[Cite as State v. Bosman, 2026-Ohio-3503.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0047
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
CHARL W. BOSMAN,
Trial Court No. 2024 C 000188
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 8, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Nicholas A. Burling, Assistant Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Joseph C. Patituce, Patituce & Associates, L.L.C., 16855 Foltz Industrial Parkway, Strongsville, OH 44149 (For Defendant-Appellant).
MATT LYNCH, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, Charl W. Bosman, appeals the judgment of the Geauga County
Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a total indefinite term of imprisonment of 18 to
23 years after he was found guilty by a jury of two counts of rape and two counts of gross
sexual imposition (“GSI”) of a minor less than 13 years of age. After careful consideration
of Bosman’s assignments of error, as well as the record and the pertinent law, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On December 23, 2024, a Geauga County grand jury indicted Bosman on
12 counts for offenses against his family members; specifically, his former spouse (“Wife”), his two daughters (“Daughter 1” d.o.b. Dec. 31, 2009, and “Daughter 2” d.o.b.
March 10, 2011), and his two sons (“Son 1” d.o.b. Oct. 18, 2013, and “Son 2” d.o.b. April
28, 2015). The counts are as follows:
Counts 1 and 2: Rape of Wife, first-degree felonies, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2);
Count 3: Rape of a person less than 13 years of age, Daughter 1, a firstdegree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b);
Count 4: Rape of Daughter 1, a first-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2);
Count 5: GSI of a person less than 13 years of age, Daughter 1, a thirddegree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4);
Count 6: GSI of Daughter 1, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(1);
Count 7: Rape of a person less than 13 years of age, Daughter 2, a firstdegree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b);
Count 8: GSI of a person less than 13 years of age, Daughter 2, a thirddegree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4);
Count 9: Strangulation of Son 2, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2903.18(B)(3);
Count 10: Domestic Violence against Son 2, a first-degree misdemeanor,
in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A);
Count 11: Strangulation of Son 1, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2903.18(B)(3); and
Count 12: Domestic Violence against Son 1, a first-degree misdemeanor,
in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).
{¶3} Bosman pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the matter proceeded to a
jury trial on November 3, 2025.
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Case No. 2025-G-0047
The Jury Trial – the State’s Case-in-Chief
{¶4} The State presented as witnesses Wife, Daughter 1, Daughter 2, Son 1,
Son 2, and expert Cody Tatum. The State also introduced into evidence text and email
messages between Bosman and Wife.
{¶5} Wife testified the family moved to Chardon from Solon in 2021. Wife has a
daughter from a previous marriage, “M.L.,” who lived with Wife, Bosman, and their four
children. Bosman has a son from a prior marriage who has reached the age of majority,
“A.B,” who lived with them on alternate weekends. Bosman and Wife were married in
2009, and were divorced several months before the trial. Wife stated their marriage had
issues, explaining that “[o]utside of dishonesty and manipulation, there were varying
levels of abuse, both physical and sexual.”
{¶6} Wife further testified they went on a family vacation to Tennessee at the end
of 2023. They returned home the day after Christmas. Several days later, Bosman
attacked her after dinner while she was sitting on the couch using her laptop. The children
were upstairs getting ready for bed. She recalled Bosman forced sexual intercourse, and
Son 1 attempted to pull Bosman off of her.
{¶7} In January 2024, Bosman, an engineer, returned home from a work trip, and
Wife made a family dinner. Wife described an incident that involved Bosman penetrating
her with his hand and fingers while the family was seated at the dinner table. After,
Bosman asked Wife if she was “going to give [him] pity sex?” He proceeded into the
backyard, and Daughter 1 followed to feed the family dogs, where she found a vape pen.
When Bosman shoved Daughter 1 against the wall, Wife told M.L. to call 911. Bosman
repeatedly stated he wanted his gun before finally leaving the property.
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{¶8} Wife read to the jury excerpts from the text and email messages between
her and Bosman in which Wife reviewed the incidents with Bosman, and he
acknowledged them and asked for forgiveness.
{¶9} Wife also described Bosman’s interactions with the children. She explained
Bosman would tuck the children in, and he had a habit of hiding in their beds “to mess”
with them. Wife and Bosman had discussed that it was unhealthy for him to be in their
beds, especially the girls, now that the children were older. One evening, Wife was
looking for Bosman. He was in Daughter 2’s bunk bed, lying on top of her. Wife also
noticed some unusual behavior between Bosman and Daughter 1. He would “slap her
butt” and comment, “she’s looking more like you every day” and “gotta watch out for this
one.” Bosman would snuggle with their daughter under a blanket, and one time she
noticed her rocking on Bosman’s leg inappropriately. When Wife came near, he “moved
back and pushed her over.”
{¶10} Wife also noticed some concerning behaviors between Bosman and their
sons. Bosman was the “disciplinarian” at home, and if their sons did not want to comply,
“he would grab them by the neck and push them to where he wanted them to go [or] it
was tickling until they couldn’t breathe.”
{¶11} Daughter 1 testified she saw Bosman assault her mother while they were
eating dinner in January 2024. Her mom jumped up and Bosman pursued her. Daughter
1 “saw him trying to or sticking his hands in my mom’s pants, and I knew that wasn’t
normal behavior, and I looked up and saw in her eyes, like fear and shock.” After her dad
stormed out, she went outside to take care of the family’s dogs. She opened the door,
and there was a vape and “some strange looking candy” on the step, which she picked
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Case No. 2025-G-0047
up and took inside to tell her mother. Bosman started rummaging through the garbage,
and Wife came forward and told him “to either be honest or leave.” They were holding
the phone for 911 because Bosman was attempting to get his gun, and then Bosman left.
{¶12} Daughter 1 also testified to unusual behaviors between Bosman and her
siblings. Bosman would go into Daughter 2’s bunk bed and lay on top of her. She
described an incident where Wife was looking for Bosman and he was in Daughter 2’s
bed, lying on top of her. Daughter 1 further testified Bosman was very violent with her
two younger brothers, “shoving them in the chest, leaving marks, which was common.”
Bosman stopped spanking them “after my father was shown to be irrational and causing
it for hurt and not teaching.”
{¶13} Daughter 1 told the jury that when she was around eleven years old,
Bosman started making her uncomfortable. In one incident, they were in the main living
room on the couch. Bosman was tickling her and then touching her “in places [she] didn’t
appreciate.” He was on top of her, and “he made it look like a game multiple times, and
then he was touching himself in his [genital] area and touching me.” She was twelve
years old when Bosman began inserting his fingers and genitals into her genitals. She
remembers this happened in 2023, before they went to Tennessee for Christmas.
{¶14} Daughter 2, in her testimony, corroborated the January 2024 family dinner
incident. She also recalled an incident in which Bosman yelled at her two younger
brothers. Bosman shoved one of them and he fell into an oil pan, which led to Bosman
“screaming at him for making a mess.” Bosman would “stab his fingers into their chests.”
She also observed Bosman snuggling Daughter 1 inappropriately under a blanket on the
couch.
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{¶15} Daughter 2 described an incident that occurred at bedtime when she was
in her top bunk bed in the room she shared with Daughter 1. Bosman laid on top of her,
put his hands underneath her shorts, and rubbed her vagina. This occurred more than
once. He would also touch her breasts and squeeze them under her clothing. She was
twelve years old at the time, and she remembered his genitals touching her thigh.
{¶16} Son 2, the youngest of the siblings, testified his sister found a vape and his
dad grabbed it. The situation escalated into a big fight, and Bosman eventually left the
house. This happened shortly before his tenth birthday. Son 2 described his relationship
with Bosman as “bad,” because “he would abuse me every time he was mad at me or if I
told my mom something that he did do.” Son 2 further testified Bosman would push him
and Son 1 against the wall by their throats. “It would feel like suffocating,” and “it would
also hurt on my throat because of the pressure.” Bosman would hit them “with the rod,”
which was a cricket bat.
{¶17} Son 1 testified the last time Bosman was in their house was the night his
sister found something and Bosman threw it in the trash. Bosman made him feel scared
or hurt when he would take him and Son 2 by the neck and guide them upstairs and into
their room “for the rod.” “It would feel kind of hard to breath and hurting . . . .” The rod
was a cricket bat Bosman would use on their “bottom” to “drive the foolishness out of us.”
He described pulling Bosman off of his mother one time on the couch: “I knew there was
something wrong so I came over and grabbed him to wrestle him to get distracted, and I
said that he should be productive, like how he tells us.”
{¶18} Prior to Tatum, the State’s expert, testifying, the court addressed defense
counsel’s motion in limine to exclude the expert from testifying as to other acts evidence.
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The State agreed it would discuss general topics, such as grooming, without any specific
reference to the instant case or the specific allegations. The court agreed, granting the
motion “in that manner.” Tatum then explained to the jury grooming and conditioning
behaviors of sexual offenders of children and delayed disclosure and reporting of offenses
by child victims.
{¶19} At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel raised a Crim.R.
29 motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The State conceded there was
insufficient evidence on Count 4, rape, and Count 6, GSI, because Daughter 1 testified
nothing happened once Bosman moved out of the home after the January 2024 incident.
The court granted defense counsel’s motion as to Counts 4 and 6.
The Defense
{¶20} The defense presented the testimony of three witnesses: Bosman’s former
spouse, “R.D.”; their son, “A.B.”; and Bosman.
{¶21} R.D. testified she was married to Bosman between 2005 to 2008, and they
had A.B. in 2007. R.D. never observed Bosman commit any acts of physical or sexual
abuse. She has never seen Bosman and Wife interact, and never spent time in their
home.
{¶22} A.B. testified his dad had never been violent towards him, and he never saw
Bosman act violently or sexually towards his half-siblings.
{¶23} Bosman testified he moved out of the house in January 2023. He denied
raping Wife, sexually abusing his daughters, and strangling or engaging in violent
behavior towards his sons. He denied the incidents and stated his family lied, they
fabricated the incidents, and his son was “a fake” when he started crying while testifying.
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Bosman explained he spanked the boys with a cricket bat because he did not want them
to associate an act of punishment with his hand. He explained he reacted to the discovery
of his vape pen from fear. His apologies in the text messages and emails were not
admissions of the incidents; rather, he was hoping to “work things out,” and he was
“emotional.” He “was trying to reconcile with the family, and [he] unfortunately wrote
things that were not true.”
Jury Verdict Forms
{¶24} In relevant part to Bosman’s assigned error, the jury verdict forms for Count
5 and Count 8 read as follows:
Verdict: Count 5 – GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION OF [DAUGHTER 1],
April 2021 to December 30, 2022
We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Charl W. Bosman . . .
Of GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION as charged in Count 5 in the indictment.
Verdict: Count 8 – GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION OF [DAUGHTER 2],
April 2021 to January 2024
We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Charl W. Bosman . . .
OF GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION as charged in Count 8 in the Indictment.
{¶25} The Jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2, rape of Wife; Count 5,
GSI of Daughter 1; and Count 8, GSI of Daughter 2. The jury returned not guilty verdicts
on Counts 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
Sentencing
{¶26} At sentencing, after hearing statements from the State and defense
counsel, Bosman’s father and mother, and A.B., the court inquired if Bosman wished to
make a statement. Bosman declined, stating, “Your Honor, due to Counsel, I’m going to
decline to say something, but I appreciate the opportunity, Your Honor.”
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{¶27} The court, in considering the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11
and 2929.12, found Bosman’s offenses more serious because of his familial relationship
with the victims and the age of the victims, especially the two minors. The court did not
find any of the less serious factors applied. The court further found, in its consideration
of the recidivism factors, “there is no demonstration of genuine remorse in this case,
inasmuch as Mr. Bosman has not made any statement on his own behalf.” The court
also noted Bosman has no criminal history.
{¶28} The court sentenced Bosman on Counts 1 and 2, rape, to 2 concurrent,
mandatory terms of imprisonment of a minimum of 10 years up to a maximum of 15 years;
and on Counts 5 and 8, GSI, to 2 consecutive, 48-month terms of imprisonment; for a
total term of imprisonment of 18 to 23 years. The court also found Bosman to be a Tier
II Sex Offender and notified him of the registration and notification requirements.
{¶29} Bosman timely appealed and raises four assignments of error for our
review:
{¶30} “[1.] Appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed
by both our federal and state constitutions.
{¶31} “[2.] Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial when the state introduced
improper other acts evidence in violation of both federal and state constitutions and
Evidence Rule 404(B).
{¶32} “[3.] The trial court violated appellant’s right to remain silent, in violation of
both of our federal and state constitutions, when it relied upon that silence as a basis for
imposing a sentence in that case.
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{¶33} “[4.] The verdict forms signed and returned by the jury, in counts five and
eight, were insufficient to maintain a felony of the third degree.”
{¶34} We address Bosman’s assignments of error out of turn for ease of
discussion.
Other Acts Evidence
{¶35} In his second assignment of error, Bosman contends it was plain error for
the trial court to admit “other acts” evidence because he was “tried on the theory that he
is the type of person who has the propensity to engage in emotional, physical, sexual
abuse and that because of that propensity he committed the acts he is accused of.” He
contends the testimony from Wife and his children describing Bosman as violent, their
fear of living with him, their fear of his interactions with their mother, and how he subjected
them to domestic violence and/or strangulation at least ten different times was improper
other acts evidence.
{¶36} “The admissibility of other acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) is a
question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207, ¶ 117. “But
the trial court’s weighing of the probative value of admissible evidence against the danger
of unfair prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of
judgment and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion is
the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State
v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.
2004).
{¶37} Evid.R. 404(B), “Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts,” provides:
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(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong or act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. The proponent
of evidence to be offered under this rule shall:
(a) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence the proponent
intends to introduce at trial so that an opposing party may have a fair
opportunity to meet it;
(b) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the
proponent intends to offer the evidence, and the reasoning that
supports the purpose; and
(c) do so in writing in advance of trial, or in any form during trial if the
court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
{¶38} “‘This type of evidence is commonly referred to as ‘propensity evidence’
because its purpose is to demonstrate that the accused has a propensity or proclivity to
commit the crime in question.’” State v. Echols, 2024-Ohio-5088, ¶ 21, quoting State v.
Hartman, 2020-Ohio-4440, ¶ 21. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act, may be
admitted, however, for a purpose other than showing a person’s propensity to commit a
crime. Evid.R. 404(B)(2).
{¶39} In Echols, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, “by Evid.R. 404(B)’s own
terms, evidence must meet two criteria to fall within [the] scope [of other acts evidence].
The evidence must be evidence of a ‘crime, wrong, or act.’ Evid.R. 404(B)(1). And it
must not be evidence that goes directly to the charged crime itself—rather, it must be
evidence of an ‘other crime, wrong or act’ . . ., id.; see also Leonard, The New Wigmore:
A Treatise on Evidence: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events, § 4.1, at 210-211 (2d Ed. 2019) (generally describing evidence to which Evid.R. 404(B) and its state
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and federal analogues applies as evidence of ‘uncharged misconduct’).” (Emphasis sic.)
Echols at ¶ 24.
{¶40} “Additionally, evidence of other crimes may be presented when they are so
blended or connected with the one on trial that proof of one incidentally involves the other,
or explains the circumstances thereof, or tends logically to prove any element of the crime
charged.” State v. Thomas, 2025-Ohio-1321, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2025-Ohio-2749; see also State v. Handshoe, 2023-Ohio-3205, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.) (“Evid.R. 404(B)
applies to the admission of ‘other acts’ extrinsic to the charged offense and not those acts
intrinsic to the offense [being tried] because the latter are outside the purview of Evid.R.
404(B)”).
{¶41} Bosman’s argument fails at the outset because he has not identified any
“other acts” evidence. A review of the testimony by his former spouse and children that
he identifies as “other acts” evidence is testimony that directly relates to the crimes of
rape, GSI, strangulation, and domestic violence as charged in the indictment. The
testimony was not offered to show he had a propensity to commit these types of acts, but
that he did commit the acts. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 2025-Ohio-712, ¶ 76 (3d Dist.)
(the evidence of the appellant’s use of sex toys and sexual contact was not evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts; it was direct testimonial evidence of the charged offenses);
Thomas at ¶ 20-27 (finding text messages were relevant, direct evidence of the crimes
charged and did not fall under an Evid.R. 404(B) other acts analysis); State v. Sanabria,
2025-Ohio-5747, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.) (“the challenged behavior happened during the
[commission of the offense], was part and parcel of the relevant facts, and was direct
evidence or ‘res gestae’ of the crime charged”).
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{¶42} Because Bosman has failed to challenge any “other acts” evidence, his
second assignment of error is without merit.
Right to Remain Silent
{¶43} In his third assignment of error, Bosman contends the trial court used his
right to remain silent against him at the sentencing hearing when considering whether he
was likely to reoffend. The State concedes the trial court’s consideration of Bosman’s
silence at sentencing as evidence of lack of remorse was improper, but argues it does
not rise to the level of plain error.
{¶44} Although an “appellate court’s jurisdiction to review sentencing factors is
limited under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b),” an “appellate court is not prohibited from reviewing
a sentence ‘when the claim is that the sentence was improperly imposed based on
impermissible considerations.’” State v. Brunson, 2022-Ohio-4299, ¶ 69, quoting State
v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22. As in Brunson, Bosman’s challenge to the trial court’s
consideration of his constitutional right to remain silent in its evaluation of his lack of
remorse, a sentencing factor under R.C. 2929.12(D)(5), falls under the Supreme Court’s
definition of “otherwise contrary to law” and, thus, may be reviewed on appeal. Id. at ¶
70.
{¶45} Bosman failed to object at the sentencing hearing; thus, he has forfeited all
but plain error review. Id. at ¶ 67. The discretion to recognize plain error must be
exercised “‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent
a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002), quoting
State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus. “Crim.R. 52(B)
does not demand that an appellate court correct [the error]. Crim.R. 52(B) states only
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that a reviewing court ‘may’ notice plain forfeited errors; a court is not obliged to correct
them.” Id. First, an error must be found, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule. Id. Second,
the error must be plain, or “obvious.” Id. Third, the error must have affected “substantial
rights,” meaning it affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id.
{¶46} In Brunson, the Supreme Court of Ohio held “that when a defendant has
maintained his or her innocence by pleading not guilty and has taken the case to trial, the
trial court errs when it considers the defendant’s silence to be a demonstration of that
defendant’s lack of remorse for purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.12(D)(5). To
consider the defendant’s silence as a lack of remorse in this context would create a
negative inference regarding the factual determinations in the case—an inference that is
prohibited under Mitchell [v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (2005)].” Brunson at ¶ 83.
{¶47} The Supreme Court further determined that although the trial court’s
consideration of the appellant’s decision to remain silent was error, it did not affect the
appellant’s sentence in that case. Id. at ¶ 84. The court noted “[a] defendant’s lack of
remorse is only one of five factors a trial court considers when evaluating a defendant’s
risk of recidivism under R.C. 2929.12(D).” Id. at ¶ 85. The trial court also found the
appellant had a high risk of recidivism because he had a lengthy criminal history, he
committed the offenses while on postrelease control, and he had been adjudicated
delinquent nine times. Id. In addition, the trial court considered the seriousness of the
conduct and other relevant factors to achieve the purposes and principles of sentencing.
Id. at ¶ 86. These facts as found by the trial court, even without the lack of remorse
consideration, demonstrated that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would not have
been different. Id.
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{¶48} There is no question the trial court erred in this case. Bosman pleaded not
guilty and chose to go to trial. The court’s error is especially troubling because Bosman
declined his right to allocution based on the advice of his counsel at sentencing.
{¶49} However, the trial court was explicit with its sentencing considerations on
the record, and after a review of the trial court’s findings, we cannot say the trial court’s
error rises to the level of plain error. The trial court stated it considered the sentencing
materials, the statements made on Bosman’s behalf, the victims’ statements provided by
the State and the victims’ advocate; heard the arguments of counsel; and considered the
principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and the recidivism and
seriousness factors as set forth in R.C. 2929.12, especially noting the familial status and
age of the victims. Lastly, Bosman was not sentenced to the maximum terms for rape
and GSI. See R.C. 2907.02(B), 2907.05(C)(3), and 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(3)(a).
{¶50} Bosman has not demonstrated, or even argued, that in the absence of the
error, his sentence would have been different.
{¶51} Accordingly, Bosman’s third assignment of error is without merit.
Verdict Forms
{¶52} In his fourth assignment of error, Bosman contends he should have been
convicted of the least degree of GSI because the jury verdict forms for Count 5 and Count
8 did not contain any enhancing language or cite the specific section of the statute.
{¶53} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.75:
(A) When the presence of one or more additional elements makes an
offense one of more serious degree:
(2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the offense of which the
offender is found guilty, or that such additional element or elements are
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present. Otherwise, a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least
degree of the offense charged.
{¶54} Recently, in State v. Khalif, 2026-Ohio-2689, the Supreme Court of Ohio
explained that “R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) plainly requires that a jury’s guilty verdict either state
the degree of offense or the additional elements elevating an offense. Otherwise, the
defendant can be convicted of only ‘the least degree of the offense charged.’” Id. at ¶ 20,
quoting R.C. 2945.75(A)(2).
{¶55} In this case, however, Bosman was not charged with an offense that
requires the jury to find additional elements to elevate the degree of the offense charged.
{¶56} R.C. 2907.05, GSI, provides, in relevant part:
(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another; cause another to
have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons
to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:
(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen
years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.
(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of gross sexual imposition.
(2) Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B)
of this section is a felony of the third degree. . . .
{¶57} In State v. Hasenyager, 2016-Ohio-3540 (9th Dist.), the Ninth District Court
of Appeals succinctly explained:
A violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) is a felony of the third degree. R.C.
2907.05(C)(2). There are no additional elements that will enhance this
offense to a higher degree. R.C. 2907.05 does contain other subsections,
but each has their own separate elements. Here, as charged in the
indictment, the State was required to prove that [the defendant] had sexual
contact with [the victim] for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification and
that [the victim] was under the age of thirteen at the time of the offense.
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Failure to prove any of these elements would have resulted in an acquittal,
not a conviction of a lesser degree of gross sexual imposition.
Id. at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Edwards, 2013-Ohio-3068, ¶ 35-36 (9th Dist.).
{¶58} Bosman’s argument fails because R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) does not apply to
R.C. 2907.04(A)(4). An additional element is not required to elevate a violation of R.C.
2907.04(A)(4) to a felony of the third degree. Id. See also State v. Kessler, 2025-Ohio1041, ¶ 78 (5th Dist.) (R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is inapplicable to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)); State v.
Haslam, 2025-Ohio-1910, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.) (same).
{¶59} Accordingly, Bosman’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶60} In his first assignment of error, Bosman contends his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to object to improper “other acts” evidence and failed to
correct the record following the jury verdicts on Counts 5 and Count 8 because the jury
verdict forms were defective.
{¶61} “‘In evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Ohio appellate
courts apply the two-part test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, it must be determined that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Second, it must be
shown that prejudice resulted. “Prejudice exists when ‘the result of the trial would have
been different’ but for counsel’s ineffectiveness.”’” (Internal citations omitted.) State v.
Allen, 2013-Ohio-434, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Woodard, 2010-Ohio-2949, ¶ 11
(11th Dist.), quoting In re Roque, 2006-Ohio-7007, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).
{¶62} “In applying the foregoing standard, a ‘reviewing court indulges a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional
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representation. Strickland at 689. An attorney’s arguably reasoned strategic or tactical
decisions do not generally constitute ineffectiveness. State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72,
85 (1995).’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. DelMonico, 2005-Ohio-2902, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.).
Further, “[t]o succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
failure to file an objection, an appellant must demonstrate that the objection had a
reasonable probability of success. If the objection would not have been successful, the
appellant cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Internal
citations omitted.) State v. Stroud, 2023-Ohio-569, ¶ 53 (11th Dist.).
{¶63} Having previously determined these issues are without merit, Bosman’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims necessarily fail. See, e.g., State v. Flitcraft,
2024-Ohio-3146, ¶ 69 (11th Dist.) (having found the appellant did not establish prejudice
in a previous assignment of error, he could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel on the same basis); State v. George, 2024-Ohio-2125, ¶ 55 (11th Dist.) (same).
{¶64} Accordingly, Bosman’s first assignment of error is without merit.
{¶65} The judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-G-0047
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Case No. 2025-G-0047