In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00542-CV
ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY COMPANY NTU, LLC, Appellant
V.
DENTON COUNTY TAX ASSESSOR-COLLECTOR, ARGYLE ISD, AUBREY
ISD, DENTON ISD, KRUM ISD, LAKE DALLAS ISD, LEWISVILLE ISD,
LITTLE ELM ISD, NORTHWEST ISD, PONDER ISD, SANGER ISD, CITY OF
ARGYLE, BARTONVILLE TOWNSHIP, CITY OF CARROLLTON, CITY OF
CORINTH, CITY OF DENTON, CITY OF HICKORY CREEK, CITY OF
HIGHLAND VILLAGE, CITY OF JUSTIN, CITY OF KRUGERVILLE, CITY OF
KRUM, TOWN OF NORTHLAKE, CITY OF ROANOKE, CITY OF LAKE
DALLAS, CITY OF LEWISVILLE, CITY OF OAK POINT, CITY OF THE
COLONY, TOWN OF TROPHY CLUB, DENTON COUNTY, CLEAR CREEK
WATERSHED, DENTON COUNTY ESD 1, DENTON COUNTY FWSD 7,
DENTON COUNTY MUD 5, DENTON COUNTY MUD 6, SMILEY ROAD
WATER CONTROL AND IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1, COPPER
CANYON TOWNSHIP, DISH TOWNSHIP, FLOWER MOUND TOWNSHIP,
LITTLE ELM TOWNSHIP, PONDER TOWNSHIP, TOWN OF SHADY SHORES,
TROPHY CLUB ESD, AND TROPHY CLUB MUD 1., 1 Appellees
On Appeal from the 477th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25-0139-158
Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
1
We identify Appellees by the names used in Appellant’s second amended petition.
2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Oncor Electric Delivery Company NTU, LLC appealed from the
trial court’s September 10, 2025 “Order on [Appellees’] First Amended Plea to the
Jurisdiction, Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Summary Judgment.”
However, this court had concerns about its jurisdiction because the order did not
appear to be a final judgment. The order stated,
The Court, after hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, makes
the following orders:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the First Amended Plea to the
Jurisdiction filed by Defendants is hereby GRANTED . . . .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Rule 91a Motion to
Dismiss filed by Defendants is hereby GRANTED . . . .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendants is hereby GRANTED. . . .
The order contained no finality language, see Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,
39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001) (providing language that would indicate
judgment’s finality), and no decretal language disposing of any of the claims in the
case. See Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73, 74 (Tex. 2003) (“An order that merely
grants a motion for judgment is in no sense a judgment itself. It adjudicates
nothing.”); In re Wilmington Tr., Nat’l Ass’n, 524 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (holding that order lacking decretal language does
not constitute a final judgment); cf. Phan v. CL Invs., LLC, No. 01-20-00551-CV,
2022 WL 175367, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20, 2022, pet. denied)
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(mem. op. on reh’g) (recognizing that an order that lacks the “ordered, adjudged, and
decreed” language typically seen in a judgment does not actually dispose of any claim
or party). Thus, it did not dismiss or otherwise dispose of any of Oncor’s claims, nor
did it address Appellees’ request for attorney’s fees contained in their Rule 91a
motion. But because it appeared from the record that the trial court may have
intended the order to be final, we abated the appeal to allow the trial court to clarify
whether it had intended to render a final judgment and, if so, to modify the order “so
as to . . . ma[k]e [it] final.” See Tex. R. App. P. 27.2.
In response, we received the trial court’s “Modified Order on [Appellees’] First
Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction, Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for
Summary Judgment.” The order states that it clarifies but does not replace the
September 10, 2025 order. This new order expresses that the trial court had intended
for its prior order to dispose of the parties’ claims, but the new order does not remedy
the issues in the prior order and does not itself constitute a final order. See In re
Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (noting that an “an order is final if it ‘states’
that it is—not if the court intends it to be”).
This court has jurisdiction over appeals only from (1) final judgments or
(2) interlocutory orders authorized by statute. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195, 200. If a
trial court orders dismissal of a claim upon a governmental entity’s plea to the
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jurisdiction, that order may be challenged by interlocutory appeal.2 See Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). But the September 10, 2025 order did not dismiss or
otherwise dispose of any claim, nor does the new, modified order signed upon
abatement. Because the trial court has not signed an appealable order, we dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: August 27, 2026
2
Oncor’s notice of appeal was not filed within the time period for an accelerated appeal, but it was filed within the 15-day period in which an extension may be requested. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1, 26.3. Oncor has not filed a motion stating “the facts relied on to reasonably explain the need for an extension,” see Tex. R. App. P. 10.5(b), 26.3, and its notice of appeal indicates its intention to appeal the trial court’s order as a “final judgment.” Even if Oncor had attempted to file an interlocutory appeal, the trial court has not rendered an appealable order because, although it purported to “grant” Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction, it did not actually dismiss any claims for lack of jurisdiction or otherwise grant any relief. See Templeton Sw. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc., No. 08-03-00262-CV, 2003 WL 22725509, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 20, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding interlocutory order was not appealable order granting temporary injunction because, although the order stated that “a Temporary Injunction should be entered,” it did not actually order injunctive relief).
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