Opinion issued August 27, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00760-CV
NATALIYA ALLEN, Appellant
V.
JOYCE ALLEN RIVES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Grimes County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 4715-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Nataliya Allen appeals the final judgment in this eviction suit. We
dismiss and vacate the county court’s judgment of possession and reverse the award
of attorney’s fees and court costs.
Background
After James Perry Allen, Jr. died intestate, his siblings—including Appellee
Joyce Allen Rives—and Nataliya disputed who was entitled to James’s estate. In
2021, they entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) which governed
how the estate would be distributed. Per the MSA, Joyce made a request to purchase
a 33.75-acre tract that was part of the estate (the Property). When disagreement
arose about other estate property, the siblings and Nataliya submitted the dispute to
arbitration pursuant to the MSA. In a 2023 award, the arbitrator ruled that Joyce
was entitled to purchase the Property. In the probate suit, the trial court confirmed
and approved the arbitration award. Joyce purchased the property on July 11, 2024.
Shortly thereafter, Joyce filed an eviction suit in justice court, alleging that
Nataliya refused to vacate the Property. Attorney Scott Ballard appeared for
Nataliya and moved to continue trial based on his conflicting criminal settings in
another county. Joyce opposed the continuance, arguing that Nataliya harassing
Joyce and her workers prevented Joyce from moving onto the Property. The justice
court proceeded to trial and rendered judgment in favor of Joyce.
The same day, Nataliya appealed the case to county court. On August 16,
2024, the county court sent a notice advising that the appeal was received on August
7 and trial was set for August 29, 2024. On August 27, Ballard filed an appearance
as Nataliya’s attorney and moved to continue trial based on his conflicting criminal
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settings in another county. On August 28, the county court denied the motion for
continuance. The county court offered to reset trial to the morning of August 30,
but Ballard was also unavailable then.
Trial occurred on August 29 as scheduled with Nataliya appearing pro se.
Counsel for the dependent administrator of the estate testified how Joyce purchased
the Property pursuant to the MSA and arbitration award. He explained that Nataliya
did not complain about the arbitration award and filed her own motion to enforce the
award. He also testified that, because of Nataliya’s misbehavior, the administrator
moved for authority to retain security to protect the agents from Nataliya, which was
granted. An agent of the administrator testified that “all the difficulties [he] had are
being caused by Nataliya.”
Joyce testified she sold her house to pay for the Property. After the sale, Joyce
went to the Property to change locks and post “No Trespassing” signs, but Nataliya
arrived and claimed the Property was hers. Since then, Nataliya has prevented Joyce
from enjoying possession of the Property.
Joyce’s counsel presented evidence regarding his attorney’s fees and then
rested Joyce’s case. Nataliya did not present any evidence. The county court orally
ruled in Joyce’s favor, ordering Nataliya to vacate the Property by 6:00 p.m. on
August 30, 2024, and noting he was issuing her a criminal-trespass warning. The
court also awarded Joyce her attorney’s fees. The same day, the county court signed
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a judgment memorializing the ruling and awarding Joyce possession of the Property.
Nataliya now appeals.
Analysis
A. Issue of possession is moot
Eviction suits are designed to provide “a summary, speedy, and inexpensive
remedy for the determination of who is entitled to possession of the premises.”
Westwood Motorcars, LLC v. Virtuolotry, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. 2024)
(quoting McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984)). “[T]he right to
actual possession” is the “[o]nly [i]ssue” in an eviction case. Id. (quoting prior
version of TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e), which also applies here). When an eviction
defendant gives up possession of the property, her appeal from the judgment of
eviction is moot unless the appellate relief she requests is “not futile; that is, so long
as she held and asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual
possession of the [Property].” Marshall v. Hous. Auth., 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex.
2006); see also Johnson v. Freo Tex. LLC, No. 01-15-00398-CV, 2016 WL 2745265,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Nataliya admits she does not have possession of the Property. 1 Nataliya
makes two arguments that appear to relate to the issue of possession: (1) the entire
1
Nothing in the record reflects Nataliya attempted to supersede the judgment or
requested that a bond amount be set.
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judgment is void because it included injunctive relief forbidding Nataliya from
remaining on the Property and a criminal-trespass notice; and (2) the trial court
should have granted her motion to continue trial due to her counsel’s unavailability.
Neither argument provides Nataliya a potentially meritorious claim of right to
possession. Even if the judgment were void for the reasons she argues or the trial
court erred by not granting a trial continuance, Nataliya does not explain how such
outcome would give her a right to possess the Property. See Longino v. Sharoni, No.
05-22-00653-CV, 2024 WL 4970949, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 4, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (not considering appellants’ argument judgment was void due to an
incorrect address because they had vacated the property and the appeal was moot).
Accordingly, the part of Nataliya’s appeal regarding possession is moot. See
Williams v. Orca Realty, LLC, No. 01-23-00854-CV, 2024 WL 4776215, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).2
2
We also briefly address here Nataliya’s argument that the entire judgment—which
would include the award of attorney’s fees—is void because the county court, sitting
as an appellate court, lacked jurisdiction to order her to vacate the Property and issue
her a criminal-trespass warning. Even if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render
this relief, it would not void the entire judgment because the relief could be deleted
from the judgment, leaving the rest of the judgment of possession intact. See Mount
v. Rodriguez, No. 13-24-00032-CV, 2024 WL 3963919, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Aug. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (deleting portion of eviction
judgment that trial court lacked jurisdiction to render). Given our disposition, we
need not reform the judgment to delete the challenged language.
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B. Attorney’s fees
Nataliya also challenges the county court’s award of attorney’s fees. This
issue is properly before us because, even when the issue of possession is moot, other
issues such as the propriety of an attorney’s fees award are still reviewable. See
Stevenson v. Housing Auth. of City of Austin (HACA), 385 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2012, no pet.).
Nataliya argues the evidence does not support that Joyce complied with
section 24.006 of the Property Code, which governs attorney’s fees in eviction
actions. We construe this issue as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence
to support the fees award. See Petrov v. Will-Brooks Inv, LLC, No. 11-24-00112-CV, 2026 WL 1593650, at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 4, 2026, no pet. h.).
Under section 24.006, a landlord is eligible to recover attorney’s fees if (1)
she gives a tenant a written demand with specific language about attorney’s fees at
least 10 days before filing suit, or (2) a written lease entitles the landlord to recover
fees. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.006(a), (b). Failure to strictly comply with statutory
requirements is fatal to a claim for attorney’s fees. See Heimlich v. Cook, No. 14-22-00358-CV, 2023 WL 3596264, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 23,
2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
No evidence shows Nataliya was sent a written demand with attorney’s fees
language or that she had a landlord-tenant lease with Joyce. Joyce argues she was
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able to collect fees under a provision of the MSA that provides, “If it becomes
necessary to assert any claim to enforce or defend the provisions of [the MSA], the
Parties agree that the prevailing Party shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorney’s fees.” But the MSA was not a landlord-tenant lease and thus does not
satisfy section 24.006. See Heafner v. Heafner, No. 01-02-00624-CV, 2003 WL
22311283, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“Because Mary and Fred did not have a landlord-tenant relationship, section 24.006
does not apply to this case.”). The evidence is legally insufficient to support that
Joyce complied with the statute authorizing recovery of fees. See Whitehurst v.
Thomas, No. 01-21-00309-CV, 2023 WL 1786160, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Feb. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). We sustain this issue.3
Conclusion
Because the possession issue is moot, we vacate the county court’s judgment
of possession and possession-related issues, including the order that Nataliya not
enter the Property after 6:00 p.m. on August 30, 2024 and that unauthorized entry
shall be treated as a criminal trespass subjecting her to arrest and, upon conviction,
up to 180 days in jail and a fine of up to $2,000, and dismiss that portion of the
3
Because of our disposition, we need not consider Nataliya’s third issue regarding
whether the trial court erred by denying her motion for continuance.
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appeal. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785–88 (when possession-related issues are
moot, court vacates possession-related portions of judgment).
We reverse that portion of the judgment awarding Joyce her trial attorney’s
fees, interest on those fees, and conditional appellate attorney’s fees. Having
vacated the possession-related issues and reversed the award of fees, there is no basis
for Joyce to collect court costs (or interest on those costs) from Nataliya, and we
reverse that portion of the judgment, too. Id. at 790 (explaining how court costs are
handled in eviction appeals when possession issue moot). The judgment, thus, is
vacated in part and reversed in part, and we render judgment that Joyce take nothing
on her claim for attorney’s fees and court costs.4
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
4
We also dismiss any remaining motions as moot.
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