Opinion issued August 31, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00414-CV
OPPIDAN HOMES VI, LTD., Appellant
V.
JAMES TIMOTHY WORK, Appellee
On Appeal from the 189th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2021-51199
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellee James Timothy Work purchased a new home from Appellant
Oppidan Homes, VI, Ltd. Claiming there were construction defects in the property,
Work sued Oppidan in state court and later filed a demand for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association. The parties ultimately arbitrated their disputes, and the arbitrator issued an award in favor of Oppidan awarding Oppidan attorney’s
fees and costs. Work moved to vacate the award in state court and Oppidan crossmoved for confirmation of the award arguing no grounds existed for vacatur.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Work’s application and vacated the
award.
On appeal, Oppidan argues that the trial court erred in vacating the award
because Work did not meet his heavy burden to establish one of the exclusive
statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award under Section 10(a) of the
Federal Arbitration Act. We agree with Oppidan that no grounds exist for vacatur of
the award.
We reverse the trial court’s order granting Work’s application to vacate the
award and render judgment confirming the award.
Background
Work purchased a new home from Oppidan. The sales contract executed by
Work and Oppidan contained an arbitration clause that required the parties to submit
their disputes to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”). In August 2021, Work sued Oppidan in state court asserting various
causes of action stemming from alleged construction defects in the home. Oppidan
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).
Before the trial court ruled on Oppidan’s motion to compel arbitration, Work filed a
2
demand for arbitration with the AAA. The AAA appointed attorney Michael
Mazzone as the sole arbitrator.
Arbitrator’s Disclosures
Pursuant to the AAA rules, Mazzone made disclosures to the parties shortly
after his appointment. He used the AAA General Arbitrator Oath Form, which
directs arbitrators to:
[P]lease disclose any past or present relationship with the parties, their
counsel, or potential witnesses, direct or indirect, whether financial,
professional, social or of any other kind. This is a continuing obligation
throughout your service on the case and should any additional direct or
indirect contact arise during the course of the arbitration or if there is
any change at any time in the biographical information that you have
provided, it must also be disclosed. Any doubts should be resolved in
favor of disclosure. If you are aware of direct or indirect contact with
such individuals, please describe it below. Failure to make timely
disclosures may forfeit your ability to collection compensation. All
disclosures will be brought to the attention of the parties.
Question 3 on the form focuses on relationships with the parties and their counsel.
It states, “Have you had any professional or social relationship with counsel for any
party in this proceeding or the firms for which they work?” Mazzone responded,
“YES,” and under “Comments” he added:
Several years ago I was counsel for a subcontractor in a multi-party
case in which Mr. Faria [Oppidan’s counsel] represented one of the
other parties in the case. Mr. Faria is or has been counsel in one or more
matters in which I was appointed the arbitrator, but none of those
matters proceeded to a final hearing and I believe all of those matters
were settled before the final evidentiary hearing.
3
The form further asked: (1) in Question 5, “Have you had any professional or social
relationships of which you are aware with any relative of any of the parties to this
proceeding, or any relative of counsel to this proceeding, or any of the witnesses
identified to date in the proceeding?” and (2) in Question 9, “Have any of the party
representatives, law firms or parties appeared before you in past arbitration cases?”
Mazzone responded “Yes” to both questions, and he referenced his response to
Question No. 3 for further comment: “See no. 3 above.”
After his initial disclosure, Mazzone made three supplemental disclosures in
which he provided additional information about prior arbitration proceedings
involving counsel for Work and Oppidan. On June 7, 2023, he disclosed that
[e]arlier this year, I was appointed in one AAA arbitration in which Mr.
Freeman [Work’s counsel] was counsel for one of the parties. I believe
that matter settled; there was no final evidentiary hearing in that case.
Regarding one of the AAA matters in which I was the arbitrator and in
which Mr. Bradley’s firm [Oppidan’s counsel] was counsel for one of
the parties did go to final hearing (contrary to my original disclosure),
but neither Mr. Bradley nor his firm appeared at the final hearing.
Apparently, the Bradley client changed counsel before the final
hearing.
On February 13, 2024, Mazzone further disclosed:
I served as the arbitrator in Susan Baker et al v Kimball Hill Homes and
Garber v Highland Holes. In both of these matters, Mr. Lynn DeGeorge
was named as an expert witness by one of the parties and the Freeman
Law Firm [Work’s counsel] for one of the parties in the Barber matter.
I do not recall if even [sic] of these matters went to final hearing.
4
And on June 3, 2024, he disclosed: “In [] light of Respondent’s [Oppidan’s]
designation of experts, I make the following additional disclosure: “Secretariat is a
former client of Haynes and Boone. The last time the firm billed Secretariat was in
March of 2022.”
No one filed an objection to Mazzone’s appointment as an arbitrator based on
his initial or supplemental disclosures.
Final Award and Work’s Motion to Vacate
The final arbitration hearing commenced on August 6, 2024. The parties
presented a total of nine witnesses who testified over four days, and they introduced
more than 110 exhibits, which Mazzone reviewed.1 On October 21, 2024, Mazzone
issued an award in which he denied all of Work’s claims, awarded Oppidan its
attorney’s fees and costs, and ordered the parties to bear their own costs for the AAA
and arbitrator fees.
On January 20, 2025, Work filed an application to vacate the arbitration award
on grounds of evident partiality, complete irrationality, manifest disregard of the
law, and corruption.2 Work alleged that after Mazzone issued the arbitration award,
1
The appellate record does not contain a complete record of the arbitration
proceedings. See Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837,
841 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (stating party seeking to
vacate arbitration award bears burden of presenting complete record that establishes
grounds for vacatur).
2
Although Work also moved to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that the
award was procured by corruption and that Mazzone had exceeded his powers by
5
Work learned that Mazzone had been appointed as the arbitrator in Christian Flores
and Daniel Flores v. Coventry Homes—a separate arbitration proceeding in which
Oppidan’s counsel, Ian Faria, represented a different homebuilder who had been
sued by a homeowner. Work alleged that even though Mazzone had been appointed
as the arbitrator in the Flores proceeding, Mazzone had not supplemented his
disclosures to reveal his appointment or that on March 5, 2024, he had granted
summary judgment in that proceeding in favor of the homebuilder, awarding the
homebuilder $31,582 in attorney’s fees, plus costs and arbitration fees. Oppidan filed
a response to Work’s motion to vacate and a counter application to confirm the
award arguing that no ground existed for vacatur of the award.
After a hearing, the trial court granted Work’s application to vacate the
arbitration award and denied Oppidan’s application to confirm. This appeal ensued.
Vacatur of Arbitration Award under FAA
Oppidan moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA and Work does not
dispute that the FAA governs the parties’ arbitration proceeding.3 Under the FAA,
rendering “a completely irrational decision,” Work does not argue on appeal that
the trial court’s order vacating the arbitration award can be affirmed on either
ground. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (corruption), (4) (arbitrator exceeded his powers).
Work confirms in his brief that he is not pressing the issue of corruption on appeal.
And nowhere in his brief does Work argue that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. 3
When reviewing claims under the FAA, we look to federal law to resolve
substantive issues, but we apply state law to resolve procedural issues. See Jack B.
Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992); see also Builders First
Source-S. Tex., LP v. Ortiz, 515 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
6
an arbitration award must be confirmed unless it is vacated under Section 10 or
modified or corrected under Section 11. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11; Cooper v. WestEnd
Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C., 832 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C.
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008)); see also Vargas v. Rigid Glob. Bldgs.,
LLC, 654 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied)
(stating Section 10 provides exclusive grounds for vacating arbitration award).
Section 10(a) of the FAA—which sets forth the exclusive grounds for vacatur
of an arbitration award—provides that a trial court may vacate an arbitration award
(1) “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,”
(2) “where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,” (3) “where
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced,” or (4) “where the arbitrators exceeded
2017, pet. denied). “Whether a case is governed by the [FAA] or the [Texas
Arbitration Act (“TAA”)], many of the underlying substantive principles are the
same.” Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 56 n.10 (Tex. 2008). The
statutory grounds for which Work seeks vacatur are also nearly identical under both
statutes. Compare 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(2), (4) (stating evident partiality and exceeding
powers are grounds for vacatur under FAA), with TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 171.088(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (same grounds under TAA).
For purposes of this opinion, we cite cases decided under the FAA and TAA. See
Forest Oil Corp., 268 S.W.3d at 56 n.10 (relying interchangeably on cases
discussing FAA and TAA); see also Deaton v. Law Offs. of Steven M. Johnson,
P.C., 697 S.W.3d 676, 692 n.8 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.) (“Because the
substantive principles that are applicable to our analysis in this appeal and the
available grounds to review an arbitration award are the same under [the FAA and
TAA], we may find guidance in court decisions that arise under either.”).
7
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4); see also
Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544 (stating Section 10 of FAA “provides the exclusive grounds
for vacatur of an arbitration award”) (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon,
562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009)). A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award
bears a heavy burden to establish one of the grounds set forth in Section 10(a), and
courts must resolve any doubts or uncertainties in favor of upholding the award. See
Cooper, 832 F.3d at 544; see also Vargas, 654 S.W.3d at 6 (“In seeking vacatur of
the Award under the FAA, Vargas bears a heavy burden to prove one of the above
statutorily enumerated grounds.”); see generally Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
569 U.S. 564, 568, (2013) (stating vacatur of arbitrator’s decision under FAA
warranted “only in very unusual circumstances”).
We review a trial court’s decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award
de novo and, if the court resolves any disputes about material facts, we review the
court’s factual findings for legal and factual sufficiency. Port Arthur Steam Energy
LP v. Oxbow Calcining LLC, 416 S.W.3d 708, 713 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2013, pet. denied); Amoco D.T. Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 343 S.W.3d 837,
844 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). “Because Texas law
favors arbitration, judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily narrow.”
E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., Inc. v. Werline, 307 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2010)
8
(footnote omitted); Forged Components, Inc. v. Guzman, 409 S.W.3d 91, 103 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (explaining that arbitration award “is
presumed valid and entitled to great deference”). An arbitrator’s award on “matters
submitted to [the arbitrator] is given the same effect as the judgment of a court of
last resort.” CVN Grp., Inc. v. Delgado, 95 S.W.3d 234, 238 (Tex. 2002). “All
reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of the award, and none against it.”
Id.; see also Stage Stores, Inc. v. Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“We review a challenge to an arbitration award
under a ‘heavy presumption’ in favor of confirming the award, and we must resolve
all doubts in favor of arbitration.”).
Evident Partiality
Oppidan argues that the trial court erred in granting Work’s application to
vacate the arbitration award because Work neither met his burden to show that
Mazzone acted with evident partiality nor presented the trial court with another
statutory basis for vacatur. According to Oppidan, Mazzone satisfied his disclosure
obligations when he initially disclosed that “Mr. Faria [Oppidan’s counsel] is or has
been counsel in one or more matters in which [Mazzone] was appointed the
arbitrator,” and Mazzone had no obligation to supplement his disclosures to disclose
either his appointment in the Flores arbitration or the outcome of that proceeding.
Even if Mazzone had a duty to make such supplemental disclosures, Oppidan argues
9
no objective observer could view Mazzone’s appointment in Flores or his decision
to grant summary judgment for the homebuilder in that proceeding as evidence that
Mazzone was partial towards Oppidan.
Work responds that the trial court did not err in vacating the award because
there is legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the court’s implied
finding of evident partiality. According to Work, an arbitrator’s “failure to disclose
when there is an obligation to do so is legally sufficient evidence of evident
partiality.” He argues that “a failure to disclose is evidence of partiality by itself.”
A. Applicable Law
Under the FAA, parties may apply to vacate an arbitration award based on
grounds of evident partiality. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2); Tenaska Energy, Inc. v.
Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tex. 2014). A neutral arbitrator
is evidently partial if he fails to disclose information that might—to an objective
observer—create a reasonable impression of his partiality towards one of the parties.
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997); Tenaska
Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 529 (applying TUCO standard for evident partiality to
cases where FAA applies). An arbitrator need not disclose trivial relationships or
connections, and the nondisclosure itself—rather than actual partiality or bias—
establishes the factual basis for the evident partiality ground. See Tenaska Energy,
10
Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 524–25; see also Burke v. Houston PT BAC Off. Ltd. P’ship
(Bank of Am.), 726 S.W.3d 828, 832 (Tex. 2025).
Contrary to Work’s contention, the nondisclosure of information—standing
alone—is not a basis for vacating an arbitration award. See Positive Software Sols.,
Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating
“nondisclosure alone does not require vacatur of an arbitral award for evident
partiality”); Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 668 F.3d 60, 77 (2nd Cir. 2012) (“The nondisclosure does not by itself constitute
evident partiality. The question is whether the facts that were not disclosed suggest
a material conflict of interest.”). Rather, the “standard for evident partiality . . .
requires vacating an award if an arbitrator fails to disclose facts which might, to an
objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality, but
information that is trivial will not rise to this level and need not be disclosed.”
Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525.
To prevail on its motion to vacate, Work thus had to establish not just that the
arbitrator failed to disclose information but also that the undisclosed facts “might, to
an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of [Mazzone’s] partiality.”4
Work did not satisfy this burden.
4
In arguing that nondisclosure of information by itself establishes evident partiality,
Work focuses on the statement in Tenaska that “evident partiality is established
from the nondisclosure itself, regardless of whether the nondisclosed information
11
B. Analysis
In the trial court, Work’s main argument in support of his evident partiality
challenge was that Mazzone was obligated, but failed, to disclose his service in the
Flores proceeding. He argued that “Mazzone’s failure to provide supplemental
disclosures regarding his involvement in [the Flores] arbitration and determination
in favor of Mr. Faria’s client [in that proceeding] require[d] vacatur [of the award]
. . . for evident partiality.” On appeal, Work argues that the AAA’s Code of Ethics
for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes required Mazzone to disclose his
involvement in the Flores arbitration and his failure to comply is sufficient to
establish evident partiality.
Because the material underlying facts are not in dispute, we review de novo
whether the undisclosed information—had it been disclosed—might convey to an
necessarily establishes partiality or bias.” Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525
(quoting TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d at 636) (emphasis in original). But that statement
merely clarifies that a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award need not establish
that the undisclosed information “actually [resulted in] partiality or bias,” because
courts apply an objective standard. Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525.
Indeed, in reviewing the moving party’s claim of evident partiality, the court in
Tenaska did not end its analysis after finding a failure to disclose. Rather, clarifying
that the nature of the undisclosed facts is relevant to the analysis, the Tenaska court
went on to review the nature of the undisclosed information to determine whether
evident partiality was established. See id. (applying “the standard for evident
partiality to these facts” to determine whether “the information the trial court found
[the arbitrator] did not disclose . . . might create a reasonable impression of partiality
to an objective observer . . . .”); see also Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 77 (2nd Cir. 2012) (holding that
“nondisclosure does not by itself constitute evident partiality” and instead courts
focus on whether the undisclosed facts “suggest a material conflict of interest”).
12
objective observer a reasonable impression that Mazzone was partial to one party.
See Burke, 726 S.W.3d at 832 (stating “whether the undisputed facts convey an
impression of partiality is a question of law”). Based on the record before us, we
conclude Work failed to establish evident partiality.
Under Canon II of the AAA Rules, an arbitrator is required to disclose—prior
to accepting an appointment—“any known existing or past financial, business,
professional or personal relationships which might reasonably affect impartiality or
lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties.” Am. Arb. Ass’n & Am. Bar
Ass’n, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (2004),
https://www.adr.org/media/urfbtl4d/commercial_code_of_ethics_for_arbitrators_2
010_10_14.pdf (last accessed Aug. 21, 2026). Arbitrators “should make a reasonable
effort to inform themselves” of any such relationships and their obligation to disclose
such relationships is a continuing duty that lasts throughout every stage of the
arbitration proceeding. See Canon II.B-C.
When he was appointed, Mazzone disclosed his professional relationship with
Faria in his AAA General Arbitrator Oath Form, where he stated that he and Faria
had been co-counsel for separate parties in a case in the past, and that he also had
been an arbitrator in other cases where Farias was counsel for one of the parties:
“Mr. Faria is or has been counsel in one or more matters in which I was appointed
the arbitrator.” Mazzone thus satisfied his duty to disclose his professional
13
relationship with Faria. To the extent Work argues that Mazzone also had a duty to
disclose his specific appointment in the Flores case and his ultimate ruling in that
proceeding, the AAA rules expressly require disclosure only of the arbitrator’s
professional relationships with the parties and their counsel. Work has not cited, nor
have we found, any binding authority requiring the disclosure of information
detailing the style of a specific arbitration or the results of such proceeding. The
cases on which Work relies are inapposite and do not establish that an arbitrator must
disclose such specific information. See Rodas v. La Madeleine of Tex., Inc., No. 05–
14-00054-CV, 2015 WL 1611780 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 10, 2015, pet. denied)
(mem. op.), Alim v. KBR (Kellogg, Brown & Root)—Halliburton, 331 S.W.3d 178
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.), and Honeycutt v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 25 Cal.
App. 5th 909 (Cal. App. 2018).
In Rodas, the court expressly declined to address whether the trial court had
erred by denying Rodas’ application to vacate the award based on grounds of evident
partiality. See 2015 WL 1611780, at *1, 2 & n.2. Rather, the court held that the trial
court had abused its discretion by denying Rodas’ motion to compel discovery
because the requested discovery was “directed at [Rodas’] evident partiality grounds
for attempting to vacate the award” and Rodas was “entitled to conduct reasonable
discovery to flesh out all relevant undisclosed facts.” Id. at *6.
14
In Alim, the court held that the arbitrator’s failure to disclose that one party’s
counsel had appeared before him in a prior arbitration in which counsel had
represented the party’s former parent company constituted evident partiality. 331
S.W.3d at 182. Unlike Mazzone—who disclosed that Faria “is or has been counsel”
in other arbitrations over which he presided, the arbitrator in Alim denied he had a
prior relationship with the parties or their counsel and that any of the parties’
representatives had appeared before him in past arbitrations.5 Id. The undisclosed
information was that the arbitrator had served as an arbitrator in a matter where
counsel for one of the parties had represented the party’s related entity and that
counsel for one of the parties had met the arbitrator when their firms represented
opposing parties in a lawsuit. Id. at 180.
Work’s reliance on Honeycutt is also misplaced. Under California law, an
arbitrator is required to disclose “matters that could cause a person aware of the facts
to reasonably entertain a doubt that the arbitrator would be able to be impartial,”
which the court stated, included service as an arbitrator for a party or lawyer for a
party. Honeycutt, 25 Cal. App. 5th at 930. Relying on California law and different
5
The arbitrator “answered ‘No’ to the following question: ‘Have any of the party
representatives, law firms or parties appeared before you in past arbitration cases?’
In that same notice, [the arbitrator] then attested, under oath, that he had ‘diligently
conducted a conflicts check’ and that he had ‘performed [his] obligations and duties
to disclose in accordance with the Rules of the [AAA], Code of Ethics for
Commercial Arbitrators and/or all applicable statutes pertaining to arbitrator
disclosures.’” Alim, 331 S.W.3d at 180.
15
vacatur standards, the court held the trial court had erred in confirming the arbitration
award because the arbitrator’s failure to disclose he had been appointed to four
arbitration proceedings in which counsel for one of the parties appeared on behalf of
another client during the pendency of the arbitration violated California’s ethical
standards, and the violation alone was sufficient to establish evident partiality. See
id. at 931–32. Given the different facts and vacatur standard, we do not find
Honeycutt persuasive.
In any event, we need not decide whether Mazzone had an obligation under
the AAA to disclose his specific appointment in the Flores proceeding or the
outcome of that arbitration, because even if he did, we conclude the undisclosed
information did not establish evident partiality. The standard for evident partiality
“requires vacating an award if an arbitrator fails to disclose facts which might, to an
objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality, but
information that is trivial will not rise to this level and need not be disclosed.”
Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525.
The decision in Grupo Unidos por el Canal, S.A. v. Autoridad del Canal de
Panama is instructive on this point. In that case, Grupo Unidos moved to vacate the
arbitration award on grounds of evident partiality because the arbitrator did not
disclose to the parties until late in the proceeding that he served as an arbitrator in
an unrelated matter in which one of Autoridad del Canal’s attorney’s represented
16
one of the parties. 78 F.4th 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2023). The court held that such
undisclosed information did not establish evident partiality. The court held that
“[r]epeated appearances establish only familiarity, and familiarity ‘does not indicate
bias.’” Id. (quoting Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors Inc.,
304 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The same holds true here. After he was appointed as the arbitrator in this case,
Mazzone disclosed that he had a prior professional relationship with Oppidan’s
counsel Faria and that Faria “is or has been counsel in one or more matters in which
[Mazzone] was appointed the arbitrator.” (Emphasis added.) While Work’s
arbitration proceeding was pending, Mazzone was appointed as an arbitrator in
Flores—a separate and unrelated arbitration proceeding involving different parties
and facts. Oppidan’s counsel Faria represented the homebuilder in Flores. Mazzone
granted summary judgment in favor of Faria’s client in the Flores matter and
awarded the homebuilder $31,582 in attorney’s fees, plus costs and arbitration fees.
Although Mazzone made three supplemental disclosures while Work’s arbitration
proceeding remained pending, Mazzone did not disclose that he had been appointed
as the arbitrator in Flores or the outcome of the Flores arbitration, which occurred
seven months before Mazzone issued the arbitration award in Work’s arbitration
proceeding. Work argues that the “failure to make the [additional disclosures] is very
troubling and raises a legitimate concern that the arbitrator was attempting to
17
obfuscate the extent of service as an arbitrator in cases involving Oppidan’s counsel
and law firm.” But at most, the undisclosed facts merely provide additional details
regarding what Mazzone had already disclosed and Work already knew—
Mazzone’s ongoing professional relationship with Faria based on Faria’s role as
counsel in multiple arbitrations where Mazzone served as arbitrator—a disclosure to
which Work did not object. See id. (stating arbitrator’s familiarity with party’s
counsel based on repeated appearances “does not indicate bias” and stating “[w]e’re
hard pressed to see how this in any way questions [the arbitrator’s] impartiality”).
We thus cannot conclude that the undisclosed information is such that it
might, to an objective observer, have created a reasonable impression of Mazzone’s
partiality toward Oppidan. See Tenaska Energy, Inc., 437 S.W.3d at 525; Cf. Burke,
726 S.W.3d at 832–33 (holding undisclosed substantive communications between
one party’s counsel and potential arbitrator that directly related to the “very matter
under consideration” for arbitration, including counsel’s promise to arbitrator that,
based on such communications, arbitrator would be placed at “the top of [that
party’s] list” for appointment, might reasonably create impression of partiality to
objective observer).
We thus conclude that Work did not meet his heavy burden to show that
Mazzone acted with evident partiality.
18
Other Grounds for Vacatur
In addition to evident partiality, Work also moved to vacate the arbitration
award on grounds of complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law.
Oppidan argues that complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law are not
valid grounds for vacatur under the FAA. Work acknowledges that manifest
disregard of the law and complete irrationality are not viable grounds for vacating
an arbitration award. He asserts, however, that he is making this argument to
preserve the issue because “[t]he issue has not been fully resolved by the U.S.
Supreme Court.” See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584 (holding Section 10 of FAA
“provide[s] the FAA’s exclusive grounds” for vacatur of an arbitration award);
Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010) (“We
do not decide whether manifest disregard survives our decision in Hall Street . . . as
an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds
for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); WEHSLMP Invs., L.L.C. v Wrangler Energy, L.L.C., No. 05-19-00271-CV, 2020 WL
994697, at *4 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The
federal circuit courts are split as to whether ‘manifest disregard’ survived Hall Street
as an independent ground for review or as a ‘judicial gloss’ on the statutory grounds
for vacatur.”).
19
Although other federal circuit courts continue to recognize nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award under the FAA after the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Hall Street, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and Texas intermediate
courts—including ours—have interpreted Hall Street otherwise. See Citigroup
Global Mkts., 562 F.3d at 358 (“In light of the Supreme Court’s clear language [in
Hall Street] that, under the FAA, the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds
for vacatur, manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory ground
for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.”); Allstyle Coil Co., L.P.
v. Carreon, 295 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“The
United States Supreme Court held that [Section 10 provides] the exclusive grounds
for vacating an arbitration award when a party has moved for confirmation of the
award in the trial court.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Hall St. Assocs.); see also
Vargas, 654 S.W.3d at 9–10 (stating “the grounds on which a trial court may vacate
an arbitration award under the FAA are limited to those expressly identified in
section 10 of the FAA, to the exclusion of all other potential grounds”) (citing Hall
St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 584, and listing cases holding courts may not vacate
arbitration award under FAA on nonstatutory grounds).
Complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the law are not one of the
grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award under Section 10 of the FAA, and thus
under binding precedent, neither ground can support a trial court’s decision to vacate
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an arbitration award. See State v. Beck, 695 S.W.3d 729, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (stating courts of appeals are “of course, obligated to follow
[its] own precedent”). Because Work did not meet his burden to show that Mazzone
acted with evident partiality, and complete irrationality and manifest disregard of the
law are not viable grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA, we hold
the trial court erred in granting Work’s application to vacate the arbitration award.
Under the FAA, a “court ‘must’ confirm an award unless the award is vacated
under Section 10 or modified or corrected under Section 11.” Cooper, 832 F.3d at
544 (citing Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 582); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 171.087 (stating trial court “shall confirm” arbitration award unless grounds are
offered for vacating, modifying, or correcting award); see also Vargas, 654 S.W.3d
at 6 (stating party seeking to vacate arbitration award under FAA “bears a heavy
burden to prove one of the . . . statutorily enumerated grounds” set forth in Section
10(a)). Because no grounds existed for vacatur under Section 10, and no one moved
for modification or correction of the award under Section 11, Oppidan was entitled
to confirmation of the award. See Belfiore Developers, LLP v. Sampieri, No. 01-17-00847-CV, 2018 WL 1161558, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing order vacating award and rendering judgment
confirming award).
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Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order granting Work’s application to vacate the
award and render judgment confirming the award.
Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
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