Evangelina Lopez Guzman Zaragoza v. Miguel Zaragoza Fuentes

majority opinion

Opinion issued August 31, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-24-00497-CV

EVANGELINA LOPEZ GUZMAN ZARAGOZA, Appellant

MIGUEL ZARAGOZA FUENTES, Appellee

On Appeal from the 245th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2014-30215

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises from a Texas divorce action. Appellant Evangelina sought

a divorce from Appellee Miguel.1 She alleged that the parties married in New

Because both parties share the “Zaragoza” surname, we refer to the parties by their

first names.

Mexico in 1953, had children together, and remained married until their relationship

deteriorated. In 2014, Evangelina filed for divorce in Harris County, Texas.

Miguel responded that the parties were not married when Evangelina filed suit

because, according to him, a Mexican court had dissolved their marriage more than

fifty years earlier, in a 1959 divorce decree. He argued that Evangelina could not

establish an existing marriage for a Texas court to dissolve.

Evangelina disputed the validity of the Mexican 1959 decree. She asserted

that she had no knowledge of the decree, that it was invalid, and that it was procured

without due process. She argued that Texas courts should not recognize it.

In addition, she separately pursued litigation in Mexico to nullify or set aside

the decree. As far as our record reflects, that litigation remains pending.

This is not the parties’ first appeal in this Texas action. In 2018, this Court

reversed a prior divorce decree rendered in Evangelina’s favor. See Fuentes v.

Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)

(“Fuentes I”). Our Court held that the property division and related awards were

unsupported by legally sufficient evidence. Id. at 149, 165. We remanded for further

proceedings and instructed the trial court to consider principles of international

comity in light of the ongoing proceedings in Mexico. Id. at 149, 160–61 (“[T]he

trial court must determine on remand whether comity requires deference to the

current Mexican proceedings addressing the 1959 divorce decree’s validity.”).

At issue here, in 2024, Miguel moved to dismiss the Texas action without

prejudice. He first argued that the trial court should recognize and give effect to the

1959 Mexican decree and dismiss this action because no marriage existed for the

court to dissolve. He also argued that, under international comity principles, Texas

should not proceed with this case while the parties litigated matters concerning the

Mexican decree in Mexico.

The trial court agreed as to the second point, the ongoing Mexican

proceedings. It determined that, under comity principles, it would defer Texas’s

process and decline to proceed now to allow Mexico to first resolve its litigation

concerning the decree. The trial court then dismissed without prejudice to refiling.

In doing so, the trial court was clear that it did not recognize or enforce the

1959 decree; that divorce decree is not currently recognized in Texas. This is

significant because, under controlling law, even if the decree is not nullified or set

aside in Mexico, the Texas trial court could not have recognized and given effect to

the Mexican decree without first determining that the decree satisfied due process

principles. See, e.g., Ashfaq v. Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d 539, 541 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give

effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due

process.” (citation modified)); accord Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154. Yet here, the

trial court was clear that it has not made any due process determination.

Instead, as noted, the trial court invoked principles of international comity to

presently decline to proceed to allow the ongoing Mexican litigation concerning the

Mexican decree to conclude (at which point, the parties would be free to continue

their litigation here and the Texas court could determine what effect, if any, the

Mexican decree should have here).2 Evangelina appeals that decision.

The trial court has discretion in this area. It did not abuse its discretion in

determining that principles of international comity support allowing Mexico to

conclude its pending proceedings concerning the Mexican divorce decree before

Texas continues with this case (which asks the Texas trial court to resolve, among

other things, whether to recognize that very decree). We thus affirm the trial court

on that basis. That said, on this record and at this stage of the litigation (which has

been ongoing in Texas for approximately 10 years), we remand to the trial court as

to the remedy.

At the conclusion of the Mexican proceedings, one of two things would happen. If

the decree is invalidated in Mexico, then it would be irrelevant to the Texas divorce

proceeding, and the proceeding would continue. If, on the other hand, the Mexican

courts do not set aside or nullify the decree, the decree would still need to be

recognized in Texas before a Texas court could give it effect in this proceeding—

i.e., it would need to satisfy the requirements for recognition here, including that it

comports with due process principles. See infra pp. 17–19 and notes 9, 13–15. To

be clear, the lack of a nullification by Mexican courts is not the same as a recognition

by Texas courts.

BACKGROUND

Our earlier opinion contains a detailed background explanation. Fuentes I,

555 S.W.3d at 149–53. We recount additional information relevant to this appeal.

A. The parties’ marriage, the divorce filing underlying this appeal, and the

disputed 1959 Mexican decree.

Evangelina and Miguel are citizens of Mexico. They married in a civil

ceremony in New Mexico in 1953. It is undisputed that the parties later lived together

for many years and had several children together. No party makes any argument here

about common law marriage.

In 2014, Evangelina filed this divorce action in Houston, Texas.

Miguel filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the parties had divorced

in 1959 in Mexico, so there was no marriage to dissolve. Miguel argues that the 1959

decree shows that the couple divorced in Mexico at that time.

Evangelina responded, disputing the validity of the decree. She argues in this

case that she had no notice of the 1959 decree and it was not procured in a manner

consistent with due process principles. She argues Texas should not recognize it.

She separately challenged the 1959 decree in Mexico.

B. The Mexican proceedings concerning the 1959 decree.

1. Evangelina’s “nullity” action in Mexico.

In addition to disputing the validity of the Mexican 1959 decree in Texas (and

arguing that Texas should not recognize it), Evangelina pursued proceedings in

Mexico challenging the 1959 decree.3

In 2015, Evangelina filed a nullity action in Mexico seeking to nullify or set

aside the 1959 decree. That litigation proceeded through several Mexican courts. In

2018, at Evangelina’s request, Mexico’s Supreme Court granted an amparo writ of

relief; that allowed the nullity action to proceed, and the case was remanded to a

civil court in Chihuahua, Mexico.

Mexican litigation continued for several years. The record reflects that the

parties disputed not only the validity of the 1959 decree, but also the proper

mechanism under Mexican law for challenging the decree and the procedural rules

governing that challenge.4

She initially filed a criminal complaint in Mexico, alleging that Miguel forged the

decree. Evangelina also brought challenges through additional Mexican

proceedings concerning the criminal complaint. The record is unclear as to the status

of those proceedings.

The Mexican courts ruled in Evangelina’s favor in some of these proceedings,

including, for example, when an intermediate appellate court sustained her

objections to a 2019 “compliance resolution” that was issued to implement the

Supreme Court’s amparo judgment.

2. The 2022 settlement agreement and current, ongoing litigation.

In October 2022, a settlement agreement was executed in Mexico. The

agreement provides that Evangelina would withdraw her nullity action and dismiss

the case. The agreement was executed by Evangelina’s Mexican counsel acting on

her behalf.

In accordance with the agreement, Evangelina withdrew the nullity claim

challenging the validity of the 1959 decree, and the court entered an order dismissing

the case with prejudice.

Shortly after, however, Evangelina challenged the settlement and withdrawal,

asserting that her Mexican counsel lacked authority to enter the agreement or

withdraw the nullity action. She pursued additional proceedings and appeals in the

Mexican court system, seeking to undo the withdrawal and reinstate the nullity

proceeding.5

Those proceedings remained pending at the time of the trial court’s hearing at

issue.

In 2022, Evangelina appealed her (former) attorneys’ dismissal of the nullity claim;

this was rejected by a Mexican intermediate court of appeals in 2023. Evangelina

then filed an amparo petition seeking relief from that decision; that proceeding

remained pending at the time of the trial court’s June 2024 hearing.

C. This case’s Texas history.

In 2015, after denying a jurisdictional challenge by Miguel based on the 1959

Mexican decree, the Texas trial court signed a final divorce decree, awarding

Evangelina half of the community estate. Miguel appealed.

In 2018, our Court issued Fuentes I, reversing and remanding. 555 S.W.3d at

149. There, we confirmed jurisdiction, then overturned the monetary and property

awards as unsupported by the evidence. See id. at 149, 155, 165. We noted the

pending proceedings in Mexico and instructed the trial court to consider comity

principles on remand. See id. at 149, 161. We also instructed that “[t]he trial court

must apply the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b.” Id. at 161.

D. The trial court’s proceedings on remand and the order under review.

On remand, the trial court initially denied Miguel’s request for dismissal or

abatement on comity grounds, and the case continued in Texas.6 Litigation also

continued in Mexico. During that period, the 2022 settlement agreement was

On remand, Miguel initially filed an answer, a motion to abate, and motions asking

the trial court to defer to the Mexican proceedings under principles of comity and

forum non conveniens. The parties submitted extensive briefing and materials. On

May 6, 2020, following a hearing by submission, then-presiding Judge Longino

denied Miguel’s motions for dismissal or abatement. That ruling was later

memorialized in a signed order.

executed, the nullity action was withdrawn, and Evangelina began challenging the

settlement and withdrawal in Mexico.7

In 2024, Miguel filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice. He

argued that, under comity principles, Texas should not proceed with this case now,

while the parties continued active litigation concerning the Mexican decree in

Mexico. (As noted, he also urged the trial court to recognize the 1959 decree and

dismiss on that basis; the trial court did not do so.)

On June 3, 2024, the trial court held a hearing. At the end of the hearing, the

trial court concluded “that comity is going to require that I give deference to the

court proceedings in Mexico” and dismissed the case.

After an abatement from our Court, the trial court entered findings of fact and

conclusions of law explaining the basis for its ruling. The trial court found that “as

of June 3, 2024, the question of validity of the Settlement Agreement and the appeal

of the dismissal of the Nullity claim challenging the 1959 Decree remains pending

in the Mexican Courts.” The court further clarified that it was “not recognizing or

enforcing a judgment or arbitration award based on foreign law,” but was instead

“extending comity to the ongoing proceedings between the parties in Mexico.”

(Emphasis added). The court concluded in relevant part:

In 2024, before filing his motion to dismiss, Miguel moved to stay or abate the Texas

proceeding until Mexico’s Supreme Court resolved Evangelina’s amparo petition.

Our record does not reflect a ruling on that motion.

9. This Court further concludes that comity requires deference to the

current proceedings pending in Mexico regarding the challenge to the

validity of the Settlement Agreement and the pending appeal of the

dismissal of the nullity claim. The Court’s conclusion is based on its

review of all submissions and arguments of the parties, and all evidence

presented, including testimony presented at the hearing conducted on

June 3, 2024. The Court’s conclusion is also based on the applicable

law regarding deference to judicial proceedings in foreign countries

pursuant to international comity. See, e.g., Acain [v. Int’l Plant

Services, LLC, 449 S.W.3d 655, 660–61 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)].

***

14. The Court concluded that Mexico has an interest in determining the

validity of the Settlement Agreement signed October 26, 2022 and the

appeal of the dismissal of the Nullity claim challenging the validity of

the 1959 Divorce Decree, as the parties are Mexican citizens, actively

litigating the validity of both of the Settlement agreement and the

appeal of the dismissal of the Nullity claim in Mexico and the active

status of those proceedings in Mexico warranted a comity deference.

15. The Court concludes that it should exercise its discretion and

dismiss the above-captioned cause, without prejudice, until the issue of

the validity of the October 26, 2022 Settlement Agreement and

reinstatement of the Nullity claim’s challenge of the 1959 Divorce

Decree’s validity have been fully and finally adjudicated by the

Mexican Court.

Evangelina timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that principles of

international comity warranted allowing the pending Mexican proceedings

concerning the 1959 Mexican decree to conclude before the Texas case continued.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law.

Texas courts are generally bound to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by

the Texas Constitution and cannot delegate their judicial prerogative where

jurisdiction exists. Acain v. Int’l Plant Services, LLC, 449 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). But Texas courts may, in appropriate

circumstances, pause or dismiss Texas proceedings in a particular case according to

principles of international comity.8 See id. at 659–60; Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 160

(“Texas courts may defer to the sovereignty of foreign nations according to

principles of international comity.”).

“Although courts in this country have long recognized the principles of

international comity and have advocated them in order to promote cooperation and

reciprocity with foreign lands, comity remains a rule of practice, convenience, and

expediency rather than of law.” Next Invs., LLC v. Bank of China, 12 F.4th 119, 131

(2d Cir. 2021) (quoting source and internal quotation marks omitted).

We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s decision

to invoke principles of comity and decline to proceed in a case, pending the

International comity “is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory

to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both

to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of

other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 659

(quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P.

308b(a)(1) (“Comity means the recognition by a court of one jurisdiction of the laws

and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction.”).

resolution of ongoing foreign proceedings. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 160

(collecting cases). In this context, “a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles.” Acain, 449

S.W.3d at 659. In matters involving factual disputes, “a trial court does not abuse its

discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports

its decision.” Id. (quoting source and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under our Court’s Acain precedent, when a trial court considers, under

principles of international comity, declining to presently proceed, we look to

Sections 402 and 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.9 Id. at

660–61. Section 402 sets forth instances in which a state has jurisdiction to prescribe

law.10 But under Section 403, “[e]ven when one of the bases for jurisdiction under

This inquiry is distinct from the inquiry required before a Texas court may recognize

or give effect to a foreign judgment. Before a Texas court gives effect to a foreign

judgment, it must determine whether recognition would be consistent with due

process principles and Texas public policy. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154–55,

161; Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d at 541–43. Additionally, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

308b governs the procedure for determining whether to recognize or enforce “a

judgment or arbitration award based on foreign law in a suit involving a marriage

relationship or a parent-child relationship under the Family Code.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

308b(b)(1). Other statutory schemes govern other situations. See, e.g., TEX. FAM.

CODE §§ 159.102(23); 159.601–159.616 (procedures for registration, enforcement,

and modification of child-support orders rendered by other American states or

foreign countries); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 36A.004 (standards for

recognition of foreign-country money judgments).

Section 402 provides:

Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:

§ 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect

to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of

such jurisdiction is unreasonable.” Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law

§ 403(1) (A.L.I. 1987). Thus, with a basis for jurisdiction under Section 402, the

question for the trial court becomes whether presently proceeding in Texas would

be unreasonable under Section 403.

Section 403 identifies the following factors as relevant to determining

reasonableness:

(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state;

(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic

activity, between the regulating state and the person principally

responsible for the activity regulated;

regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states

(1)

(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place

within its territory;

(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present

within its territory;

have substantial effect within its territory;

(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals

outside as well as within its territory; and

(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals

that is directed against the security of the state or against a

limited class of other state interests.

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402 (A.L.I. 1987).

regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability

of such regulation is generally accepted;

(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or

hurt by the regulation;

(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,

legal, or economic system;

(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions

of the international system;

(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in

regulating the activity; and

(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.

Id. § 403(2).

The Restatement factors are not exhaustive, and their weight depends on the

facts of the particular case. Id. § 403 cmt. b. The burden falls on the party urging

comity. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 664; Int’l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora

Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347 F.3d 589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b, in turn, governs the procedure for

determining whether, as a matter of comity, to recognize or enforce a judgment based

on foreign law “in a suit involving a marriage relationship or a parent-child

relationship under the Family Code.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(b)(1).11 Under that rule

and related law, before the 1959 Mexican divorce decree at issue could be given

effect here, the trial court would need to determine whether to recognize it. But here,

The Rule has two exceptions that are inapplicable here. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

308b(b)(2), (3).

the trial court did not yet reach that determination; it instead decided as a matter of

comity to decline to continue with the Texas proceedings for now (and thus to defer

a determination on whether to recognize the Mexican decree) to first allow Mexico

to conclude its own ongoing proceedings concerning that decree. Rule 308b(f)

enables the trial court to issue any order necessary to preserve the principles of

comity while protecting against violations of constitutional rights and public policy.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(f)(3).

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that comity

supports declining to proceed in Texas now, to allow the ongoing Mexican

litigation concerning the 1959 decree to conclude.

The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in

determining that comity supports declining to proceed in Texas, for now, to allow

the ongoing Mexican proceedings concerning the Mexican decree to conclude before

Texas proceedings continue. On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion.

A valid marriage is a prerequisite to a Texas divorce. Ex parte Threet, 333

S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (Tex. 1960). As we explained in Fuentes I, “[a] valid marriage

must exist for a trial court to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit for the

spouses’ divorce,” and if the marriage was previously dissolved, then “the court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to again dissolve that marriage.” Fuentes I, 555

S.W.3d at 153.

Evangelina met her initial burden to establish a prima facie marriage by

producing evidence that she and Miguel married in New Mexico in 1953. See Ex

parte Threet, 333 S.W.2d at 364. The dispute is not whether the parties ever married,

but whether that marriage continued to exist when Evangelina filed this Texas

divorce action in 2014.

As explained, Miguel contends the marriage was dissolved by a 1959 decree

issued by a Mexican court. Evangelina disputes the decree’s validity. She contends

that it was procured without notice and due process, as well as through irregular or

fraudulent proceedings. She urges the Texas court not to recognize the Mexican

decree. Unless and until Texas recognizes that foreign decree, this record reflects a

marriage and no divorce.

Apart from the Texas arguments and issues, the Mexican divorce decree and

related Mexican process (including a settlement agreement and nullity action

concerning that decree) remain the subject of pending litigation in Mexico.

That is, at the time that the trial court ruled based on principles of comity,

there was ongoing litigation in Mexico concerning the validity of the very Mexican

decree that, in turn, the parties are fighting about in Texas.

Indeed, as explained above, Evangelina challenged the 1959 decree in Mexico

through a nullity proceeding. That proceeding has generated substantial litigation in

the Mexican courts. In 2022, the parties executed a settlement agreement in Mexico

that Miguel contends resolved the Mexican litigation. But Evangelina disputes the

validity of that agreement and has pursued further proceedings in Mexico

challenging the settlement and seeking reinstatement of her nullity action. Those

proceedings were pending at the time of the trial court’s ruling at issue.12

The possible outcomes of the Mexican proceedings underscore their

significance to this Texas case. If the Mexican courts were to determine that the 1959

decree is invalid, then Miguel could not use that (invalid) decree in Texas to defeat

the existence of a marriage. That would resolve this 1959 Mexican decree issue, and

Evangelina’s Texas divorce filing would proceed (we offer no comment on the

merits of that proceeding).

If, on the other hand, the Mexican courts determine that the decree, the 2022

settlement agreement, or the withdrawal of the nullity action is valid under Mexican

law, then the 1959 decree dispute would continue in Texas court. We emphasize that

that determination would not itself end the Texas inquiry. Before a Texas court can

Miguel filed a Motion for Judicial Notice, asserting that, while this appeal was

pending, the Mexican proceedings concluded. Evangelina opposed the motion. At

oral argument, the parties appeared to acknowledge that the Mexican proceedings

remain ongoing. In any event, we need not resolve the motion to decide this appeal.

The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its discretion based on the

record before it when it ruled, and the Mexican proceedings were undisputedly

ongoing when the trial court made the decision before us. See Brazoria Civic Club

v. Brazoria Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“An appellate court’s review of the merits of a trial court’s

ruling is limited to the record in the trial court when the trial court ruled, and the

appellate court does not consider events that occurred after the trial court’s ruling.”).

give effect to a foreign judgment, the Texas court must determine that the judgment

was obtained in a manner consistent with our notions of due process;13 it must also

assess whether recognition would violate Texas policy. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d

at 154–55, 161; Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d at 541–43; see also TEX. R. CIV. P 308b.

“Recognition of a foreign judgment in the absence of due process constitutes an

abuse of discretion.” Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154. Indeed, “due process requires

that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment

elsewhere acquired without due process.” Id. (quoting Ashfaq, 467 S.W.3d at

This examination looks to our understanding of constitutionally adequate process.

See, e.g., In re Marriage of San Emeterio, No. 13-24-00255-CV, 2026 WL 961754,

at *3, *6–7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.) (collecting

cases and explaining that “[d]ue process at a minimum requires notice and an

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” (quoting

source omitted)); In re Marriage of Sabir & Javed, No. 05-23-00837-CV, 2024 WL

3507200, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas, July 23, 2024, no pet.) (“While we agree that

the Pakistani court was not required to comply with Texas law or procedure, we also

conclude that the record lacks evidence of any notice to Wife of the Pakistani

proceedings until after a judgment was rendered, and therefore, Wife was deprived

of minimum due process.”); see also Int’l Transactions, 347 F.3d at 594 (“Notice is

an element of our notion of due process and the United States will not enforce a

judgment obtained without the bare minimum requirements of notice.”); Bank Melli

Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1411–13 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to enforce Iranian

judgment and concluding that Iranian system did not comport with due process

standards); Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519–20 (11th

Cir. 1994) (international comity turns on whether the foreign judgment was

rendered by a competent court under proceedings consistent with “civilized

jurisprudence,” with an opportunity to defend that satisfies “American notions of

due process”); In re Application of Alves Braga, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1308 (S.D.

Fla. 2011). This inquiry ensures that, if we are recognizing a foreign judgment,

adequate process existed underlying that foreign judgment.

541);14 accord In re E.H., 450 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2014, pet. denied); see also Int’l Transactions, 347 F.3d at 594 (“Under the law of

the United States, a foreign judgment cannot be enforced in a U.S. court unless it

was obtained under a system with procedures compatible with the requirements of

due process of law.”). Thus, the due process and other appropriate inquiries would

need to occur in Texas before the decree could be recognized or enforced.15

In short, the ongoing Mexican proceedings do not necessarily resolve critical

questions for the Texas divorce case. But they could do so.

The trial court did not attempt to resolve the question of whether the 1959

decree is valid. The court did not address whether the decree was procured in a

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution “does not require

a domestic court to give binding effect to a foreign country judgment when the

validity of the judgment is disputed.” Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 154; see also

Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 714–15

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“Texas, like its sister states,

is not constitutionally required to give full faith and credit to the judgments of

foreign countries.” (emphasis in original)); In re E.H., 450 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“Generally, however, states are not

required to give full faith and credit to foreign country judgments.”); Schacht v.

Schacht, 435 S.W.2d 197, 202 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1968, no writ) (declining to

recognize Mexican divorce decree where wife was not served with process, and

explaining that Full Faith and Credit Clause of U.S. Constitution “does not require

that binding effect and validity be given a judgment of a foreign country such as

Mexico, more especially where such judgments are shown to be invalid”). 15

As explained, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b generally applies to the

recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment in a suit involving a marriage

relationship under the Family Code.

manner consistent with due process principles. Nor did the court purport to recognize

or enforce the decree.

Instead, it invoked comity principles to allow the pending Mexican

proceedings to resolve before Texas proceedings (including Texas’s determination

of whether to recognize that Mexican decree) continued. On this record, that decision

was within the trial court’s discretion.

An examination of the Section 403 Restatement factors supports the trial

court’s comity decision. The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that

it would be unreasonable to currently proceed with the litigation in Texas, while

litigation concerning the very decree at issue here remained ongoing in Mexico. This

inquiry turns on reasonableness. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 660.

To begin, one relevant Restatement factor is the extent to which another state

may have an interest in regulating the activity (the seventh factor). The trial court

could have reasonably found that this factor favors comity. Mexico’s interest is

substantial because the Mexican proceedings concern matters connected to Mexican

law and judicial authority. The 1959 decree at issue (and subject to challenge) was

rendered by a Mexican court; the nullity proceeding concerning it was filed there;

the settlement agreement and withdrawal occurred in connection with that litigation;

and the parties are Mexican citizens. Mexico has a strong interest in regulating these

matters relating to its own decree. Texas, on the other hand, could address the

Mexican decree and whether to recognize it here under Texas’s recognition inquiry

(if the decree is not first invalidated in Mexico) after Mexico concludes its process.

So too with another Restatement factor, the character of the activity to be

regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which

other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such

regulation is generally accepted (the third factor). Mexico has a substantial sovereign

interest in the character of the complained-of activity—the validity of a divorce

decree issued in Mexico—and in supervising litigation over a related settlement

agreement and withdrawal filed in its judicial system.

The trial court also could have reasonably found that the likelihood of conflict

factor (the eighth factor) favors comity. If both Texas and Mexico are addressing the

same decree at the same time, there is a real risk of some inconsistent determination.

That risk supports temporarily allowing the Mexican process concerning the decree

to proceed before Texas determines what effect, if any, the Mexican decree should

have here. See Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1521 (11th

Cir. 1994) (“[T]he prospect of ‘dueling courts,’ conflicting judgments, and attempts

to enforce conflicting judgments raise major concerns of international comity.”).

Additionally, the trial court could reasonably have determined that parties’

justified expectations (the fourth factor) support comity. The validity of the decree

has been litigated in Mexico for years. Evangelina pursued the Mexican nullity

proceeding, obtained relief in the Mexican appellate process allowing that challenge

to proceed, and then pursued further proceedings challenging the subsequent

settlement and withdrawal of her nullity action. The parties could justifiably expect

Mexican courts to conclude their process.

Other factors are more neutral—but they do not weigh strongly against comity

or show an abuse of discretion here. The trial court could reasonably have

determined that first Restatement factor, the link of the activity to Texas, was neutral

or, at the least, did not weigh heavily against comity. Texas has an obvious interest

in this divorce proceeding: Evangelina filed suit in Harris County, the case has been

pending here for years, and the parties have Texas property and other Texas

connections. But the specific issues on which the trial court premised its comity

determination concern the validity of a Mexican decree, a nullity action filed in

Mexico, a settlement agreement executed in connection with that Mexican litigation,

and the authority and conduct of counsel in those proceedings. Those matters are

substantially connected to Mexico.

The same is true as to the second factor—the connections of the parties to

Texas and Mexico. Both parties are Mexican citizens, and the Mexican proceedings

involve the validity of a Mexican decree and related proceedings between those

parties. Evangelina’s residence in Texas and Miguel’s Texas contacts weigh in the

opposite direction. But they do not eliminate Mexico’s substantial connection here.

The final Restatement factors (the fifth and sixth factors) do not alter this

dynamic. Nothing in this record suggests the dispute implicates the international

political, legal, or economic system in the manner contemplated by these factors.

Nor does either party identify a practice or convention that would affect the analysis.

Moreover, as noted and in addition to this analysis, in Fuentes I, our Court

instructed the trial court, on remand, to consider principles of comity and the

ongoing proceedings in Mexico. 555 S.W.3d at 161 (“[T]he trial court must

determine on remand whether comity requires deference to the current Mexican

proceedings addressing the 1959 divorce decree’s validity.”). Our Court also

instructed the trial court to “apply the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

308b in making this determination.” Id. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 308b(f)(3),

in turn, enabled the trial court to issue any order necessary to preserve the principles

of comity while protecting against violations of constitutional rights and public

policy. TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(f)(3).16

* * *

In total—and emphasizing that proceedings concerning the validity of the

very Mexican decree in dispute here were ongoing in Mexico at the time the trial

As explained, Rule 308b sets the procedure for determining whether, under comity

principles, to recognize or enforce a judgment based on foreign law in a Texas

family-law suit. This trial court did not yet purport to decide whether to recognize a

judgment. It invoked comity principles to allow Mexico to first conclude its ongoing

litigation concerning its decree.

court decided this issue—we cannot say that the trial court acted arbitrarily,

unreasonably, or without reference to guiding legal principles in concluding that

proceeding here now would be unreasonable. See Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 659. This is

a reasonableness analysis layered on a reasonable analysis. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to proceed now.

C. We remand as to the remedy.

We remand, however, for the trial court to address the appropriate remedy for

its comity determination and to consider whether a temporary stay or abatement

(rather than dismissal) may be proper in this circumstance. At the June 2024 hearing,

Evangelina’s counsel stated that, if the trial court was going to take any action on

the basis of comity, it should abate the case rather than dismiss it. Moreover, as

explained, the trial court did not yet make a determination about whether to

ultimately recognize the Mexican decree; contrary to Miguel’s urging, the trial court

did not recognize the decree and then dismiss this case because of it. The trial court

instead elected, as a matter of comity, to decline to proceed, for now, to allow

Mexico to resolve its ongoing litigation concerning the decree. Rule 308b(f)

empowered the trial court to issue “any order necessary to preserve the principles of

comity . . . while protecting against violations of constitutional rights and public

policy.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 308b(f)(3). In light of these considerations, on this record,

an examination of potential remedies is warranted.

Our Court has explained that a trial court may abate (or stay) or dismiss based

on comity, depending on the circumstances. See Fuentes I, 555 S.W.3d at 160. With

abatement, the case is paused and “all proceedings in a suit” are “suspen[ded],” but

all filings remain part of the file. 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enters., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 533, 539

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). A stay likewise pauses for some

period of time. See, e.g., Crown Leasing Corp. v. Sims, 92 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). With a dismissal without prejudice, on the other

hand, when the foreign proceedings resolve, the parties would have to begin anew.

CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 627,

630 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice

means that the same claims may be refiled in an entirely new cause.”).

When a trial court recognizes a foreign judgment, for instance, dismissal may,

at times, follow. Take the following example. If a trial court recognizes a foreign

divorce decree—after going through the Rule 308b process and after concluding that

the foreign decree satisfied due process principles—then at that point there would

be no marriage to dissolve, and the Texas court would lack jurisdiction. See Ashfaq,

467 S.W.3d at 544 (holding that trial court acted within its discretion in recognizing

Pakistani divorce as valid as matter of comity and affirming dismissal); In re

Marriage of San Emeterio, No. 13-24-00255-CV, 2026 WL 961754, at *1, *6–7

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 9, 2026, no pet.) (affirming dismissal

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because trial court did not abuse discretion in

recognizing Mexican divorce judgment).

But this record does not reflect the recognition of a foreign judgment. Nor

does this case involve a situation in which the foreign proceedings have concluded.

Instead, it is precisely because the foreign proceedings are ongoing that the trial court

reached its comity decision (and why the trial court had discretion to do so).

This is likewise not a situation in which the conclusion of the foreign

proceedings would resolve the Texas litigation. To the contrary, as explained, if the

1959 decree is invalidated in Mexico, the divorce proceedings would continue here

in Texas. And if the decree is not invalidated in Mexico, then a Texas court would

still need to determine whether to recognize that decree in Texas. Thus, the case

would need to come back to Texas regardless. Moreover, should the Texas court

decline to recognize the decree (for instance, were the court to conclude that it did

not satisfy our notions of due process), then the Texas divorce proceedings would

continue.

This litigation has been ongoing in Texas for approximately ten years. It has

gone up and down to our Court, and substantial work has gone into the case. Those

points might potentially support a temporary stay or abatement rather than dismissal.

See, e.g., Turner Entm’t Co., 25 F.3d at 1523 (ordering stay rather than dismissal

where German court had rendered judgment but appeal and fee determination

remained pending); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1224 (11th Cir.

1999) (concluding comity was appropriate but trial court should have stayed, rather

than dismissed, claims over which it had jurisdiction); Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of

Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (“As a lesser

intrusion on the principle of obligatory jurisdiction, which might permit the district

court a window to determine whether the foreign action will in fact offer an efficient

vehicle for fairly resolving all the rights of the parties, . . . a stay is an alternative

that normally should be considered before a comity-based dismissal is

entertained.”); cf. Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2011, no pet.) (“Under the doctrine of comity, a Texas court would usually stay its

proceeding pending adjudication of the first filed suit pending in another state.”).17

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2 empowers courts of appeals to affirm

or reverse judgments in whole or in part, to modify and affirm as modified, and to

reverse and remand for further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2; see also Crown

Leasing, 92 S.W.3d at 928 (affirming on comity rationale but modifying remedy:

“[B]ased on the principles of comity, a stay is the proper form of relief when two

identical suits are filed and pending in different states. . . . Accordingly, we modify

See Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 916 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996,

no writ) (noting “(1) promoting justice; (2) avoiding prejudice; and (3) promoting

judicial economy” as factors on whether to abate extracontractual causes of action).

the trial court’s judgment to institute a stay, as opposed to an abatement, and we

affirm the judgment as modified.”).

Here, the record does not reflect adequate development of this remedy issue

by the trial court. We reverse in part as to the order of dismissal and remand for the

trial court to examine potential remedies under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s decision to decline to proceed now, in light of

comity principles and the ongoing litigation in Mexico. We reverse the portion of

the trial court’s order dismissing the case, and we remand for the court to assess the

appropriate remedy.

On remand, the trial court may conduct further proceedings as necessary and

consider the current status of the Mexican proceedings. If those proceedings remain

pending and the court determines that a stay or abatement is warranted, it may

require periodic status reports, identify the Mexican proceedings whose resolution

will govern the duration of the suspension, or lift the stay or abatement when those

proceedings conclude or when suspension is otherwise no longer warranted. When

the relevant Mexican proceedings conclude, or if the trial court otherwise determines

that further suspension is no longer warranted, the court may proceed with the case

in accordance with this opinion and applicable Texas law.

Finally, we note that the trial court appears to have misunderstood the due

process inquiry relating to the recognition of a foreign judgment; the court seemed

to understand that inquiry to focus only on Mexican law. Going forward, we instruct

the court to proceed in accordance with this opinion.

We affirm the portion of the trial court’s order affording comity to Mexico’s

ongoing proceedings, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order dismissing the

case, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Jennifer Caughey

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Gunn, Caughey, and Morgan.

Justice Morgan, concurring.

Evangelina Lopez Guzman Zaragoza v. Miguel Zaragoza Fuentes

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain