Opinion issued August 25, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00612-CV
FILOMENA GARCIA CHAVARRIETA, MARIO MOLINA RIOS, AND
KENSINGTON PARK HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellants
V.
MARGARITA VIERA, EVA ONOFRE VIOLANTE, SALVADOR NAJAR,
HECTOR R. GARCIA, MARIA G. HERNANDEZ, ISAACK NTI, ISABEL
MENDOZA-BARRIENTOS, IRIS J. ARITA, OLIVIA MARTINEZ, AND
RICARDO MARTINEZ, Appellees
On Appeal from the 113th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-50064
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Filomena Garcia Chavarrieta, Mario Molina Rios, and
Kensington Park Homeowner’s Association, Inc. appeal from the trial court’s final judgment in favor of Appellees voiding certain foreclosure sales conducted by the
Kensington Park Homeowner’s Association, voiding certain foreclosure deeds in
connection with those sales of certain condominiums, and establishing quiet title
with respect to some condominiums in favor of Appellees Hector Garcia, Isaack
Nti, Maria G. Hernandez, Salvador Najar, Olivia Martinez, Ricardo Martinez, Eva
Onofre Violante, Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos, and Iris J. Arita.
In two issues, Appellant Kensington Park Homeowner’s Association argues
the trial court erred in holding that its board elections conducted after May 24,
2016 were invalid and void because the jury was not asked to decide that issue, and
the trial court erred in denying its motion to modify the judgment. In five issues,
Appellants Filomena Garcia Chavarrieta and Mario Molina Rios argue the trial
court erred in awarding title to the condominiums to Appellees under the
Declaratory Judgment Act because the Act is not the proper vehicle to determine
title disputes; the trial court erred in awarding title of one of the condominiums to
Appellee Maria Hernandez because she elected to recover monetary damages in
lieu of setting aside the trustee’s deed; the trial court erred in awarding title of three
other condominiums because the jury found that Garcia and Molina were bona fide
purchasers of those units; the trial court erred in awarding title to eight of the
condominiums to Appellees because the court granted directed verdict as to the
2
wrongful foreclosure claim of those units; and the trial court erred in denying
Garcia’s and Molina’s motion for new trial and motion to reconsider.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
The Kensington Park Condominiums comprise thirty-six units in Houston,
Texas.1 Some of the condominium owners live in their units and others rent them
out to third parties. The Kensington Park Homeowners’ Association
(“KPHOA”)—subject to its bylaws and declarations—has governed the housing
complex since it was built in 1980. The board’s leadership is voted on by residents
each year. Melanie Davis became the president of the board in 2013, and at trial,
she remained the president.
KPHOA’s bylaws provide that a majority of the condominium owners must
approve an amendment of the bylaws “in a duly-constituted meeting for such
purpose[.]” The bylaws mandate that “[a]ll owners are obligated to pay monthly
assessments imposed by the [KPHOA] to meet all the condominium project’s
common expenses as determined by the board of directors[.]” Prior to March 15,
2016, the monthly assessment fees were $200 per unit.
On March 15, 2016, the bylaws were amended at a KPHOA meeting,
permitting the board to increase the monthly assessment fees. After the increase—
1
The Third Amended Petition indicated the complex “originally comprise[d] fiftyfour units,” but testimony at trial indicated the other units “burned down.”
3
which apparently became effective June 1, 2016—some appellees were charged
more than $700 in monthly assessments.2 Appellees testified at trial that they could
not afford the assessment increases and continued to pay the $200 assessments
until KPHOA refused to accept them beginning in November 2016.
Between December 2016 and September 2018, KPHOA foreclosed on nine
units owned by Appellees for failure to pay the increased assessments: Units 11,
13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 39, and 43. During that period—on March 7, 2017—six
appellees filed a lis pendens with respect to seven of the units: Units 11, 13, 17, 18,
20, 21, and 43. Sometime later in 2020 and 2021—after foreclosing on the units
and while the lis pendens remained on file—KPHOA sold several units to
Appellants Garcia and Molina, who attempted to evict the remaining tenants.3
Garcia testified that she owned ten Kensington Park condominiums, several
of which are involved in the present appeal.4 She testified that she paid $5,000 to
$15,000 to KPHOA for the units, which she purchased in 2020 and 2021, spending
a total of approximately $80,000. Garcia made the checks out to Kensington Park
and handed the checks to Davis. Davis then gave Garcia a deed for the units which
Garcia later filed.
2
The assessments varied for each unit. According to Davis, the increase was
necessary because the condominium complex’s expenses had increased. 3
Garcia and Molina were married during the relevant time period.
4
The jury charge addressed nine units.
4
A. Appellees’ Claims
In July 2016, Appellees filed their original petition against KPHOA for
declaratory judgment, application for temporary restraining order, and application
for permanent injunction. By the time they filed their third amended petition in
2022—the live pleading at trial—they had added Garcia, Molina, Davis, and Ileana
Roque5 as defendants. Appellees asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
wrongful foreclosure, slander of title/clear title, and civil conspiracy to interfere
with Appellees’ quiet enjoyment of their homes. They also sought declaratory
relief on several grounds. Appellants asserted several counterclaims but by the
time of trial, the only counterclaim remaining was Garcia’s and Molina’s
counterclaim to quiet title.6
During the four-day trial, Appellees testified similarly: they purchased units
in the Kensington Park Condominiums and paid $200 monthly assessment fees;
KPHOA raised the fees after a March 2016 KPHOA meeting; they could not afford
the increased assessments; KPHOA tried to evict them for failure to pay the
increased assessments; their units were foreclosed upon; and Garcia and Molina
ultimately bought the condominiums from Kensington Park and evicted or
5
Roque was KPHOA’s secretary-treasurer when the foreclosures occurred. 6
It is not clear from the record how KPHOA’s counterclaims were resolved but
they appear to have been resolved by the time of trial, and HPHOA does not
appeal from the resolution of its counterclaims.
5
attempted to evict Appellees. Only Appellee Maria G. Hernandez testified as to the
value of her unit at the time of the foreclosure, estimating its worth in March 2017
as “at least 60,000.” Her unit sold at the foreclosure sale for $3,385.80.
The jury returned a verdict finding that KPHOA had wrongfully foreclosed
on Hernandez’s condominium; that zero monetary damages had resulted from the
wrongful foreclosure;7 that KPHOA had not provided proper notice to its members
“for purposes of amending its bylaws” at the KPHOA March 15, 2016 meeting;
that there was not a majority vote of the KPHOA members to approve the
amendment to the bylaws; and that Garcia and Molina were bona fide purchasers
of three of the nine condominiums at issue: Units 13, 27, and 39.8
7
Hernandez testified that she continued to receive rental payments through the time
of trial for her unit, notwithstanding her claim that the unit was improperly
foreclosed upon.
8
KPHOA, Davis, and Roque moved for directed verdict after Appellees completed
their case in chief. The trial court granted the motion with respect to the wrongful
foreclosure claims against KPHOA, except for the claim asserted by Hernandez,
apparently because Hernandez was the only plaintiff who testified about the
grossly inadequate selling price of her property—an element of a wrongful
foreclosure claim. See Dunn v. Park Harbor Improvement Assn. Inc., No. 01-21-00010-CV, 2022 WL 17813755, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20,
2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Appellees voluntarily dismissed their claims for breach
of fiduciary duty and conceded that they were not asserting wrongful foreclosure
claims against Garcia and Molina. The trial court denied Garcia’s and Molina’s
motion for directed verdict on their claims involving quiet title of the properties.
By the time of trial, no claims remained against Davis and Roque.
6
The Final Judgment
The trial court’s final judgment declared that the attempted amendment of
the KPHOA bylaws on May 24, 2016—pursuant to which the assessment fees
were raised and the properties foreclosed upon—was invalid and that all KPHOA
elections for board members and officers conducted after May 24, 2016 were
“invalid and void.” The court ordered that the foreclosure sales conducted by
KPHOA were void as to Appellees Hector Garcia, Isaack Nti, Hernandez, Salvador
Najar, Olivia Martinez, Ricardo Martinez, Eva Onofre Violante, Isabel MendozaBarrientos, and Iris J. Arita.9, 10
The final judgment further ordered that all foreclosure deeds filed in the
Harris County Real Property records were void and quiet title was established in
Appellees as to units 13, 11, 17, 18, 20, 21, 39, and 27 (owned by Hector Garcia,
Isaack Nti, Hernandez, Salvador Najar, Ricardo Martinez, Eva Onofre Violante,
Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos, and Iris J. Arita, respectively).11 Finally, the judgment
enjoined Garcia and Molina “from initiating any forcible detainer, forcible entry or
9
Margarita Viera was a plaintiff in the lower court and she is identified in the style
of the final judgment. However, she did not testify at trial, and her claim was not
addressed in the final judgment. It appears the court implicitly granted a directed
verdict in favor of Appellants on Viera’s claim.
10
The final judgment identifies Isaack Nti’s first name as “Isaac,” but the appellate
briefs and the live petition identify his name as “Isaack.”
11
Appellee Olivia Martinez is Ricardo Martinez’s wife. The final judgment quiets
title in their unit to Ricardo Martinez only.
7
eviction action against [Appellees] based on any deed executed by [KPHOA]”
prior to the date of the judgment.
KPHOA filed a motion to modify the judgment, asking the court to strike the
paragraph that declared that all KPHOA elections conducted after May 24, 2016
were invalid. Garcia and Molina filed a motion for new trial and motion to
reconsider, arguing there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support
the judgment quieting title as to the eight condominium units and there was no
determination the foreclosures were wrongful for those units; that Hernandez
should not be awarded title to her unit; and that Garcia and Molina “were
precluded from arguing title claims” because they believed the Court had in its
directed verdict “ruled definitively on the matter, thereby precluding the need for
further litigation on the same issue.”12 The trial court signed an order denying the
motion to modify judgment and the motion for new trial was overruled by
operation of law. This appeal ensued.
KPHOA’s Appeal
In its first and second issues, KPHOA complains about the portion of the
final judgment ordering that all KPHOA elections for board members and officers
conducted after May 24, 2016, are “invalid and void.” KPHOA argues that this
12
In their motion for new trial, Garcia and Molina argued that the directed verdict
granted by the trial court was tantamount to a “determination that the foreclosures
were not wrongful,” making the final judgment “wholly invalid and inconsistent
with the court’s determination[.]”
8
portion of the final judgment should be reversed because it does not conform to the
jury’s verdict, the case proved, or the pleadings. It argues that the trial court thus
erred in denying its motion to reform the judgment in that respect. Appellees argue
that the trial court was justified in finding that board elections conducted after May
2016 were invalid in light of the jury’s findings that KPHOA had not “provide[d]
proper notice for purpose of amending its bylaws at the HOA meeting [on] March
15, 2016,” and that there was not a majority member vote to approve the new
bylaws.
A. Standard of Review
Because determining the effects of the jury’s answers is a question of law,
we review a trial court’s entry of judgment on a jury verdict de novo. Castille v.
Serv. Datsun, Inc., No. 01-16-00082-CV, 2017 WL 3910918, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Arbor Windsor Court,
Ltd. v. Weekley Homes, LP, 463 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2015, pet. denied); see also In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex.
1994) (“[Q]uestions of law are always subject to de novo review.”).
B. The Judgment Conforms to the Jury Verdict, the Evidence, and the
Pleadings.
KPHOA argues that the issue of electing KPHOA board members was not
presented to the jury, was not requested to be submitted to the jury, and was not
ruled upon in response to any party’s motion. In addition, KPHOA argues that no
9
evidence at trial established that it had not properly conducted board member
elections after May 2016. Finally, KPHOA argues that “[t]here is nothing, aside
from conclusory statements” made in Appellees’ third amended petition that “even
makes reference to KPHOA Board elections after May 201[6].”
Because they overlap, we address the first two components of KPHOA’s
argument—that the jury verdict and the evidence did not support the trial court’s
final judgment with respect to the conduct of board elections—together. In
response to Question No. 3, the jury found that KPHOA did not provide proper
notice to its members “for purpose of amending its bylaws at the KPHOA
homeowners’ meeting on March 15, 2016.” And the jury found in response to
Question No. 4 that a majority of KPHOA’s members did not vote “to approve the
amendment to the bylaws.”13 No other jury questions were pertinent to KPHOA’s
meetings.
Appellees argue that given the jury’s answers to Question Nos. 3 and 4, and
the evidence14 proffered during trial, “the [c]ourt was justified in finding that
subsequent elections based on the procedures in the new bylaws were invalid.”
Indeed, the evidence showed that on May 24, 2016, the KPHOA’s secretary
certified the amendments to KPHOA’s bylaws. Included in the amendments were
13
KPHOA does not complain about the jury’s answers to Question Nos. 3 or 4. 14
Appellees do not identify which evidence at trial supports their argument.
10
sections on electing members of the board of directors and voting on board
matters.
“[I]n a declaratory judgment action, a trial court may render declarations
based not only on the jury’s resolution of disputed facts but also on the undisputed
evidence adduced at trial.” Shadow Dance Ranch P’ship, Ltd. v. Weiner, No. 04-03-00926-CV, 2005 WL 3295664, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 7, 2005,
no pet.) (mem. op.). A “trial court is not required to submit jury questions on
uncontroverted issues of fact.” Id. (citing Sullivan v. Barnett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 44
(Tex. 1971)). It is uncontroverted that the KPHOA bylaws adopted at the March
2016 meeting set forth the procedures to conduct KPHOA board elections. Given
this undisputed fact, coupled with the jury’s findings in Question Nos. 3 and 4 that
KPHOA did not provide proper notice to its members “for purpose of amending its
bylaws” on March 15, 2016 and that a majority of KPHOA’s members did not vote
“to approve the amendment to the bylaws,” we conclude the trial court did not err
in rendering declaratory relief with respect to the board elections.
KPHOA argues that the final judgment does not conform to the pleadings.
“[A] judgment must be supported by the pleadings, and a party may not be granted
relief in the absence of pleadings to support such relief.” Bouknight v. Llanelly
Enters., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 01-22-00863-CV, 2026 WL 872698, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2026, no pet. h.) (citing Salomon v. Lesay, 369
11
S.W.3d 540, 553 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)). A judgment that
grants more relief than a party requested in the pleadings is “erroneous” and must
be set aside. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813–14
(Tex. 1983)).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 provides in relevant part:
The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature
of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to
give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled either in law or
equity. Provided, that upon motion and reasonable notice the court
may render judgment non obstante veredicto if a directed verdict
would have been proper, and provided further that the court may,
upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding on a question
that has no support in the evidence.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 301. “In determining whether the judgment conform[s] to the
pleadings, an appellate court should view the pleadings as a whole.” Bouknight,
2026 WL 872698, at *4 (quoting Khalaf v. Williams, 814 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)). A trial court is “not constrained to enter
judgment only in a form specified by one of the parties, because in addition to
conforming to the pleadings, the judgment must also reflect a correct application of
the law.” Id. (quoting Salomon, 369 S.W.3d at 553–54).
Contrary to KPHOA’s argument that nothing in the pleadings makes
reference to the KPHOA board elections, the trial court’s challenged declaration is
declaratory relief Appellees requested in their pleadings. In their third amended
petition, Appellees alleged that beginning in May 2015, “the Board failed to follow
12
basic legal procedures, failed to conduct valid meetings, failed to conduct valid
voting of the Board and failed to properly exercise any policy or action.” Appellees
alleged that the “purported action[s] of the Board, from May 2015 to the present
[were] invalid and [were] simply Melanie Davis[’] personal actions against
[Appellees]” and that “[a]ll elections held from May 2015 to the present were
invalid in that they failed to comply with the Declarations, Bylaws, and failed to
notify and/or allow voting by [Appellees].” In seeking declaratory relief, Appellees
specifically sought declarations that “the purported actions of the Board, from May
2015 to the present are invalid” and “[a]ll elections held from May 2015 to the
present were invalid in that they failed to comply with the Declarations, Bylaws,
and failed to notify and/or allow voting by [Appellees].” The final judgment thus
conforms to the pleadings.
We overrule KPHOA’s first issue.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying KPHOA’s Motion to Modify
Final Judgment
In its second issue, KPHOA argues the trial court erred in denying its motion
to modify the final judgment.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to modify a final judgment for
abuse of discretion. Brooks v. Kirkendall Dwyer, LLP, No. 01-23-00624-CV, 2025
WL 2248568, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 7, 2025, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (citing Ramirez v. JJ & EG, LLC, No. 14-22-00715-CV, 2023 WL
13
6561230, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 10, 2023, pet. denied)
(mem. op.)). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted
arbitrarily or without reference to guiding legal principles. Cire v. Cummings, 134
S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).
KPHOA’s argument with respect to its motion to modify simply echoes the
arguments in its first issue. KPHOA states, “as described above, the Final
Judgment improperly fails to conform to (1) the pleadings, (2) the case proved, and
(3) the verdict.” There is no additional discussion or new authorities, and we need
not engage in a second analysis of the same issues. For the reasons discussed
above, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying KPHOA’s
motion to modify judgment.
We overrule KPHOA’s second issue.
Garcia’s and Molina’s Appeal
A. The Declaratory Relief Claims
Garcia and Molina argue the Declaratory Judgment Act was not the proper
vehicle to determine the disputes at issue. They argue that a claim for trespass to
try title is the proper method to determine title to real property. Because they did
not make this argument in the trial court, it is not preserved for our review. See
McAlester Fuel Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 732, 737 n.2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“If a party does not specially except or
14
otherwise make the trial court aware of a complaint that a declaratory judgment
action is improper prior to the trial judge signing the judgment, the party fails to
preserve that complaint for appeal.”) (citing Harlingen Irrigation Dist. Cameron
Cnty. No. 1 v. Caprock Commc’ns Corp., 49 S.W.3d 520, 534 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2001, pet. denied)); TEX. R. CIV. P. 90 (stating that party waives
appeal for “[e]very defect, omission or fault in a pleading either of form or of
substance, which is not specifically pointed out by exception in writing and
brought to the attention of the judge in the trial court before the instruction or
charge to the jury or, in a non-jury case, before the judgment is signed”); TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1 (stating that to preserve complaint for appellate review, appellant must
make specific complaint to trial court by timely request, objection or motion and
trial court must rule on request or refuse to rule on request).15
We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s first issue.
B. Maria Hernandez’s Election of Remedies
In response to Questions No. 1 and 2, the jury found that KPHOA
wrongfully foreclosed on Hernandez’s unit and that Hernandez had suffered no
15
Garcia and Molina rely on Mundy v. ENE, Inc., No. 14-21-00146-CV, 2022 WL
7278288 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) in
arguing that a declaratory judgment is not the proper cause of action in a dispute
over title to real property. But in Mundy, the appellants argued in the trial court in
response to the appellee’s summary judgment motion that a declaratory judgment
action was “not the proper cause of action in a dispute over title to real property.”
Id. at *2. Thus, unlike the present case, the issue was preserved.
15
monetary damages as a result of the wrongful foreclosure.16 In its final judgment,
the trial court “[o]rdered and [d]eclared that title to Unit 17 . . . is established and
quieted in Maria G. Hernandez, and any deed or other claim of title filed [of]
record prior to the date of this Judgment purporting to establish title in [KPHOA,
Garcia or Rios] is set aside and declared void.”
In their second issue, Garcia and Molina argue that the trial court erred in
quieting title of Unit 17 to Hernandez because she elected to recover monetary
damages in lieu of setting aside the trustee’s deed. Relying on Diversified, Inc. v.
Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n, Garcia and Molina correctly argue that there are two
mutually exclusive remedies a debtor may elect in a wrongful foreclosure suit. 762
S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
“[F]ollowing a wrongful foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale
contained within a deed of trust, the mortgagor may seek two alternative remedies.
The mortgagor may elect to: (1) set aside the void trustee’s deed; or (2) recover
damages in the amount of the value of the property less indebtedness.” Id. (citing
cases) (emphasis in original).
16
In answering the damages question, the jury was instructed to “[c]onsider the
following elements of damages, if any, and none other. The difference, if any,
between the value of the property at the date of the foreclosure and the remaining
balance due on the indebtedness. Answer separately in dollar and cents for
damages, if any.” The jury answered: “Zero.”
16
However, Diversified did not involve a jury verdict—it was an appeal from a
summary judgment—and it does not hold that a plaintiff must elect his remedies
before the jury returns a verdict. Indeed, Texas law is clear that election of
remedies is not required before a jury’s verdict.17 Hernandez was therefore not
precluded from seeking and obtaining the relief the trial court afforded her in the
final judgment. See Boyce Iron Works, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 747 S.W.2d 785,
787 (Tex. 1988) (“When a party tries a case on alternative theories of recovery and
a jury returns favorable findings on two or more theories, the party has a right to a
judgment on the theory entitling him to the greatest or most favorable relief.”)
(citing Hargrove v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 152 Tex. 243, 256 S.W.2d 73
(1953)); State v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 50, 56 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“[U]nder the doctrine of election of remedies, if a
plaintiff pleads more than one theory of recovery, he need not make an election
between them until after the verdict.”) (citing cases).18
17
Garcia and Molina rely on a quote from Houston Sash & Door Co., Inc. v.
Davidson, 509 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.) in
noting that a plaintiff must be bound by an election of remedies. But that case also
states, “Plaintiff was entitled to plead and prove inconsistent causes of action and
seek alternative relief. Thus, his plea to overturn the foreclosure sale and his
alternate prayer for damages caused by the alleged wrongful foreclosure were
properly combined in a single suit.” Id.
18
See also Commercial Music Co. v. Klag, 288 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1955, no writ) (“The trial court did not commit reversible error in failing
to require such election of remedy before the charge was submitted to the jury.”);
see generally Drury Sw., Inc. v. Louie Ledeaux #1, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 287, 293
17
We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s second issue.
C. Units 13, 27, and 39
Garcia and Molina argue in their third issue that the trial court erred in
awarding quiet title of Units 13, 27, and 39 to Hector Garcia, Iris J. Arita, and
Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos, respectively, because the jury found that Garcia and
Molina were bona fide purchasers of those units.
Appellees argue that Garcia and Molina were not bona fide purchasers of the
units because a lis pendens was on file in the Harris County Real Property records
when the foreclosure sales occurred and thus, they had notice of their claims to the
units. The lis pendens did not concern Units 27 or 39. Garcia’s and Molina’s
argument with respect to those units thus lacks merit. There was a lis pendens on
file with respect to Unit 13, however.
A bona fide purchaser is one who “acquire[s] property in good faith, for
value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest.” Madison v. Gordon,
39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001) (citations omitted). “Status as a bona fide
purchaser is an affirmative defense to a title dispute.” Saravia v. Benson, 433
S.W.3d 658, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Madison,
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (“A party prevailing on two or more
theories need not formally waive all other alternative theories of recovery in
electing a remedy, and where the prevailing party fails to elect a remedy, the trial
court ‘should utilize the findings affording the greater recovery and render
judgment accordingly.’”) (quoting Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., 747
S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987)).
18
39 S.W.3d at 606). A bona fide purchaser acquires real property in good faith, for
value, and without actual or constructive notice of any third-party claim or interest
in the property. Id. (citing Madison, 39 S.W.3d at 606). “A properly filed lis
pendens operates as constructive notice ‘to the world of its contents.’” Id. (quoting
In re Cohen, 340 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, orig.
proceeding)); see TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.004(a) (“A recorded lis pendens is notice
to the world of its contents.”).19
Given that Hector Garcia’s lis pendens was in place with respect to Unit 13,
Garcia and Molina could not have been bona fide purchasers of that unit. See
Saravia, 433 S.W.3d at 666 (“Because Saravia had constructive notice [through a
lis pendens], Saravia is not a bona fide purchaser.”). Thus, the trial court did not err
in awarding quiet title of that unit to Hector Garcia.
The record does not reflect that a lis pendens was filed on Units 27 or 39.
And the jury found in Question No. 5 that Garcia and Rios were bona fide
purchasers of Units 27 and 39. Garcia and Molina argue that because the jury
found they were bona fide purchasers of Units 27 and 39, the trial court erred in
quieting title in those units to Iris J. Arita and Isabel Mendoza-Barrientos.
An appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. 19
Garcia and Molina do not argue on appeal that the lis pendens was improperly
filed or otherwise invalid.
19
R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant’s failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue
or cite appropriate authority waives the complaint. Kozera v. Velemir, No. 01-17-00290-CV, 2018 WL 6542584, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13,
2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). When an appellate issue lacks citation to the record
or legal authority and is not supported by argument, nothing is presented for
review. Zhu v. Zhang, No. 01-21-00699-CV, 2022 WL 16841697, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Fredonia State
Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (discussing
“long-standing rule” that inadequate briefing waives issue on appeal)); see also
Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) (“Failure to
provide citations or argument and analysis as to an appellate issue may waive it.”)
(citing ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880 (Tex. 2010)).
The entirety of Garcia’s and Molina’s argument in support of their third
issue is that “the trial court’s judgment does not account for this finding, and
instead, quiets title to Units 13, 39, and 27 to Appellees; a decision inconsistent
with the finding that [Garcia and Molina] were bona fide purchases of these
properties.” Garcia and Molina do not cite to any authorities, nor do they cite to the
record. They also do not explain how they are entitled to their requested relief
given that the trial court also granted declaratory judgment declaring the
foreclosure of Units 27 and 39 void and ordering that all foreclosure deeds filed as
20
those properties are void based on the trial court’s additional finding—premised on
the jury’s finding on this point—that the amendment to the KPHOA bylaws—
pursuant to which the fees were raised and the units were foreclosed upon—are
invalid. We have already affirmed the trial court’s final judgment awarding
declaratory relief as to the validity of KPHOA’s bylaws, and Garcia and Molina
did not properly challenge the trial court’s declaratory relief voiding the
foreclosures of these units, because as we held in response to their first issue, they
failed to raise their challenge to the court’s declaratory relief on appeal and thus
waived the issue for our review. And they do not explain how we otherwise can set
aside the jury’s finding and the trial court’s final declaratory judgment as to these
issues.
To the extent that Garcia and Molina argue that there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the jury’s findings and the trial court’s final judgment, they have
waived the issue due to inadequate briefing.
We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s third issue.
D. Units 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, and 39
In their fourth issue, Garcia and Molina argue that the trial court erred in
awarding quiet title of the units to Appellees. In a single paragraph, without any
citation to authorities or controlling law, Garcia and Molina argue only that even
though the trial court granted KPHOA’s directed verdict on Appellees’ wrongful
21
foreclosure claim against KPHOA except as to Hernandez, “a final judgment was
entered awarding Appellees title to Units 11, 13, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27 and 39.”20
Here again, Garcia and Molina failed to cite any authorities in support of
their argument and they do not engage in any meaningful analysis explaining how
they are entitled to their requested relief given the trial court’s declaratory
judgment declaring the foreclosure of the relevant units void and ordering that all
foreclosure deeds filed as those properties are void. We have already affirmed the
trial court’s final judgment awarding declaratory relief as to the validity of the
KPHOA bylaws, and Garcia and Molina did not properly challenge the trial court’s
declaratory relief voiding the foreclosures of these units, because as we held in
response to their first issue, they failed to raise their challenge to the court’s
declaratory relief on appeal and thus waived the issue for our review.
To the extent that Garcia and Molina argue that there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the jury’s findings and the trial court’s final judgment, they have
waived the issue due to inadequate briefing. See Kozera, 2018 WL 6542584, at *4
(stating appellant’s brief must contain clear and concise argument with appropriate
citations to authority); Zhu, 2022 WL 16841697, at *2 (holding appellate issue that
lacked citation to legal authority and was not supported by argument presented
20
Appellees did not pursue a wrongful foreclosure claim against Garcia and Molina.
22
nothing for appellate review); Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284 (explaining
that inadequate briefing waives issue on appeal).
We overrule Garcia’s and Molina’s fourth issue.21
E. The Motion for New Trial
Garcia and Molina argue in their final issue that the trial court erred in
denying their motion for new trial and motion to reconsider. The motion for new
trial comprises three arguments: that the final judgment is inconsistent with the
jury’s findings that Garcia and Molina were bona fide purchasers of units 13, 27,
and 29; that Hernandez is not entitled to ownership of unit 17 because she elected
to recover monetary remedies in her wrongful foreclosure claim; and that the trial
court previously determined that the foreclosures were not wrongful.
We have already addressed these arguments. We thus overrule Garcia’s and
Molina’s fifth issue.
21
In their reply brief, Garcia and Molina argue that Appellees “did not assert
superior title against [Garcia’s and Molina’s] claim of title.” But by filing their
quiet title counterclaim, Garcia and Molina placed the question of title before the
court. If the plaintiff who asserts a claim for quiet title fails to establish his title,
“the effect of a judgment of take nothing against him is to vest title in the
defendant.” Hejl v. Wirth, 161 Tex. 609, 610, 343 S.W.2d 226, 226 (1961); see
also Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366, 388 (Tex. App.–
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (“The effect of a suit to quiet title is to
declare invalid or ineffective the defendant’s claim to title.”). The plaintiff in a
quiet-title suit “must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and
that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.” Lance v.
Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 739 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Essex Crane Rental Corp.,
371 S.W.3d at 388)).
23
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.
24