In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00206-CR
THOMAS LEE WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 485th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1779494
Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a single issue, Appellant Thomas Lee Williams challenges his conviction for
the third-degree felony offense of assault of a family or household member by impeding
breath or circulation.1 Williams argues that the trial court’s charge to the jury contained
conflicting application paragraphs. Because the jury charge was not erroneous, we will
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams’s tumultuous romantic relationship with the complainant began in
2011. They lived together in 2023 when they argued over cell phones—Williams
refused to return the complainant’s phone because he believed she had taken his. The
argument became a physical fight. Williams hit the complainant in the mouth and
dislodged a crown from her tooth, grabbed her by her throat and squeezed, then pushed
her down onto a couch. During the ensuing “tussle,” Williams choked the complainant
multiple times and spit in her face.
After the complainant’s daughter called 911, police arrived and arrested Williams.
Williams was indicted for assault causing bodily injury to a family or household member
by impeding breath or circulation, and the indictment included a repeat-offender notice
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See Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.34, 22.01(b)(2)(B).
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for a 2019 conviction for unlawful use of a weapon.2 Williams pleaded not guilty to the
offense and true to the enhancement paragraph and proceeded to trial by jury.
At trial, after the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court provided
Williams and the State with a proposed jury charge. Williams affirmatively stated that
he had no objection to the charge. Williams also did not object when the charge was
read aloud to the jury.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. After the punishment phase, the jury
assessed Williams’s punishment at thirteen years’ confinement. Williams timely filed
this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Williams argues that the jury charge permitted the jury to convict
him without first requiring a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in
self-defense. Williams concedes that he did not preserve error in the charge. However,
we must review “all alleged jury-charge error . . . regardless of preservation in the trial
court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In reviewing a jury
charge, we first determine whether error occurred; if not, our analysis ends. Id.
The charge included an application section that outlined the elements of the
offense charged without any mention of self-defense. That paragraph instructed the
jury that it would convict Williams upon a finding of each element beyond a reasonable
See id. § 12.42.
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doubt but that “[u]nless [it] so [found] from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
or if [it had] a reasonable doubt thereof, [it would] acquit [Williams].” Immediately
following that paragraph, the charge set forth the law of self-defense and the State’s
burden to “prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense [did] not apply.” The
charge instructed the jury that if it found the elements of assault beyond a reasonable
doubt but further found that Williams was justified in his use of force, “then [it had to]
acquit [Williams] of the offense . . . and say by [its] verdict not guilty.”
Williams complains that the first application paragraph incorrectly directed the
jury to convict him without instructing the jury to consider self-defense. He argues that
the first application paragraph irreconcilably conflicts with the second instruction,
thereby permitting the jury to convict him without considering if he had acted in
self-defense. We disagree.
In Hernandez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the
trial court did not err when, as here, self-defense was not incorporated into the
application paragraph of the charged offense but was included in a later instruction.
375 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); see Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 366
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (requiring reviewing courts to examine the charge as a whole,
not as a series of isolated and unrelated statements); Ekern v. State, 200 S.W.2d 412, 415
(Tex. Crim. App. 1947) (“The court cannot and is not required to charge all the law in
each paragraph of [its] charge, but such charge should be taken and considered as a
whole; and an ordinary jury is expected to and surely does take the charge as a whole
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and considers it as such.”); Rodriguez v. State, No. 06-25-00113-CR, 2026 WL 1857742,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (holding charge with
initial application paragraph that referenced only elements of offense and in subsequent
paragraphs instructed jury how to apply law of self-defense was not erroneous); Walker
v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 850 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (“In evaluating
jury instructions . . . juries are ‘presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions in the
manner presented.’” (citing Kirk v. State, 199 S.W.3d 467, 479 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2006, pet. ref’d))). Here, we reach the same conclusion, and with the conclusion that
the jury charge was not erroneous based on the submission of the self-defense
instructions, our analysis ends. Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 649; see Hernandez, 375 S.W.2d at
288. We overrule Williams’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Williams’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 27, 2026
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