Opinion issued August 27, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00223-CV
RAMESH KAPUR, Appellant
V.
THE NEW PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATION
OF NEWPORT, INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 165th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-01555
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ramesh Kapur, doing business under the assumed name of AIC Management
Company, owns two residential properties in a subdivision in Harris County. The
homeowners association for the subdivision, New Properties Association of Newport, Inc. (Newport), sued Kapur for past due maintenance assessments and
collection fees.
Newport moved for summary judgment on its claims, and the trial court
granted the motion. In five issues, Kapur contends that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Newport and in denying his motion for new
trial.
We affirm.
Background
This is Newport’s third lawsuit against Kapur for unpaid assessments and
related charges. The first two were filed in 2019, consolidated, and dismissed for
want of prosecution on January 6, 2022.1
Newport filed this suit against Kapur on January 10, 2022, alleging that Kapur
had not paid any subdivision assessments on his properties since 2009. It sought to
recover from Kapur past due assessments and other charges to his properties and to
establish the amount of and foreclose on its liens against Kapur’s properties.
Kapur’s answer, entitled “Defendant’s Original Answer and Counterclaims,”
included two section headings: “General Denial” and “Affirmative Defense.” Under
“Affirmative Defense,” he alleged that Newport brought two previous lawsuits
against him which were dismissed for want of prosecution and Newport’s actions,
1
Harris County Court at Law No. 3, Cause No. 1137966.
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“past and current [are] tantamount to causing harassment and mental anguish to
which Kapur files his counterclaims.”2
Newport answered Kapur’s filing and generally denied his allegations. It
refuted Kapur’s allegation that the suit was brought without notice. According to
Newport, all conditions precedent to filing the lawsuit were met. It attached copies
of notices, including an opportunity to cure, that Newport’s attorney sent to Kapur
by certified mail, return receipt requested, on May 9, 2019. The notices informed
Kapur that a lien affidavit had been filed against each of his properties and that
absent payment of the outstanding charges within 30 days, it would file a lawsuit to
recover that amount, plus attorney’s fees and other charges, and request foreclosure
of the liens.
Newport’s accounting records showed that as of February 1, 2023, Kapur
owed a total of $10,307.94. On July 31, 2024, Kapur tendered two certified checks
totaling $7,900, the amount of the unpaid assessments; it did not include the
attorney’s fees and costs charged by Newport, which Kapur disputed. In response,
Newport proposed a three-month payment plan, which stated that the total amount
due for delinquent charges relating to Kapur’s property as of August 2024 was
2
Kapur mentions the statute of limitations in his response to the summary judgment
motion and in his appellant’s brief. He did not provide any argument or citation to
authority to support this affirmative defense in the trial court, so it is waived. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
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$8,114.71. Newport informed Kapur that if it did not hear from him about the
payment plan within 10 days, it would return his checks and proceed with the
lawsuit. Kapur did not respond, and Newport returned the checks.
Newport then moved for summary judgment on traditional grounds. It
explained that the purchase of all lots within the subdivision were subject to its
Declaration of Reservations, Restrictions, Covenants and Liens, which was filed in
the Harris County property records and attached to its motion. The Declaration holds
each property owner responsible for the payment of monthly maintenance
assessments, as well as any collection expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred in
collecting such payments. Each property owner’s payment obligations were secured
by an express vendor’s lien on the property.
In his response, Kapur objected to the validity of the May 2019 notices of lien
sent to him by Newport’s attorney but did not deny having received them. Kapur
also made certain evidentiary objections about Newport’s summary judgment
evidence, but he did not obtain a ruling on any of them.
The trial court signed a final judgment granting Newport’s motion and
awarding Newport $13,450.56 in damages for past due assessments and other
charges due from Kapur through July 1, 2024, $4,200.00 for attorney’s fees incurred
by Newport, costs of court, and postjudgment interest. The trial court also ordered
foreclosure of Newport’s liens in the amount of the judgment against Kapur’s
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interest in the properties. And it awarded $7,500 in appellate attorney’s fees in the
event of an unsuccessful appeal by Kapur.
Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Valence
Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Under the traditional
summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985).
In our review, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge
every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003).
When the trial court’s summary judgment does not state the basis for the
court’s decision, we must uphold the summary judgment if any of the theories
advanced in the motion have merit. Id. at 216.
We liberally construe Kapur’s pro se brief, but we decline to address issues
that he raises in passing without analysis or citation to pertinent authority. Courts
hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys, so pro se litigants
are required to properly present their case to the trial court and on appeal and must
comply with all applicable rules of procedure. See, e.g., Frias v. Rios, No.
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01-25-00676-CV, 2026 WL 616064, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5,
2026, no pet. h.); In re L.C., No. 01-21-00521-CV, 2022 WL 1572273, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 19, 2022, no pet.).
B. Analysis
1. Finality of judgment
In his first issue, Kapur asserts that the trial court’s judgment is not final
because it did not dispose of his “counterclaims for harassment and mental anguish.”
He raised this issue in his motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.
“Under the general one-final-judgment rule, a judgment is final if it either
‘actually disposes of every pending claim and party’ or ‘clearly and unequivocally
states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.’” Estate of Wheatfall, 729
S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. 2026) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191,
205 (Tex. 2001)). The trial court’s judgment declares, in boldface font: “This is a
final judgment, which disposes of all claims and all causes of action made or asserted
by any party to this action.”
The judgment does not deny all relief not expressly granted or otherwise
dispose of Kapur’s purported counterclaims. This omission is erroneous. But
because of the judgment’s unmistakable finality language, it is nevertheless final for
purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Tanner v. Black, No. 01-17-00883-CV, 2019 WL
1064568, at n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 7, 2019, no pet.).
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We overrule Kapur’s first issue.
2. Attorney’s fees
In his second issue, Kapur asserts that the trial court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees as damages and allowing for their double recovery.
a. Attorney’s fees as contractual damages
Kapur asserts that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees as damages,
but he concedes that they are recoverable when authorized by contract and proven
by competent evidence. Written instruments like the Declaration are contractual in
nature. See Weston Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Cassell, No. 01-23-00200-CV,
2025 WL 1583524, at *2 (June 5, 2025, no pet.).
The lots purchased by Kapur, like all lots in the subdivision, are subject to the
Declaration, which holds the owner responsible for “monthly maintenance charges
hereby imposed, together with all collection expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred
in connection therewith.” The Declaration also allows for the creation of a lien
against the owner’s property in the amount of unpaid maintenance assessments and
other charges, including attorney’s fees and court costs.
This language does not limit Kapur’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees to those
incurred only in successful collection efforts or only in the instant litigation. The
record shows that Newport filed two previous lawsuits in an attempt to collect the
delinquent assessments from Kapur. Kapur acknowledges that Newport did not
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recover attorney’s fees in those lawsuits. And Kapur did not object to the evidence
of Newport’s attorney’s fees that Newport attached to its summary-judgment
motion.
b. Propriety of attorney’s fee award
Kapur also asserts that the trial court awarded a double recovery of attorney’s
fees, but the record does not support this assertion. The attorney’s fee charges in the
damages are two entries in Newport’s account ledger for $500 each, incurred in
previous collection efforts. The other evidence submitted with Newport’s summary
judgment motion concerned only those attorney’s fees incurred in this litigation. It
consisted of the affidavit of its attorney, Dennis McQueen, who calculated that he
spent 12 hours working on this litigation at an hourly rate of $350. McQueen attested
that the time spent and amount charged was reasonable and necessary, and Kapur
did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and
necessity of the charges. Thus, the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court
supports the award of attorney’s fees.
We overrule Kapur’s second issue.
3. Notice of past due assessments
In his third issue, Kapur argues that Newport was not entitled to recover fees
and costs because it failed to give him written notice of delinquency by certified mail
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and a 45-day opportunity to cure under Property Code section 209.0064(b). Under
that provision,
[a] property owners’ association may not hold an owner liable for fees
of a collection agent retained by the association unless the association
first provides written notice to the owner by certified mail that:
(1) specifies each delinquent amount and the total amount of the
payment required to make the account current;
(2) if the association is subject to Section 209.0062 or the association's
dedicatory instruments contain a requirement to offer a payment plan,
describes the options the owner has to avoid having the account turned
over to a collection agent, including information regarding availability
of a payment plan through the association; and
(3) provides a period of at least 45 days for the owner to cure the
delinquency before further collection action is taken.
TEX. PROP. CODE § 209.0064(b). The record shows that Newport filed copies of the
notices that Newport’s attorney sent to Kapur by certified mail, return receipt
requested on May 9, 2019. These notices specified the unpaid charges for each
property owned by Kapur and showed the total amount of the payment required to
make the accounts current. See id. § 209.0064(b)(1). They notified Kapur of the
amounts due at the time Newport filed its earlier lawsuits. Kapur did not make any
payments after receiving them.
Kapur acknowledges that he received a statement of account for each of his
properties at a Newport board meeting in April 2022. Kapur also corresponded with
Newport about the unpaid charges in July and August 2024. While Kapur disputes
the total amount stated in Newport’s account statements, he does not dispute that he
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received actual notice of the unpaid charges. And at no time did Kapur ask the trial
court for a 45-day abatement. See id. § 209.0064(b)(3). As a result, he waived
statutory notice.
We overrule Kapur’s third issue.
4. Tender
In his fourth issue, Kapur argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment
in favor of Newport because his July 2024 tender of two certified checks totaling
$7,900 extinguished his debt to Newport.
“Valid tender is an unconditional offer of and actual production of funds by a
debtor to pay a sum not less than the amount due on a debt or obligation.” AngloDutch Petroleum Int’l , Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C., 522 S.W.3d 471, 489 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The tender “generally must include
everything the creditor is entitled to, and a tender of any less sum is not effective.”
Id. at 490. If a tender meets these requirements, it will defeat a claim for interest on
the debt accruing after the date of the tender. Id. at 489. “The party asserting a valid
tender has the burden of proving it.” Id.
While Kapur disputed the total amount he owed Newport, he concedes in his
appellant’s brief that the amount he owed for principal assessments was $7,930. This
was less than the amount due and thus did not constitute tender. Kapur also mentions
earlier attempts to make payments, but does not cite any evidence showing that the
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amount of each attempted payment would have fully satisfied the amount he owed
at the time he tried to pay. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err
in awarding prejudgment interest.
We overrule Kapur’s fourth issue
Motion for New Trial
In his fifth issue, Kapur asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion
for new trial without a hearing. A trial court can exercise its discretion over whether
to hold a hearing on a motion for new trial in most civil matters and is required to
do so only when the motion raises a fact issue for which evidence must be heard.
Bishop v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 01-18-01115-CV, 2020 WL 4983246,
at *17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see
Hensley v. Salinas, 583 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1979). Kapur’s motion sought to
vacate or modify the summary judgment; a trial court is not required to hold a
hearing in a summary judgment proceeding. See Coteril-Jenkins v. Tex. Med. Ass’n
Health Care Liab. Claim Tr., 383 S.W.3d 581, 591 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
Kapur mentions but does not re-urge any of the issues raised in his response
to Newport’s summary judgment motion or in his motion for new trial on their merits
in his appellant’s brief or provide appropriate citations to authorities in support of
granting the relief he requested. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain
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a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record.”). Thus, Kapur has not shown that the trial court erred
in denying his motion without hearing.
We overrule Kapur’s fifth issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Clint Morgan
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.
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