In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00176-CR
JACOB WAYNE LINDSAY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1868460
Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Wallach
OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Jacob Wayne Lindsay of “fentanyl murder,” i.e.,
murder under Texas Penal Code Section 19.02(b)(4)1, based on his delivery of fentanyl
to a person who then died of an overdose. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(4)
(providing that a person commits murder by knowingly manufacturing or delivering a
controlled substance included in Penalty Group 1-B and an individual dies as a result
of introducing it into the individual’s body); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 481.1022 (listing opiates, including fentanyl, that are included in Penalty Group 1-B).
In his first three points, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that
fentanyl was the cause of death (point one); that he knowingly delivered fentanyl
(point two); and that the drugs delivered by him, as opposed to someone else, caused
the death (point three). In his fourth and final point, he argues that the trial court
erred by failing to limit the jury charge’s definition of “knowing” to the
result-of-conduct element. We will affirm.
1
The judgment lists the “Offense for which Defendant Convicted” and
“Statute for Offense” as Penal Code Section “19.02(c).” Subsection (c) does not set out an offense; rather, it provides that “an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.” Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(c). Because the conviction was for murder under Subsection (b)(4), we correct the “Offense for which Defendant Convicted” and “Statute for Offense” in the judgment to “19.02(b)(4).” See id. § 19.02(b)(4); Porath v. State, Nos. 02-24-00445-CR through 02-24-00453-CR, 2025 WL 2552350, at *1– 2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 4, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that we may modify a trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors that contradict the record).
2
Background
On September 17, 2023, Lindsay delivered to Brandon Harrison some
methamphetamine and two “Percs.” Police officers testified at trial that a “Perc” is a
counterfeit Percocet tablet containing fentanyl. Text messages introduced at trial
showed Harrison requesting and Lindsay delivering to him some methamphetamine
and the “Percs”:
• On September 17, 2023, Harrison texted Lindsay to ask for “a 20 of clear and
4 perks [sic].” A police officer testified at trial that “clear” referred to
methamphetamine.
• Lindsay asked for $40, and Harrison responded, “I can only do 30 [right now]
so maybe just a 20 and 2 perks [sic].” Lindsay said he only had “a shard(10¢)on
[him], and the percs.” Harrison accepted that deal.
• At around 6:20 p.m., Lindsay went to the restaurant where Harrison was
working to deliver the drugs. About thirty minutes later, Harrison texted,
“Thanks homie,” and, “[Let me know] if you can swing by with a little more
clear.” Later that evening, they agreed that Lindsay would go by Harrison’s
work the next day with more “clear.”
• Harrison then asked if Lindsay could get more potent methamphetamine for
him: “Hey but when you come by tomorrow[,] can you try and get some clear
that’s some straight fire? Bc today’s was not great.” He followed up, “Still
thankful bc it helped a lot but [I] need some of that gas.”
• At 4:29 a.m. on September 18, Lindsay texted, “I gotcha when I get done with
my methadone clinic.”
• Over twelve hours later, at 5:24 p.m., he texted, “So what is up bro. Do you
want me to come bring you what I owe you and hook up some more because I
have plenty now.” About four hours later, at 9:31 p.m., he texted, “Hey are you
good broski? I’ve got that for you but you have to tell me where to go homie?!”
3
Harrison did not answer Lindsay’s texts; on the evening of September 18, he had been
found dead of an overdose.
At the time of his death, Harrison was living in a sober house attempting to
recover from his drug addiction. When EMTs reported to the call about his suspected
overdose, he had in one of his pockets a small baggie containing some
methamphetamine residue and one blue pill; laboratory testing revealed that the pill
contained fentanyl. The resulting police investigation led to Lindsay’s arrest. A grand
jury charged him with murder under Section 19.02(b)(4); the indictment alleged that
he had knowingly delivered a controlled substance, “to-wit: fentanyl,” the ingestion of
which had led to Harrison’s death. At trial, the State and Lindsay each produced
expert testimony about whether the fentanyl caused Harrison’s death.
The jury found Lindsay guilty. He pled “true” to an allegation that he had
previously been convicted of the felony offense of burglary of a habitation, and the
jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment. The trial court sentenced him
accordingly. He now appeals.
Discussion
I. Jury Charge
We begin with Lindsay’s fourth point, which requires construction of Section
19.02(b)(4). Under this point, he argues that murder is a result-of-conduct offense,
thus “knowing delivery requires the result that a specific drug—fentanyl—is
delivered,” and so the jury charge should have limited the definition of “knowingly”
4
in the charge to the result-of-conduct definition. See Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(b)
(providing that a person acts knowingly “with respect to the nature of his conduct . . .
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct” and acts knowingly “with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
the result”); Wesley v. State, 605 S.W.3d 909, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2020, no pet.) (stating that in a jury charge, the language regarding the applicable
culpable mental state must be tailored to the appropriate conduct element). Lindsay
acknowledges that because he did not object, the record must show egregious harm
for him to prevail on this point. The State counters that while “the gravamen of
murder is the result of the offense[—]the death of an individual”2—the subsection at
issue here does not require a culpable mental state regarding the result of the conduct.
Instead, a culpable mental state is required only as to the knowing manufacture or
delivery of the controlled substance. We agree with the State.
The murder statute sets out multiple ways to commit an offense through
conduct that resulted in an individual’s death. Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b). One way to
commit the offense is to “intentionally or knowingly cause[ ] the death of an
individual.” Id. § 19.02(b)(1). Proving this intentional murder offense requires proving
that the defendant had a culpable mental state—intentional or knowing—with respect
to the result of his or her conduct. See Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex.
2
The charge required the jury to find that the controlled substance delivered by Lindsay had caused Harrison’s death in order to find Lindsay guilty.
5
Crim. App. 2003). Thus, in an intentional murder case, jury charge language defining
the culpable mental states should be limited to definitions that relate to the result of
the defendant’s conduct. Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
But the subsection at issue in this case provides that a person commits the
offense of murder if the person “knowingly manufactures or delivers” certain
controlled substances in violation of the Health and Safety Code and a person dies as
a result of introducing that substance into the person’s body. Tex. Penal Code
§ 19.02(b)(4). The subsection provides,
(b) A person commits an offense if the person:
(4) knowingly manufactures or delivers a controlled substance
included in Penalty Group 1-B under [Health and Safety Code] Section
481.1022 . . . in violation of [Health and Safety Code] Section
481.1123, . . . and an individual dies as a result of injecting, ingesting,
inhaling, or introducing into the individual’s body any amount of the
controlled substance manufactured or delivered by the actor, regardless
of whether the controlled substance was used by itself or with another
substance, including a drug, adulterant, or dilutant.
Id. (emphasis added). As Lindsay acknowledges, the statute does not require an intent
to cause the death. He nevertheless argues that because murder is a “result of
conduct” offense, the charge should have included the definition of “knowingly”
applicable to result-of-conduct offenses.
The only culpable mental state included in the statute is in the “knowingly
delivers” language, which mirrors the language of the
6
delivery-of-a-controlled-substance offenses in the Health and Safety Code. See, e.g.,
Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.1123 (providing that a person commits an offense
when the person “knowingly . . . delivers[ ], . . . a controlled substance listed in Penalty
Group 1-B”). The Court of Criminal Appeals has said that delivery of a controlled
substance is a nature-of-conduct offense. White v. State, 509 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). Thus, as the State says, the statute on its face requires a culpable
mental state as to the nature of the defendant’s conduct—manufacture or delivery of
the controlled substance—but not as to the result of that conduct. See id.; Tex. Penal
Code § 19.02(b)(4).
This reading of Subsection (b)(4) is consistent with the offense of felony
murder (i.e., “unintentional murder”) set out in Subsection (b)(3)3 for which no
culpable mental state is required other than whatever culpable mental state is required
to prove the underlying felony. See Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 305–07 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). Because the applicable culpable mental state is the mental state required
for the underlying offense, the applicable mental state definitions are likewise those
that apply to the underlying offense. See Williamson v. State, No. 03-17-00787-CR,
2019 WL 4849605, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 2, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
That section provides that a person commits an offense if the person
3
“commits or attempts to commit a felony” and “in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt,” “commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(3).
7
not designated for publication) (concluding that trial court did not err by not
including a culpable mental state in the application paragraph for felony murder
offense when the abstract section correctly set out the elements of the underlying
offense “and defined the culpable mental states applicable to that offense,” i.e., the
definitions relating to nature-of-conduct and circumstances-surrounding-conduct
offenses (emphasis added)); Cardenas v. State, No. 08-18-00083-CR, 2021 WL 3629990,
at *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 17, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(holding that with felony murder, “if the elements of the underlying felony include a
culpable mental state, the relevant element for purposes of the [mental state]
definitions is the one applicable to the mens-rea element in the underlying felony” and
that because the underlying felony in that case was a nature-of-conduct offense, the
jury charge correctly included the nature-of-conduct definitions for “intentionally”
and “knowingly”). Similarly, the culpable mental state applicable to Subsection (b)(4)
is the culpable mental state for knowing manufacture or delivery of a controlled
substance in Penalty Group 1-B, which is a nature-of-conduct offense. Thus, the jury
charge correctly included the nature-of-conduct definition of “knowingly.” We
overrule Lindsay’s fourth point.4
4
We further note that Lindsay’s argument for why the charge was egregiously harmful is based on his assertion that the evidence was insufficient to show that he “knew the drugs that he delivered contained fentanyl.” We reject that argument below.
8
II. Sufficiency Challenges
Having set out the applicable Penal Code statute, we now turn to Lindsay’s
points arguing that the State did not prove several elements of the offense.
A. Evidence that fentanyl, as opposed to another drug, caused the death
Under Lindsay’s first point, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove
that fentanyl, alone or combined with other drugs, caused Harrison’s death. He relies
on evidence that Harrison had mitragynine in his system, which the experts testified
could have alone caused the death. He argues that “the [S]tate’s own toxicologist
agreed” that it was not possible to determine from the lab results whether mitragynine
caused the death, and if that drug alone caused the death, then “the fentanyl did not.”
Because this point relies on competing expert testimony presented at trial, we begin
by setting out the relevant testimony.
The State called Dr. Robert Johnson, the chief toxicologist at the Tarrant
County Medical Examiner’s Office, and Dr. Steven Hemberger, a deputy medical
examiner with the office. Johnson testified about the toxicology report. The report
stated that Harrison’s blood had 174 nanograms per milliliter of methamphetamine,
which “in general terms, . . . is not a lot,” as well as 8.5 nanograms of fentanyl and
2.1 nanograms of norfentanyl, a metabolite of fentanyl, and “in general terms, that’s a
lot of fentanyl.”
Johnson further stated that no amount of fentanyl is small enough to be
incapable of causing death; “[f]or any given individual, fentanyl could be deadly at
9
virtually any concentration,” depending on factors such as “route of administration”
and a person’s “tolerance or experience.” Johnson told the jury that “[t]he more often
you use the drug, the more it would take to cause harm.” He then explained what the
ratio of fentanyl to its metabolite meant in his opinion. He said,
Typically, if someone’s using fentanyl therapeutically, which is absolutely
possible during pain management, those values are very similar in nature.
So eight nanograms per mil and eight nanograms per mil for the
metabolite and the parent drug.
[In this case, t]he fact that it’s basically 4 to 1 suggests that
fentanyl had not been in the body therapeutically for an extended period
of time. Death occurred before metabolism had been completed.
The testing detected two other substances in Harrison’s blood: acetaminophen
and mitragynine, a legal drug also called kratom. Johnson explained that “at low
concentrations [mitragynine] is a stimulant-type drug, and then at high concentrations,
it’s a depressant drug.” However, he could not say how much mitragynine was in
Harrison’s blood because when the testing occurred, the lab did not “have a validated
method to quantify the amount” of that substance. He acknowledged on
cross-examination that mitragynine can be deadly and that he could not tell from the
lab results if the mitragynine “could have been the problem or been the cause of
death” because the office did “did not do any quantitative work.”
Johnson also answered questions about issues with postmortem testing for
fentanyl. He stated that fentanyl, like most compounds, can increase in the blood after
death. To mitigate that issue, the office tests blood isolated from the leg rather than
10
blood contained in the heart “because fentanyl can move around the chest cavity of
the body from areas of high concentration, like the liver, to the blood that’s contained
in the heart.” However, “[a] femoral blood concentration of eight at the time of
death[ ] may[ ]be 7.8 or 8.2 or 8.5 at the time of testing, but it’s not going to be half or
double or 10 times what it was at the time of death.”
Hemberger testified about the results of the autopsy and his opinion about the
cause of death. He explained that methamphetamine had opposite effects to fentanyl
and described what happens when a person has overdosed on the two substances:
Methamphetamine is a stimulant. So that increases your heart rate,
your blood pressure, [you] start sweating more, things of that nature.
Whereas fentanyl is an opiate, so it decreases your breathing,
decreases your heart rate, slows your central nervous system down.
So basically the amount of fire between your neurons starts to
lower. So basically they’re kind of competing with each other. You have
one that’s trying to go fast, one that’s going really slow, so there’s this
competition in your heart and with other organs it can -- it can cause
injury and lead to death.
Hermberger then talked about his opinion on the cause of Harrison’s death:
• In his opinion, Harrison’s death was caused by fentanyl and
methamphetamine toxicity.
• On cross-examination, he acknowledged that mitragynine can by itself
cause death, and he stated that he could not say whether either the
fentanyl or the methamphetamine could by itself have caused Harrison’s
death or which drug in Harrison’s system caused the death.
• But he further stated that fentanyl was one of the causes of death. On
redirect, he testified that in his opinion, although he could not say
11
whether the fentanyl or methamphetamine had a stronger effect,
fentanyl was a contributing cause of Harrison’s death.
Lindsay called his own expert, Dr. Satish Chundru, a private forensic
pathologist. Chundru downplayed the role of the fentanyl in Harrison’s death,
pointing to the mitragynine as the bigger issue. He said,
• Harrison did not die because of the fentanyl “because it’s a mixed drug
toxicity.” Rather, “the cause of death should be the fentanyl, the
methamphetamine, the mitragynine, and the acetaminophen.”
• He did not believe that the 8.5 nanograms of fentanyl recited in the
toxicology report was accurate or that drawing Harrison’s blood from
the femoral artery would have ameliorated the issue of postmortem
increase of drugs in blood. He asserted that when a person ingests
fentanyl, “it distributes in the fat and the muscle,” where “it’s not doing
anything to [the person’s] body,” but when the person dies, that
concentration of the drug “leak[s] into the blood” and increases the level
of the drug there. The longer the period between death and the blood
draw, “the larger the fentanyl level.” Thus, the amount of fentanyl in
Harrison’s blood at the time of death was “most likely lower than 8.5.”
• Even at that amount, he asserted, the level of fentanyl in Harrison’s
blood was “on the lower level,” so testing to determine the level of
mitragynine in his blood would have helped with determining how he
died. If Harrison had “a sky-high level” of mitragynine, then the fentanyl
and methamphetamine “didn’t play [as] much of a role as the
mitragynine.” “And at a low level, . . . as a stimulant, that combined with
the meth . . . would play a more significant level than the fentanyl.”
• But on cross-examination, when asked if fentanyl in any way contributed
to Harrison’s death, he stated, “[I]t could have played some role.”
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
12
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2024). Under this standard, based on the above evidence, the jury could
have found that Harrison died as a result of ingesting fentanyl.
If another cause—such as the mitragynine—was clearly sufficient by itself to
have caused Harrison’s death, and the fentanyl was clearly not sufficient to have
caused it, then Linday could not be convicted. See Pixley v. State, No. 12-18-00236-CR,
2019 WL 4196909, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 4, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). But on the other hand, if fentanyl, alone or in combination
with another drug, was sufficient to cause Harrison’s death, then the fentanyl was a
but-for cause of the death. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b)(4) (providing that person
commits the offense if an individual dies as a result of ingesting any amount of a
controlled substance delivered by the defendant, regardless of whether the controlled
substance was used by itself or with another substance); cf. Jimenez v. State,
No. 02-23-00348-CR, 2025 WL 211319, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 16, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that for purposes of felony
murder in Subsection (b)(3), when two or more causes satisfy “but for” causation, the
defendant is liable if his or her conduct was sufficient to have caused the result alone,
regardless of a concurrent cause, or if both causes together were sufficient to cause
the result).
Here, any testimony about whether the mitragynine could have caused or
contributed to Harrison’s death could only be speculation because testing had not
13
been done to determine the amount in Harrison’s body at the time of his death.
Regarding the fentanyl, however, although the parties’ experts disagreed about
whether the amount of fentanyl in Harrison’s blood was a high amount, Hemberger,
the State’s witness, testified that fentanyl was a contributing factor to and a cause of
Harrison’s death. Even Chundru, the defense expert, acknowledged that the fentanyl
could have played a role in Harrison’s death. Further, he included fentanyl in the mix
of drugs that, in combination, he concluded had caused Harrison’s death.
It was the jury’s role to weigh the evidence and to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, and we may not reevaluate the evidence’s weight or credibility. See
Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341–42. Based on the evidence before it, the jury could have
found that fentanyl was a cause of Harrison’s death.
B. Evidence that Lindsay knowingly delivered the fentanyl
Lindsay’s second point challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding that he knowingly delivered fentanyl. Lindsay contends that the text messages
reflected that he delivered “Percs,” “which are Percocet pills, i.e. OxyContin,” that
“on the street level . . . can be manufactured such that they contain fentanyl,” but “the
term ‘Perc’ refers to OxyContin pills, not fentanyl pills.” He further argues that
although he frankly admitted to police that he had used and possessed fentanyl, “he
referenced the fentanyl as a separate substance from the Percocet pills.” He contends
that a police officer testified that there was no evidence that Harrison knew that the
pills could contain fentanyl, and argues that “[l]ikewise, there is no evidence that
14
[Lindsay] knew [that] the Percocet pills were laced with fentanyl, either.” Although he
acknowledged that some pills sold on the street can contain fentanyl, he contends that
shows only a reckless mental state, not a knowing delivery. The State counters that it
only had to prove that he knowingly delivered a controlled substance, not that he
knowingly delivered fentanyl, but even if it did have to meet that burden, it did so. We
agree with the State that the evidence shows knowing delivery of fentanyl.
Fort Worth Police Officers Joseph Hill and Gregory Miller investigated
Harrison’s death. Both officers are on the police department’s fentanyl overdose
response team. The blue pill found in the baggie in Harrison’s pocket was labeled,
“M-30,” and the two officers testified that drug dealers sell blue M-30 pills mixed with
fentanyl, called “Percs,” that are counterfeit Percocet tablets. Hill testified that at the
time of trial, “the trend is now that individuals are selling fentanyl powder,” but when
the department was investigating overdose deaths “back in 2019, 2020, the trend was
M-30 pills.” See English v. State, Nos. 02-24-00392-CR through 02-24-00395-CR,
2025 WL 2552340, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (noting police officer’s testimony that “M30 pills
are counterfeit oxycodone tablets containing fentanyl”); Rachel L. Rothberg, Kate
Stith, Fentanyl: A Whole New World?, 46 J.L. Med. & Ethics 314, 317 (2018) (noting that
“[o]n the street,” counterfeit oxycodone pills containing fentanyl are sold as “‘perc
30s’”).
15
In addition to the text messages between Harrison and Lindsay described
above, the State also introduced copies of text messages that Lindsay had sent to
other people, including one in which he told someone that he was “going to be dope
sick from perks [sic]” and another responding to a question in the same conversation
about what he had “been doing,” “Just fentanyl and methadone and speed[5] and
alcohol.” The jury could construe these texts as evidence that Lindsay understood that
“Percs” were fentanyl.
Additionally, the State introduced and published to the jury the police interview
of Lindsay after his arrest. In the interview, Lindsay told Miller that he had gone to
“rehab” for fentanyl addiction but left before completing the program, and he was
hoping to go back. When Miller asked Lindsay if he used pills like “hydrocodone,
Oxys, [or] anything like that,” he denied it. After Lindsay briefly discussed his
experience in the treatment program, Miller asked him how he used fentanyl—for
example, whether he used powder or pills—Lindsay said, “pill form.” When Miller
followed up with, “Just the blues, the Percs, or something like that?” Lindsay nodded
and said, “Yeah.” Miller then asked him when he had last taken a “Perc,” and Lindsay
said it was earlier that day. He told the officers that he “do[es], like, 10 of them a day.”
Further, Lindsay not only used the pills but also sold them, and Miller asked him
That is, methamphetamine. See Elizabeth Berry, Joe Stephens, & George
5
Gallagher, Texas Crim. Jury Charges § 13:220 (2025).
16
questions about the persons from whom he bought the drugs and how many he had
sold. Lindsay said he had been selling them for about a year.
At trial, Miller was asked about the terms “blues” and “Percs” that they used in
the interview. He said, “[W]hen we hear blues or Percs, it’s, like, street slang for
counterfeit OxyContin pills,” and in his opinion, Lindsay knew that “the Percs, the
blues contained fentanyl” and knew that he was selling fentanyl.
In our sufficiency review, “the logical force of all of the admitted evidence
must be considered in the light most favorable to the conviction, meaning that all
reasonable inferences from the evidence must be resolved in favor of the jury’s guilty
verdict.” Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). From Lindsay’s
addiction to fentanyl; his admitting to daily use of “Percs” yet denying use of
oxycodone; his agreeing with Miller’s description of “the blues, the Percs” when
describing the form of fentanyl he uses; his participating in dealing “Percs”; and
Miller’s testimony that “Percs” are counterfeit pills containing fentanyl, the jury could
find that Lindsay was aware that the counterfeit Percocets pills that he sold, including
the ones that he sold to Harrison, contained fentanyl. See Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d
234, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Juries can draw any
reasonable inference from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the
evidence.”). We overrule Lindsay’s second point.
17
C. Evidence that the fentanyl that caused the death came from Lindsay
In Lindsay’s related third point, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that the drugs that he delivered, “as opposed to drugs obtained from another
source,” caused the death. He contends that Harrison was found more than
twenty-four hours after getting drugs from him, “leav[ing] a 24-hour window within
which [Harrison] could have received drugs from another source,” and argues that he
had not given Harrison the mitragynine. Lindsay further argues that located in the
room where Harrison was found were a container of Narcan “that someone had used,
but no one would claim responsibility for,” as well as a vape pen (found near
Harrison’s hand) that was not subjected to lab tests to determine what it contained.
As for the baggie in Harrison’s pocket containing the methamphetamine residue and
the blue pill, Lindsay complains that it was never tested for DNA or fingerprints to
prove that it came from him. He further argues that Harrison’s text to him about
wanting more drugs that were “straight fire” indicated that Harrison had used the
drugs from him on the day before he died. He argues, “The reasonable inference from
this evidence is that [Harrison] was seeking more drugs after consuming the ones
[Lindsay] provided. Although it is a possibility [Harrison] continued to consume what
[Lindsay] gave him, it is as equally likely he obtained additional drugs from another
source.” We disagree.
First, Harrison’s text stated that he was looking for more “clear” that was
“straight fire,” and Hill testified that “clear” referred to methamphetamine. Thus, the
18
texts did not indicate that Harrison had already taken both—or even one of—the
fentanyl pills. Further, after looking through the text messages on Harrison’s phone,
Miller did not see any evidence of Harrison’s buying drugs from anyone else around
that time.
As for the baggie with the blue pill, we have held that the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find that Lindsay gave Harrison fentanyl in the form of two
“Percs” the day before he died, and he was found with a “Perc.” As for the other
substances in his room, the trial testimony explained the Narcan; Harrison’s
roommate told a police officer who had responded to the report of a possible
overdose that “once they . . . saw [Harrison] in the room like that, they tried to
administer Narcan themselves.” As for the mitragynine, Johnson testified that the
substance is legal and available at gas stations. Thus, Harrison’s having taken it does
not imply the existence of another dealer who might have supplied him with fentanyl.
As for the vape pen, while it was not tested for fentanyl or other substances, its
presence in the room did not prevent the jury from finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that Lindsay had supplied the fentanyl to Harrison. Although Lindsay’s trial
attorney made a point at trial of repeatedly asking witnesses to confirm that Harrison
lived in a sober house with other people in recovery, at one point describing the
house as “full of drug addicts,” those questions were not evidence that Harrison
obtained the fentanyl from another source. While the jury had evidence that Harrison
had bought fentanyl from Lindsay, there is no evidence that he obtained any
19
controlled substance from anyone other than Lindsay. Having presented sufficient
evidence from which the jury could find that Lindsay gave the fentanyl to Harrison,
the State had no burden to disprove every possible alternative source. See Ramsey v.
State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“Beyond a reasonable doubt . . .
does not require the State to disprove every conceivable alternative to a defendant’s
guilt.”); see also Ingerson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 501, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(“Focusing on other reasonable explanations for evidence improperly applies the
abrogated reasonable-alternative-hypothesis construct.”). We overrule Lindsay’s third
point.
Conclusion
Having overruled Lindsay’s four points, we modify the judgment to show the
“Offense for which Defendant Convicted” and the “Statute for Offense” as
“19.02(b)(4),” and we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Publish
Delivered: August 27, 2026
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