Opinion issued August 27, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-23-00542-CR
BYRON LLOYD COLLINS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 174th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1799146
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Byron Lloyd Collins of capital murder. Because the State
did not seek the death penalty, the trial court automatically assessed punishment at
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.
On appeal, Collins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
offense of capital murder, arguing that the State failed to prove the underlying
predicate felony of aggravated sexual assault. In two related issues, he argues that
the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his involuntary statement and
then erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law concerning the voluntariness of
statements. Collins also raises three evidentiary issues. In these issues, he first argues
that the State sponsored perjury because a detective’s trial testimony concerning
Collins’s arrest differed from his testimony at the suppression hearing. He then
argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that the complainant had
worked as an escort and evidence that challenged the credibility of an alternate
suspect, and the exclusion of this evidence violated his right to present a defense.1
We modify the judgment of conviction and affirm as modified.
Background
Nataliya Shal was born in Ukraine. In the 2000s, she lived and worked in
Prague, where she met David Englerth, an American servicemember stationed in
Germany and vacationing in the city while on leave. They began dating and married
1
Collins also raised a seventh issue concerning the trial court’s failure to file findings
of fact and conclusions of law relating to the voluntariness of his oral statement.
This Court abated the appeal and ordered the trial court to make findings and
conclusions on this issue, and the trial court did so. We therefore do not address
Collins’s seventh issue in this opinion.
2
several years later. Nataliya did not immediately move to the United States, even
after Englerth was discharged from the Army.
Following his discharge, Englerth began a trucking business and worked as a
long-haul trucker. Nataliya and Englerth maintained an apartment in Prague, where
Nataliya still lived, and in Baytown, where Englerth lived when he was not on the
road. Nataliya would occasionally visit. Nataliya finally attained U.S. citizenship
and moved here permanently around January 2016.
Initially, Nataliya went on the road with Englerth in his truck, but the lifestyle
was too much for her, so she remained in Baytown while Englerth worked. Englerth
estimated that he was home “for a couple of days about two to three times a month,”
and the rest of the time he was on the road. Despite the physical separation, he and
Nataliya remained close, and they spoke on the phone every day, usually around
early evening after Englerth got off the road.
Englerth described Nataliya as a very friendly person who “never met a
stranger.” She enjoyed sitting on their front porch and speaking with fellow
residents. She tended to leave their front door unlocked, and she also tended to leave
the front door slightly open in nice weather so their adopted cat could come and go
when it pleased. Both habits concerned Englerth. Worried about Nataliya’s safety,
he installed a camera in a corner of their living room. The camera showed their living
room and, if the door was open, a portion of their bedroom near the foot of the bed.
3
He could view a live feed from this camera on his phone, but he had not paid for
recording capabilities. As an additional security measure, the front door had a sensor
that indicated when the door was opened and closed.
On May 8, 2016, Englerth was in the Los Angeles area preparing to deliver a
load the next morning. He had not heard from Nataliya that day, which he believed
might be due to the time difference between Baytown and Los Angeles, so he
decided to call her. He called over half a dozen times, but Nataliya never answered.
Englerth then checked the live feed from the living room camera. He could
not see Nataliya. However, the bedroom door was open, and he could see that “the
bed was all messed up.” This was out-of-character for Nataliya, who made the bed
everyday “without fail.” Now deeply concerned, Englerth called local police in
California and asked them to contact the Baytown Police Department for a welfare
check on Nataliya.
Around 10:00 p.m., a patrol officer arrived at the apartment and knocked
several times, but no one answered. While the officer was at the front door,
Nataliya’s cat climbed onto the windowsill of an adjacent window and sat between
the window and the blinds. Due to the space created by the cat, the officer could see
through a gap in the blinds and into the bedroom, where he saw Nataliya, bloodied
and lying motionless on the floor. Nataliya did not respond to the officer knocking
on the window, so he radioed for EMS and kicked the front door in. A blanket was
4
covering her, and when the officer removed it, he saw Nataliya lying face down,
wearing only a dress pushed up around her chest, and with puncture wounds in her
back “and a bunch of blood around her.” The autopsy later revealed that Nataliya
had been stabbed thirty times,2 with stab wounds on her head, face, neck, left arm,
abdomen, and back.
The apartment was mostly tidy, but the bedroom was in disarray with signs of
a struggle: the bedding was falling off the bed, some bloodstains were on the wall,
and random items (including a pair of glasses and a pair of headphones) were lying
on or near Nataliya’s body. Officers collected the items and the bedding for further
fingerprint and DNA analysis. Given the placement of Nataliya’s body and her
mostly unclothed state, detectives believed she may have been sexually assaulted,
and they requested that the medical examiner conduct a sexual assault exam during
the autopsy. An analyst also swabbed various places on Nataliya’s body in hopes of
recovering trace DNA evidence.
With no readily apparent suspects,3 officers canvassed the apartment complex
to gather more information. They spoke with Nataliya’s upstairs neighbor, who
2
The lead detective and the crime scene detective documenting the scene with
photographs both noted that knives were missing from the set in the kitchen. The
knives were never recovered.
3
Upon learning of Nataliya’s murder, Englerth was able to arrange for another truck
driver to make the delivery that he was in California to make. He put his truck in
5
reported that around 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the murder, she was leaving the
complex and saw Nataliya sitting outside on her front porch with a man the neighbor
had never seen before. The neighbor testified that while Nataliya was “usually super
friendly,” on this occasion she “just was very quiet,” and the neighbor “had this very
eerie feeling—this overwhelming feeling that something is off.” The neighbor
provided a description of the man she saw sitting with Nataliya: young, African
American, very skinny, very large and “very open” eyes, and a very small chin.
Officers showed the neighbor two photo arrays shortly after the murder. The
neighbor did not identify anyone in the first array, and she identified someone with
30 percent certainty in the second array. Neither photo array contained a picture of
Collins. The neighbor later met with a police sketch artist who created a sketch based
on the neighbor’s description.
Detectives initially spoke with several persons of interest—such as the
apartment complex maintenance man and another man who was arrested shortly
after the murder while covered in blood and with cuts on his hands—who provided
DNA samples. None of these samples matched any of the samples collected from
the apartment or Nataliya’s body.
long-term storage and flew back to Houston the day after the murder. Englerth
cooperated with the officers and their investigation.
6
With no fresh leads, detectives took an unknown DNA profile generated
during the investigation and uploaded it to CODIS to see if that profile would match
the DNA profile of someone already in the system. That did not yield a match. In
2017, months after the murder, detectives learned about familial DNA. The
Department of Public Safety took the unknown DNA profile and ran it through its
system, not looking for an exact match but for a link with a close relative. This search
did yield a result: Travis Collins. From that name, detectives learned that Travis
Collins had a living father and a brother, Byron Collins. Collins’s mother lived in
the same apartment complex as Nataliya and Englerth.
Detectives quickly ruled out Collins’s father as a suspect based on the age
description that Nataliya’s neighbor had provided. But detectives noticed similarities
when comparing a photo of Collins to the sketch made by the sketch artist. A
detective drove by the apartment rented by Collins’s mother and saw Collins sitting
on the front porch and smoking. When Collins went inside the apartment, the
detective walked past and collected several cigarette butts. Based on the comparison
of the DNA profile from the cigarette butt to the unknown DNA profile, Collins
could not be excluded as a suspect in the murder. In December 2017, more than
eighteen months after the murder, the detective prepared a third photo array to show
Nataliya’s neighbor, and this time the array included a picture of Collins. The
neighbor identified Collins with “55 percent” certainty.
7
The detective obtained a search warrant for Collins’s DNA and an arrest
warrant. As Collins was leaving the apartment, detectives confronted him and
requested that he accompany them to the police station for questioning. Collins
moved to suppress the resulting statement on the ground that the statement was not
voluntary, specifically, because the detectives improperly induced him to give a
statement by lying and telling him that they wanted to speak with him to help clear
his name while they knew he was their lead suspect and they had evidence that
incriminated him. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
statement.
At the beginning of the interview, the detectives let Collins read a copy of the
search warrant for his DNA and then took a DNA sample. The detectives read the
Miranda warnings, and Collins indicated that he understood each right, asking to
clarify whether terminate the interview “really means” he could go home. A
detective told Collins that his name “came up in stuff” and asked where he was on
the date of the murder. Collins answered that he had been having suicidal thoughts
(primarily due to some ongoing familial strife and pain from a tooth he needed
pulled), and he unsuccessfully tried to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital on the
day of the murder but was able to get in the following day.4
4
The trial court admitted Collins’s medical records from this hospitalization. The
records reflect that Collins was admitted on May 9, 2016, and discharged on May
13, 2016. At the time of his admission, he had cuts on his left arm and right hand.
8
Collins repeatedly denied seeing Nataliya at the apartment complex, speaking
with her, being in her apartment, or having a romantic or sexual relationship with
her. After being informed that he was a suspect in Nataliya’s murder, he repeatedly
denied killing her. The closest Collins came to admitting any kind of involvement in
the murder was informing the detectives that he had been taking pills and drinking
around that time, and he “probably blacked out if I’ve been there.”
Following the interview, the detectives arrested Collins, and he was charged
with capital murder for killing Nataliya while sexually assaulting her. Subsequent
analysis of Collins’s DNA profile revealed that he could not be excluded as a
contributor to the DNA or the DNA mixture present on several items of evidence,
including: the cord of the headphones found lying on Nataliya’s body, swabs taken
from her face, swabs from under her fingernails, the sperm fraction from the swab
of her vagina, and the sperm fractions found on both bedsheets. The frequency of
the profile found on the vaginal swab was approximately 1 in 2 billion individuals,
and the frequency of the profile found on the bedsheets was approximately 1 in 102
sextillion individuals.5
The records described the cuts as superficial and stated that they were “bleeding
controlled.” During his interview, Collins explained that both cuts were the result
of a suicide attempt.
5
After the initial DNA analysis was performed, the Harris County Institute of
Forensic Sciences began using a new measure to express the frequency that a DNA
profile might reoccur: the likelihood ratio. Likelihood ratios greater than a million
9
The jury found Collins guilty of capital murder. Because the State did not seek
the death penalty, the court automatically assessed punishment at confinement for
life without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of Evidence
In his fifth issue, Collins argues that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that he committed the underlying predicate felony of aggravated sexual
assault, and therefore the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for capital
murder. We address this issue first.
A. Standard of Review
When assessing sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction,
we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);
Hernandez v. State, 727 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). We may not
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
provide “very strong support” that the profile originated from a particular person as
opposed to an unknown individual. The DNA analyst performed this analysis on the
DNA samples involved in this case and concluded that the likelihood ratios for
Collins as the source of the DNA profile or contributor to a DNA mixture were 108
million for a cutting from the headphones cord, 3 billion for the fingernail clippings
on Nataliya’s right hand, 17 billion for the swabs from the left side of her face, 231
million for the swabs from her left ankle, 220 trillion for the sperm fraction of the
vaginal swab, and 245 trillion for the sperm fraction of the cuttings taken from the
bedsheets.
10
credibility of the evidence. Hernandez, 727 S.W.3d at 87. We also may not “engage
in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy” but must instead “consider the cumulative force
of all the evidence.” Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
The jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial.
Hernandez, 727 S.W.3d at 87. The jury may use common sense, common
knowledge, personal experience, and observations from life when drawing
inferences. Id. But the jury may not “come to conclusions based on mere speculation
or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d
571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is as
probative as direct evidence and can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hammack v.
State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
B. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence that Collins Killed Nataliya in
the Course of Committing or Attempting to Commit Aggravated Sexual
Assault
To convict Collins of capital murder, the State was required to prove that
Collins, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the aggravated
sexual assault of Nataliya, intentionally caused her death by stabbing her with a knife
or an unknown sharp object. The charge listed multiple manners and means of
committing aggravated sexual assault, including if the person “causes the
penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of another person by any means,
without that person’s consent,” and the person causes serious bodily injury or
11
attempts to cause the death of the victim in the course of the same criminal episode
or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon in the course of the same criminal episode. The
charge further instructed that aggravated sexual assault “is without the consent of
the other person if the defendant compels the other person to submit or participate
by the use of physical force or violence.”
In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed or
attempted to commit aggravated sexual assault of Nataliya, Collins focuses on the
medical examiner’s testimony that Nataliya’s autopsy revealed no evidence of force
or injury to her genitalia. Lack of genital trauma, however, does not necessarily mean
there is insufficient evidence of aggravated sexual assault. See Borrego v. State, 966
S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d). The medical
examiner testified that “[t]here was no obvious injury [to Nataliya’s vagina] visible
with the naked eye.” But she also testified that she did not find this strange, noting
that she had had “several cases involving sexual assault where there are no visible
injuries.” She would not expect to find visible injury in every sexual assault case. In
both her own professional experience with known sexual assault cases and in
reviewing the relevant literature, “maybe 40 percent or less have visible injuries.”
The medical examiner also clarified that in an autopsy setting, she does not look
“microscopically,” and therefore an autopsy would not uncover microscopic tears to
the genitalia.
12
Collins further argues that no evidence supports “the idea that if there was
sexual contact between Collins and the complainant, it was contemporaneous with
her killing.” We disagree and conclude that the jury could draw a reasonable
inference from all the surrounding circumstances that the sexual encounter between
Collins and Nataliya was not consensual. Around 3:00 p.m. on the day of the
murder,6 Nataliya’s neighbor saw Nataliya and a man she later identified through a
photo-array with 55% certainty as Collins sitting on Nataliya’s front porch. Nataliya
was not her usual “super friendly” self, and the neighbor had an “eerie” and
“overwhelming” feeling that “something is off.”
When the responding officer discovered Nataliya’s body several hours later,
she was lying facedown on the floor next to the bed. Although the other rooms of
the apartment were neat and orderly, the bedroom was in disarray, with bloodstains
on the carpet and walls, the bedclothes falling off the bed, a blanket covering
Nataliya, and random items lying on or near her body. Nataliya’s legs were spread,
she was wearing a sundress that was pushed up around her chest, and she was
unclothed from the waist down. Two knives were missing from the set in the kitchen,
6
A record of the front door sensor showed that the front door to Nataliya’s apartment
closed at 2:52 p.m., opened and closed at 3:50 p.m., opened and closed at 4:19 p.m.,
and then did not open again until 9:55 p.m., which corresponds to the time the officer
performing the welfare check saw Nataliya’s body through the bedroom window
and kicked in the front door.
13
and Nataliya had been stabbed 30 times over various parts of her body. She also had
wounds on her hands that were consistent with defensive wounds.
Collins could not be excluded as the contributor of a DNA profile found on
swabs taken from Nataliya’s vagina and from underneath her fingernails. He also
could not be excluded as the contributor of DNA found on the sheets of Nataliya’s
bed. Furthermore, medical records revealed that when Collins checked himself into
a hospital the day after the murder, he had superficial cuts to his left arm and right
hand. Officers agreed that when a suspect cuts or stabs someone with a knife, it is
common for the suspect using the knife “to cut up their hands.”
When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict
and considering “the cumulative force” of the evidence, we conclude that a rational
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins killed Nataliya during
the course of committing or attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault. We
therefore hold that sufficient evidence supports the conviction.
We overrule Collins’s fifth issue.
Voluntariness of Statement
In his first issue, Collins argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
to suppress the statement made during his interview with detectives because it was
involuntary. He primarily argues that the detectives improperly induced him to make
a statement by lying to him that they were trying to clear his name when they knew
14
that his DNA was present at the scene and they intended to arrest him regardless of
what he said during the interview. He also argues that the detectives improperly
continued questioning him after he requested termination of the interview and a
court-appointed lawyer.
A. Standard of Review and Law on Voluntariness
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review, affording the court almost complete deference in determining
historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor, but reviewing the
determination of legal questions de novo. Igboji v. State, 666 S.W.3d 607, 612 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2023); State v. Lujan, 634 S.W.3d 862, 865–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)
(applying almost total deference to trial court rulings on application-of-law-to-fact
questions that depend on credibility and demeanor). The trial court is the sole
factfinder during a suppression hearing and may believe or disbelieve all or any part
of a witness’s testimony. Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). “Determining whether the requirements of Article 38.22 were met is an
application-of-law-to-fact question that commands a view of the evidence that is
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at 866.
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 governs when a defendant’s written
and oral custodial statements may be used. The statute mandates that the defendant
receive a warning of certain rights:
15
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at
all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at
his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in
court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to
and during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a
lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any
questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a). For an oral statement to be admissible,
there must be an electronic recording of the statement and “prior to the statement but
during the recording,” officers must give the defendant the above warning, and the
defendant must “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[] any rights set out
in the warning.” Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(1)–(2).
A confession must be voluntary to be admissible. Lopez v. State, 610 S.W.3d
487, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21 (“A
statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears that the
same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion, under the
rules hereafter prescribed.”); id. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2) (requiring accused to
“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waive certain rights for statement to be
admissible). We examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement
to determine voluntariness. Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 494.
16
A statement may be involuntary under the due process clause, Miranda v.
Arizona as expanded by article 38.22, or “general voluntariness” under article 38.22.
Id.; Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under the
due process clause, a defendant must show that (1) the police engaged in activity
that was objectively coercive, (2) the statement is causally related to the coercive
government misconduct, and (3) the coercion overbore the defendant’s will. Lopez,
610 S.W.3d at 494; Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 169 (“A confession may be
involuntary under the Due Process Clause only when there is police overreaching.”).
“Coercive government misconduct renders a confession involuntary if the
defendant’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.’” Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973)).
An officer’s use of deception during an investigation does not automatically
render a suspect’s statement involuntary. State v. McDonald, — S.W.3d —, 2026
WL 1025753, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2026). Coercion, threats, or promises
might undermine the voluntariness of a confession, but trickery or deception “does
not make a statement involuntary unless the method was calculated to produce an
untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.” Id. (quoting Creager v. State,
952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The “mere use of investigative
strategy,” which might involve misrepresentations about facts or evidence, “does not
17
itself rise to the level of constitutional coercion” and may be used without
invalidating an otherwise voluntary statement. Id.; but see Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at
462–64 (manufacturing physical evidence and fabricating documents runs afoul of
article 38.23’s exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence obtained in violation
of penal statutes relating to acquisition of evidence). “The question is whether law
enforcement employed tactics that were so coercive as to overbear the suspect’s will
or were designed to elicit a false confession.” McDonald, 2026 WL 1025753, at *6.
If an officer makes remarks during an interrogation that might lead a
defendant to believe that a confession could help him, the remarks “might be a
circumstance which bear on the voluntariness of the [defendant’s] statement, but
they would not necessarily render the statement inadmissible.” Creager, 952 S.W.2d
at 855. Instead, the totality of the circumstances must be considered when
determining voluntariness. Id.; McDonald, 2026 WL 1025753, at *6 (“[T]he
voluntariness inquiry turns on the totality of the circumstances.”). A detective can
permissibly use “psychological tactics” such as “play[ing] on a suspect’s
sympathies” or “explain[ing] that honesty might be the best policy for a criminal
who hopes for leniency,” but a detective may not obtain a confession “by any direct
or implied promises, however slight.” Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); see Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596,
603 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (officer’s “general, non18
specific statement” that defendant “could help herself” did not make statement
involuntary).
Article 38.22’s protection is broader and “protects suspects from themselves,
not only police overreach.” Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 495; Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at
173. As an example, confessions “given under the duress of hallucinations, illness,
medications, or even a private threat” can be involuntary under article 38.22. Lopez,
610 S.W.3d at 495 (quoting Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 172).
B. Considering the Totality of the Circumstances, the Trial Court Properly
Concluded Collins’s Statement was Voluntary
We assume for the purpose of this analysis that Collins was in custody at the
time he made his statement to detectives. But that is not the end of the inquiry
because custodial statements can be admissible if certain procedural safeguards are
followed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 § 3(a) (“No oral or sign language
statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be
admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless . . . .”) (emphasis
added); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The
warnings required by Miranda and article 38.22 are intended to safeguard a person’s
privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.”).
Baytown Police Department Detective C. Green was the primary investigator
of Nataliya’s murder, and he took the lead in conducting Collins’s interview. He
began the interview by stating that Collins mentioned “out there” that he wanted to
19
give a sample of his DNA. Collins responded, “If it’ll help clear my name.”
Detective Green informed Collins that he had a search warrant to obtain a DNA
sample, and Collins asked to see the warrant. While Collins was reading the warrant,
Green said, “That’s based on information we’ve learned, and that’s why we need to
clear your name, well, try to attempt to clear your name.” Green later assured Collins
that he was not mad Collins was reviewing the warrant, stating that he had a right to
read it and he would give Collins a copy. He then said, “I’m not here to hurt you,
bro.” After another officer collected Collins’s DNA sample and Collins finished
reading the warrant, Green told Collins that he did not want Collins to think that
officers were lying to him or fabricating evidence.
Before any substantive questioning about the offense began, Green read the
Miranda warnings to Collins. Green read the warnings exactly as they appear in
article 38.22. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a). After each warning,
Green asked Collins if he understood the warning, and Green responded that he did.
Collins asked what it “really means” to “terminate the interview,” such as whether
it meant he could “go home.” Green replied, “Well, that’s a question I can’t answer
right now.” Both Green and Collins laughed, and Collins said, “We all want that.”
Green then shifted to asking for some “basic information.” He told Collins,
“We’re here to try to exclude you more than convict you.” He then asked Collins
about his living arrangements. After about ten minutes, Green then began discussing
20
the investigation, stating, “I’ll be honest with you, your name came up in stuff, but I
just want to be able to try to rule you out of this situation.” Collins told the detectives
that he was trying to check himself into a psychiatric hospital on the day of the
murder because he was having suicidal thoughts, he did not know anyone who lived
in Nataliya’s building, he did not know anything about Nataliya’s murder, and he
did not know Nataliya. After Collins denied knowing Nataliya, Green said, “Don’t
think I’m accusing you of anything,” and asked if he had ever been inside any
apartment in Nataliya’s building. Collins responded that he had not.
Later in the interview, Green stated, “We know you were there,” but Collins
still denied being at the apartment complex on the day of the murder, and he denied
murdering Nataliya. Green told Collins that the detectives had DNA evidence and
said, “I can prove that you was there.” In response to this statement, and after saying
earlier that he had been drinking and taking medication during this time period,
Collins said, “I probably blacked out if I’ve been there.” This statement is the closest
Collins comes to admitting that he knew Nataliya or admitting any kind of
involvement in her murder. Throughout the interview, even after the detectives
confronted him with DNA evidence, Collins consistently denied knowing Nataliya,
having a sexual relationship with her, or killing her.
21
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the
voluntariness of the statement. Among other findings and conclusions, the trial
court:
• Found that Detective Green’s testimony at the suppression hearing was
credible;
• Found that officers spoke with Collins at the scene of his detention (the
apartment complex), and he agreed to go to the station with them
voluntarily;
• Found that detectives properly admonished Collins and administered
the statutory warnings prior to beginning any substantive interrogation;
• Found that Collins knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and
engaged in the interview;
• Found that none of the detectives’ statements during the interview were
intended to induce Collins into making a confession;
• Found that Collins made no statements consistent with his will being
overborne by any of the detectives’ statements;
• Concluded that Collins was properly advised of his rights, which he
knowingly and effectively waived;
• Concluded that none of the detectives’ statements amounted to
improper inducement and none of Collins’s statements were made as a
result of promises or statements by the detectives;
• Concluded that Collins’s will was not overborne by any circumstances
of the interview or statements by the detectives; and
• Concluded that Collins made his statement knowingly and voluntarily.
Collins challenges these findings and conclusions on appeal.
When considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Collins’s
detention and interview, we conclude that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
22
Miranda rights and his statement was voluntary under both the due process clause
and article 38.22. Although Collins was in custody at the Baytown Police
Department, the atmosphere during the beginning of the interview when Detective
Green read him the Miranda warnings was relaxed and amiable. Collins asked
questions of the detectives, including whether he could see the search warrant and a
question about what it “really means” to terminate the interview. Collins makes
much of the fact that when he asked whether it meant he could go home, Green
laughed and responded, “Well, that’s a question I can’t answer right now,” but
Collins also laughed and replied, “We all want that.”
Collins also focuses on the fact that the Miranda warnings were not read until
over twelve minutes into the interview, but for the first five minutes of the recording,
Collins was alone in the interview room. Over the next seven minutes, he read the
search warrant, and an officer obtained his DNA sample. Detective Green did not
ask Collins any questions about his background or the murder until after he read the
warnings.7
Collins further argues that he was in pain from a tooth that needed to be pulled
and under mental distress at the time of the interview, pointing to discussions during
7
Collins argues that Green questioned him at the scene, which was reflected on the
video recording when Green referenced a prior conversation about Collins wanting
to give a sample of his DNA. The State did not seek to introduce any statement from
Collins other than the statement made in the interview room.
23
the interview about his history with suicidal ideation. Collins mentioned struggling
with both issues during the month leading up to Nataliya’s murder and his
hospitalization for suicidal thoughts that occurred the day after the murder. He
specifically mentioned severe tooth pain as a factor contributing to his suicidal
thoughts. Collins was reluctant to talk about his mental health, but when asked how
often he had suicidal thoughts, he responded, “Once in a while.” Although there is
evidence that he was suffering from severe tooth pain and suicidal ideation at the
time of the murder in May 2016, there is little evidence that he was still struggling
with both issues nineteen months later in December 2017, when the interview
occurred. And that is the relevant time period for determining whether the tooth pain
and mental distress impacted the voluntariness of his statement under article 38.22.
See Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 495 (noting that mental health concerns, illnesses, and
medications are relevant to assessing voluntariness under article 38.22, which is
broader than due process clause and encompasses considerations beyond police
overreach).
The crux of Collins’s appellate complaint about voluntariness is the
statements made by Detective Green relating to attempting to clear his name and
exclude or rule him out as a suspect. Collins argues that Green was lying when he
made these statements because he had DNA evidence placing Collins at the scene of
the murder, and Green planned to arrest Collins regardless of what he said during
24
the interview. Even if that were the case, we see no indication that these statements
overpowered Collins’s will. Collins acknowledges that officers may permissibly use
“trickery or deception” during an interrogation. Such tactics do not “make a
statement involuntary unless the method was calculated to produce an untruthful
confession or was offensive to due process.” See McDonald, 2026 WL 1025753, at
*6 (concluding that officers’ statement that defendant “was ‘not in trouble’ does not
transform an otherwise voluntary conversation into an unconstitutional interrogation
tactic”). Green made no specific promises to Collins, and when he read the Miranda
warnings to Collins, he followed the language of article 38.22 and did not tell Collins
that any statement he made could be used “for or against” him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Detective Green did
not employ interrogation tactics that were “so coercive as to overbear the suspect’s
will or were designed to elicit a false confession.” See id. Furthermore, no additional
considerations were present that make Collins’s statement involuntary under article
38.22’s broader protection. We hold that the trial court did not err when it concluded
that Collins’s statement was voluntary and admissible.
As part of his first issue, Collins also argues that the trial court erroneously
concluded that the detectives “scrupulously observed” his wish to terminate the
25
interview and obtain court-appointed counsel,8 noting that the detectives returned to
the interrogation room after a break and resumed questioning Collins, including by
showing Collins a crime scene photograph of Nataliya and telling him, “That’s how
you left her. You did this.” Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by
concluding that the detectives honored Collins’s desire to terminate the interview,
we conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. TEX. R. APP.
P. 44.2(a) (for constitutional errors, appellate court must reverse judgment of
conviction unless court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that error did not
contribute to conviction); Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 419 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (concluding that because police did not “scrupulously honor” defendant’s
invocation of right to remain silent, subsequent written statement was inadmissible
at trial, and remanding for harm analysis under Rule 44.2(a)).
Following Collins’s invocation of the right to terminate the interview, a short
break occurred in which Collins was left alone in the interrogation room to smoke a
cigarette. Seven minutes later, the detectives returned and resumed trying to get
Collins to admit his involvement in the murder. This occurred approximately one
hour and forty-five minutes into the interview. After Green commented on Collins’s
unwillingness to say anything, he then said, “That shows me that you’re guilty.”
8
Collins did not raise this argument at the suppression hearing as a basis for
suppressing the statement. We nevertheless address this argument because the trial
court made an express finding and conclusion about it.
26
Collins replied, “I’m not guilty.” He made no other statements and did not answer
any further questions.
The portion of the interview that occurred after Collins invoked his right to
terminate represents a small fraction of the interview as a whole (approximately six
minutes out of an hour-and-fifty-one-minute interview), and Collins made no
statements that could be considered inculpatory. To the contrary, he again denied
killing Nataliya. We determine beyond a reasonable doubt that any error in admitting
the portion of Collins’s statement after he invoked his right to terminate the
interview did not contribute to his conviction.
We overrule Collins’s first issue.
Jury Instruction on Voluntariness
In his related sixth issue, Collins argues that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury about law relating to the voluntariness of oral statements and that
this failure caused him egregious harm.
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
The trial court shall deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth
the law applicable to the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14; Watts v. State,
371 S.W.3d 448, 464 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“The ‘law
applicable to the case’ includes any instruction, such as that contained under article
38.22, that is required when particular circumstances are met.”). When analyzing a
27
charge-error claim, we must first decide whether error in the charge exists, and if so,
we must determine whether the error harmed the defendant. Alcoser v. State, 663
S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). When, as here, the defendant raises no
objection to the error, the record must show “egregious harm” to the defendant. Id.
There are three types of jury instructions relevant to the taking of confessions:
(1) a “general” article 38.22, § 6 voluntariness instruction; (2) a “general” article
38.22, § 7 warnings instruction relating to the warnings that article 38.22 requires
for a written or oral statement to be admissible; and (3) a “specific” article 38.23(a)
exclusionary-rule instruction that is fact-based.9 Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 173.
Because these instructions look different, the defendant bears the “responsibility to
delineate which type of ‘involuntariness’ he is claiming.” Id. at 174.
When a question is raised about the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement,
“the court must make an independent finding in the absence of the jury as to whether
9
The Court of Criminal Appeals offered this example of an article 38.23(a)
instruction: “Do you believe that Officer Obie held a gun to the defendant’s head to
extract his statement? If so, do not consider the defendant’s confession.” Oursbourn,
259 S.W.3d at 173–74. Article 38.23 “imposes upon a trial court the duty to submit
a due process voluntariness instruction sua sponte when it is raised by the evidence,”
but because due process involuntariness instructions “could come in myriad forms”
depending on the particular case, it is “at least incumbent upon an appellant to
explain to the appellate court what instruction he desired” so the appellate court can
“intelligently assess whether such an instruction was required, and if so, whether
the defendant suffered harm.” Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 575. In his appellate brief,
Collins states that a “general and specific voluntariness instruction under [sic] would
be applicable to this case.” Beyond this statement, Collins does not inform us of the
article 38.23 instruction the trial court should have given.
28
the statement was made under voluntary conditions.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
38.22, § 6. If the court finds that the statement was voluntarily made, “evidence
pertaining to such matter may be submitted to the jury and it shall be instructed that
unless the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntarily
made, the jury shall not consider such statement for any purpose nor any evidence
obtained as a result thereof.” Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals has described the
sequence of events under section 6:
(1) a party notifies the trial judge that there is an issue about the
voluntariness of the confession (or the trial judge raises the issue on his
own); (2) the trial judge holds a hearing outside the presence of the jury;
(3) the trial judge decides whether the confession was voluntary; (4) if
the trial judge decides that the confession was voluntary, it will be
admitted, and a party may offer evidence before the jury suggesting that
the confession was not in fact voluntary; (5) if such evidence is offered
before the jury, the trial judge shall give the jury a voluntariness
instruction.
Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 175 (emphasis added).
To be entitled to a section 6 instruction, the record must “contain some
evidence presented at trial that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the
statement was not voluntary.” Watts, 371 S.W.3d at 464; see Vasquez v. State, 225
S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Some evidence must have been presented
to the jury that the defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily.”); see also
Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 299–300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (assuming that
defendant offered evidence before jury suggesting confession was not voluntary but
29
concluding that defendant was not entitled to section 6 instruction because no
reasonable jury could find that facts, disputed or undisputed, rendered him unable to
make voluntary statement).
If the statement is the result of custodial interrogation, the defendant is entitled
under article 38.22, section 7 to have the jury decide whether he was adequately
warned of his rights and knowingly and intelligently waived those rights when the
issue is raised by the trial evidence. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176; TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 7 (“When the issue is raised by the evidence, the trial judge
shall appropriately instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such
statement.”). Section 7’s phrase “the issue” refers to compliance with the article
38.22 warnings “and the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver of the rights.” See
Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 176; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a) (setting
out warnings that must given for custodial statement to be admissible).
The exclusionary rule of article 38.23(a) provides that no evidence obtained
in violation of any provisions of the state or federal constitution or laws shall be
admitted in evidence against a defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a). If
“the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder,” the defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction that if the jury believes or has reasonable doubt that the evidence was
obtained in violation of article 38.23, then it shall disregard any such evidence. Id.
To be entitled to this instruction, (1) the evidence heard by the jury must raise a fact
30
issue; (2) the evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and (3) the
contested fact issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in
obtaining the alleged involuntary statement. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 177.
In sum, for a defendant to be entitled to any of these three jury instructions,
evidence on the voluntariness issue must have been presented to the jury at trial.
B. Collins Is Not Entitled to a Voluntariness Jury Instruction Because No
Evidence Relevant to Voluntariness Was Presented to the Jury
Collins argues that evidence presented at trial would have permitted the jury
to conclude his statement was involuntary. He points to admission of the statement
itself, as well as Green’s testimony that he asked Collins to cooperate and voluntarily
provide a DNA sample and his testimony that despite having an arrest warrant, he
“wanted to see if [Collins] would volunteer to come in and talk with us.”
As the State points out, a dispute over whether Collins truly volunteered to
speak with detectives at the police station or agreed to do so solely to avoid execution
of the arrest warrant does not affect the voluntariness of his later statement. Collins
could have been arrested and still, during the custodial interrogation, voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights and provided a voluntary statement. The defense crossexamined Green about the statement, but the questions focused on the substance of
Green’s questions and Collins’s answers and whether Collins lost his temper during
the interview. Aside from asking why Green showed Collins a crime scene photo of
Nataliya when attempting to diffuse an atmosphere that had grown tense, the defense
31
did not question Green about his interrogation tactics. The defense did not question
Green about any of the issues it raises on appeal as bases to call the voluntariness of
Collins’s statement into question.
The jury was therefore faced with the statement itself: a statement in which
Green read the statutory warnings to Collins prior to any substantive questioning
about the offense, Collins indicated that he understood the warnings and he spoke
with the detectives for nearly two hours, the conversation was generally relaxed for
a large portion of the interview, the detectives offered Collins something to drink,
Collins received two breaks to smoke a cigarette, Collins was coherent and rational,
and he did not appear to be in a state of distress. We conclude that because evidence
relating to the voluntariness of the statement was not presented before the jury, none
of the three theories of voluntariness became the “law applicable to the case” such
that Collins was entitled to a jury instruction on those theories. See id. at 174–77;
Watts, 371 S.W.3d at 465 (“Without any evidence that the statements were made
involuntarily, we cannot say that article 38.22 ever became the law applicable to the
case. Therefore, the trial court was not required to submit the instruction to the
jury.”).
We overrule Collins’s sixth issue.
32
State-Sponsored Perjury
In his second issue, Collins argues that the State sponsored perjury, pointing
to purportedly inconsistent testimony from Detective Green concerning the
circumstances of Collins’s arrest.
At the suppression hearing, Green testified that upon his detention outside his
residence, he volunteered to speak with detectives at the police station:
Q. Now, what did you do once you had placed the defendant under
arrest for this offense?
A. Well, actually, we—once we got the search warrant [for
Collins’s DNA], we did surveillance on the defendant’s
residence. We observed him walking through a parking lot and
we detained him. And he actually volunteered to come back to
the police station with us.
Q. Okay. Now, I guess, can—can you describe that more? I mean,
if he was detained, were you going to bring him back to the
station anyway, or did he say that he was willing to come along?
A. Well, we talked with him at the scene. We did have the [arrest]
warrant in hand, but—at the time we would have executed it, but
we didn’t think we needed to. We talked with him, explained to
him that we would like to go talk with him at the PD, and he
agreed to come with us.
Collins argues that Green testified to a different version of events at trial, a
version in which Collins did not volunteer to speak with detectives:
Q. [W]ell, I don’t recall how you described approaching Mr. Collins
with your warrant or picking him up, other than he was scared.
What did you say to him when you approached him and asked
him to come with you?
A. . . . Myself and I think four of the unmarked—or undercover—
well, I guess unmarked, plainclothes detectives, we were in
33
unmarked cars as well as marked units. Once Mr. Collins cleared
Building 20 and he was in the parking lot near the office, we
blocked him in with our cars situated so he couldn’t run. I then
approached, identified myself, who I was and why we were there.
I did have an arrest warrant on hand, but I first just wanted to see
if he would volunteer to come in and talk with us in reference to
a case we were working. He said he didn’t want to and why. And
then at that point, I advised him that we had an arrest warrant for
him for murder.
Q. And so he got in the car?
A. Yes, he volunteer—well, not voluntary. He got in the patrol car
and was transported to the P.D.
Collins did not raise the issue of possibly perjured testimony during trial or in a postjudgment motion. Collins acknowledges this, but he argues that “nowhere in the
Constitution is there a requirement for a liar to get a chance to redeem himself on
cross-examination” and that the State bears the burden not to proffer false or perjured
testimony. He further argues that both of Green’s statements cannot be true, so either
Green lied at the suppression hearing or he lied at trial, and under either scenario,
the false statement harmed him.
We agree with the State that Collins has not presented us with a purported trial
court error that we, as an appellate court, can review. The Court of Criminal Appeals
recognizes a procedure to raise claims of false or perjurious evidence, but that
procedure contemplates fact findings and legal determinations by the trial court in
the first instance followed by appellate review of such findings and determinations.
See, e.g., Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We
34
review factual findings concerning whether a witness’s testimony is perjurious or
false under a deferential standard, but we review the ultimate legal conclusion of
whether such testimony was ‘material’ de novo.”); see also Ex parte De La Cruz,
466 S.W.3d 855, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (recognizing that false-evidence claim
can serve as basis for post-conviction habeas relief if applicant proves by
preponderance of evidence that false evidence was presented at trial and that
evidence was material to guilty verdict); Cantu v. State, 678 S.W.3d 331, 354–55
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (reviewing false-evidence claim that had
been raised in motion for new trial).
Because Collins did not raise a perjured-testimony claim in the trial court, we
do not have the benefit of any trial court fact findings on this issue and instead only
have the cold record before us. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
Collins’s second appellate issue presents no error for us to review.10
We overrule Collins’s second issue.
10
It is well-established that the State’s use of materially false testimony to obtain a
conviction violates a defendant’s due process rights. See, e.g., Ex parte Carter, 721
S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). We note, however, that Collins cites no
authority for the proposition that such a claim may be raised for the first time on
appeal, and both cases he cites to support his broader argument either involve a postconviction proceeding or a request for leave to file a post-conviction proceeding.
See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267 (1959) (allegation of false testimony
litigated in post-conviction proceeding); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115
(1935) (per curiam) (denying leave to file post-conviction habeas proceeding
without prejudice because defendant had not filed state habeas proceeding raising
perjured-testimony claim).
35
Exclusion of Evidence
In his third and fourth issues, Collins challenges the trial court’s exclusion of
evidence his digital forensics expert discovered that Nataliya had been involved in
escort activities and that Englerth—an alternate suspect in the murder—had child
pornography on his computer, which may have played a role in his court martial
contrary to representations he made to the State, calling his credibility into question.
Collins argues that by excluding this evidence, the trial court deprived him of his
constitutional right to present a complete defense. We address these issues together.
State rulemakers “have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules
excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,
324 (2006) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). But this
discretion is not unlimited because the Constitution “guarantees criminal defendants
‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Id. (quoting Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). “This right is abridged by evidence rules that
‘infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused’ and are ‘arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” Id. (quoting Scheffer,
523 U.S. at 308). However, “well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such
as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at
36
326. The Constitution also permits trial courts to exclude evidence that is repetitive
or only marginally relevant. Id.
Ordinarily, the erroneous exclusion of evidence under the Rules of Evidence
constitutes non-constitutional error that is reviewed under Rule of Appellate
Procedure 44.2(b). Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
An exception exists when the erroneously excluded evidence “forms such a vital
portion of the case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from
presenting a defense.” Id. (quoting Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 665 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002)). Exclusion of evidence might rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, warranting review under Rule 44.2(a), if: (1) a state evidentiary rule
categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the defendant from offering otherwise
relevant, reliable evidence vital to his defense; or (2) a trial court’s clearly erroneous
ruling results in exclusion of admissible evidence that forms the vital core of a
defensive theory and effectively prevents him from presenting that defense. Id.; Ray
v. State, 178 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
At trial, Collins proffered the testimony and report of Eric Devlin, a licensed
investigator and digital forensics expert. Devlin examined computers and other
electronic devices owned by Nataliya and Englerth. The defense sought to admit
Devlin’s testimony that he had found “several thousands” of child pornography
images on Englerth’s computer. Devlin informed the Harris County District
37
Attorney’s Office of this discovery, but an assistant district attorney told him that no
charges would be filed because the statute of limitations had passed. With respect to
Nataliya, Devlin found evidence that she “was involved in a group called Planet
Dreams, which is a known human traffic and escort agency based in Europe,”
including “e-mails from 2012 in which she was communicating with Planet Dreams
about engaging in escort-type activity.” He found images dating from 2005 to 2010,
including several photographs in which Nataliya was “scantily clad and advertising
her sexual services for a fee.” He also found evidence that in November 2015, two
months before she moved to America permanently and six months before her
murder, she performed four internet searches for escort agencies in Houston. The
State argued that Devlin’s proposed testimony was inadmissible under Rule 403, it
was improper character evidence, and it was not relevant.
The defense argued that the evidence relating to Nataliya was relevant because
its theory of the case was that “the sex was consensual and not an aggravated sexual
assault.” It argued that the evidence relating to Englerth was relevant because it was
“completely opposite of what Mr. Englerth proffered to the State regarding his court
martial, which was for child pornography, that he was given a device that he didn’t
know had child pornography on it.” The defense believed that Englerth provided a
false explanation of his court martial proceeding to the State, and it wished to
38
impeach him “with those issues.” No testimony regarding a court martial had been
presented to the jury due to a pre-trial limine ruling.
The trial court excluded the evidence, ruling that the evidence of child
pornography images was “definitely improper character evidence or impeachment
of character.” It noted that no evidence had been presented to the jury about a court
martial or purported false testimony from Englerth. The court ruled that the evidence
of Nataliya’s alleged escort activities was too remote in time to be relevant. It further
explained that the internet searches “doesn’t mean she was actually escorting,” and
if the defense “had evidence that she was, in fact, an escort, that would be a different
story; I would consider that being relevant.”
We conclude that the exclusion of Devlin’s testimony and report did not
prevent Collins from presenting a complete defense. See Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666
(“Exclusions of evidence are unconstitutional only if they ‘significantly undermine
fundamental elements of the accused’s defense.’” (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at
315)). Collins was able to develop Englerth as an alternate suspect for Nataliya’s
murder, extensively questioning detectives and Englerth himself about his testimony
that he was in California for work at the time of Nataliya’s murder. As an example,
Collins asked the detectives whether they had obtained the passenger manifest from
the flight Englerth supposedly took from Los Angeles to Houston, rather than relying
on the boarding pass, which “can be printed at any time prior to actually flying.”
39
Collins also asked whether the detectives verified that Englerth was actually driving
his truck, rather than relying on driver logs that only showed the location of the truck
but not who the driver was.
Collins was also able to raise the possibility that sex with Nataliya was
consensual and not contemporaneous with the murder. As discussed above, he
elicited testimony from the medical examiner that Nataliya did not have any visible
injuries to her genitalia, evidence that he relies on to argue that the State did not
present sufficient evidence to support the aggravated sexual assault predicate. He
also elicited testimony from the DNA experts that the presence of DNA in a location
says nothing about when it was left there, which the defense used to cast doubt on
the timing of any sexual contact relative to the murder. “That [the defendant] was
unable to . . . present his case to the extent and in the form he desired is not
prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented from presenting the substance of
his defense to the jury.” See id. (quotation omitted). The trial court’s rulings
excluding Collins’s evidence did not deprive him of the ability to present a complete
defense.
We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
excluding the evidence under the Rules of Evidence. As the trial court stated when
it excluded the evidence relating to Nataliya, the evidence that Devlin allegedly
discovered was remote in time, and the evidence that was nearer in time to the
40
murder (the internet searches) does not establish that Nataliya was actually working
as an escort. It was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial court
to conclude that evidence of alleged remote escort activity was not relevant to any
issue involved in this case. See Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, court
abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside zone of reasonable disagreement,
[o]nly relevant evidence is admissible,” and “the trial court judge has the discretion
to exclude irrelevant evidence”); TEX. R. EVID. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to make fact in consequence more or less probable than it would be without
evidence).
Similarly, it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement for the trial court
to exclude evidence that Devlin found child pornography on Englerth’s computer.
Collins cross-examined Englerth about his alibi and inconsistencies between his
testimony and other evidence, he cross-examined the detectives about their
investigation into Englerth as a suspect in the murder, and he established Englerth
as an alternate suspect. The jury, however, heard no testimony about a court martial
or the circumstances surrounding Englerth’s discharge from the army.11 The trial
11
Aside from this issue relating to Devlin’s testimony, Collins does not raise an
appellate issue challenging the exclusion of evidence relating to a court martial. Nor
could he because he never offered any evidence of a court martial or circumstances
surrounding it. He argues that such evidence was excluded by a pretrial limine
ruling, but it is well-established that a motion in limine is a preliminary matter that
41
court reasonably could have concluded that any marginal relevance of this evidence
was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues before the jury.
See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”); Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (“The general rule is that a party is not entitled to impeach a
witness on a collateral matter.”); see also Hayden v. State, 296 S.W.3d 549, 554
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Unless the witness’s testimony created a false impression
that is directly relevant to the offense charged, allowing a party to delve into the
issue beyond the limits of cross examination wastes time and confuses the issues.”
(quotation omitted)).
We overrule Collins’s third and fourth issues.
Modification of Judgment
An appellate court may modify a trial court’s judgment to “make the record
speak the truth when the matter has been called to its attention by any source.”
French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Van Flowers v. State,
normally preserves nothing for appellate review. See Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d
220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“For error to be preserved with regard to the
subject of a motion in limine, an objection must be made at the time the subject is
raised during trial.”) (italics omitted).
42
629 S.W.3d 707, 710–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); TEX. R.
APP. P. 43.2(b) (“The court of appeals may modify the trial court’s judgment and
affirm it as modified.”). We may do so on our own motion if the parties do not raise
the error. Vasquez v. State, 674 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2023, no pet.).
The jury found Collins guilty of capital murder. The trial court discharged the
jury and imposed punishment: “Mr. Collins, after having been found guilty of capital
murder by the jury, it’s at this time I assess your punishment at automatic life in
prison without the possibility of parole.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.31(a)(2)
(punishment for capital felony when state does not seek death penalty). The
judgment of conviction, however, states that the jury assessed Collins’s punishment.
We modify the judgment to state that the punishment was assessed by the court.
Conclusion
We modify the judgment of conviction and affirm as modified.
David Gunn
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Gunn and Johnson.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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