Opinion issued August 31, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-01059-CV
CINCINNATI SPECIALTY UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellant
V.
WOODWAY SQUARE 507, LLC; CARDONE WOODWAY SQUARE
MEMBER, LLC; AND CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 189th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-71627
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an attempted appeal from an order signed November 18, 2025 granting
a traditional motion for summary judgment filed by appellees, Woodway Square
507, LLC, Cardone Woodway Square Member, LLC, and Cardone Capital, LLC. Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We grant
the motion.
This case began in the trial court as a suit by Abhishek Bansal and Nishtha
Agrawal, individually and as next friends of Keshav Bansal and Daksh Bansal,
Minors, against defendants Woodway Square 507, LLC, Cardone Woodway Square
Member, LLC, and Cardone Capital, LLC. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants’
negligent and/or grossly negligent conduct resulted in severe injuries to one of their
children. In their first amended original petition, plaintiffs added as defendants
Kings III of America, LLC and Bridge Real Estate Group LLC d/b/a Weller
Management. Defendant Bridge Real Estate filed crossclaims against Woodway
Square 507, Cardone Woodway Square Member, and Cardone Capital. Cincinnati
Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company filed a petition in intervention.
On June 4, 2026, the trial court signed an Agreed Judgment on Minors’ Final
Settlement and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. On November 18, 2026, the trial
court signed an order denying the intervenor’s motion for partial summary judgment.
On the same date, the trial court signed an order granting the motion for summary
judgment filed by defendants Woodway Square 507, Cardone Woodway Square
Member, and Cardone Capital. Intervenor Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters
Insurance Company filed a notice of appeal, challenging the November 18, 2026
order denying its motion for summary judgment, noting that the trial court had
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signed a final judgment granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which
included finality language.
In their motion to dismiss, appellees contend that when the trial court signed
a judgment on June 4, 2025, entitled “Agreed Judgment on Minors’ Final Settlement
and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice,” the judgment included the following
finality language:
This judgment finally disposes of all Plaintiffs claims against
Defendants. This Final Agreed Judgment is intended to fully and finally
dispose of all claims and causes of action asserted in this cause.
Therefore, any claims, causes of action, third-party actions, crossactions, counterclaims, and interventions not specifically addressed in
this final judgment are dismissed.
Appellees contend that this language made the judgment final and appealable
under Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 206 (Tex. 2001). Appellees
reason that, because no post-judgment motions were filed, the trial court lost plenary
power thirty days after the June 4, 2025 judgment was signed. And because the trial
court’s plenary power expired, any orders or judgments signed after that date,
including the November 18, 2025 order appealed in this case, were void.
Appellant, who was the intervenor below, filed a response to the motion to
dismiss, claiming that the June 4, 2025 judgment was clearly not intended to be final;
the parties’ actions after June 4, 2025, indicate that no party believed the June 4,
2025 judgment was final; and the intervenor was not a party to the judgment.
Appellant also argues that the alleged finality language in the June 4, 2025 judgment
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is not the same as the language quoted in Lehmann which showed a clear intention
to render a final judgment because the language in the June 4, 2025 order did not
state that it disposed of all parties and claims and did not state that it was appealable.
Finally, appellant contends that the judgment clearly only addressed the minor
settlement and was not intended to adjudicate any other claims or parties.
In Lehmann, the Texas Supreme Court held that, “when there has not been a
conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of
appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it
clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.”
Id. at 205. The Court explained:
An order that adjudicates only the plaintiff’s claims against the
defendant does not adjudicate a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third
party claim, nor does an order adjudicating claims like the latter dispose
of the plaintiff’s claims. An order that disposes of claims by only one
of multiple plaintiffs or against one of multiple defendants does not
adjudicate claims by or against other parties. An order does not dispose
of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled “final”, or
because the word “final” appears elsewhere in the order, or even
because it awards costs. Nor does an order completely dispose of a case
merely because it states that is appealable, since even interlocutory
orders may sometimes be appealable.
Id.
In determining whether an order or judgment is final and appealable, the
Lehmann Court held that an appellate court may need to look at the record to
determine if the order or judgment disposes of all parties and claims. Id. at 206. But
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the Court reasoned that, if the order or judgment contains language that leaves no
doubt about the trial court’s intention to render a final, appealable judgment, it must
be given effect even if the parties did not intend for the judgment to be final. See id.
The Court gave the following example of the type of language that would indicate
an intent to render a final judgment: “This judgment finally disposes of all parties
and all claims and is appealable.” Id.
Since Lehmann, the Court has addressed situations in which the trial court’s
language varied from the finality language quoted in Lehmann. For example, in In
re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. 2010), the trial court signed a default judgment
that included the language: “This judgment disposes of all parties and all claims in
this cause of action and is therefore FINAL.” Id. at 248. No party appealed and then,
more than fifteen months later, American Express moved for judgment nunc pro
tunc to correct the judgment to include the word “interlocutory” so that the case
could proceed against Daredia, who owed over $700,000 on credit card accounts.
See id. Daredia responded that the judgment was final and the trial court had lost
plenary power thirty days after the judgment was signed. See id. The trial court
granted the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc and Daredia sought mandamus relief,
claiming the nunc pro tunc judgment was void. See id. American Express urged the
Court to look at the record to determine that the judgment was not intended to be
final and thus, the trial court retained plenary power to correct it. See id. at 249. The
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Texas Supreme Court concluded that the language in the judgment clearly disposed
of all parties and claims and was therefore, final, even if that was not intended by
the parties, and had American Express acted promptly in pursuing its claims against
Daredia, the error in allowing the claim to be dismissed could have been rectified.
See id. at 250.
In Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. 2020), the Court stated
that an “[i]ntent to render a final judgment is demonstrated by a ‘clear indication that
the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case.’” Id. at 801
(quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205). Although the trial court’s original judgment
did not contain clear finality language, the trial court subsequently entered an order
clarifying that the summary judgment was intended to be a final judgment, was
appealable, and disposed of all parties and claims. See id. at 800. “Although no
‘magic language’ is required, a trial court may express its intent to render a final
judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and
parties, and (3) appealable.” Id.
Although the first sentence in the trial court’s adjudicative paragraph only
disposes of plaintiff’s claims against the defendant, the last two sentences in this
paragraph clearly state that the judgment “is intended to fully and finally dispose of
all claims and causes of action asserted in the cause.” To clarify its intent further,
the trial court described the types of claims it was adjudicating: “any claims, causes
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of action, third-party actions, cross-actions, counterclaims, and interventions . . . .”
Appellant argues that this language is insufficient to reflect an intent to render a final
judgment because it does not state that it finally disposes of all parties and claims
and is appealable. But “magic language” is not required. What is required is a clear
statement of intent to dispose of all claims and parties, and we conclude that the trial
court did that here. Although the trial court does not state the words “finally
disposing of all parties and claims,” the language it used did just that by listing every
type of claim or cause of action that was or could have been asserted by any party in
the case. And even if the intervenor was not part of the settlement recited in the June
4, 2025 judgment, the finality language in the judgment clearly disposed of its
intervention.
Finally, appellant’s argument that the title and subject of the judgment
indicated no intent to render a final judgment disposing of all parties and claims is
without merit. In In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. 2018), Elizondo argued that
the First Court of Appeals’ ruling1 was an absurd result because it concluded that an
order removing a lien clearly was intended to be a final judgment, but the Texas
1
The appellate court case was In re M & O Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d 101
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting
petition for writ of mandamus and holding that trial court’s order correcting prior
order was void because original order contained finality language and thus, was a
final judgment and trial court’s plenary power expired before signing of second
order).
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Supreme Court disagreed. See id. at 826–27. Instead, the Court stated that it would
be absurd to “hold that a clear and unequivocal finality phrase does not trigger
Lehmann’s directive that ‘[a] party who is uncertain whether a judgment is final must
err on the side of appealing.’” Id. at 828 (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 196).
Appellant had the opportunity to challenge the June 4, 2025 judgment and did not.
Because the June 4, 2025 judgment was final and appealable, “the length of
the trial court’s plenary power to reinstate the case depended upon whether a timely
filed post-judgment motion was filed.” In re State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 01-22-00099-CV, 2022 WL 1462940, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 10,
2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing to TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (f)). If no postjudgment motion is timely filed, the trial court has plenary power to grant a new trial
within thirty days after the judgment is signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). Once
that period expires, the trial court may not set aside the judgment but may only
correct clerical errors. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f).
The clerk’s record reveals that no post-judgment motion was timely filed after
the June 4, 2026 judgment was signed. Therefore, the trial court lacked plenary
power over the underlying dispute after the expiration of the thirty-day period
following the signing of the June 4, 2025 judgment. See Newsom v. Ballinger Indep.
Sch. Dist., 213 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (observing that
judicial action taken after trial court’s plenary power has expired is void); TEX. R.
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CIV. P. 329b(d),(f). “The very purpose of limiting a trial court’s plenary power over
a proceeding is to foreclose the possibility of a suit continuing indefinitely even
though a final judgment has been obtained.” Newsom, 213 S.W.3d at 379. Because
the trial court lost plenary power thirty days after the June 4, 2025 order was signed,
the November 18, 2025 order, signed after plenary power had expired, was void. See
id. at 379–80. The notice of appeal was filed too late to challenge the June 4, 2025
final judgment and without a timely notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider
the merits of this appeal. See, e.g., Parker v. Wisehouse Inv. Grp., LLC, Nos. 05-24-00104-CV & 05-24-00105-CV, 2025 WL 1712079, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 18, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have jurisdiction only to set aside the trial
court’s void order and to dismiss the appeal. See id. at *7.
We grant appellee’s motion to dismiss, vacate the trial court’s November 18,
2025 judgment as void, and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. TEX. R. APP.
P. 42.3(a). Any other pending motions are dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Johnson, and Dokupil.
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