.W.3d at 290; see In re Woodard, 2016 WL 1731473, at *2. The
insurance case has been pending since 2022 and was set for trial on June 22, 2026;
however, the trial court’s consolidation order delayed that trial. The debt case has only
been pending since 2025, and one of the defendants in that case has yet to be served.
Accordingly, the delay caused by consolidation would cause significant prejudice.
Further, given that the real parties allege that relators’ “mishandling of the fire-loss
claim caused the very default Amur sues to collect,” we consider the risk of jury confusion
to be high because there is no contractual relationship between relators and Amur. In this
regard, the injection of property insurance into the debt case may cause the jury to infer
that someone other than Dr. Hopkins and MD PA are liable for Amur’s damages. Cf. TEX.
R. EVID. 411 (“Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible to prove whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.”);
Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Sims, No. 12-14-00123-CV, 2015 WL 7770166, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Tyler Dec. 3, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The probative value of such evidence is
vastly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”); Thornhill v. Ronnie’s I–45 Truck
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Stop, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 780, 794 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, writ dism’d by agr.) (“One
of the purposes of the rule against admitting evidence of insurance is to avoid informing
the jury that someone other than the defendant may be liable to pay the damages.”).
The dominant consideration in consolidation is whether the resultant trial will be
fair and impartial to all parties. In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 614–15 (Tex.1998)
(orig. proceeding). Based on the foregoing, we determine that a consolidated trial would
not be fair and impartial to all parties. See id. Therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion by consolidating the cases. We sustain relators’ first issue.
C. Remedy by Appeal
In their second issue, relators assert that they lack an adequate remedy by appeal
to cure the trial court’s error. The real parties argue, in contrast, that “[r]elators identify no
right that will be permanently lost by trying this controversy once, to one jury, on one
record.” The real parties’ contentions in this regard are based on their argument, which
we have rejected, that the cases are related and relators would not suffer prejudice from
their consolidation.
We conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator
possesses an adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837,
843 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148
S.W.3d at 136–37. “An appeal is inadequate ‘when parties are in danger of permanently
losing substantial rights,’ which occurs when ‘the appellate court would not be able to
cure the error . . . .’” Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation
Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex. 2021); see In re K & L Auto
Crushers, LLC, 627 S.W.3d 239, 256 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding).
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Here, relators risk losing a substantial right to meaningful appellate review if
mandamus is not granted. Specifically, if these lawsuits are tried together to a jury, there
exists a likelihood that an appellate court could not untangle how or whether prejudice
and confusion affected the jury’s deliberations. See In re All Repair & Restoration, 2024
WL 1792802, at *3 (“When cases are consolidated and presented to a jury there exists
potential for confusion of the issues and weight of the evidence—especially, as is this
case, where the weight afforded to the evidence differs between claims.”); In re Gulf Coast
Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d at 797 (stating that “on this record, were these lawsuits to
be tried together to a jury, there exists a likelihood that an appellate court could not
untangle how or whether prejudice and confusion infected the jury’s deliberations”).
Therefore, we determine that relators lack an adequate remedy at law to address the trial
court’s error in consolidating these two dissimilar cases. We sustain relators’ second
issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered relators’ petition for writ of
mandamus, the real parties’ response, relators’ reply, and the applicable law, is of the
opinion that relators have met their burden to obtain relief. We lift the stay previously
imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). We conditionally grant the petition for
writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial court to: (1) vacate its May 27, 2026
consolidation order; and (2) proceed in accordance with this memorandum opinion. Our
writ will be issued only if the trial court fails to promptly comply.
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YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
1st day of September, 2026.
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