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City of Houston v. Ma Yolanda Valdes Gutierrez

2026-08-27

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-25-00047-CV

CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant

V.

MA YOLANDA VALDES GUTIERREZ, Appellee

On Appeal from the 133rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2024-72514

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The City of Houston appeals the trial court’s denial of its Rule 91a motion to

dismiss Ma Yolanda Valdes Gutierrez’s negligence claim, arguing it retains

governmental immunity to suit. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. We affirm.

Background

Gutierrez filed a claim against the City alleging that a police officer, while

operating a City-owned vehicle in the course and scope of his employment,

negligently rear-ended her vehicle. Gutierrez’s claim sought personal-injury

damages that resulted from the incident under section 101.021 of the Texas Tort

Claims Act (TTCA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021. The City

answered and filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 91a, arguing Gutierrez’s claims

have no basis in law because the allegations do not show a waiver of governmental

immunity under the TTCA. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The trial court denied the

motion, and the City filed this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 51.014(a)(8).

Analysis

A. Rule 91a and standard of review

A governmental entity may move to dismiss a claim under Rule 91a because

the claim has no basis in law due to immunity. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; see also City

of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016); City of Houston v.

Johnson, No. 01-23-00938-CV, 2025 WL 1033754, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Apr. 8, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). A claim “has no basis in law if the

allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do

not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1.

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We review a ruling on a Rule 91a motion de novo. San Jacinto River Auth.

v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. 2021); Johnson, 2025 WL 1033754, at *1.

We must accept the factual allegations in the pleadings as true and liberally

construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff. Johnson, 2025 WL 1033754, at *1.

B. Gutierrez alleged sufficient facts

The City argues Gutierrez’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim

within TTCA section 101.021(1)’s waiver of governmental immunity. To plead

within section 101.021(1)’s waiver, the pleading must allege: (1) property damage

or personal injury; (2) that was proximately caused by the wrongful act, omission,

or negligence; (3) of a government employee; (4) while acting within the scope of

employment; and (5) that arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven

vehicle. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1).

Gutierrez alleges in her live pleading that (1) while driving east on

Kingwood Drive, the rear of her vehicle was struck by the front of a City-owned

vehicle being driven by Police Officer Daniel Torres Robert, (2) at the time of the

incident, Officer Robert was employed by the City and acting within the course

and scope of his employment, and (3) the collision and Gutierrez’s injuries were

proximately caused by Officer Robert’s negligence, including his using a phone

while driving, failing to keep a proper lookout, following too closely, and failing to

control vehicle speed. Viewing these allegations and reasonable inferences drawn

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from them in the light most favorable to Gutierrez, the elements required to

establish a waiver of governmental immunity under section 101.021(1) have been

pled. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021; see Hsu v. Hernandez, No. 01-24-00948-CV, 2025 WL 3236294, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Hernandez alleged that a City employee caused her

damages by operating a car negligently, listing several ways in which he did so. At

this stage of the litigation and under our standard of review, we accept the factual

allegations in Hernandez’s pleading as true.”).

The City also contends Gutierrez failed to expressly negate the 9-1-1 and

emergency exceptions to section 101.021(1)’s immunity waiver. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.055(2) (emergency exception), 101.062 (9-1-1

exception).

A plaintiff suing a governmental unit must allege facts to negate the TTCA’s

exceptions that the “allegations plausibly implicate, which will depend on the

nature of the dispute.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 867–68

(Tex. 2023). “It will be readily apparent in most cases” which exceptions are

plausibly implicated, and when exceptions are not plausibly implicated, the

plaintiff need not negate them. Id. at 868.

Gutierrez pled no facts suggesting that the City employee in question was

responding to a 9-1-1 call or other emergency. Thus, she was not required to

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allege additional facts negating these exceptions. City of Houston v. Ortiz, No. 01-24-00361-CV, 2025 WL 3521320, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 9,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s denial of the City’s Rule 91a motion.

Andrew Johnson

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Johnson, and Dokupil.

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