09/08/2026
DA 24-0163
Case Number: DA 24-0163
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 211
HOLLY ANNE MATHIS,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Fergus, Cause No. DV-2023-69
Honorable Heather Perry, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Holly Anne Mathis, Self-Represented, Billings, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Kent Sipe, Fergus County Attorney, Jean Adams, Deputy County
Attorney, Lewistown, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 9, 2025
Decided: September 8, 2026
Filed:
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Holly Anne Mathis (Mathis) was convicted of felony incest. Mathis appealed her
conviction, which this Court affirmed. See State v. Mathis, 2022 MT 156, 409 Mont. 348,
515 P.3d 758 (hereinafter, Mathis I). Mathis then filed a petition for post-conviction relief,
with a motion for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, which the District Court denied,
and from which Mathis now appeals.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Did the District Court err in denying Mathis’s petition for post-conviction relief
alleging prosecutorial misconduct?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it did not allow post-conviction
discovery?
3. Did the District Court err in denying Mathis’s IAC claim?
4. Did the District Court err in denying Mathis’s claim of actual innocence?
¶3 We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 Mathis married Timothy Norling Sr. (Norling) in 2016. She had two daughters from
a previous marriage—N.M., age eleven, and J.M., age seven. Norling had one son from a
prior marriage, T.N., who was nine years old. In 2018, N.M. told a counselor at her school
that Norling had sexually abused her. Forensic interviews of all three children corroborated
the abuse. These forensic interviews in connection to Norling’s criminal case were
conducted with N.M. and J.M. in March of 2018, and with T.N. in April of 2018. Norling
pled guilty to two counts of felony incest and was sentenced to prison in 2018, and Mathis
divorced Norling shortly thereafter.
2
¶5 During another counseling session in July 2018, J.M. disclosed that her stepbrother,
T.N., had been sexually abused by Mathis. J.M. reported that her mother had asked T.N.
to touch her breasts on at least two occasions. J.M.’s statements were reported to law
enforcement, and the State began investigating the allegations against Mathis. We
summarized T.N.’s disclosures of abuse and subsequent charges in Mathis’s direct criminal
appeal:
T.N. was interviewed on July 26, 2018. During this interview, T.N. disclosed
that Mathis would frequently walk around the house half-naked. He also
recounted two specific instances where Mathis had sat in front of him while
topless and encouraged him to touch her bare breasts, which he then did.
According to T.N.’s disclosure, the first instance of abuse occurred when he
was ten years old, while the second instance occurred more recently when he
was eleven years old. Based on T.N.’s allegations, the State charged
Mathis on August 24, 2018, with two counts of incest. Count I charged
Mathis with incest between December 2016 and December 2017, the
twelve-month-period during which T.N. was ten years old. Count II charged
Mathis with incest between December 2017 and March 2018, which reflected
the three-month-period prior to T.N.’s removal from Mathis and Norling’s
home.
Mathis I, ¶ 6.
¶6 Mathis filed a pre-trial motion to obtain all information associated with Norling’s
criminal case, “including, but not limited to police reports, notes, investigations, medical
records and reports, and forensic interviews and other information relating to [the] child
victims,” as well as all of J.M., N.M., and T.N.’s “psychological and counseling records”
and “school records.” In response, the State claimed the only counseling records in its
possession were J.M.’s July 2018 counseling records disclosing Mathis’s abuse of T.N.,
which it lodged with the District Court for in camera review. The entirety of T.N.’s July
2018 forensic interview conducted in the Mathis investigation had already been provided
3
to the defense in discovery, and following the District Court’s in camera inspection, Mathis
was also granted access to J.M.’s July 2018 counseling records. The District Court noted
it was Mathis’s responsibility to subpoena all records not in the State’s possession,
including the forensic interviews of the children conducted in March and April of 2018
during the course of the State’s investigation of Norling.
¶7 Mathis filed a motion for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to the Department of
Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS), requesting “[a]ll records, notes, reports,
information[,] and recordings” relating to investigations of both her and Norling “for the
time period of January 1st through August 30th, 2018.” DPHHS mailed the court its
physical case file containing “151 pages of information,” which was provided in full to
Mathis. The file did not contain the March and April 2018 interviews of J.M and T.N.
conducted in connection with the investigation of Norling, although Mathis never objected
to the failure to lodge these forensic interviews for an in camera inspection. Shortly before
the initial trial date, Mathis requested leave to conduct in-person interviews of T.N. and
J.M under § 46-15-320, MCA, which the District Court denied, reasoning Mathis had not
met her burden of demonstrating “exceptional circumstances” as required by the statute,
especially since the forensic interviews of T.N. and J.M. in the summer of 2018 regarding
the allegations against Mathis had been provided to the defense.
¶8 Mathis’s trial was held January 27-30, 2020, and included testimony from T.N.,
J.M., and Norling.1 No specific act-unanimity instruction was requested by Mathis, and
1
The Court’s opinion in Mathis’s direct appeal provides extensive detail regarding testimony presented at Mathis’s trial, which we do not repeat here. See Mathis I, ¶¶ 14-18.
4
none was provided to the jury. When the jury asked the District Court during deliberations
“[w]hy are the charges separated into 2 counts?” the District Court, with both parties’
consent, replied: “[e]ach count alleges a separate criminal offense.” The jury returned a
verdict convicting Mathis of Count I: incest committed during the period between
December 2016 and December 2017, a felony in violation of § 45-5-507(5)(a)(i), MCA.
The jury acquitted Mathis on Count II: incest committed during the three-month period
between December 2017 and March 2018.
¶9 In 2015, the Montana Legislature revised the statutory minimum sentence for
offenders convicted of incest. See § 45-5-507(5)(a)(i), MCA (2015). That provision,
effective from December of 2016 to October 1, 2017, permitted an offender convicted of
incest to argue for an exception to the mandatory minimum sentence if a sentencing court,
in the exercise of its discretion, determined that a reduced sentence could afford the
offender a “better opportunity for rehabilitation” and provided “for the ultimate protection
of the victim and society.” Section 46-18-222(6), MCA. In 2017, the Legislature again
revised the statute, made effective from October 1, 2017, to December 2017, which
repealed the § 46-18-222(6), MCA (2015), exception. On April 24, 2020, the District Court
held a hearing to determine whether the 2015 or 2017 statute should apply to Mathis’s
sentencing. Mathis argued that the 2015 version of the statute applied to her. At the
hearing, Mathis and Shawn Abbott (Abbott), a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, testified.
Abbott noted that Mathis’s treatment needs could be accomplished in a community setting
but, on cross-examination, admitted that if Mathis did not consistently attend to her mental
health counselling, she could pose a community risk. The District Court agreed with
5
Mathis’s argument that the 2015 statute applied, but ruled that she had not demonstrated
the exception should be applied in her case:
The [c]ourt agrees with the Defendant that the 2015 version of
§ 45-5-507(5)(a)(i) MCA allows [her] to argue that the exception to the
mandatory minimum sentencing set forth in § 46-18-222(6) MCA applies.
Therefore, the [c]ourt will rule whether the exception set forth in
§ 46-18-222(6) MCA applies in this case.
The Defendant has illustrated that there is certainly an opportunity for
rehabilitation in a community setting. However, the [c]ourt believes that
placement of the Defendant in prison is necessary for the ultimate protection
of the victim and society. . . . The exception to the mandatory minimum
sentence set forth in 46-18-222(6) MCA does not apply in this case.
Mathis was sentenced on June 26, 2020, to 100 years in prison with 90 years suspended,
and subjected to a ten-year parole restriction. The District Court also ordered Mathis to
pay up to $20,000 towards costs of counseling for T.N.
¶10 Mathis appealed her conviction to this Court, arguing the District Court erred by
denying her motion to conduct pretrial interviews of the children, that the State’s failure to
lodge the children’s—including T.N.’s—March and April 2018 forensic interviews
conducted in the Norling investigation violated her right to a fair trial, and that the lack of
a specific unanimity instruction constituted a reversible error. Assuming for the sake of
our analysis that T.N.’s April 2018 interview was “exculpatory,” which the State had been
willing to acknowledge during the trial,2 we nonetheless affirmed, reasoning:
2
In January 2019, the State acknowledged that “[T.N.] did not disclose any sexual abuse” by Mathis during the April 2018 interview, and that “an argument could be made that the [April 2018] forensic interview of [T.N.] is exculpatory.” Mathis’s counsel argued during the trial that T.N.’s interview was exculpatory and supported a not guilty verdict.
6
Mathis cannot show it was the statute, rather than the witnesses’ refusal to be
interviewed, that prevented her from having pretrial access to interview
them. Mathis’s failure to receive T.N.’s April 2018 interview did not affect
the outcome of her trial based on the strength of the existing evidentiary
record. Last, the District Court’s failure to offer a specific-act unanimity
instruction to the jury does not merit reversal under plain error review.
Mathis I, ¶ 48.
¶11 In September 2023, Mathis filed a post-conviction relief petition raising numerous
claims that the District Court determined to be 12 in number, but also found to be
overlapping. The District Court assessed that Mathis’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims ran through all of her claims, whether prosecutorial misconduct, malicious
prosecution, civil conspiracy, or her three separate witness tampering claims. Mathis
offered a generic argument that she was actually innocent and also claimed her right to a
speedy trial had been violated. Her petition was substantially based upon the production
of records at issue and the underlying reports on which the records were based, claiming
the DPHHS file provided to her “still did not contain the exculpatory forensic interviews
conducted on the children . . . . Yet the Tenth District Court did not hold the State or
DPHHS in Contempt. . . . Mathis’s Public Defender did not Compel the court to enforce
its order, nor did Mathis’s defense try again to obtain the requested DPHHS file.” Mathis’s
petition scrutinized the timeline of abuse reports made to DPHHS, the origin of those
reports, and the handling of subsequent interviews, claiming that state employees,
including the prosecutor, engaged in a conspiracy to charge her with sex crimes and
tampered with witnesses and public records on multiple occasions. Mathis offered what
she deemed to be “New Evidence” in the form of a report, dated July 13, 2018, in which
7
DPHHS’s Helena Centralized Intake Hotline recorded a disclosure of alleged child abuse
made by “Deputy County Attorney, Jean Adams,” (Adams), which stated: “HOLLY
MADE SON . . . TOUCH AND FONDLE HER BREAST BEFORE SHE WOULD
ALLOW HIM INTO BED FOR FAMILY MOVIE NIGHT.” The petition offered that
“[t]his report was printed on September 24, 2019, and sent to Mathis from DPHHS. It was
found in Mathis’s personal files on May 8, 2023.”
¶12 About one month after filing her petition, Mathis filed a motion for issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum requiring DPHHS to produce “all the records it has in its
possession” specifically pertaining to, but not limited to, the interviews conducted with
J.M., N.M., and T.N., in March and April of 2018. However, in January 2024, the District
Court issued an order denying and dismissing the petition, denying the motion for subpoena
duces tecum, and sealing the cause. The District Court determined:
[T]he State publicly conceded the April 2018 video interview of T.N. was
exculpatory . . . . Although Defendants have absolutely no obligation to
defend, here Defendant had the benefit of arguing that T.N.’s April 2018
interview was exculpatory and T.N. was inconsistent with his reporting in a
later interview. Petitioner knew this well in advance of her final pretrial
motions and throughout her cross-examination of witnesses—including T.N.
himself, who testified—and arguments made at trial. That the jury
considered all of the evidence at trial, including all witness testimony both
direct and through cross-examination, exhibits, and arguments by counsel,
and still unanimously concluded Petitioner was guilty of Count I fails to
establish the requirements for a finding of actual innocence[.]
Petitioner’s claim of new evidence is, in fact, not newly discovered since
trial . . . . Any third-party DN (abuse and neglect) initial reports were not
8
germane to the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. The prosecutor(s)
were not out of line.[3]
Regarding Mathis’s speedy trial claim, the District Court referenced the Defendant’s
Waiver of Speedy Trial, dated February 22, 2019, and signed by Mathis, in which Mathis
averred: “I understand that I have a constitutional right to a speedy trial. This right has
been fully explained to me by my attorney. It is my desire to waive this right . . . .” About
the claims of witness tampering and civil conspiracy, the District Court found that all
relevant witnesses were known to the parties before trial and subject to being called as a
witness for questioning. The District Court noted that Mathis’s “lack of understanding as
to the differing procedures, purposes, and burdens of proof between DN cases and a felony
criminal case does not constitute or create new evidence, nor does it support any finding of
actual innocence.” Addressing Mathis’s claims of ineffective counsel, the District Court
concluded Mathis’s lawyers “filed motions, interviewed witnesses, poured over
documents, and vigorously cross-examined witnesses in an effort to discredit their
testimony with the jury,” and there was no new evidence to support any claim to the
contrary. It reasoned that Mathis “is silent as to her counsel’s representation for Count II,
for which she was acquitted . . . .” The District Court dismissed Mathis’s petition with
prejudice without requesting a response from the State or holding a hearing.
3
The District Court sealed the proceeding, reasoning that “Petitioner—as a pro se litigant—has interspersed identifying information, confidential criminal justice information, and DN information throughout the extensive documentation submitted in this cause, such that the [c]ourt believes it has no other choice but to seal this case to protect the privacy of all parties.”
9
¶13 Mathis appealed the dismissal of her petition to this Court. After the completion of
appellate briefing by the parties, the Court entered an order remanding this case for “the
District Court [to] conduct an in camera review of the March 2018 forensic interviews of
N.M. and J.M., and the April 2018 forensic interview of T.N. that were conducted in
connection with the criminal prosecution of Timothy Norling,” and to “enter appropriate
findings and an order as to whether any of the interviews contain information that should
have been disclosed to Mathis in her criminal case.” Thereafter, the District Court entered
an order containing its findings and conclusions regarding the referenced material. The
District Court concluded “that the March and April forensic interviews with N.M., J.M.,
and T.N. do not contain anything that would have made them relevant to or discoverable
in Petitioner’s criminal case,” but that “the May 16, 2018 forensic interview with J.M. also
disclosed by the State includes content relevant to Petitioner’s criminal case, specifically
discussion of an interaction between her and T.N. and behavior of T.N. that . . . may have
shed important light on the relationship between Petitioner and T.N., in particular T.N.’s
feelings toward Petitioner or T.N.’s credibility as a witness.” Therefore, the District Court
concluded that the May 2018 interview should have been disclosed to Petitioner in her
criminal case. The District Court’s Order, and the forensic interviews themselves, were
forwarded to this Court and made part of the record for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶14 This Court reviews a district court’s denial of post-conviction relief under
§ 46-21-102(2), MCA (newly discovered evidence of innocence) to determine whether the
district court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous, whether its conclusions of law are
10
correct, and whether it abused its discretion. Henderson v. State, 2024 MT 253, ¶ 10,
418 Mont. 431, 558 P.3d 749 (citing Marble v. State, 2015 MT 242, ¶¶ 13, 31, 36,
380 Mont. 366, 355 P.3d 742; Wilson v. State, 2010 MT 278, ¶ 16, 358 Mont. 438, 249 P.3d
28; Heath v. State, 2009 MT 7, ¶ 13, 348 Mont. 361, 202 P.3d 118). Findings of fact are
clearly erroneous only when not supported by substantial evidence, if “the court
misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or, upon or independent record review, we are
firmly convinced that the court was otherwise mistaken.” Henderson, ¶ 10 (citing State v.
Hoover, 2017 MT 236, ¶ 12, 388 Mont. 533, 402 P.3d 1224). We review conclusions of
law de novo for correctness. Henderson, ¶ 10 (citing State v. Christensen, 265 Mont. 374,
375-76, 877 P.2d 468, 469 (1944)). An abuse of discretion occurs where a district court
“‘acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of
reason, resulting in substantial injustice.’” State v. Garcia, 2025 MT 25, ¶ 10, 420 Mont.
283, 563 P.3d 277 (quoting State v. Pine, 2023 MT 172, ¶ 15, 413 Mont. 254, 548 P.3d
390).
¶15 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) are mixed questions of law and
fact that are reviewed de novo by this Court. State v. Bryson, 2024 MT 315, ¶ 23,
419 Mont. 490, 560 P.3d 1270. We analyze IAC claims using the U.S. Supreme Court’s
two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2063 (1984). State v. Marfuta, 2024 MT 245, ¶ 47, 418 Mont. 353, 557 P.3d 1260 (citing
Oliphant v. State, 2023 MT 43, ¶ 37, 411 Mont. 250, 525 P.3d 1214).
Under the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Under the second prong
11
of Strickland, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance
prejudiced the defense. Thus, if a defendant makes an insufficient showing
regarding one prong of the test, there is no need to address the other prong.
Marfuta, ¶ 47 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
¶16 Montana law affords a person convicted of a crime the ability to challenge that
conviction within one year of its finality by filing a petition for post-conviction relief.
Sections 46-21-101 through -111, MCA. “To succeed on a postconviction petition based
on newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must produce newly discovered evidence that,
if proved, would show that he did not commit the crime for which he was convicted.” Main
v. State, 2024 MT 215, ¶ 16, 418 Mont. 159, 556 P.3d 940; § 46-21-102(2), MCA. “The
petition must identify all facts supporting the grounds for relief set forth in the petition and
have attached affidavits, records, or other evidence establishing the existence of those
facts.” Main, ¶ 16; § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA. In determining what constitutes new
evidence, a court may consider multiple factors, including whether the evidence has been
discovered since the defendant’s trial, whether the evidence is “material to the issues at
trial,” whether “failure to discover the evidence sooner was not the result of the defendant’s
lack of diligence,” and “whether the evidence is not merely cumulative nor impeaching.”
Main, ¶ 16 (citing Marble, ¶¶ 22, 36). A district court is not required to obtain a response
from the State or hold an evidentiary hearing for every petition for post-conviction relief.
Herman v. State, 2006 MT 7, ¶ 15, 330 Mont. 267, 127 P.3d 422; Main, ¶ 17. Relief which
could have reasonably been requested on direct appeal is procedurally barred from being
raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA; State v. Dyfort,
2000 MT 338, ¶ 8, 303 Mont. 153, 15 P.3d 464.
12
DISCUSSION
¶17 In her appellate briefing, Mathis states several new issues, such as lack of probable
cause and subornation of perjury, not raised before the District Court. She has also
reorganized and restated her issues into four numbered and one unnumbered issue
statements, wherein she fundamentally argues the same issues she pursued in her petition.
Mathis contends she was repeatedly denied access to T.N.’s forensic interview conducted
in connection with Norling’s crimes and that the report by Adams to DPHHS’s Helena
Centralized Intake Hotline was never made available to her defense “because it is contained
in the same DPHHS file zealously suppressed by the State, the very file which contains
T.N.’s April 4, 2018 exculpatory interview.” Mathis contends the prosecution improperly
“lumped together” her alleged crimes with those of her ex-husband, and that her innocence
is demonstrated by T.N.’s lack of allegations against her in his 2018 forensic interview
conducted in the Norling investigation. The State responds that many of the sub-issues
proffered by Mathis are procedurally barred for failing to raise them on direct appeal from
her conviction, or because the issues were then raised and she is now rearguing them, and
that, even so, the claims are all premised upon the incorrect contention that “newly
discovered evidence” exists. We take up Mathis’s issues in turn.
¶18 1. Did the District Court err in denying Mathis’s petition for post-conviction relief
alleging prosecutorial misconduct?
¶19 We conclude the District Court correctly ruled that Mathis cannot demonstrate
prosecutorial misconduct occurred simply because the prosecution included some
information about Norling’s crimes within Mathis’s charging documents. While Mathis
13
may well have had good reason to dissociate herself from her ex-husband, the factual
background of Norling’s charges as well as her charges began when the two were living
together. The State first investigated Norling’s crimes, for which he was convicted. Only
after the initial investigation into Norling did the State become aware of potential abuse by
Mathis. The two cases were entirely separate and handled separately by the courts. Mathis
points to the State’s Information, dated August 24, 2018, as proof of the State’s improper
conflation of her crimes with Norling’s. However, the Information merely provided
the necessary context for charging Mathis with two felony counts of incest. See
§ 46-11-201(2), MCA. And, even if for sake of argument the document somehow
constituted prosecutorial misconduct, it is not new evidence but has been available to
Mathis since its filing in 2018 and could have been raised as an issue on her direct criminal
appeal.
¶20 Related to Mathis’s claims about the forensic interviews, the Court, after completion
of appellate briefing, remanded this case for an in camera review of the forensic interviews
of all three children. The District Court found that, while the March and April 2018
forensic interviews of the three children did not contain any information making them
relevant to Mathis’s criminal case, the May 2018 forensic interview of J.M. should have
been disclosed to Mathis because it may have been relevant to understanding the
relationship between T.N. and Mathis, or to T.N.’s credibility as a witness. Nonetheless,
the fact that T.N. never mentioned Mathis’s sexual abuse during his April 2018 interview
concerning Norling’s abuse was well emphasized by the defense during trial. T.N. was
subject to cross-examination and his credibility was questioned. In Mathis’s direct appeal,
14
we noted that “all parties involved in the trial, including the District Court, accepted that
the exculpatory value of the interview was in T.N.’s failure to make any disclosures of
sexual abuse,” and we accepted “for purposes of our analysis that T.N.’s April 2018
interview . . . was likely ‘favorable’ to the defense.” Mathis I, ¶¶ 33, 35. Notwithstanding
this favorable assumption, we concluded that “T.N.’s April 2018 interview is not the type
of evidence that could have ‘affected the outcome’ of Mathis’s trial.” Mathis I, ¶ 39.
Having now received the benefit of the District Court’s in camera assessment, we are
unmoved to depart from our previous conclusion. The defense obtained the benefit of
presuming T.N.’s interview was exculpatory during trial, T.N. was subject to
cross-examination, and a jury of Mathis’s peers still convicted her on one count of incest.
T.N.’s 2018 forensic interview, conducted for purposes of the Norling investigation, is not
newly discovered evidence, and to the extent it was material to the investigation and trial
of Mathis as being exculpatory in light of T.N.’s lack of disclosure about Mathis’s abuse
at that time, and relevant to T.N.’s credibility, it was cumulative to the trial testimony.
¶21 Mathis claims Adams’s report to the Helena Centralized Intake Hotline illuminates
an altered timeline in which her alleged abuse was first reported by a prosecutor, not J.M.,
and that the State tampered with witnesses to corroborate its own timeline. Of course, a
prosecutor’s dutiful reporting of suspected child abuse does not itself constitute
prosecutorial misconduct, and the burden of proof remains upon the State to prove incest,
regardless of which report was the first one. Thus, the Adams report, which was a fact
about the initiation of the investigation, was not ultimately material to, and did not alter,
the State’s burden to prove the elements of incest. The report was available to Mathis
15
before her trial, and she admits it “was printed on September 24, 2019, and sent to Mathis
from DPHHS.” Mathis now states she did not “understand her case or the law (and
therefore the importance of this document)” until her appeal in 2022. Realizing the
importance of a document in a file possessed by the defense before trial is not discovering
new evidence. As our case law provides, newly discovered evidence under § 46-21-102(2),
MCA, must be discovered after the defendant’s trial and not simply overlooked due to the
defendant’s failure to discover the evidence sooner or lack of diligence. See Marble, ¶ 22;
see also State v. Clark, 2005 MT 330, ¶ 34, 330 Mont. 8, 125 P.3d 1099. Adams’s report
is, therefore, not new evidence and does not support post-conviction relief.
¶22 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it did not allow post-conviction
discovery?
¶23 Mathis’s appellate briefing, filed prior to our remand, contended the District Court
abused its discretion by failing to conduct an in camera review of T.N. and J.M.’s 2018
forensic interviews conducted in the Norling investigation after her conviction and by
denying her the chance to subpoena DPHHS for the same records a second time during the
post-conviction proceeding. Generally, a district court has broad discretion to govern
discovery within a post-conviction proceeding. See Marble, ¶ 30 (“the court may for
good cause grant either party leave to use discovery procedures; it may also receive proof
of affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence, and may order the
petitioner brought before the court for hearing”). A district court is not required to
authorize post-conviction discovery. Heath, ¶ 16. “A court may dismiss a petition for
post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing if the petition fails to satisfy
16
the procedural threshold set forth in § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA.” Heath, ¶ 16. This threshold
requires every petition for post-conviction relief to “identify all facts supporting the
grounds for relief set forth in the petition and have attached affidavits, records, or other
evidence establishing the existence of those facts.” Section 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA.
¶24 Our remand of the case for an in camera review of the children’s interviews has
partially mooted this issue. Regarding Mathis’s remaining argument about additional
discovery, the District Court continued the trial to allow the defense additional time for
discovery. Following a four-day trial, as well as a hearing on applicability of statutes
governing the authorized sentence for this crime, a sentencing hearing, an appeal, and
review of Mathis’s post-conviction petition, the District Court was in a good position to
assess the need for further discovery and declined to grant Mathis another opportunity to
subpoena records from DPHHS. As the District Court noted, the amount of evidence
presented at trial, “including all witness testimony both direct and through
cross-examination, exhibits, and arguments by counsel,” was clearly sufficient for the
jury to find Mathis guilty. The evidence requested by the subpoena duces tecum would
likely not have affected the outcome of Mathis’s trial and has little value to her post-trial
claims. Mathis I, ¶ 48. The District Court was under no obligation to elicit a response
from the State or order additional proceedings when it was apparent Mathis’s request was
repetitive and not based on actual new evidence. Accordingly, the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Mathis’s subpoena duces tecum because doing so neither
exceeded the bounds of reason nor resulted in a substantial injustice.
17
¶25 3. Did the District Court err in denying Mathis’s IAC claim?
¶26 Mathis argues her defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at nearly every
juncture of the trial process.4 Specifically, Mathis alleges her counsel failed to adequately
question the timing and origin of reports of abuse made to the State, failed to assert her
right to a speedy trial, and failed to argue for a reduction to her sentence under the exception
within § 46-18-222(6), MCA (2015). The District Court disagreed with these claims,
stating, “[Trial counsel] filed motions, interviewed witnesses, poured over documents, and
vigorously cross-examined witnesses in an effort to discredit their testimony with the jury.”
Under the second prong of Strickland, Mathis must show that her counsel’s performance
prejudiced her defense. Marfuta, ¶ 47. Reviewing the record anew, we conclude Mathis
has not met her burden. As explained above, the timing and origin of reports of abuse
made to the State’s intake hotline was ultimately immaterial to the State’s satisfaction of
its burden to prove the elements of the charged crime. Mathis’s trial counsel did not
prejudice her defense by not focusing on these details. Additionally, Mathis waived her
right to a speedy trial as part of her own strategy. The waiver is part of the District Court
record, signed by Mathis, and states: “This right has been fully explained to me by my
attorney. It is my desire to waive this right . . . .” Thus, counsel did not fail to assert the
right, but rather concluded it was in Mathis’s interest to waive it. Mathis’s counsel argued
for application of the more favorable sentencing statute at a hearing, specifically addressing
whether the exception under § 46-18-222(6), MCA (2015), applied to Mathis’s sentence.
4
Mathis was represented by two attorneys at the trial level and another attorney at the appellate level. This IAC claim refers exclusively to Mathis’s trial counsel: Mr. Larsen and Ms. LeCount.
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The District Court agreed with this argument, although it ultimately declined to extend the
exception to Mathis. Mathis’s assertions do not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland
analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel, and we need not address the first prong.
¶27 4. Did the District Court err in denying Mathis’s claim of actual innocence?
¶28 Finally, although Mathis never makes a direct and supported claim of actual
innocence, that tone underlies much of her arguments. To succeed on a freestanding actual
innocence claim at the post-conviction stage, the petitioner must show “truly persuasive”
evidence entitling her to relief despite a valid conviction that the petitioner was “actually
factually innocent (i.e., in fact did not commit the crime) rather than merely procedurally
or legally innocent.” Henderson, ¶ 18 (emphasis in original). Mathis asks this Court to
speculate as to the motives of various personnel involved in prosecuting child abuse, to
infer meaning from a minor victim’s silence, and to ignore the verdict of a jury without
providing actual newly discovered evidence. Such suggested actions do not overcome the
“extraordinarily high” bar for proving Mathis did not commit the crime of which she was
convicted. Henderson, ¶ 18. Without evidence of actual innocence, we must defer to the
jury’s understanding of the facts presented at trial, assessment of the evidence, and ultimate
determination of guilt. Upky v. Marshall Mountain, LLC, 2008 MT 90, ¶ 23, 342 Mont.
273, 180 P.3d 651. Because the jury was presented with two charges, it was permissible
for the jury to convict on one count and to acquit on the other. State v. Kelley, 2005 MT
200, ¶ 26, 328 Mont. 187, 119 P.3d 67. Mathis argues that the jury’s split conviction
demonstrates a lack of clarity among jurors, but an acquittal on one count might also mean
that the jury made its best attempt to understand how the charges applied to each timeframe
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presented. See Kelley, ¶ 28 (“The acquittal . . . can not be considered tantamount to an
affirmative proposition that [the defendant] did or did not engage in any particular act.”).
Mathis’s actual innocence claim thus fails.
¶29 Mathis does not provide new evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, actual
innocence, or a deliberate attempt to conceal exculpatory evidence from her defense.
¶30 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
Justice James Jeremiah Shea, concurring.
¶31 I concur with the Court’s Opinion. I dissented from this Court’s Opinion in
Mathis I, principally because it departed from our well-established precedent that we would
not attempt to pass judgment on the exculpatory value of evidence we had not seen.
Mathis I, ¶ 50 (Shea, J. dissenting) (citing State v Johnston, 2014 MT 329, ¶ 9, 377 Mont.
291, 339 P.3d 829; State v. Little, 260 Mont. 460, 466, 861 P.2d 154, 158 (1993)).
I asserted at the time that we should remand the matter to the District Court to conduct an
in camera review of the forensic interviews at issue and only after that had been done, and
the interviews were made part of the Court record, did I feel the Court could adequately
20
address the merits of Mathis’s appeal. I noted that “[d]epending on that review, it is entirely
possible I may have ultimately agreed with the majority that the [forensic interviews]
would not have impacted the outcome of Mathis’s trial.” Mathis I, ¶ 56 (Shea, J.
dissenting).
¶32 In this matter, the Court has rectified the error of Mathis I, and reestablished the
provenance of Little and Johnston as precedents for the principle that we will not attempt
to determine the exculpatory value of evidence without having the opportunity to view the
evidence ourselves. Pursuant to our Order, the District Court conducted an in camera
review, and the forensic interviews were then made part of the Court record for our review.
(Mathis v. State, No. DA 24-0163, Order (Mont. July 22, 2025)). I have reviewed the
forensic interviews, and I agree they would not have impacted the outcome of Mathis’s
trial. I therefore concur with the outcome the Court reaches in this matter.
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
Justices Ingrid Gustafson and Katherine M. Bidegaray join in the concurring Opinion of Justice James Jeremiah Shea.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
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