In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00358-CV
ZACHARY WAYNE WHITE AND ALAINA WHITE, Appellants
V.
AJ ESTATES, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 467th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24-5962-467
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment in favor of Appellee in an action
to quiet title to a residential property. We will affirm.
I. Background
Because of the nature of the disposition of this case, this background statement
is general in nature with more specifics being laid out as necessary under the analysis
section below. Appellants are Zachary Wayne White (Mr. White) and Alaina Michelle
White (Ms. White) (collectively the Whites or Appellants). They were self-represented
in the trial court and remain so on appeal.
The Whites executed a promissory note and deed of trust securing the note with
respect to the property in question. AJ Estates LLC (Appellee) purchased the property
at a non-judicial foreclosure sale on September 5, 2023. The Whites refused to vacate
the property after Appellee purchased it and engaged in conduct that Appellee alleged
constituted a cloud on its title to the property. Appellee filed the underlying action to
remove the cloud on title, confirm its ownership interest, and obtain an order for
possession of the property.
Appellee filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, and the Whites
responded. Appellee filed a motion to strike the response. The trial court purportedly
granted the motion to strike as to Ms. White but denied it as to Mr. White. The trial
court granted the summary judgment motion. The Whites filed a Motion for New Trial
that was overruled by operation of law.
2
II. Standards of Review and Applicable Legal Principles
A. Inadequate Briefing
We summarized the law regarding briefing requirements in In re J.D.:
Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure contains specific
requirements for an appellant’s brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. To comply
with Rule 38.1, an appellant’s brief must, among other things, “contain a
clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Merely
uttering brief, conclusory statements unsupported by citation to legal
authorities does not satisfy briefing requirements. In re A.N.G.,
631 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). Indeed,
“[f]ailure to cite legal authority or provide substantive analysis of the legal
issue presented results in waiver of the complaint.” Valadez v. Avitia,
238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Similarly, when
an appellant fails to cite the record to support an appellate issue, the
appellant waives that complaint. Floyd v. Floyd, No. 02-23-00193-CV,
2024 WL 3714176, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 8, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
No. 02-24-00515-CV, 2025 WL 2810523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
Briefing requirements apply to self-represented litigants just as they apply to
licensed attorneys; all must comply with the applicable rules of procedure. Id. In
reviewing for briefing waiver, we are to construe briefs liberally so as not to waive the
right to appellate review. Id. But it is not this court’s responsibility to identify “possible
trial court error, search[ ] the record for facts favorable to a party’s position, or
conduct[ ] legal research to support a party’s contentions.” In re J.O.A.M.,
Nos. 01-23-00691-CV, 01-23-00692-CV, 2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.D., 2025 WL 2810523, at
3
*2. “Were we to engage in such activities, we would be abandoning our role as judges
and taking on the role of advocate for that party.” In re J.O.A.M., 2024 WL 1169432, at
*23 (citing Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845).
B. Preservation of Error
Again, looking to our opinion in In re J.D.,
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific
grounds for the desired ruling, if not apparent from the request’s,
objection’s, or motion’s context. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); see ETC
Mktg., Ltd. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 528 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. 2017). If
a party fails to do this, error is not preserved. Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d
711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
The objecting party must also get a ruling—either express or
implied—from the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A), (b); see Lenz
v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. 2002). If the trial court refuses to rule, the
party preserves error by objecting to that refusal. Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a)(2)(B). If the trial court does not rule and the party does not object
to the refusal to rule, error is not preserved. Id.
2025 WL 2810523, at *3.
C. Summary Judgment Standards of Review1
We summarized the standards of review for a traditional summary judgment in
MVP Fort Worth Taylor, LLC v. Roy,
1
Appellee filed its motion for summary judgment before 2026, so the
2026 amendments to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a do not apply. Supreme Court of Texas, Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Feb. 27, 2026) (applying amendments to motions “filed on or after March 1, 2026”).
4
We review a summary judgment de novo. Energen Res. Corp. v. Wallace,
642 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. 2022); City of Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery
Co., 539 S.W.3d 252, 258–59 (Tex. 2018); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Fontana Evolution,
LLC v. SCP Distribs., LLC, No. 02-22-00211-CV, 2023 WL 308176, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 19, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). A party
moving for traditional summary judgment must conclusively establish that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (b),
(c); Energen Res. Corp., 642 S.W.3d at 509; City of Richardson, 539 S.W.3d at
258–59; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, 289 S.W.3d at 848. Unless
it carries this burden, the non-movant has no obligation to even respond.
Energen Res. Corp., 642 S.W.3d at 509.
When, as here, the trial court does not specify a basis for its
summary judgment, we must affirm if any basis presented to the trial court
has merit. Fontana Evolution, 2023 WL 308176, at *3.
No. 02-23-00060-CV, 2024 WL 3529432, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2024,
no pet.) (mem. op.).
We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could,
and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could
not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc., 289 S.W.3d at 848. We indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v.
Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008).
III. Analysis
Appellants raise eight issues on appeal, numbered one through nine but omitting
number four. The first three issues deal with procedural complaints:
1. Did the trial court render a summary judgment void by granting it
without the proof of notice required by the Denton County
5
Summary-Judgment Instructions and without an opportunity to be
heard, contrary to Rule 166a(c) and due process? (CR 464, 946.)
[footnote omitted]
2. Did the trial court violate due process by canceling the
Reconsideration hearing before its noticed date for “failure to
appear” and refusing to hear a new-trial motion? (CR 840, 963)
3. Is the judgment void where the court: (a) first inserted the new
dispositive finding “Defendants have not pled any affirmative
defense” in the final order, and (b) failed to serve it, effectively
concealing the finding? (CR 893–895; (CR-SUPP 6–10)
The last five issues are merits-related:
[4. Omitted by Appellants]
5. Did [Appellee] fail to conclusively establish superior title . . . ? (CR
486-497, 439-440.)
6. Was the foreclosure void because the obligation had been
discharged by tender under[2] Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 3.310,
3.420, and 3.603 before the sale, and no competent evidence
refuted discharge? (CR 534–566, 439-440.)
7. Was the deed of trust void ab initio . . . ? (CR 512–513.)
8. Was the sale void because the substitute trustee lacked
neutrality . . . ? (CR 567–577, 439–440 CR-SUPP 6-10).
9. Did constructive notice recorded before the sale defeat [Appellee’s]
bona fide-purchaser claim? (CR 486-566.)
2
The Whites’ brief asserts that the debt had been discharged and that “a related federal wrongful-foreclosure action [brought by Mr. White] remained pending.” The federal suit was resolved against Mr. White. White v. Fifth Third Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 4:23-CV-00847, 2025 WL 2591575 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:23-CV-00847, 2025 WL 2663660 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2025), aff’d sub nom. White v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 25-40647, 2026 WL 1135449 (5th Cir. Apr. 27, 2026).
6
A. Issue One
The Whites complain of being deprived of due process because of inadequate
notice of the two summary judgment hearings in question pursuant to Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 166a(c) and the Denton County Summary Judgment Instructions.
Contrary to the Whites’ argument that inadequate notice renders a summary judgment
void, inadequate notice is a non-jurisdictional defect. May v. Nacogdoches Mem. Hosp.,
61 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); White v. Wah, 789 S.W.2d 312,
319 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ). If a party receives notice that is
untimely but sufficient to enable the party to attend the summary judgment hearing, the
party must file a motion for continuance or raise the complaint of late notice in writing,
supported by affidavit evidence, and raise the issue before the trial court considers the
motion. May, 61 S.W.3d at 626. Here, the Whites admit that they had notice of the first
submission date and that they showed up in the courtroom. However, no hearing was
held since the matter was set for submission, not hearing. Regardless, they did not file
a motion for continuance or an objection to inadequate notice. As a result, their
complaint was not preserved for review. Id.
Additionally, the party complaining of inadequate notice of a summary judgment
hearing must show harm to obtain relief. Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d
704, 710 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (holding that where party did not
give 21 days’ notice for summary judgment hearing but rescheduled the hearing with
25 days’ notice, no harm was demonstrated).
7
Here, although the clerk’s record does not reflect a motion for summary
judgment having been filed yet, Appellee’s first summary judgment hearing was set by
notice signed by Appellee’s counsel on October 8, 2024, to be heard by submission on
November 7, 2024, at 10:00 AM.3 Summary judgments do not require an in-person
hearing but may be considered by written submission. Martin v. Martin, Martin &
Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. 1998). Notice of hearing or written submission
of a summary judgment motion, however, is required, although it is not jurisdictional.
Id. The Whites contend that this notice was insufficient because it did not explain the
process of written submission versus a hearing, but they are held to the same standards
as licensed attorneys and are required to be familiar with and to comply with all
applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181,
184–85 (Tex. 1978); Barrientos v. Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied). Appellants appeared in person at the time and place designated in
the notice, but neither opposing counsel nor the court showed up, as would be expected
from a licensed attorney for a summary judgment being handled by submission.
3
Interestingly, the clerk’s record reflects that the Whites filed a Response to Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment on October 16, 2024, (almost thirty days before it was supposedly filed), but only Mr. White signed it. Appellee filed a Response to the White’s Response. Also interestingly, Appellee filed a Motion to Strike this Response because, among other reasons, Ms. White had not signed it and Mr. White could not represent her since he was not licensed to practice law. The Whites responded to this Motion to Strike on November 6, 2024. The Whites filed and served their “Response to [Appellee’s] Response to Motion [for] Summary Judgment” on November 8, 2024 and attached multiple exhibits.
8
However, Appellee’s motion—which is not in the record—was not considered. No
judgment was entered based on that submission. Assuming error was present, no harm
was demonstrated. Tivoli, 932 S.W.2d at 710.4
The clerk’s record reflects that Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment was
filed on November 14, 2024, with service on Mr. White electronically through the
electronic filing manager and on Ms. White at her residence address by mail.
On November 18, 2024, Appellee’s attorney electronically served and filed a
“Notice of Hearing” on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, setting it for
submission on December 13, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in the 467th District Court of Denton
County. 5 On December 2, 2024, the Whites timely filed another “Response in
Opposition to [Appellee’s] Motion for Summary Judgment” (second response) and
served it through the electronic record document service on Appellee’s counsel. See
Fuller v. City of Waco Police Dep’t, No. 13-22-00615-CV, 2023 WL 5487370, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the
party opposing a traditional motion for summary judgment may file and serve opposing
4
Appellants also complain that they were not served with Appellee’s motion for summary judgment before the hearing. However, as with their notice argument, since the court did not rule on the motion for summary judgment at this setting, no harm is demonstrated. See Smith v. Erhard, 715 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e) (holding that reversible error is not present where the record does reflect a ruling by the trial court).
5
The notice states that it was also sent to the Whites by certified mail.
9
affidavits or other written response not later than seven days before the hearing on the
motion, except on leave of court); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)).
Additionally, this second response was signed by both of the Whites pursuant to
Rule 21(7)(f) by typing their names and an “/s/.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(7)(f). Despite
the fact that the Whites’ second response was signed electronically by both of them, on
December 10, 2024, Appellee filed another Motion to Strike contending, among other
things, that Ms. White had not signed the response and that Mr. White could not sign
for her since he was not licensed to practice law. On December 23, 2024, the court
signed an order stating it was the court’s “opinion” that Appellee’s “Motion to Strike”
as to Ms. White “should be . . . [g]ranted” but denied as to Mr. White. The “order” did
not actually order Ms. White’s second response stricken and it gave no rationale. But
given the arguments raised in the motion to strike, the only interpretation of the order
that would justify striking Ms. White but not Mr. White from the response would be
that Mr. White was not competent to sign for her since he is not an attorney. To the
extent that this constituted an actual order, the trial court erred since Ms. White’s
signature was on the second response in compliance with Rule 21(7)(f).
On December 23, 2024, the court coordinator sent an email to the Whites and
Appellee’s attorney purporting to communicate the “Judge’s Ruling” on Appellee’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. The email opened with the coordinator advising the
parties that the matter was set on the court order entry docket for January 24, 2025, at
10
8:30 a.m. via Zoom. The email had the typed initials “dj” (presumably for Derbha Jones,
the presiding judge) at the end of the purported ruling that said
The Court considered Plaintiffs MSJ by submission. After review of the
pleadings, responses, and admitted evidence the Court finds that the
Plaintiff’s MSJ should be GRANTED as to both Defendants, the case
should be dismissed with prejudice, and IT IS SO ORDERED. Attorney
for Plaintiff shall draft the order accordingly and this matter will be set on
the Court’s order entry docket by the Court coordinator.
This email ruling will be filed with the clerk’s as part of the Court
record. dj
The coordinator’s email did not constitute a final judgment. First, it did not even
constitute an order because it was not signed in conformity with Rule 21(7)(f)—there
is no name with an “/s/.” Second, it expressly set the matter for the court’s order entry
docket, meaning the court anticipated another final order to be entered. Finally, there
is no “finality” language. See In re C.K.M., 709 S.W.3d 613, 616–19 (Tex. 2025) (for a
general discussion of finality requirements for judgment in cases disposed of without a
conventional trial on the merits).6 According to the Denton County Case Detail, the
6
This “order,” on its face, does not comport with the pleadings and motion for summary judgment. Granting the plaintiff’s (Appellee’s) motion for summary judgment would not result in a dismissal with prejudice. Mr. White raised this discrepancy with the court coordinator and counsel by email dated December 30, 2024. The coordinator responded to Mr. White and counsel that no hearing would be necessary for order entry; rather, she instructed them to submit a proposed order “granting the MSJ only—no dismissal and the parties can proceed accordingly.” Also, the Whites complain that this email “order” did not contain language found in the final judgment entered on May 14 that “Defendants have not pled any affirmative defense.” This email was not a final order. It was interlocutory in nature and subject to the court’s right to change or rescind it as long as the court’s plenary power remained. Watanbe v. Summit Path Partners, LLC, 650 S.W.3d 112, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). In fact, the court
11
January 24, 2025 Order Entry hearing was passed, noting “no hearing wanted at this
time.”
On January 27, 2025, the Whites filed their “Response to [Appellee’s] Motion to
Strike and Reply to [Appellee’s] Response to Defendants Response to Motion for
Summary Judg[ ]ment.” Apparently believing that the court had granted the motion for
summary judgment, on January 27, 2025, the Whites filed their Motion to Reconsider
Summary Judgment. Then, on March 12, 2025, the Whites gave notice that a hearing
was going to be conducted in person on their Motion to Reconsider on June 25, 2025.7
This was followed on April 4, 2025, by Appellee’s filing its Motion for Entry of
Judgment. Appellee then set the Motion for Judgment by Zoom hearing on April 17,
2025, at 9:00 a.m.
On April 30, 2025, the Whites filed their Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration and Preservation of Evidence with additional evidence, asking the
court for permission to supplement the summary judgment record and that the court
defer ruling on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment until the scheduled June
coordinator’s email told Mr. White and counsel to submit an order granting the summary judgment with “no dismissal.” In this case, the court’s final summary judgment was not signed until May 14, 2025, which started the clock running on the expiration of the court’s plenary power.
According to the Denton County Case Detail, the Whites’ Motion to Reconsider
7
the summary judgment was denied, and the moving party failed to appear. The same entry appears on the Judicial Docket Entry for that date.
12
25, 2025 hearing. Appellee then set a bench conference for May 14, 2025, in person, at
8:30 a.m.
On May 14, 2025, the trial court signed the Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. According to the Order, the trial court had considered the
motion on the submission date—December 13, 2024. The court further stated that it
had considered “the summary judgment evidence, including affidavits, discovery,
documentary evidence and Non-Movant’s [singular] pleadings, and the argument[s] of
counsel” in deciding the motion.
Appellate courts presume that the trial court did not consider untimely filed
responses unless the record affirmatively indicates that it did. B.C. v. Steak N Shake
Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2020); Johnson v. Parkway Lakes Vill.
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 01-23-00220-CV, 2025 WL 920099, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 27, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Likewise, when the record
does not affirmatively indicate the trial court considered an untimely filed summary
judgment response, appellate courts do not consider the response or any attached
evidence in its review of the summary judgment. Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d
657, 663 (Tex. 1996); Johnson, 2025 WL 920099, at *2.
In this case, the record does not affirmatively indicate that the trial court
permitted the Whites to file any summary judgment response or evidence late or that it
considered any late filed response or evidence. We will consider the Whites’ second
response to be filed by Ms. White, as indicated above. That will put her in the same
13
position as Mr. White, and any harm from the court’s erroneous striking of her from
the second response will depend on whether the court erred in granting Appellee’s
summary judgment.
We sustain the Whites’ first issue as to Ms. White regarding the striking of her
joinder in the second response. As noted above, whether that was harmful will be
determined in the merits discussion. Otherwise, we overrule Issue 1. Regarding the first
summary judgment submission, there was no error preserved and no harm
demonstrated. Regarding the December 13, 2024 submission, as set out above, the
Whites received timely notice of the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment and
the submission date under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.8 The Whites timely filed
their second response before the December 13, 2024 submission. Therefore, they
received due process. See Martin, 989 S.W.3d at 359; Thompson v. Yellowhouse Mach. Co.,
No. 02-24-00257-CV, 2025 WL 2087930, at *1, n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
8
Additionally, a nonmovant who complains of inadequate notice of a summary judgment submission but admits to knowing of the submission date before it occurs waives its defense of insufficient notice if he fails to bring the defect to the trial court’s attention at or before the erroneously scheduled submission date. Schied v. Merritt, No. 01-15-00466-CV, 2016 WL 3751619, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 12, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). The record here demonstrates that the Whites received notice of the motion for summary judgment filing and the submission date in a timely fashion and that they timely filed a response, but it does not reflect any objection to the inadequacy of notice by the Whites. Therefore, any complaints as to the adequacy of notice are waived. See id.
14
B. Issue Two
The Whites complain that the trial court violated due process by canceling the
reconsideration hearing before its noticed date for “failure to appear” and refusing to
hear a new trial motion. The crux of the argument that the court canceled the Motion
to Reconsider is a note on a proposed order for the Motion. The undated note, in red
ink print, says that “Movant failed to appear. [D]j[.]” In the upper right-hand corner, in
red ink, is the district clerk’s file stamp notation dated June 17, 2025, 9:32 a.m. If one
conflates these two entries, one could argue as the Whites do. That inference, though,
is not reasonable. Although both entries are in red ink, they obviously use different
font. They are separated by half a page laterally, and these are signed or initialed by two
different people. “[D]j” corresponds to the presiding judge’s initials while the other
entry is by a deputy clerk. The reasonable inference is that “dj”’s entry was made at a
different time after the Whites failed to appear, as noted on the judicial docket sheet.
The Whites also complain that they were denied due process because the trial
court did not have a hearing on their Motion for New Trial. Their Motion for New
Trial was filed on May 19, 2025. There is nothing in the record showing that the Whites
requested a hearing on their motion. Ordinarily, a trial court is not required to conduct
a hearing on a motion for new trial or to even sign an order on a motion for new trial
unless the motion requires presentation of evidence. Slack v. Shreve,
No. 12-24-00014-CV, 2024 WL 4644610, at *9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 31, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op.). If a hearing is necessary, a party must request a hearing from the court;
15
failure to request a hearing constitutes waiver of any error from the failure to conduct
a hearing. Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 07-26-00058-CV, 2026 WL 1408803, at *3 n.3 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo May 19, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The Whites’ motion dealt in part
with issues that would require a hearing, including newly discovered evidence. Slack,
2024 WL 4644610, at *9. Having failed to request a hearing on the motion, their
complaint is waived. Mitchell, 2026 WL 1408803, at *3 n.3.
Issue Two is overruled.
C. Issue Three
The Whites contend that “the judgment is void because the court: (a) first
inserted the new dispositive finding ‘Defendants have not pled any affirmative defense’
in the final order, and (b) failed to serve the order, effectively concealing the finding.
(CR 893–895).” First, the Whites are using an incomplete quote from the final order.
In full context, the order states, “The Court finds that Defendants have not pled any
affirmative defense that would preclude summary judgment in this case.” [Emphasis added.] It
is a significant difference. Whether Defendants had pled any affirmative defense is a
fact question—one that is clearly answered in their favor as they had pled what they
characterized as affirmative defenses. The actual statement in the final order is that the
Defendants had not pled any affirmative defense “that would preclude summary
judgment in this case.” That statement is a conclusion of law. Second, as noted above,
the trial court had plenary power to modify any previous interlocutory ruling, and when
it did, it notified the parties.
16
There was nothing surreptitious either. The Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment was signed on May 14, 2025, and file stamped by the district
clerk that same day. Parties are charged with notice of all orders in the case to which
they are a party. Weirich v. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Tex. 1992); Chavez v. Tex. Tech
Healthcare Sys., No. 11-08-00321-CV, 2010 WL 3008807, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland
July 29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). Finally, the Whites admitted that on May 14, 2025,
they received an email from the court coordinator that the “MSJ order has been signed
and filed with the Clerk’s office.” As the Whites admitted, when they eventually sought
a copy from the clerk’s office, they received it.
Issue Three is overruled.
D. Issues Five through Nine
Issues Five through Nine are characterized by the Whites as “merits-related.”
However, their arguments consist of sporadic case citations, 9 general statements of law,
9
Appellants cite cases that do not support their arguments. For example, they cite Gaines v. Kelly, 235 S.W.3d 179, 182–83 (Tex. 2007), to argue that “[a] void instrument cannot be revived by recordation or assignment” and that “recording a void instrument conveys no rights and provides no constructive notice.” But Gaines does not discuss void instruments or the effect of recording them. Appellants likewise cite AIC Management v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tex. 2008), and Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005), for propositions not supported by those cases. In other parts of the brief, the Whites cite cases for general statements of law that they stretch to support their issues, but the cases do not support the Whites’ ultimate arguments. For example, they cite Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977), and Bonilla v. Roberson, 918 S.W.2d 17, 22 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no writ), to argue that a deed-of-trust trustee’s lack of neutrality “voids every act done under that compromised authority,” and thus the foreclosure deed was void because the trustee who executed it also acted as counsel for Fifth Third Bank. But these cases say nothing
17
and conclusory arguments without meaningful analysis. As we summarized above, this
does not satisfy Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 and constitutes waiver because
of inadequate briefing. See In re J.D., 2025 WL 2810523, at *2; see also Britton v. Almasri,
No. 02-25-00298-CV, 2025 WL 3119024, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 6, 2025,
no pet.) (mem. op.); Gunderson v. Nat’l Indoor RV Ctrs., LLC, No. 02-24-00025-CV,
2024 WL 3365233, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2024, pet. denied) (mem.
op.). Issues Five through Nine are overruled. 10
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled all of Mr. Whites’ issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court as to him. Having overruled all of Ms. Whites’ issues except Issue One as to the
striking of her response but overruling her remaining issues, we hold that there was no
about voiding actions in such a circumstance. Cf. Valley v. Patterson, 614 S.W.2d 867, 872 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (“Mere interest in the secured debt does not disqualify one from acting as a trustee.”). Appellants also cite Sharp v. Kowalski, 767 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1989), and Myers v. Crews, 847 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1992, no writ), but we were unable to locate those cases at those citations or by searching for cases with those styles.
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Moreover, the Whites did not carry their summary judgment burden to
overcome the presumption of validity of the substitute trustee’s deed’s recitals, see Houston First Am. Savings & Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767–68 (Tex. 1983). None of their self-serving documents filed in response to the motion for summary judgment raise any genuine issue of material fact concerning the underlying foreclosure sale or the substitute trustee’s deed. Nor did the Whites file any counterclaim to set aside the sale and cancel the trustee’s deed. See Bonilla, 918 S.W.2d at 22. Thus, to the extent they did not waive their merits-based appellate issues, we overrule Issues Five through Nine because the Whites failed to carry their summary judgment burden.
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reversible error in the trial court’s judgment as to Ms. White. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: August 27, 2026
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