IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-KA-00661-COA
DOMINIQUE WEATHERSPOON APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/16/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CARMEN BROOKS DRAKE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WILKINSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TAMARRA AKIEA BOWIE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TIM COTTON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/08/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CONSOLIDATED WITH
NO. 2024-KA-00663-COA
WILLIAM JACKSON, III A/K/A WILLIAMS APPELLANT
JACKSON, III
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/23/2023
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CARMEN BROOKS DRAKE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: WILKINSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TAMARRA AKIEA BOWIE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TIM COTTON
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/08/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WESTBROOKS, McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Siblings Dominique Weatherspoon and William Jackson III participated in a series
of shootings in Woodville, Mississippi, that resulted in the death of an eleven-year-old child
and an injury to another victim. Weatherspoon and Jackson were convicted of first-degree
murder and aggravated assault.1 They argue on appeal that (1) their right to an impartial jury
was violated because a friend or relative of one of the victims’ families served on the jury;
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the circuit court improperly
refused a cautionary jury instruction on accomplice testimony; (4) their trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to disclose two witnesses’ immunity agreements to the jury; (5) the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to correct a witness’s testimony; and (6)
cumulative error warrants reversal.
¶2. We preserve the first and fourth issues for a motion for post-conviction collateral
relief and find the remaining issues are procedurally barred or without merit. Therefore, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. On June 10, 2020, twenty-eight-year-old Weatherspoon and her twenty-three-year-old
brother Jackson were drinking and playing cards in a motel room in Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
with their seventeen-year-old cousin Derrick Brown and Jackson’s girlfriend, nineteen-yearold Keizjah Bateaste. Brown called Olivia Cole to join them. Bateaste and Cole were the
1
This Court granted their appellate counsel’s motion to consolidate the two appeals.
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same age and had been classmates in school. Cole joined them in the motel room for a while,
and she drove them to buy a necklace from her friend. She then left to go back home around
8 or 9 p.m.
¶4. Around midnight, Bateaste started an Instagram live feed on her cell phone. Bateaste
placed her phone on the TV stand in the motel room, and she, Jackson, Weatherspoon, and
Brown were visible at different times on the live stream. When Weatherspoon appeared on
the live stream, Jalarraus Stewart typed a comment calling Weatherspoon a “bomb a**
b****.” He then commented “ole cripple a**,” which Weatherspoon took as referring to
Jackson.
¶5. Jackson had been enduring comments that he was a “cripple” since February 2020
when he was shot multiple times on Super Bowl Sunday at Pisces Sports Bar in his
hometown of Woodville. As a result of his injuries, he was in a wheelchair for several
months but was walking with crutches on June 10. Bateaste testified that she started dating
Jackson after he was shot. She testified that no one was arrested for shooting Jackson, nor
did Jackson know who shot him. Bateaste further testified that Jackson and Stewart “use[d]
[to] get into it a lot” because Stewart teased Jackson about being a “cripple.”
¶6. When Weatherspoon saw Stewart’s “ole cripple a**” comment on the Instagram live
stream, she pulled out a .40-caliber gun and said in the live stream:
Yo mammy, ho. Just like that, yo mammy. And I’m on my way. Yo mammy,
ho. Just like that, yo mammy. And I’m on my way. F*** with it. I’m gone
put yo name on this bullet, ho. Yo name gone be on this, b****. I promise.
Brown also appeared on the live stream holding a gun. Bateaste testified that at this point,
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she told Jackson that Weatherspoon and Stewart “were into it,” and Jackson told her to end
the live stream, which she did. The live stream then stopped.
¶7. Sometime after 1 a.m. on June 11, 2020, Brown called Cole and asked her to come
back to the motel and drive the group to Woodville to pick up money from Weatherspoon
and Jackson’s grandmother’s house so they could buy more necklaces from Cole’s friend.
Cole testified that she agreed to drive to the motel, but she told them that she did not want
to drive to Woodville because she had been drinking and had a headache. When Cole
arrived, Jackson, Weatherspoon, Brown, and Bateaste joined Cole in her car, a red Buick
Regal with a headlight out. Brown got in the driver’s seat.
¶8. Brown drove the group to Woodville. Weatherspoon and Jackson retrieved cash from
their grandmother’s house, and they talked to their mother, who was present at the home.
¶9. Weatherspoon then got in the driver’s seat, and Jackson sat in the front passenger seat.
Brown, Bateaste, and Cole sat in the back. Bateaste testified that when they left the house,
Brown directed Weatherspoon to “take him for a ride.” In her statement to law enforcement,
Cole stated that Weatherspoon drove through Woodville, but as they drove toward Fords
Creek Road, “[a]ll of a sudden [Weatherspoon] started talking crazy saying we ain’t come
all the way down here for nothing.” Weatherspoon then said “something about a Nikki
person saying I’m kill that b****.”
¶10. Weatherspoon drove to the end of Fords Creek Road, turned around at the dead end,
and drove back up the road until they arrived at the house trailer where Nook Stein lived.
Bateaste testified that Jackson and Stein had issues with one another “based off who all had
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something to do with shooting [Jackson].” In Cole’s statement to law enforcement, she
stated that when they drove by Stein’s house trailer, Weatherspoon “was pointing out the
house. She told [Brown] and [Jackson,] [‘T]hat house right there.[’]”
¶11. Weatherspoon pulled the car over in front of Stein’s house, and gunfire began.
Bateaste and Cole testified that they immediately got down on the floorboard of the backseat
of the car. Bateaste testified, “I only seen two guns. I seen [Brown] with a gun, and
[Jackson] with a gun.” She could hear “a lot” of gunshots coming from the two guns. In her
statement to law enforcement, Bateaste stated that Brown, who was sitting in the backseat
by the passenger side window, was shooting out of the back window of the car, and she could
hear him saying, “Reload it, Reload it[.] [H]urry up give it back.” Cole testified that she
could hear gunshots being fired right beside her where Brown was sitting. She was “clueless
as to why he was shooting.”
¶12. Stein’s eleven-year-old sister, Lakerriya Chambers, was asleep in one of the bedrooms
in the house trailer. Multiple bullets penetrated the front of the trailer, and one bullet struck
Chambers in the chest. Mary Wells, a resident of the house, testified that the shooting
occurred at approximately 3:30 a.m. She and the other residents of the trailer awoke and
discovered that Chambers had been shot, and a neighbor transported Chambers to the local
hospital. She was airlifted to a hospital in Jackson where she died.
¶13. Bateaste testified that after they left Fords Creek Road, Weatherspoon drove to
downtown Woodville, where another shooting took place. On Main Street, a man called
“Tiny” was driving toward Stein’s trailer because he had heard about the shooting. When
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Weatherspoon entered Main Street, their two cars passed each other, and gunshots were
exchanged. Cole testified that she felt a bullet go past her face as Brown shot at the car. In
Bateaste’s statement to law enforcement, she stated that she was on the floor screaming, and
Weatherspoon, Jackson, and Brown were telling her to “shut the f*** up.”
¶14. Weatherspoon then drove to Sugar Hill in Woodville. According to Cole, she and
Bateaste continued to scream, and Jackson told them that they should have “stayed [their] a**
at the room if [they] was scared” and that he had told them “about all that hollering[,]
screaming[,] and being scared.” So they “started being quiet.” In her statement to law
enforcement, Cole stated that when they got to Sugar Hill, Jackson told Brown to “get that
b****[,] talking about Nook [Stein’s] mama house.” Bateaste testified that Stewart was
sometimes at Stein’s mother’s house playing cards or shooting dice. Bateaste stated that
when they were driving through Sugar Hill, Jackson “told [Weatherspoon] to stop the car,”
“this the house.” Brown then shot at the house. Tanyankia Tolliver, who lived on Gaylord
Street in Sugar Hill, testified that she heard gunshots around 4 a.m. on June 11, 2020, and
later that morning she went outside to discover bullet holes in her house trailer and truck.
She reported the shooting to law enforcement. No one was injured during the shooting in
Sugar Hill.
¶15. Bateaste testified that when they left Sugar Hill, Brown told Weatherspoon to “take
him to Bay Ridge.” Cole told Weatherspoon to take her back to Baton Rouge, but Brown
said, “[F]*** that we going to Bay Ridge. We gone get Lay Lay sh** tonight.”
Weatherspoon drove to Bay Ridge to the home of Alazja “Lay Lay” Robinson and her
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mother, Shelitha Jarvis. When they arrived at the house, Brown started shooting. In her
statement to law enforcement, Cole stated, “I know [Brown] shot his gun. [Brown] kept
telling [Jackson] to reload. I can hear [Jackson] putting the bullets in the gun. The bullets
was up there with [Jackson], but [Brown] was shooting from the back.”
¶16. Jarvis, who was asleep in her bed, testified that she was awoken around 4 a.m. to the
sound of gunshots. When she tried to get up to check on her son who was asleep in another
room, she realized that she had been shot in the leg. She testified that the bullet broke a bone
in her leg, and her recovery took approximately eighteen months.
¶17. As Weatherspoon drove away after the final shooting, Brown started an Instagram live
stream on his cell phone and bragged about the shootings. Bateaste testified that after they
drove a couple miles, Weatherspoon said she did not want to drive anymore, and she and
Brown exchanged seats.
¶18. Brown drove them back to the motel in Baton Rouge. Cole went home, and the rest
of them went to sleep. Bateaste testified that police officers met them outside when they
exited the room later that day, and the officers took the two guns that had been used in the
shootings the night before.
¶19. At trial, Cole was asked, “Did [Weatherspoon] say anything to you about her role in
all of this?” Cole responded, “Just that, how would I feel if it was my brother . . . that had
been shot over forty times.”
¶20. Weatherspoon testified in her own defense at trial. She was questioned about two
statements she gave to law enforcement after the shootings. In her first statement, she denied
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going to Woodville on the night of June 10-11, 2020. She gave a second statement admitting
to going to Woodville, but she stated that she was drunk and passed out in the backseat while
Brown drove and that she awoke to gunshots with no idea what was happening. She stated,
“[I]f I known we was going to Woodville, I would have not gotten in the car when I’m
already running from people trying to kill me.”
¶21. Weatherspoon admitted at trial that her statements to law enforcement were false and
that she did in fact go with Brown, Bateaste, Cole, and Jackson from Baton Rouge to
Woodville. She also admitted that after she and Jackson retrieved the cash and talked to their
mother for ten or fifteen minutes, she drove Cole’s car to Pisces Sports Bar in Woodville.
¶22. Weatherspoon testified that she was unaware that Brown had a gun on him until he
started shooting on Fords Creek Road, and she was “shocked and scared” when he started
shooting. She admitted that after witnessing him shooting from the car, she could have
stopped the car and “took off running.” But she “was headed home” to Baton Rouge, so she
“just pressed on the gas, and was trying to get home.” Weatherspoon testified that when they
came to Bay Ridge Road, Brown told her, “B****, stop this car,” because she “was flying
trying to get back to Baton Rouge.” Weatherspoon testified that despite driving from Baton
Rouge to multiple locations in Woodville, she was “drunk” on the night of the shootings.
Weatherspoon testified that when they left Baton Rouge, she was unaware of any plan to
shoot or kill anyone.
¶23. When asked about her statement on the Instagram live stream from the motel
room—“I’m on my way. . . . I’m gone put yo name on this bullet”—she responded, “I was
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drunk talking—speaking. But, that didn’t have anything relating to why we went to
Woodville.”
¶24. When asked about Jackson’s physical condition, Weatherspoon responded, “He had
a nerve condition in his fingers where he couldn’t use his hand. His legs was messed up, he
couldn’t walk” without crutches. Weatherspoon testified that Jackson’s condition was a
result of being shot thirteen times at Pisces Sports Bar. She did not know who shot Jackson.
¶25. Markus Sylvester with the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department assisted with the
arrest of Jackson, Weatherspoon, Brown, and Bateaste. Sylvester testified that he recovered
a .40-caliber handgun and 9-millimeter handgun from Brown. When Sylvester asked Brown
his name, he responded, “Jalarraus Stewart,” which officers later learned was incorrect.
¶26. Lemuel Rutledge with the Wilkinson County Sheriff’s Department responded to the
Fords Creek Road shooting on June 11, 2020. Rutledge testified that while he was en route
to Fords Creek Road, he was flagged down at the Family Dollar on Main Street by “Tiny,”
who told Rutledge that someone had just shot at his vehicle. Tiny told Rutledge that as he
drove down Main Street, he encountered a red or burgundy car with one headlight out.
Rutledge then proceeded to Fords Creek Road to respond to the shooting at Stein’s house.
¶27. Rutledge testified that at Stein’s house on Fords Creek Road, he observed multiple
spent shell casings from a .40-caliber and 9-millimeter handgun on the road and multiple
bullet holes throughout the front of Stein’s house trailer and the car parked in the driveway.
Shell casings were also found in Stein’s driveway, indicating that someone had been in the
driveway while shooting. Rutledge identified the two guns recovered from Brown as a black
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.40-caliber Glock handgun with two magazines and a purple and gray 9-millimeter handgun
with one magazine.
¶28. Starks Hathcock with the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory testified that he examined
the shell casings found at the multiple crime scenes, as well as the two guns recovered from
Brown. He was able to positively identify some of the shell casings as having been fired
from the purple and gray 9-millimeter gun. Although the bullet extracted from Chambers’s
body did not “mark well,” he testified that it had the “same class characteristics” as a .40-caliber gun and could have been shot from the .40-caliber Glock recovered from Brown.
¶29. Dr. Mark LeVaughn with the State Medical Examiner’s Office testified that
Chambers’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the chest from a single bullet, which was
recovered from her body.
¶30. Weatherspoon, Jackson, and Brown were indicted for first-degree murder and
aggravated assault with a firearm. Bateaste and Cole were indicted for accessory after the
fact, but their charges were dropped in exchange for testifying at Weatherspoon, Jackson, and
Brown’s joint trial.
¶31. On June 20, 2023, after the jury was empaneled and just before trial began, Brown
entered a guilty plea, and the trial proceeded against Weatherspoon and Jackson. The jury
found Weatherspoon and Jackson guilty of first-degree murder and aggravated assault with
a firearm enhancement. The circuit court sentenced Weatherspoon and Jackson to life
imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for firstdegree murder and twenty years for aggravated assault with a five-year firearm enhancement.
10
The life sentences and the twenty-year sentences were ordered to run concurrently, and the
five-year firearm enhancement was ordered to run consecutively following the concurrent
sentences.
¶32. Weatherspoon and Jackson moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)
or, alternatively, a new trial. On July 14, 2023, the circuit court denied the motions. No
appeal was filed. On November 14, 2023, Weatherspoon and Jackson, through new counsel,
filed motions to reopen the time to appeal in the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court dismissed the motions without prejudice for filing in the circuit court. See M.R.A.P.
4(h). The circuit court ultimately granted the motions and extended the time to appeal, and
on May 31, 2024, Weatherspoon and Jackson filed their notices of appeal.2
¶33. Weatherspoon and Jackson raise six issues on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Juror Disqualification
¶34. Weatherspoon and Jackson first argue that their right to a fair and impartial jury under
the Sixth Amendment was violated because Juror 22, who served as the jury foreman, was
allegedly a family member or friend of Chambers’s family.
¶35. This issue was not raised at trial and is procedurally barred on appeal. The failure “to
request the substitution of an alternate juror or object in any way to [a juror’s] presence on
the jury” procedurally bars the issue from appellate review. Neal v. State, 15 So. 3d 388, 400
2
To the extent the circuit court lacked authority to reopen the time for appeal under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h), we exercise our discretion to suspend the rules pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(c) and allow the appeals to proceed.
11
(¶24) (Miss. 2009). Defense counsel elected not to conduct any voir dire on behalf of his
clients, let alone ask any questions about the relationship any jurors had with the victims’
families.
¶36. Even if not procedurally barred, this issue is not subject to review as part of this direct
appeal because it is not supported by any evidence in the record. Rather, Weatherspoon and
Jackson attempt to support their argument through an exhibit attached to their appellants’
brief. The exhibit was submitted for the first time with the appellants’ brief filed in this
Court. The exhibit purports to be six unauthenticated screenshots from what appears to be
various Facebook posts. Weatherspoon and Jackson assert that these posts somehow show
that Juror 22 is connected to Chambers’s family and that the juror should have disclosed this
information during voir dire.
¶37. “Mississippi appellate courts may not consider information that is outside the record.”
Lenoir v. State, 409 So. 3d 558, 565 (¶32) (Miss. 2025). The record on appeal “shall consist
of designated papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any,
and in all cases a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court.”
M.R.A.P. 10(a). The screenshots were not presented to the circuit court and are outside the
trial court and appellate records. Therefore, we will not consider them in this appeal.
¶38. Because no evidence in the record substantiates Weatherspoon and Jackson’s assertion
that Juror 22 was a friend or relative of the victim’s family or that Juror 22 intentionally
withheld this information during voir dire, this argument is “wholly speculative” and shall
not be reviewed as part of this direct appeal. Neal, 15 So. 3d at 400 (¶24). We deny this
12
issue without prejudice to Weatherspoon’s and Jackson’s rights to raise this issue in a
properly filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). Miss. Code Ann. §
99-39-5(1) (Rev. 2020).
¶39. We briefly note that in their reply brief, Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that this
issue is proper for review on direct appeal because they were granted an out-of-time appeal,
and “[o]ut-of-time appeals are governed by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1)(i) . . . .” They are
correct that section 99-39-5(1)(i) of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral
Relief Act allows a petitioner to file a PCR motion on the basis “[t]hat he is entitled to an
out-of-time appeal . . . .” However, Weatherspoon and Jackson did not file a PCR motion
requesting an out-of-time appeal. Rather, their motion was filed under “Mississippi Rules
of Appellate Procedure 4(h) and/or 2(c).” The circuit court granted the motion under Rule
4(h), which allows a trial court to reopen the time for appeal “upon motion filed within 180
days of entry of the judgment . . . .” Regardless, even if the motion had sought relief
pursuant to the PCR statute, no issue regarding the partiality of Juror 22 was raised in the
motion or addressed by the circuit court, and the filing of a PCR motion for an out-of-time
direct appeal, in and of itself, does not permit an appellant to raise other unrelated PCR issues
outside the trial court record on direct appeal.
¶40. Again, this issue is not appropriate for review on direct appeal, and we reserve the
issue for any post-conviction review that Weatherspoon and Jackson may pursue.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶41. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their
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convictions because there was no testimony that they intended to kill or cause serious bodily
injury to the victims or aid and abet in the crimes. Rather, they argue that the proof showed
that “they were simply taking a ride and then Derrick Brown started shooting.”
¶42. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Wallace v. State,
426 So. 3d 268, 273 (¶19) (Miss. 2026). “We determine if any rational juror could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Moody v. State, 421
So. 3d 1236, 1238 (¶10) (Miss. 2025). The State is given “the benefit of all favorable
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 1239 (¶10).
¶43. To prove the defendants were guilty of first-degree murder, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt “[t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law
by any means or in any manner . . . [w]hen done with deliberate design to effect the death of
the person killed, or of any human being[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev. 2020).
“The term ‘deliberate’ means ‘a full awareness of what one is doing and generally implies
careful and unhurried consideration of the consequences.’” House v. State, 430 So. 3d 811,
817 (¶15) (Miss. 2026) (quoting Watts v. State, 402 So. 3d 744, 749 (¶20) (Miss. 2025)).
“The term ‘design’ ‘means to calculate, plan or contemplate.’” Id. (quoting Watts, 402 So.
3d at 749 (¶20)). “Deliberate design ‘may be formed very quickly, and perhaps only
moments before the act of consummating the intent.’” Id. (quoting Watts, 402 So. 3d at 749
(¶20)).
¶44. Aggravated assault is committed when a person “attempts to cause serious bodily
injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under
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circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” or “attempts to
cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or
other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. §
97-3-7(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (Rev. 2020).
¶45. “One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is guilty as a
principal.” Williams v. State, 334 So. 3d 68, 73 (¶8) (Miss. 2022) (quoting Buchanan v.
State, 316 So. 3d 619, 631 (¶51) (Miss. 2021)). “Aiding and abetting is defined to be the
offense committed by those persons who, although not the direct perpetrators of a crime, are
yet present at its commission, doing some act to render aid to the actual perpetrator.” Lynch
v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1279 (¶79) (Miss. 2004) (quoting Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d
912, 915 (Miss. 1995)). “[A]iding and abetting may be manifested by acts, words, signs,
motions, or any conduct which unmistakably evinces a design to encourage, incite or approve
of the crime, or even by being present, with the intention of giving assistance, if necessary,
though such assistance may not be called into requisition.” Tubbs v. State, 414 So. 3d 76,
83 (¶31) (Miss. 2025) (quoting Swinford, 653 So. 2d at 915).
¶46. Finally, our law provides for a sentencing enhancement for “any person who uses or
displays a firearm during the commission of any felony . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-37(1) (Rev. 2020).
¶47. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the testimony at trial
showed that just hours before the shooting spree, Weatherspoon pulled out a gun on an
Instagram live stream and told Stewart, “I’m on my way. . . . I’m gone put yo name on this
15
bullet, ho. Yo name gone be on this, b****. I promise.” After arriving in Woodville, she
“started talking crazy saying we ain’t come all the way down here for nothing.” She drove
to multiple houses where either Stewart or Stein, who were thought to have been involved
in shooting Jackson four months prior, may have been located. At the first location,
Weatherspoon pointed to Stein’s house and said “that house right there” just before the
shooting began that resulted in Chambers’s death.
¶48. Weatherspoon testified that although she drove during the commission of the crimes,
she was drunk, and seventeen-year-old Brown was entirely to blame for the shootings. She
admitted, however, that she followed his directions to drive to various locations in
Woodville, even though she could have stopped the car and “took off running.” Although
she testified that she did not know that Brown was going to shoot at anyone, the testimony
showed that after witnessing the first three shootings, she proceeded to drive to the location
of the fourth shooting on Bay Ridge Road, where Jarvis was shot in the leg, even after Brown
said to “take him to Bay Ridge” because “[w]e gone get Lay Lay [(Robinson’s)] sh**
tonight.”
¶49. The testimony showed that Jackson and Brown both had guns in the car, and
passengers in the car could hear shots being fired from the car from two different guns.
Brown, who was sitting in the back, yelled, “[R]eload it,” and a gun could be heard being
reloaded. The bullets were in the front with Jackson. As Weatherspoon drove, Jackson told
Brown to “get that b****[,] talking about Nook [Stein’s] mama house,” where Stewart
sometimes played cards or shot dice. When they arrived at the house, Jackson said, “[S]top
16
the car,” “this the house.” Bateaste and Cole, who were in the backseat, were ducked down,
screaming, and Jackson told them they should have “stayed [their] a** at the room if [they]
was scared.”
¶50. The proof at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to find that Weatherspoon and
Jackson killed Chambers “without the authority of law” and “with deliberate design to effect
[her] death.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a). The evidence was also sufficient to show
that they were guilty of aggravated assault by causing injury to Jarvis with a deadly weapon.
Even if neither Weatherspoon nor Jackson shot the bullets that struck Chambers or Jarvis,
the testimony at trial “unmistakably” showed that Weatherspoon and Jackson aided and
abetted in the crimes by engaging in actions, words, and conduct that assisted in the
commission of the crimes, thereby making them equally guilty as if they had been the
principal actor. Williams, 334 So. 3d at 73 (¶8).
¶51. Weatherspoon and Jackson alternatively argue that their “convictions should be . . .
remanded to the trial court to be resentenced [under the direct-remand rule] for a lesser
included offense” because Chambers and Jarvis were not the intended targets of the
shootings. However, the doctrine of transferred intent “is well-established in the common
law and in Mississippi.” Walden v. State, 29 So. 3d 17, 25 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
(quoting Dykes v. State, 232 Miss. 379, 386, 99 So. 2d 602, 606 (1957)), cert. denied, 29 So.
3d 774 (Miss. 2010). “Under the doctrine of transferred intent, ‘where there is express
malice and an intent to kill, the accidental killing of a person other than the one intended is
murder. The malicious intent of the unlawful act directed toward one person is transferred
17
to the other person.’” Id. (quoting Ross v. State, 158 Miss. 827, 832, 131 So. 367, 368
(1930)). Therefore, for purposes of intent, it is irrelevant that the two victims in this case
were not the intended targets.
¶52. The proof at trial was sufficient to uphold the convictions, and the circuit court did
not err by denying the motions for a JNOV or new trial.
III. Accomplice Jury Instruction
¶53. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that the circuit court erred in refusing a jury
instruction warning the jury that “the law looks with suspicion and distrust on the testimony
of an alleged accomplice or informant, and requires the jury to weigh that testimony with
great care and suspicion. . . . [Y]ou should weigh it with great care and caution, and look
upon it with distrust and suspicion.”
¶54. “[D]efendants are entitled to have instructions on their theory of the case presented
to the jury for which there is foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence might be
weak, insufficient, inconsistent or of doubtful credibility.” Jones v. State, 283 So. 3d 64, 72
(¶41) (Miss. 2019). We review a circuit court’s decision to give or refuse jury instructions
for abuse of discretion. Id.
¶55. A circuit court may give a cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony when (1)
the witness is an accomplice and (2) the witness’s testimony is uncorroborated. Slaughter
v. State, 815 So. 2d 1122, 1134 (¶65) (Miss. 2002) (citing Derden v. State, 522 So. 2d 752,
755 (Miss. 1988)). “An accomplice is a person who is implicated in the commission of the
crime.” Id. at (¶66). “[I]f the evidence admits a reasonable inference that the witness may
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have been a co-perpetrator or the sole perpetrator the cautionary instruction should be given.”
Id.
¶56. The circuit court refused the cautionary instruction on the basis that no proof was
presented that Bateaste and Cole were accomplices. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that
Bateaste and Cole were accomplices because (1) Cole’s car was used to drive to the locations
of the shootings; (2) Bateaste and Cole knew the victims and where they lived; (3) they did
not try to retreat; and (4) they knew Brown was “beefing” with Stewart. Weatherspoon and
Jackson also argue that Bateaste’s and Cole’s testimony was uncorroborated.
¶57. Although Bateaste and Cole were present for the crimes, the undisputed testimony
showed that they thought they were going to Woodville to get money to purchase necklaces
from Cole’s friend, and when the shooting began, they ducked down in the backseat of the
car and screamed and asked to go home. No testimony showed that Bateaste or Cole
participated or assisted in any way with the first-degree murder or aggravated assault. They
were unarmed, did not drive the car, did not give any instructions in furtherance of the crime,
and did not otherwise participate in the crimes, nor were they implicated in the commission
of the crimes.
¶58. Bateaste and Cole were indicted for accessory after the fact. However, accessories
after the fact have been found not to be accomplices. Hye v. State, 162 So. 3d 818, 823 (¶16)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (“[The witness] was convicted of accessory after the fact; thus, he was
not an accomplice.”).
¶59. Further, although Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that Bateaste’s and Cole’s
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testimony was uncorroborated, Weatherspoon herself testified that to her knowledge,
Bateaste and Cole did not participate in or plan the shootings. Weatherspoon was asked at
trial, “[W]ere you aware that . . . Cole [or Bateaste] was participating, or planning, or
overheard anything about what Derrick Brown was doing?” Weatherspoon answered, “No,
sir.”
¶60. “A cautionary instruction about accomplice testimony is not required unless there is
an accomplice.” Slaughter, 815 So. 2d at 1135 (¶68). The evidence showed that Bateaste
and Cole were merely passengers in the car, and no “reasonable inference” was created that
they were accomplices to the crimes for which Weatherspoon and Jackson were charged. Id.
at 1134 (¶66). Therefore, no cautionary instruction was warranted.
¶61. Because no evidence showed that Bateaste and Cole were accomplices, the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the cautionary instruction.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶62. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that their trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
question Bateaste and Cole about receiving leniency/immunity agreements in exchange for
their testimony. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that Bateaste and Cole were key witnesses
at trial, and the jury could not appropriately determine their credibility as witnesses without
knowledge of their leniency/immunity agreements.3
3
During a pretrial motion hearing, defense counsel asked the prosecutor if an agreement had been reached with Bateaste. The prosecutor responded, “If [Bateaste] testifies truthfully and consistent with her previous statements, then we’re going to dismiss the [accessory-after-the-fact] charge against her.” The record does not reflect whether the prosecutor offered Cole the same agreement regarding her charge of accessory after the fact or whether defense counsel knew of such an agreement. Defense counsel briefly cross20
¶63. “To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) that
counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.”
Reyes v. State, 419 So. 3d 903, 917 (¶47) (Miss. 2025) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). In order to be deemed deficient, counsel’s performance must fall
“below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
“[A] strong presumption exists that counsel’s performance constituted trial strategy and was
‘within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689). To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
¶64. “Ordinarily, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are more appropriately brought
during post-conviction proceedings.” Id. at (¶46) (quoting Archer v. State, 986 So. 2d 951,
955 (¶15) (Miss. 2008)). This Court “may, however, address an ineffectiveness claim on
direct appeal if the presented issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record.” Id.
(quoting Dartez v. State, 177 So. 3d 420, 423 (¶18) (Miss. 2015)). As our Supreme Court
has explained:
This Court addresses ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal
only where “[1] the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of
constitutional dimensions, or [2] the parties stipulate that the record is
adequate and the Court determines that findings of fact by a trial judge able to
consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc.[,] are not needed.”
Bell v. State, 202 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶12) (Miss. 2016) (quoting Read v. State, 430 So. 2d
examined Cole but did not ask whether she had been offered immunity or leniency in exchange for her testimony. Defense counsel did not cross-examine Bateaste.
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832, 841 (Miss. 1983)). This Court may also resolve claims if the record affirmatively shows
they are without merit. Ross v. State, 288 So. 3d 317, 324 (¶¶29-30) (Miss. 2020). However,
where “insufficient evidence and/or information exists within the record to address the claim
adequately[,] . . . the appropriate procedure is to deny relief, preserving the defendant’s right
to argue the issue through a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR).” Dartez, 177 So. 3d
at 423 (¶18); see Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2020).
¶65. We cannot find that the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional
dimensions, nor have the parties stipulated that the record is adequate to determine this issue.
Because this issue is not fully apparent from the record, we decline to address this issue,
preserving Weatherspoon’s and Jackson’s right to raise this issue in a motion for postconviction collateral relief.
V. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶66. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that reversible error occurred when the prosecutor
failed to correct a witness’s testimony that three guns were submitted to the Mississippi
Forensics Laboratory for testing when law enforcement only recovered two guns after the
crimes. They argue that the prosecutor intended to “confuse the jury” by making it seem that
“all three [(Weatherspoon, Jackson, and Brown)] had a gun and was shooting.”
¶67. Mike Hood with the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory testified at trial as an expert in
latent print analysis. Relevant to the issue raised on appeal, the prosecutor questioned Hood
as follows:
Q. Okay. Where did you receive these submissions from?
22
A. They came in on June 12, 2020, from Wilkinson County Sheriff[’s]
Department, Oliver Packnett.
Q. Okay. What were the submissions?
A. The three submissions I was asked on the first request were three guns.
Submissions 1, 2, and 3 of Mississippi Crime Lab Case Number
20-007268.
***
Q. I’m going to reach you two firearms. Can you identify those firearms
for me?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. Okay. What are those firearms?
A. The first one is SCCY CPX-1 9 Millimeter Pistol. Submission 2 is a
Glock Model 27[ .]40 Caliber Pistol.
Q. Are those the submissions that you received from the Wilkinson County
Sheriff[’s] Office?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Q. What were you asked to do with those submissions?
A. Asked to process them for latent prints.
(Emphasis added). Hood then testified that in addition to the two guns, he examined
“magazines” and “live rounds,” but he was unable to recover a sufficient fingerprint for
analysis. Defense counsel did not object to the testimony and did not cross-examine Hood.
¶68. “Where prosecutorial misconduct endangers the fairness of a trial and the impartial
administration of justice, reversal must follow.” Harrelson v. State, 415 So. 3d 622, 628
(¶17) (Miss. 2025). “Generally, a party who fails to make a contemporaneous objection at
23
trial must rely on plain error to raise the issue on appeal, because otherwise it is procedurally
barred.” Reyes, 419 So. 3d at 915 (¶37) (finding that an issue regarding prosecutorial
misconduct was procedurally barred for failure to make a contemporaneous objection at
trial). “The plain error doctrine permits this Court to recognize obvious error which was not
properly raised by the defendant and which affects a defendant’s fundamental, substantive
right.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶69. The prosecutor’s failure to correct Hood’s testimony did not affect Weatherspoon’s
and Jackson’s fundamental, substantive right to a fair trial. There is no indication that the
prosecutor intentionally elicited false, irrelevant, or inflammatory testimony or that the
testimony otherwise prejudiced their defense. See contra Minor v. State, 402 So. 3d 1272,
1279 (¶20) (Miss. 2025) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor elicited
inflammatory testimony without any evidentiary basis regarding the effect of edibles on
children).
¶70. After Hood mentioned “three guns,” the prosecutor immediately handed him “two
firearms” and clarified, “Are those the submissions that you received from the Wilkinson
County Sheriff[’s] Office?” to which Hood responded in the affirmative. There was no other
mention of three guns. The prosecutor’s closing statement likewise only referenced two
guns. In closing the prosecutor argued:
You’ve heard testimony that there were two guns. Everybody knew there were
two guns at that hotel. You heard two witnesses, Ms. Cole and Ms. Bateaste
say, “Yeah, man, there were two guns. One was purple, one was black.” You
heard our firearms expert testify. “Yeah, that’s a fact. Actually, this is a
SCCY, that’s a 9 millimeter, and the black Glock, that’s a 40-caliber.” So it
doesn’t matter who was shooting and what round went in, it matters that they
24
were working together, and they all were working together.
¶71. We find no “obvious error which was not properly raised by the defendant and which
affect[ed] [the] defendant[s’] fundamental, substantive right” to a fair trial. Reyes, 419 So.
3d at 915 (¶37) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, this issue is procedurally
barred. Further, because the transcript contradicts the argument that the prosecution tried to
mislead the jury, this issue is also without merit.
VI. Cumulative Error
¶72. Weatherspoon and Jackson argue that their convictions should be reversed due to a
culmination of errors at trial. “The cumulative error doctrine stands for the proposition that
individual errors that are not reversible alone may combine with other errors to amount to
reversible error if ‘the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a
fundamentally fair trial.’” Cole v. State, 412 So. 3d 1144, 1152 (¶27) (Miss. 2025) (quoting
Harris v. State, 970 So. 2d 151, 157 (¶24) (Miss. 2007)). However, if no individual error is
found, “there can be no reversible cumulative error.” Id.
¶73. Having found no individual error, we find no cumulative error. Weatherspoon’s and
Jackson’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
¶74. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND
LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., McCARTY, EMFINGER AND
WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.
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