Opinion issued August 27, 2026.
In the
Court of Appeals
for the
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00345-CV
CAREY LYNN JOHNSON, Appellant
v.
JON P. HERRERA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 311th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2018-77006
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal arises from a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR)
between appellant Carey Lynn Johnson and appellee Jon P. Herrera. Johnson appeals
two post-judgment orders. In one of her issues, Johnson complains that the trial court
erred by granting a motion to enforce provisions of the final SAPCR order and, as a result, imposing additional restrictions on her that she argues operate as
unconstitutional prior restraints on the exercise of the freedom of speech. Because
neither the parties nor the trial court complied with chapter 156 of the Texas Family
Code, which governs modifications of SAPCR orders, we reverse the portion of the
trial court’s order that imposed additional restrictions on Johnson and render
judgment that those portions are struck. As to the remainder of Johnson’s issues, we
lack jurisdiction because the orders from which Johnson appeals—with the
aforementioned exception—are neither final judgments nor appealable interlocutory
orders. Accordingly, we dismiss the remainder of Johnson’s issues.
Background
On October 23, 2018, Herrera filed his original SAPCR petition and named
Johnson as the respondent. More than five years later, Herrera and Johnson went to
trial and, on May 14, 2024, the trial court rendered a final order (the Final Order).
The Final Order included a permanent injunction against Johnson, enjoining her
from “[h]arassing Bruce Jefferies, his employees at National Screening Centers Inc.
or any insurance company associated with National Screening Centers, Inc., or Quest
Diagnostics” and from “[p]osting negative reviews on social media regarding
National Screening Centers, Inc. or Quest Diagnostics.” In a prior appeal, Johnson
appealed from the Final Order, but this Court dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution when Johnson failed to file an appellant’s brief despite notice that her
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appeal was subject to dismissal. Johnson v. Herrera, No. 01-24-00407-CV, 2025
WL 554041, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
On August 29, 2024, while that prior appeal was pending, Quest
Diagnostics—a non-party to the SAPCR proceedings—filed a motion in the trial
court under chapter 157 of the Texas Family Code to enforce provisions of the Final
Order that enjoined Johnson from harassing Quest Diagnostics. See TEX. FAM. CODE
157.001(a) (“A motion for enforcement as provided in this chapter may be filed to
enforce any provision of a temporary or final order rendered in a suit.”). In response
to the motion to enforce, Johnson filed a “Motion to Dismiss Enforcement Action
and Vacate Order” (the Motion to Dismiss). In that motion, Johnson argued that,
among other things, Quest Diagnostics lacked standing, the presiding judge of the
trial court was constitutionally disqualified, and the Final Order should be vacated.
On April 8, 2025, the trial court granted the motion to enforce and found
Johnson in contempt of the provisions of the Final Order that enjoined Johnson from
harassing Quest Diagnostics (the Contempt Order). In addition to finding Johnson
in contempt, the trial court required that Johnson “obtain consent from this Court
before contacting Quest Diagnostics, its employees or attorneys or making any
additional complaints to Quest Diagnostics or any regulatory body.” Three days
later, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss (the Motion to Dismiss Order).
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On April 21, 2025, Johnson filed a motion to disqualify or recuse the presiding
judge of the trial court. The following day, the trial court issued an order in which
the presiding judge declined to recuse herself voluntarily and referred the motion to
the presiding judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 18a(f)(1) (directing respondent judge to either (a) sign order of recusal or
disqualification or (b) refer motion to presiding judge of administrative judicial
region). On April 24, 2025, the presiding judge of the Eleventh Administrative
Judicial Region denied Johnson’s recusal motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(g)(1)
(requiring presiding judge of administrative judicial region to rule on referred
motion or assign judge to rule).
On May 8, 2025, Johnson filed a notice of appeal, in which she states that she
appeals from the Contempt Order and the Motion to Dismiss Order.1 See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.1(d)(2) (requiring that notice of appeal “state the date of the judgment or
order appealed from”).
1
Johnson’s notice of appeal also states that she appeals from the “Order Denying
Recusal [signed on] April 11, 2025.” Besides the Motion to Dismiss Order, there is
no other order signed by the trial court on April 11, 2025, that is a part of the record.
There is an April 24, 2025 order in which the presiding judge of the Eleventh
Administrative Judicial Region denied a recusal motion filed by Johnson. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 18a(g)(1) (requiring presiding judge of administrative judicial region to
rule on referred motion or assign judge to rule). However, after this Court requested
a response from Johnson addressing this Court’s jurisdiction, Johnson clarified that
“[t]he April 24 recusal ruling should not . . . be conflated with the April 11 order”
and that she appeals the trial court’s denial of her Motion to Dismiss, which included
as an argument that the presiding judge of the trial court is constitutionally
disqualified. Accordingly, we do not address the April 24, 2025 order.
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Appellate Jurisdiction
“[W]e must consider issues affecting our jurisdiction sua sponte.” State ex rel.
Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2018). Generally, an appeal may be taken
from—and we have jurisdiction over—only a final judgment or certain interlocutory
orders expressly made appealable by statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 51.012, 51.014(a); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
“Orders made for the purpose of enforcing or carrying into effect an alreadyrendered judgment generally are not final judgments or decrees, and therefore cannot
be appealed.” Sintim v. Larson, 489 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (citing cases). We have appellate jurisdiction to review such
orders only if a statute explicitly authorizes an appeal. Sunnyland Dev., Inc. v. Shawn
Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). We
commit jurisdictional fundamental error if we assume appellate jurisdiction over an
order from which an appeal is not statutorily authorized. N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam).
On July 30, 2026, we notified the parties that we appeared to lack jurisdiction
and ordered that Johnson file a response addressing whether this Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to each order from which Johnson appeals.
On August 7, 2026, Johnson filed a response and argued that: (1) this Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal from the Contempt Order because, in that order, the trial
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court granted additional injunctive relief against Johnson “beyond the contempt
determination”; (2) the Motion to Dismiss Order is a final judgment because it
finally disposed of Johnson’s post-judgment motion to vacate; and (3) to the extent
that the Motion to Dismiss Order is appealable, we have jurisdiction to review
Johnson’s complaint that the presiding judge of the trial court erred by failing to
disqualify herself.
A. Motion to Dismiss Order
In the Motion to Dismiss, filed in response to Quest Diagnostics’ enforcement
motion under chapter 157 of the Family Code, Johnson argued that Quest
Diagnostics lacked standing, the presiding judge of the trial court was
constitutionally disqualified, and the Final Order should be vacated. Chapter 157 of
the Family Code does not authorize or contemplate motions to dismiss enforcement
proceedings brought under that chapter. And chapter 51 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code—which authorizes appeals from certain interlocutory orders—
does not authorize appeals from interlocutory orders granting or denying motions to
dismiss under chapter 157 of the Family Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a). Nonetheless, Johnson argues that we should construe the Motion to
Dismiss Order as an order (1) denying her request that the presiding judge of the trial
court recuse herself and (2) denying her request that the trial court vacate the Final
Order.
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1. Denial of disqualification request
An “order granting or denying a motion to disqualify may be reviewed by
mandamus and may be appealed in accordance with other law.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
18a(j)(2); see also Moss v. Holzworth, 722 S.W.3d 739, 745 n.3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. denied) (noting that order denying recusal motion is
only reviewable on appeal from final judgment). Johnson has challenged the Motion
to Dismiss Order on direct appeal, not by mandamus,2 and we are unaware of any
“other law” that would permit review of the order on direct appeal insofar as the
order denied Johnson’s motion to disqualify. See Fisher v. Steadfast Funding, LLC,
No. 01-20-00190-CV, 2022 WL 2513475, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
July 7, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting lack of “other law” that would permit
direct appeal from interlocutory order on motion to disqualify). Thus, to the extent
we construe the Motion to Dismiss Order as denying Johnson’s request for
disqualification, we lack jurisdiction to consider any issue related to that order.
2. Denial of request to vacate Final Order
An order denying a motion to vacate is not independently appealable.
Fazzolari v. Fazzolari, No. 01-26-00019-CV, 2026 WL 1139715, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing cases). Although a
2
Johnson has since requested that we construe her appeal as a petition for writ of
mandamus. We address Johnson’s request later in this opinion.
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motion to vacate can extend the time by which a party must file a notice of appeal,
the motion must be filed within 30 days after the final judgment is signed. Id.; see
TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a), (g) (requiring post-judgment motions to be filed within 30
days after judgment is signed); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(2) (specifying periods of time
in which to file notice of appeal “if any party timely files” applicable post-judgment
motion). Because Johnson filed her Motion to Dismiss more than 10 months after
the trial court signed the Final Order, that motion did not extend the period of time
by which Johnson was required to file a notice of appeal from the Final Order. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a) (specifying that, if party timely files certain post-judgment
motions, notice of appeal must be filed within 90 days after judgment is signed).
Notwithstanding that Johnson filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial
court’s signing the Motion to Dismiss Order, that order had no effect on the parties’
appellate deadlines. Fazzolari, 2026 WL 1139715, at *1. Thus, to the extent we
construe the Motion to Dismiss Order as denying Johnson’s request to vacate the
Final Order, the appeal would be untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to consider any
of Johnson’s issues related to the Final Order.
Because the Motion to Dismiss Order is neither a final judgment nor an order
from which an appeal is statutorily authorized, we dismiss Johnson’s appeal from
the Motion to Dismiss Order for lack of jurisdiction. Even if we construed the order
as denying Johnson’s requests for disqualification or vacatur of the Final Order, we
8
nonetheless lack jurisdiction over those portions of the Motion to Dismiss Order: an
order denying a motion to disqualify is not reviewable by direct appeal, and the trial
court’s order denying Johnson’s motion to vacate had no effect on the parties’
appellate deadlines—which had already passed by the time of Johnson’s motion—
and is not independently reviewable. See id.
B. Contempt Order
A contempt order, including an order granting a motion to enforce under
chapter 157 of the Texas Family Code, is neither a final judgment nor an appealable
interlocutory order. In re R.J.J., No. 12-25-00126-CV, 2025 WL 3301167, at *5
(Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). “A contempt judgment is
reviewable only via a petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is
confined) or a petition for writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved).” Cline
v. Cline, 557 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)
(dismissing portion of appeal challenging contempt finding). However, “absent
appropriate pleadings and proof, the trial court may not extend the scope of the
contempt proceedings and by its order modify or reform previous orders of the court
affecting the custody of the child.” Martin v. Martin, 519 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, order), disp. on merits, 523 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). To the extent an order “purports to modify
or reform previous orders of the court as to custody of the child,” we have
9
jurisdiction to review the matter. Id.; see Stephens v. Stephens, 543 S.W.2d 686, 688
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ) (noting that appellate court has
jurisdiction to review “order of contempt” that “purports to modify or reform a prior
order of the court”); Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, No. 03-06-00025-CV, 2009 WL 1896074, at
*1-2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 1, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing portion of
order modifying amount of spousal maintenance but dismissing issues challenging
contempt finding); In re Gergen, No. 07-98-0137-CV, 1999 WL 125530, at *2-3
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 10, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(dismissing point of error challenging contempt but exercising jurisdiction over
appeal from portion of order that modified parent-child relationship).
As stated in the Contempt Order, the trial court found Johnson “in contempt
of [the trial court’s] prior Orders enjoining her from harassing Quest Diagnostics”
and imposed additional restrictions on Johnson with respect to communicating with
or complaining about Quest Diagnostics. Although we have no jurisdiction to review
the portion of the order finding Johnson in contempt, the remainder of the order goes
beyond “the scope of the contempt proceedings” and modifies “previous orders of
the court affecting the custody of the child.” Martin, 519 S.W.2d at 902. Contempt
orders “are limited to those orders that assess monetary fines or incarcerate an
individual for failure to follow a court order.” In re A.R.G., 645 S.W.3d 789, 794
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (citing In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d
10
443, 450 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding). The additional
requirement imposed on Johnson—that she obtain the trial court’s consent before
contacting or complaining of Quest Diagnostics—does not assess monetary fines or
incarcerate Johnson. Furthermore, nothing in chapter 157 authorizes the imposition
of the additional requirement as a contempt remedy. Chapter 157 of the Family
Code, which governs enforcement of temporary or final orders in SAPCR
proceedings, permits a trial court to, among other things:
• award the movant her attorney’s fees, TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.167(a);
• order additional periods of possession of or access to a child to compensate
one party for the other party’s wrongful denial of court-ordered possession
or access, id. § 157.168(a);
• place the contemnor on community supervision and suspend an order of
commitment, id. § 157.211(a); and
• award the movant a judgment for unpaid child support, id. § 157.261(a).
Rather than functioning as a remedy for Johnson’s contempt, the requirement
to obtain the trial court’s pre-approval for certain communications has the
appearance of modifying the trial court’s final SAPCR order, which enjoined
Johnson from harassing Quest Diagnostics. In Martin, this Court concluded that the
trial court had modified its prior SAPCR order even though the trial court, in its
contempt order, did not use the words “modify” or “reform.” 519 S.W.2d at 901.
This Court in Martin examined the substance of the order and noted that it
“designated the details of the visitation privileges which [the father] was to have.”
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Id. We concluded that, by doing so, the contempt order “purported to grant relief
beyond the scope of the contempt proceedings.” Id. at 902. In our subsequent opinion
on the merits, we held that, because neither the parties nor the trial court followed
the procedures required to modify a SAPCR order,3 the trial court “was without
authority to modify or reform the terms of the visitation privileges set out in its
former order.” 523 S.W.2d at 253. Accordingly, with respect to that portion of the
order, we reversed and rendered judgment that those portions of the contempt order
be struck. Id.
Although the circumstances present in Martin—the modification of a SAPCR
order within a contempt order—appear to be rare, we have never retreated from, nor
has the Texas Supreme Court abrogated, our holding in Martin: this Court has
jurisdiction to review a contempt order insofar as it “purport[s] to modify or reform
previous orders of the court as to the custody of the child.” Martin, 523 S.W.2d at
252. The pre-approval restrictions imposed on Johnson, strictly speaking, do not
modify or reform previous orders of the trial court as to the custody of the child.
Rather, those restrictions modify provisions of the trial court’s Final Order regarding
3
In Martin, this Court considered the requirements of then-section 14.08 of the Texas
Family Code. Martin v. Martin, 523 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1975, no writ). The provisions of then-section 14.08 of the Texas Family Code
are now found in chapter 156 of the Family Code, which governs modifications of
final orders providing for the conservatorship, support, or possession of and access
to a child. Turner v. Turner, 47 S.W.3d 761, 763 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.); TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.001 et seq.
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Johnson’s communications with Quest Diagnostics. The distinction is immaterial.
The trial court’s authority to enter permanent injunctions in SAPCR proceedings
rests on the trial court’s statutorily mandated consideration of the child’s best
interests. King v. Lyons, 457 S.W.3d 122, 127 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002); Gardner v. McKenney, No. 03-21-00130-CV, 2023 WL 1998902, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 15, 2023, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (“Texas courts have construed . . . provisions [requiring trial courts
to consider the child’s best interest] as providing the trial court the authority to issue
permanent injunctions.”). Thus, the permanent injunction in the Final Order relates
to “the custody of the child” in the sense that the injunction was entered in a SAPCR
proceeding, in which the trial court’s authority to grant such relief rests on its
mandatory consideration of the child’s best interest. Accordingly, under Martin, we
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction to review the Contempt Order insofar
as it purports to modify the Final Order. We proceed to consider the merits.
Johnson argues that the pre-approval restrictions in the Contempt Order do
not “conform to the pleadings and proof” and are unconstitutional prior restraints on
the exercise of the freedom of speech. Herrera responds that the trial court had
“jurisdiction to enforce its order through contempt” and that the injunction against
harassing Quest Diagnostics “would be meaningless if the court had no means to
enforce it.” However, nowhere in Herrera’s appellate brief does he explain how or
13
why the trial court’s ordering additional restrictions complied with the Texas Family
Code.
Here, the Final Order is an “Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child
Relationship.” To modify the Final Order, the parties were required to follow the
procedures of chapter 156 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.001
(“A court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may modify an order that provides
for the conservatorship, support, or possession of and access to a child.”); see also
id. § 155.001(a) (“[A] court acquires continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
matters provided for by this title in connection with a child on the rendition of a final
order.”). Quest Diagnostics did not file a petition for modification. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 156.002 (specifying who may file suit for modification); see also id.
§ 157.003(a) (“A party requesting enforcement may join in the same proceeding any
claim and remedy provided for in . . . other provisions of this title . . . .” (Emphasis
added.)). Quest Diagnostics did not plead or present evidence that “modification
would be in the best interest of the child” or that “the circumstances of the child, a
conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially
changed” since rendition of the Final Order. Id. § 156.101(a)(1). Nothing in the
record demonstrates that the parties complied with, and nothing in the record
indicates the trial court believed it was acting under, chapter 156 of the Family Code.
See Martin, 523 S.W.2d at 253 (reversing order modifying visitation where parties
14
did not comply with statutory procedures to modify SAPCR order); see also Nesbitt,
at *2 (reversing order modifying spousal maintenance where parties failed to comply
with statutory provisions to modify spousal maintenance order). Accordingly, the
trial court was without authority to modify or reform the provisions of the SAPCR
order enjoining Johnson from harassing Quest Diagnostics and impose additional
requirements.
We reverse the portion of the Contempt Order imposing additional
requirements on Johnson and render judgment that that portion of the Contempt
Order is struck. We lack jurisdiction to review the remainder of the Contempt Order
and leave undisturbed the trial court’s contempt findings. We also lack jurisdiction
over any of Johnson’s issues that challenge the propriety of any provision of the
Final Order, including the provisions that enjoined Johnson from harassing Quest
Diagnostics.
C. Mandamus Request
In response to our order that Johnson address this Court’s jurisdiction,
Johnson requests that, for any issues over which we lack appellate jurisdiction, we
construe her brief as a petition for writ of mandamus. When an appellant
“specifically request[s] mandamus relief” in her attempted appeal from an
unappealable order, she is entitled to have the appeal treated as a petition for writ of
mandamus. CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex. 2011). However,
15
“there is no authority for treating a case as both an original proceeding and an
appeal.” Cline, 557 S.W.3d at 812. Having addressed the appellate issue over which
we have jurisdiction, we dismiss the remainder of Johnson’s issues for lack of
jurisdiction. See Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (holding that, even where appellate court has jurisdiction
to consider part of appeal, proper resolution is to dismiss, not overrule, issues over
which court has no jurisdiction).
Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the Contempt Order imposing additional
requirements on Johnson and render judgment that the following two paragraphs of
the Contempt Order are struck:
1. Johnson must obtain consent from this Court before contacting Quest
Diagnostics, its employees or attorneys or making any additional
complaints to Quest Diagnostics or any regulatory body such as, but
not limited to, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the College of
American Pathologists, the Centers for Medicare/Medicaid Services,
and/or state or federal Departments of Health regarding any issues
arising out of or related to any urine or hair specimens submitted by
Johnson to Quest Diagnostics for testing from July 20, 2020 through
May 14, 2024;
2. Upon obtaining consent of this Court to contact Quest Diagnostics or
to make an additional complaint to any entity regarding Quest
Diagnostics’s testing of her specimens in the course of this proceeding,
Johnson must direct such communications or complaints solely to D.
Faye Caldwell of Caldwell Everson PLLC[.]
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We dismiss the remainder of Johnson’s issues for lack of jurisdiction. We dismiss
all pending motions as moot.
Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Gunn, and Morgan.
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