Opinion issued August 27, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00896-CV
HARRIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT F/K/A HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellant
V.
PARK ON WESTVIEW APTS, LP, Appellee
On Appeal from the 157th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2024-50252
OPINION
In this ad valorem tax case, Appellant Harris Central Appraisal District f/k/a
Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) appeals the denial of its plea to the
jurisdiction, arguing Appellee Park on Westview Apts, LP’s (POW) failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. We
reverse and render judgment dismissing POW’s claims for want of jurisdiction.
Background
POW owns a defunct apartment complex at 10157 Westview, Houston,
Texas (the Property). In 2023, HCAD appraised the Property at $2.6 million.
Regarding 2024, POW alleges HCAD did not comply with the deadlines for
appraising the Property or submitting the appraisal record to the appraisal review
board (ARB) and that the ARB did not hear and determine any protests of the
appraised value. POW sued HCAD in district court.1 It asked the district court to
value the Property in accordance with the Tax Code.
HCAD answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing the trial court
lacks jurisdiction over POW’s claim for a valuation of the Property because POW
did not exhaust its administrative remedies.
In its response, POW argued the district court has jurisdiction because
HCAD’s failure to comply with the Tax Code made it “impossible” for POW to
exhaust administrative remedies. POW also filed a traditional motion for summary
judgment, asking the district court to value the Property based on the evidence
attached to its motion.
1
Two plaintiffs filed this suit, POW and Westview Drive Investments, LLC, which
involves two distinct properties. This interlocutory appeal pertains only to POW’s
claims regarding the Property.
2
After a hearing, the district court denied HCAD’s plea and granted POW’s
summary-judgment motion. HCAD appeals the district court’s denial of its plea.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).2
Analysis
A. Standard of review
“We construe the Tax Code and address questions regarding the scope of a
trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and the exclusivity of an agency’s
jurisdiction de novo.” Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. NTU, LLC v. Wilbarger Cnty.
Appraisal Dist., 691 S.W.3d 890, 901 (Tex. 2024). We also review the denial of a
plea to the jurisdiction de novo. City of Houston v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, 164
(Tex. 2025).
B. POW’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies deprived the
district court of jurisdiction over its tax protest
The Tax Code establishes procedures by which property is valued and taxed,
and by which property owners can dispute those valuations. See generally TEX.
TAX CODE §§ 1.01–43.04; Morris v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 388 S.W.3d 310,
313 (Tex. 2012). For properties that are not single-family residences, the Code
generally requires the chief appraiser to deliver notice to property owners of their
properties’ appraised values by May 1 or as soon thereafter as practicable if the
2
The district court’s grant of POW’s summary-judgment motion is not a subject of
this interlocutory appeal. However, based on our disposition, that summaryjudgment order is nullified.
3
appraised value of the property for that year is greater than the preceding year.
TEX. TAX CODE § 25.19(a). The chief appraiser shall submit the completed
appraisal records to the ARB for review and determination of protests by May 15
or as soon thereafter as practicable. Id. § 25.22(a). And by July 20, the ARB
shall “hear and determine all or substantially all timely filed protests.” Id.
§ 41.12(a)(1).3
Chapter 41 gives a property owner the right to “protest” an appraisal
district’s valuation of property before the ARB. Id. § 41.41(a)(1). If the owner is
dissatisfied with the ARB’s decision, Chapter 42 gives the owner a right to judicial
review. See id. §§ 42.01–.09.
The Tax Code gives “exclusive” original jurisdiction to ARBs to hear
taxpayer protests of the valuations of their properties. See Cameron Appraisal
Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing TEX. TAX
CODE § 42.09(a)). There is “no question” the Legislature intended to “bestow
exclusive original jurisdiction” over valuation protests upon ARBs. Id. “The
property owner must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its petition
for judicial review.” Mansion Partners, Ltd. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No.
3
For counties where the population exceeds one million, the appraisal district’s
board of directors can extend this July 20 deadline to August 30. TEX. PROP.
CODE § 41.12(c)(1).
4
01-21-00306-CV, 2023 WL 8938405, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.
28, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
POW acknowledges it has not exhausted administrative remedies but argues
HCAD’s failure to value the Property made it “impossible” for POW to do so.
However, the Tax Code specifically provides taxpayers the right “to protest before
the [ARB] the failure of the chief appraiser . . . to provide or deliver any notice to
which the property owner is entitled.” TEX. TAX CODE § 41.411(a). And once
failure to provide the notice is established, “the [ARB] shall determine a protest
made by the property owner on any other grounds of protest authorized by this
title.” Id. § 41.411(b).
Accordingly, POW’s lawsuit is an attempt to protest HCAD’s failure to
provide notice of its valuation of the Property to the district court in the first
instance, before exhausting the administrative remedy provided by section 41.411.
See Brazoria Civic Club v. Brazoria Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 854, 868–
69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (recognizing section 41.411 is
the exclusive ground for protesting the chief appraiser’s failure to provide notice).
Nevertheless, POW contends a taxpayer’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under the Tax Code is no longer a jurisdictional limitation in light of two
recent Supreme Court cases, Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. v. Travis
Central Appraisal District, 694 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. 2024), and Oncor Electric
5
Delivery Co. NTU, LLC v. Wilbarger County Appraisal District, 691 S.W.3d 890
(Tex. 2024). Neither case supports this argument.
In Texas Disposal Systems, the Supreme Court recognized that, when “the
Legislature assigns exclusive or original jurisdiction to an administrative body,”
and a statute provides for judicial review of the administrative body’s order,
“ordinarily the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction until the party exhausts its
administrative remedies.” 694 S.W.3d at 757–58. Turning to sections 42.01 and
42.02 of the Tax Code, the Court explained that a “taxpayer and the appraisal
district each may appeal to the trial court an order determining a protest.” Id. at
759 (emphasis added). The Court then determined that limits on such an appeal to
the trial court (specifically, limits regarding the bases raised in the taxpayer’s
protest), although mandatory, are not jurisdictional. Id. at 759–63. In support of
this conclusion, the Court held, “When a taxpayer raises a new basis to protest for
the first time in the trial court,” provisions in section 42.231 allowing the taxpayer
a remand to the ARB to exhaust administrative remedies and allowing the parties
to agree for the trial court to consider the new basis indicate that limits on the
appeal to the trial court are not jurisdictional. Id. at 759–60.
In Oncor Electric, the Supreme Court similarly held that “although
limitations on an ARB’s authority to review or reject a Section 1.111(e) agreement
[which is a final agreement between a property owner and the chief appraiser on
6
certain matters] may restrict the scope of a court’s review [of an appeal filed under
Chapter 42], they do not defeat its jurisdiction.” 691 S.W.3d at 896, 901–02, 909.
In so ruling, the Court recognized that “a taxpayer’s failure to exhaust the Tax
Code’s exclusive administrative remedies deprives the courts of jurisdiction to
decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes” and that “Chapter 42 provides
for review of ARB decisions by trial de novo in district court.” Id. at 895–96
(emphasis added) (citing Cameron Appraisal Dist., 194 S.W.3d at 502). Further,
the Court explained that section 42.01 lists the types of “ARB orders” a property
owner is entitled to appeal to the court, and section 42.21(h) provides a court
jurisdiction over an appeal “so long as the property was the subject of an [ARB]
order.” Id. at 906–08.
Common among the Chapter 42 judicial-review statutes cited by the
Supreme Court is that they allow an appeal of an ARB order. See TEX. TAX CODE
§§ 42.01, 42.02, 42.21, 42.231. Without an ARB order, the taxpayer has not
exhausted the administrative remedies required for the trial court to have
jurisdiction over the suit. See Starflight 50, L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist.,
287 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (holding trial
court had subject-matter jurisdiction over suit because taxpayer exhausted its
administrative remedies by obtaining ARB order); Cooke Cnty. Tax Appraisal
Dist. v. Teel, 129 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)
7
(“Appellees met the jurisdictional requirement set forth in section 42.01 of the tax
code. Appellees have obtained an order from the ARB, thereby exhausting their
administrative remedies and establishing a right to appeal.”); see also Mansion
Partners, 2023 WL 8938405, at *8 (“The administrative proceeding before the
ARB is complete when the board determines the protest by written order.”).4
Texas Disposal Systems and Oncor Electric did not change this settled law but
recognized it.
In its plea to the jurisdiction, HCAD is not complaining about statutory
limits to the scope of POW’s appeal of an ARB order but is correctly asserting that
there is no ARB order being appealed. Because POW did not exhaust its
administrative remedies by obtaining an ARB order, the district court lacks
jurisdiction of this suit. See Cameron Appraisal Dist., 194 S.W.3d at 502; Fort
Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. McGee Chapel Baptist Church, 611 S.W.3d 443,
450–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (concluding trial court
lacked jurisdiction over suit because taxpayer had not exhausted administrative
remedies by obtaining ARB order). We sustain HCAD’s appellate issue.
4
And without an ARB order, section 42.231’s procedure for remand to ARB to
exhaust administrative remedies does not apply. See Holcim (US) Inc. v. Ellis
Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 642 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.)
(section 42.231 “only applies when an appraisal review board has entered an order
determining the protest”).
8
Conclusion
We reverse the district court’s order denying HCAD’s partial plea to the
jurisdiction and render judgment dismissing POW’s claims against HCAD for
want of jurisdiction.
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
9