COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 1552-25-4
JEFFREY DONELLE HAMPTON
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Athey, Bernhard and Senior Judge Clements
Argued by videoconference
Opinion Issued September 8, 2026
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Kimberly A. Irving, Judge
Collin Chayce Crookenden (Vanderpool, Frostick & Nishanian, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Paul-Michael R. Lowey, Assistant Attorney General (Jay Jones, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
PUBLISHED OPINION BY
JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR.
A Prince William County jury found Jeffrey Donelle Hampton (“Hampton”) guilty of
recklessly handling a firearm and unlawfully discharging a firearm at an occupied building.
Following the completion of the jury trial on the aforementioned charges, the Circuit Court of
Prince William County (“trial court”) also conducted a bench trial after which Hampton was also
convicted of possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a non-violent felony.
Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Hampton to 10 years and 12 months’
incarceration, with 5 years and 12 months suspended. On appeal, Hampton claims that the trial
court abused its discretion during sentencing, citing several remarks the trial court made during
post-trial proceedings. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2023, Sade Anglin (“Anglin”) and her new boyfriend, Michael Hawkins
(“Hawkins”), became engaged in a physical altercation while in their apartment. The altercation
occurred during a party celebrating the birthday of Hawkins’s stepbrother, Derick Batchelor
(“Batchelor”). During the altercation, Anglin’s six-year-old son and several other children were
present in the apartment and witnessed the altercation. As a result, Hawkins ended his relationship
with Anglin.
The following morning, Anglin contacted Hampton, who is the father of her six-year-old
son. She requested that Hampton pick up their son because Hawkins had “threatened” him. As a
result, Hampton drove to the apartment complex where Anglin and Hawkins lived in order to pick
up their son. Hampton parked 80 yards from the apartment, armed himself with a .380 caliber
pistol, and began walking shirtless toward the apartment. Meanwhile, Hawkins and Batchelor were
removing Hawkins’s possessions from the apartment. As Hampton approached the apartment,
gunfire was exchanged. As a result of the gunfire, Hawkins sustained a single gunshot wound that
entered his buttock and exited through the front of his leg. Hawkins succumbed to the single
gunshot wound the following day after being transported to the hospital. Police subsequently
arrested Hampton about four months later when he turned himself in to law enforcement.
Hampton was initially charged with second-degree murder, in addition to numerous other
firearm charges. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth moved to amend the murder charge to
involuntary-manslaughter, contending that Hampton only set in motion the means by which another
person shot and killed Hawkins. Based upon the Commonwealth’s proffer, the trial court granted
the motion to amend the indictment. Following the amendment, Hampton was ultimately charged
with involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Code § 18.2-36; attempted malicious wounding, in
violation of Code §§ 18.2-26, -51.2; using a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of
-2-Code § 18.2-53.1; maliciously discharging a firearm at an occupied building, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-279; discharging a firearm in a public place, in violation of Code § 18.2-280; possessing a
firearm after having previously being convicted of a non-violent felony, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-308.2(A); misdemeanor brandishing a firearm, in violation of Code § 18.2-282; and
misdemeanor reckless handling of a firearm, in violation of Code § 18.2-56.1. The felon-inpossession charge was then severed from the other charges and set for a bench trial to occur based
upon the outcome of the jury trial. The remaining charges proceeded to a five-day trial by jury that
began on October 16, 2024.
During Hampton’s jury trial, Batchelor testified that Hampton had approached the apartment
“clutching” the .380 pistol, meaning that “[Hampton] was holding [the] gun.” He further testified
that Hampton shot at Hawkins when Hawkins exited the apartment. He then explained to the jury
that Hawkins initially retreated and then returned fire at Hampton with a .300 caliber rifle.
Batchelor recalled running to assist Hawkins after he heard Hawkins exclaim that he had been shot.
Batchelor then recalled saying, “Give me the F’ing 26”—referring to a Glock 26 handgun that
shoots 9mm caliber bullets—because “[he] wanted to go after the person that shot [his] brother.”
One of the crime scene investigators assigned to the case testified that he found four .380
caliber cartridge cases at the scene next to a car parked outside the apartment. Four .300 caliber
cartridge cases that were located closer to the “sidewalk area in front of the apartment” were also
recovered by investigators. In addition, other law-enforcement officers also testified that they found
a 9mm caliber bullet that “fell out of [Hawkins’s] shorts” when they initially assessed his gunshot
wound. Forensic examination further revealed that Hawkins’s gunshot wound resulted from a 9mm
caliber bullet. Although the origin of the 9mm bullet was not determined, the evidence as a whole
indicated that the 9mm bullet was likely fired by a third party. In fact, the Commonwealth
conceded that the bullet that killed Hawkins did not come from Hampton’s gun.
-3-Investigators next testified that they recovered several bullet fragments in nearby homes.
One of the bullet fragments recovered was found “between a bunk bed in [a] children’s room and
the wall” in a neighboring apartment. Another fragment was recovered from the wall of a different
neighbor’s living area. In addition, several vehicles in the parking area near the scene of the
shootout were also damaged by gunfire.1 The Commonwealth also introduced in evidence video
footage from an interior security camera in another neighbor’s home, depicting that neighbor diving
behind cabinets once the shooting began.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Hampton moved to strike each of
the charges. Hampton then withdrew his motion and began his own case-in-chief. Hampton
testified that on the day of the shooting, he approached the apartment with the .380 pistol concealed
in his pocket. He further explained to the jury that as he approached the apartment, Hawkins came
outside and instructed Batchelor to “[g]rab the AR, grab the AR.” Hampton recalled that Hawkins
then retrieved the .300 caliber rifle from a vehicle and pointed the rifle at him. Hampton explained
that because of Hawkins’s actions, he was forced to take cover behind a car and that it was only
then that he “pulled [his] gun out.” He testified that Hawkins fired at him first and he returned fire
“over the top of the car.” He explained that he “didn’t see where [he] was actually shooting” and
only returned fire because “[he] didn’t think [he] was going to make it [out] from behind that car
alive.” He also repeatedly represented to the jury that “[his] intent when [he] [was] shooting” was
“to defend [him]self” and to “fire[] the gun so [Hawkins] couldn’t walk down on [him] and shoot
[him].”
Hampton also testified that, after the shootout, he fled the scene and did not call police
because “[he] was scared.” He stated that later that same day, he “gave [the gun he used] to a
1
Hampton did not admit that he caused the damage to the vehicles. However, he did acknowledge that the bullet fragment found in the wall of the neighbor’s living area originated from his firearm.
-4-friend” and told his friend “to get rid of it.”2 Hampton explained that he had not seen the gun he
used in the shootout since he gave it to his friend. He also explained that he did not turn himself in
for several months because he was taking care of “two litters of puppies” until they could “fend for
themselves,” “getting [his] kids together and getting everything together,”3 and “try[ing] to find
counsel to represent [him] . . . with the[] charges that w[ere] put on [him].”
Hampton then rested his case-in-chief and the Commonwealth offered no rebuttal.
Hampton then moved to strike each of the charges. The trial court granted his motion only with
respect to discharging a firearm in a public place. The trial court instructed the jury and both parties
presented their closing arguments. The jury then retired to deliberate. During deliberations, the jury
inquired whether they should “automatically” find Hampton “not guilty on all charges” if they
believed he acted in self-defense. After discussing the question and an appropriate response thereto
with counsel for Hampton and the Commonwealth, the trial court provided the jury a written
response, stating that “self[-]defense is an available defense for each of the charges, and you should
consider it when analyzing each one of the charges.”
The jury subsequently returned its verdicts, convicting Hampton of recklessly handling a
firearm and unlawfully discharging a firearm at an occupied building. The jury acquitted
Hampton of using a firearm in the commission of a felony, attempted malicious wounding,
brandishing a firearm, and involuntary manslaughter. Shortly after the reading of the jury’s
verdicts, the trial court held a bench trial before separately convicting Hampton for possessing a
firearm after having previously been convicted of a non-violent felony.
2
Hampton’s friend subsequently died of an overdose after receiving the gun Hampton used in the shootout.
3
Hampton testified that he has ten children.
-5-Hampton then moved to be admitted to bail. During the post-trial bail hearing, the
Commonwealth asserted that Hampton was both a flight risk and a danger to the community due
to his decision to show up to the apartment armed. Hampton responded that he was justified in
bringing the firearm to the apartment the day of the shootout. The following colloquy then
ensued:
[HAMPTON]: But, Judge, I have to say this, and this doesn’t make
it right, but if he didn’t have that firearm that day, he might not be
here. He may not be here, Judge. I am not justifying it, but I
believe that the jury agreed with us that he was defending himself.
[TRIAL COURT]: No. No, that’s—the jury agreed that they
didn’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt the other, and you and I
both know that that’s how that goes.
[HAMPTON]: Okay. Well, possibly.
The trial court then began discussing the felon-in-possession conviction:
[TRIAL COURT]: So, on the one hand, [p]retrial; right?
[HAMPTON]: Uh-huh.
[TRIAL COURT]: We don’t know then that he is going to be
convicted of anything. He stands here now differently than he did
before, because he is convicted, which actually makes it worse;
right?
[HAMPTON]: Right.
[TRIAL COURT]: But not convicted of all of the charges that
came about, which I understand.
[HAMPTON]: Right.
[TRIAL COURT]: I am going to tell you, Mr. Hampton, I think
you may just be in the position of being unlucky enough to have
maybe the wrong judge. I despise these felons with convictions in
possession of a firearm cases. I do, because this is what’s
happening on our streets.
And the fact that he got rid of the gun, and nobody has ever
found it, and, “Oh, the person I gave it to died, and I don’t know
what happened to it,” I find to be garbage. It means there is a gun
with a body on it somewhere out there, probably sold on the black
-6-market, that is going to come back around to the same problem we
are having right now, and that is problematic to me.
And so I’ve got to sit here and think, realistically, what am
I going to do with an individual who is a convicted felon, who
carried a gun—regardless of what happened on that day—when
you are not supposed to, who then got rid of that gun, didn’t turn it
in, and it is now floating around somewhere.
[T]his is not whether you are a flight risk or a danger to the
community. That ship has sailed. That ship is gone. We are now
sitting here saying, what makes sense with somebody who has
been convicted of two felonies and one misdemeanor, that is going
to be sentenced accordingly?
The trial court then clarified, “I am not sitting here saying [Hampton] [is] getting eleven
years of active time. He’s not. I’m not doing that, you know.” The trial court subsequently
denied the motion for post-trial bail.
At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Hampton “request[ed] a sentence within the
sentencing [guidelines] range.”4 In support, he claimed that he “did not have an extensive
criminal record.” He also asserted that his involvement in a previous shooting incident in which
he was targeted was his reason for carrying a firearm and maintained that he was defending
himself from Hawkins.
The trial court disagreed with Hampton’s assertions. Concerning his criminal record, the
court noted that Hampton had convictions for drug offenses, eluding, firearm offenses, assault
and battery, and contempt of court. The trial court also addressed the way Hampton approached
the apartment, referencing Batchelor’s testimony at trial that Hampton “was clutching” his gun.
And the trial court emphasized the surrounding circumstances of the shooting when expressing
that it was “not sure this [wa]s a guidelines case”:
4
The sentencing guidelines recommended a range from 7 months’ to 1 year and 11 months’ incarceration.
-7-I can’t ignore the fact that at some point, somebody has to
say we’re not having gunfire in the middle of these apartment
dwellings and townhouse complexes that put all of these little kids
in danger who are simply trying to play outside; and when you
bring a firearm into that, that’s what you do.
The fact of the matter is there were bullet holes in people’s
residences; and that’s a problem. They did not all come from him,
though, and that’s mitigating.
In addition, the trial court emphasized that Hampton “was on the run” for four months
before turning himself in, further warranting a longer sentence. The trial court also highlighted
that due to Hampton previously being convicted of a felony, he lost his ability to lawfully
possess a firearm, no matter his justification for having one—a statement with which Hampton
agreed.
Hampton then responded that the jury accepted his theory that he was defending himself,
further claiming that, had he not been “armed that day,” he would be dead. The following
exchange ensued:
[HAMPTON]: Judge, I think we could agree on this one point: If
he wasn’t armed that day, . . . this would have been a funeral.
[TRIAL COURT]: That’s not—see, and there’s where we disagree.
I’m not sure that’s true. I’m not sure that it was not proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense.
But the standards are what the standards are. I’m not sure
that if he hadn’t brought a gun—I believed every person who said
he walked out and was clutching. I believed when he took his shirt
off and he walked up there and he had a gun in his pocket, that
people who have seen people with a gun in their pocket knew he
had a gun in his pocket. And I am not sure that he’s not the one
that triggered it just by clutching a firearm, walking into there.
And if I did, I wouldn’t be struggling with this. If I thought
for sure that his life was at danger but for him bringing a firearm,
we wouldn’t be having this conversation. I would happily look
within the guidelines that there are. But I’m not sure about that.
The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt means that the
jury couldn’t beyond a reasonable doubt find. You’ve got these
two different events. And the videos, while some of them were
good, they weren’t all great, there are some things that were crystal
clear. And to me, the fact that everybody saw him clutching, the
fact that I heard that on the video is crystal clear. And so I’m not
-8-going to jump in and say, well you know, he’d be dead if he didn’t
bring a firearm here.
I don’t know that an entire neighborhood wouldn’t have
been the victim of a shootout in the middle of an afternoon day
where kids are had he not brought a gun there. I’m not sure that
that’s not what started this. I have no doubt that the phone call
from [Anglin] played a role. I have no doubt in that. But the
reaction of him, I believe, played a role, as well.
The fact of the matter is the jury found him not guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that is their function and their job,
and I’m not sure they’re wrong. But the flip of it doesn’t mean
that’s correct either.
At the same time, the trial court emphasized that it was cognizant of the jury’s findings
and did not seek to overturn them, albeit erroneously calling the involuntary-manslaughter
charge “murder”:
I can’t ignore the jury verdict. And the reality is the jury found
him not guilty of the murder. And they even found, into the
occupied dwelling, a lesser mens rea than what was charged. I
can’t ignore that. It would be wrong for me to sentence him to 11
years when a jury of his peers dropped those, even though I
doubted some of what he had to say.
Hampton, during allocution, expressed remorse, apologized to Hawkins’s family, and
stated that he was “just trying to protect [him]self.” The trial court, finding the guidelines’
recommendation inadequate, then sentenced Hampton to 5 years’ active incarceration: 5 years’
incarceration, with 4 years suspended, for his felon-in-possession conviction; 5 years’
incarceration, with 1 year suspended, for his unlawfully discharging a firearm at an occupied
dwelling conviction; and 12 months’ incarceration, all suspended, for his reckless handling of a
firearm conviction. The trial court entered its sentencing order on February 5, 2025.
Hampton moved for reconsideration of his sentence, pursuant to Code § 19.2-303, in May
of 2025. He asserted that the trial court’s sentence was “contrary to the jury’s findings.”
Hampton also claimed that the jury implicitly accepted his self-defense theory and found that he
-9-“did not instigate the shooting.” In Hampton’s view, the trial court’s finding at sentencing that
he played a role in instigating the shootout was erroneous. He argued that the trial court’s
“interpretation of the facts at sentencing must flow from the findings of the jury.” Finally,
Hampton emphasized the trial court’s misstatements at sentencing concerning his burden to
prove self-defense and that the jury found him not guilty of “murder.”
At the reconsideration hearing, the trial court stated, “[M]otion[s] for reconsideration . . .
[are] not something I take up often, however, the record in this case deserves some clean up
which is why I did take this up the way I did.” It clarified that the jury “[did]n’t have to find
beyond reasonable doubt that [Hampton] acted in self-defense” to acquit him and that a
defendant’s self-defense theory need only “give[] rise to reasonable doubt.” And because the
murder charge had been amended to manslaughter before trial, the trial court agreed that it
“shouldn’t have said murder. Sometimes we talk so quickly that we misspeak.”
Concerning the jury’s findings, the trial court “struggle[d] with the idea” that the jury’s
verdict implied that it definitively accepted Hampton’s theory. The trial court reasoned that,
although the jury acquitted Hampton of manslaughter, “that d[id]n’t mean that [the jury] found
that he acted in self-defense. It mean[t] that they didn’t find that the Commonwealth proved
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements they need[ed] to prove.” Continuing, the trial
court stated that it did not know what specific facts the jury accepted or rejected during
deliberations, further asking, “[D]id [the jury] find that [Hampton] didn’t instigate [the
shootout]? . . . Or could they just not find that he did?” The trial court further explained that it
did not think it gave significant weight to an improper factor during sentencing because it gave
weight to “the fact that . . . [there was] a shootout in the middle of a parking lot on a Sunday with
people who shouldn’t have guns.”
- 10 -Finally, the trial court addressed its comments from the post-trial bail hearing. In
response to Hampton re-raising the trial court’s statement of distaste toward felon-in-possession
cases, the trial court stated, “I do. I said that really to let the Commonwealth know I have no
idea why it is that they constantly break these down, including in this case.” The trial court then
explained why it only sentenced Hampton to one year of active time for the felon-in-possession
charge in light of its comments at the post-trial bond hearing. It described how the court first
“determined . . . that [Hampton’s convictions] w[ere] worth five years because” there were
“bullets in one old lady’s house and bullets in a bunkbed of somebody else,” then concluded that
the unlawful-discharging charge warranted “the majority of the time . . . because, the fact of the
matter is, you can’t discharge firearms in random people’s houses.” The following colloquy then
ensued:
[TRIAL COURT]: [D]o you ever read your own transcripts?
[HAMPTON]: I do.
[TRIAL COURT]: It’s painful.
[HAMPTON]: And I hate it.
[TRIAL COURT]: It’s painful to do. I accepted this [motion]
because as I read it—and I will fully acknowledge I enjoyed
[Hampton’s trial counsel] being up there. The fact of the matter is
having an intellectual conversation with very capable lawyers fits
right within the things I enjoy doing.
I went back through the file to think and I never know what
I’m thinking at the day, but I have notes and I reviewed them and
the reality is he was still a convicted felon who brought a gun and
there were still houses that were shot up as a result, in a
neighborhood that may never be the same because it’s not what we
expect in Prince William County on a Sunday afternoon.
You know, everything else was very conversant with
[Hampton’s counsel]. Maybe I should learn to be less conversant
when I am dealing at such high stakes because I certainly don’t
mean to cloud the issues. But I respect [Hampton’s] read of things
- 11 -and as soon as I got his written motion, I thought oh, he’s
absolutely right.
The trial court concluded, “I think five years was the right sentence,” adding, “[M]y
words were wrong. I don’t think my decision was wrong.” The trial court then denied
Hampton’s motion to reconsider his sentence. Hampton appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“A [trial court’s] sentencing decision will not be reversed unless the trial court abused its
discretion.” Garibaldi v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 64, 67 (2019) (quoting Martin v.
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735 (2007)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we
say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Khine v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 530, 558 (2024)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015)).
Regarding pure “challenge[s] to the duration of imprisonment,” “our view adheres to the
‘general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in
the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.’” Minh Duy Du v.
Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564-65 (2016) (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,
431 (1974)). We have called these challenges “substantive” sentencing challenges. Cellucci v.
Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 36, 49 (2023). But as to other sentencing challenges,5 “when a
decision is discretionary,” “the court has a range of choice, and . . . its decision will not be disturbed
as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Lawlor v.
Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212-13 (2013) (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis
Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352 (2011)). A trial court exceeds its “range of choice” in “three
5
We have, at times, referred to these other challenges as “procedural” sentencing challenges, where a defendant alleges that “the sentencing process” was “infected by a statutory or constitutional violation.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. App. 722, 747 (2026).
- 12 -principal ways”: 1) “when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not
considered”; 2) “when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight”;
and 3) “when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing
those factors, commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting Landrum, 282 Va. at 352).
Finally, “[t]he abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion
was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260
(2008) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)). This means that “where the issue
underlying the imposition of a [sentence] ‘is one of law, and not fact, we do not accord the trial
court’s ruling the same weight it would be accorded if reached upon conflicting factual evidence.’”
Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 287 (1991) (quoting Tullidge v. Bd. of Supervisors of Augusta
Cnty., 239 Va. 611, 614 (1990)).
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Hampton.
Hampton contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in sentencing [him].”6 In
support, Hampton asserts that the trial court erroneously rejected facts that the jury purportedly
found at trial, inaccurately stated the burden of proof for self-defense, and improperly weighed
mitigating evidence while “in pursuit of its own personal views on Hampton carrying a firearm to
defend himself.” For the reasons that follow, we disagree with Hampton and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
6
Hampton’s second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred by “denying [his] motion to reconsider sentencing.” While Hampton has two separate assignments of error, his opening brief only contains a single argument section that, while including statements made during the reconsideration hearing, only targets the trial court’s ruling in sentencing Hampton. As such, “we can discern no argument of assignment[] of error [two] . . . within [appellant’s] opening appellate brief. The failure to brief an assignment of error constitutes a waiver of the argument.” Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 422 (2004); see Rule 5A:20(e). We continue to address his arguments in the context of whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Hampton.
- 13 -1. The trial court did not rely on facts that the jury necessarily rejected.
Hampton first contends that the trial court considered facts at sentencing “that were rejected
by the jury.” In support, he raises the jury’s verdict and its question posed during deliberations as
proof that it found he acted in self-defense. That purported finding, according to Hampton, required
the trial court to not rely on facts indicating that he instigated the shootout, such as the fact that he
arrived at the scene “clutching” his firearm.
When an appellant claims that the sentencing judge specifically misrepresented facts
previously found by a jury, an appellant may rely solely upon “[t]he verdict, as finally agreed upon
and pronounced in court by the jurors,” and “only those factual findings which, by logical necessity,
must have been made for the jury to reach the conclusion it did” to support his contention.
Kennemore v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 703, 708-09 (2007). Any inquiry into juror
deliberations or questions sent to the trial court “offers no window into the actual motivations and
beliefs of the jurors.” Barnes v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 588, 596 n.3 (2024); see Kennemore,
50 Va. App. at 709 (holding that a jury’s “question[s] posed to the court during deliberations” are
not representative of implicit findings of fact).
Hampton’s argument on this point proceeds from a faulty premise. That the jury acquitted
Hampton of involuntary manslaughter does not definitively imply that it accepted his self-defense
theory. Barnes, 80 Va. App. at 593, 596 n.3 (rejecting appellant’s “mistaken contention that the
jury found that he acted in self-defense” when it acquitted him of second-degree murder). In other
words, the jury, “by logical necessity,” did not need to find that Hampton acted in self-defense “to
reach the conclusion it did.” Kennemore, 50 Va. App. at 708-09 (emphasis added). Similarly, the
jury, “by logical necessity,” id. (emphasis added), did not have to reject the notion that Hampton
was “clutching” his gun in order to acquit him of involuntary manslaughter. As the trial court noted
upon reconsideration, the jury instead could simply have found the Commonwealth did not meet its
- 14 -burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury could have also
“simply decided to be lenient with [Hampton]” by “convict[ing] him only of the . . . offense[s][]
[that] carried a lesser penalty,” which involves no affirmative factfinding at all. Reed v.
Commonwealth, 239 Va. 594, 597 (1990).
The only way to conclude that the jury either accepted Hampton’s theory of self-defense or
that he was not “clutching” his gun while approaching the apartment, without a special verdict form
saying as much, is by piercing into the “deliberative safe space” that is the jury room—something
that “Virginia is ‘more careful [to avoid] than most states.’” McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 298 Va.
456, 460 (2020) (quoting Reed, 239 Va. at 598). “In almost every case, especially every case of
felony in which the jury is kept together for several days, a plausible ground might be shown for
setting aside the verdict” if courts could pierce the jury room, and “the sufficiency” of those grounds
“would have to [be] decide[d] according to [the court’s] own discretion,” thereby introducing
“painful uncertainty” into “the administration of justice.” Bull v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.)
613, 632 (1857). And if we did permit such invasions, it “would hold out to unsuccessful parties
and their friends[] the strongest temptation to tamper with jurors after their discharge[] and would
otherwise be productive of the greatest evils.” Id. Accordingly, we reject Hampton’s invitation to
invade the “inviolability and secrecy of jurors’ deliberations” and, because the jury in this case
simply returned verdicts of not guilty, we cannot conclude that the trial court relied on facts that the
jury necessarily rejected in sentencing Hampton. Reed, 239 Va. at 598 (quoting Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Hulvey, 233 Va. 77, 82 (1987)).
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made nonprejudicial misstatements of
law during sentencing.
Second, Hampton contends that the trial court’s misstatements during sentencing regarding
the burden of proof for self-defense illustrate the trial court’s “reliance on . . . incorrect legal
- 15 -principles or factual findings.” While the trial court made a misstatement during sentencing, it does
not constitute reversible error.
“[A]ll trial court rulings come to an appellate court with a presumption of correctness.”
Riggins v. O’Brien, 263 Va. 444, 448 (2002); see Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 929 (1941)
(“All presumptions exist in favor of the regularity of the judgments of courts of general
jurisdiction.” (quoting Salistean v. State, 215 N.W. 107, 109 (Neb. 1927))). An appellant claiming
error by the trial court “is required to overcome the presumption [of correctness] by record proof.”
Mack, 177 Va. at 929.
Relatedly, “[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary in the record, the judgment of a trial court
comes to us on appeal with a presumption that the law was correctly applied to the facts.”
Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978 (1977). But “judges continue to be [human] and
do not cast aside all human imperfections when they ascend the bench.” Via v. Commonwealth, 42
Va. App. 164, 180 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Moore v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 453,
463 (1947)). As such, judges may have “the occasional lapse in the judicial demeanor” by making
certain “comments” that “we [cannot] . . . condone.” Id. at 182.
However, to warrant reversal, an appellant must specifically “provide meritorious argument
that the [statements] were more than harmless misspeak.” Milam v. Milam, 65 Va. App. 439,
466-67 (2015) (citing Yarborough, 217 Va. at 978). Our Supreme Court has specifically held that a
trial court does not commit reversible error when an appellate court “can be satisfied the [decision]
was based on a correct application of the law,” “even though an incorrect theory may also have been
considered by the court” at the time it rendered its judgment. Yarborough, 217 Va. at 979. As such,
our Supreme Court has made a crucial observation regarding judges who make inaccurate
statements on the record: “No trial is perfect, and error will at times creep in, particularly in hotly
- 16 -contested cases. [But] [t]o warrant a reversal it must be substantial; otherwise litigation would be
interminable.” Parsons v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 832, 852-53 (1930).
An appellant has several options to show that a judge’s statements were not “harmless
misspeak.” Milam, 65 Va. App. at 467. An appellant may, for example, claim that the judge’s
statements were made before a jury and “intimate[d] the bias of the court with respect to the
character or weight of the testimony.” Mazer v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 649, 653 (1925) (quoting
Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 874 (1881)); see also Via, 42 Va. App. at 181. An
appellant could also claim that the misstatements, “[v]iewed cumulatively,” amounted to a
deprivation of a defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law because the misstatements
“undermine[d] confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the . . . proceeding.” Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 86 Va. App. 722, 753-54 (2026). As Hampton contends here, however, another
option is that the judge’s misstatements establish that the trial court simply abused its discretion
because its “discretion was . . . guided by [the] erroneous legal conclusion[]” endorsed by the
misstatement. Porter, 276 Va. at 260 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100); see Slayton v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367-68 (1946). We may look to numerous proceedings throughout
the timeline of a case to assess whether a trial court ultimately abused its discretion when it rendered
its final judgment. Cf. Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 371, 376, 379-81 (1946) (collecting
cases where courts reviewed statements by a judge in a prior proceeding to discern whether that
judge was biased during the proceeding at issue).
Here, Hampton is correct that the trial court made an incorrect statement of law when it said,
“I’m not sure that it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense.”7
The trial court also erroneously stated, during the same exchange as the previous statement, that
7
On brief, Hampton does not raise the fact that the trial court also accidentally referred to the involuntary-manslaughter charge as “murder,” so we do not address it here.
- 17 -“the jury found [Hampton] not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Yet what Hampton fails to show
is that the trial court’s “discretion was . . . guided by erroneous legal conclusions,” thereby
rendering the judgment an abuse of discretion. Porter, 276 Va. at 260 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at
100).
Taking the trial court’s misstatement in context, as we must, see Cellucci, 77 Va. App. at 51,
the transcript reflects that the trial court made the inaccurate statement of law when responding to
Hampton after he claimed that but-for his bringing a firearm with him to pick up his son, Hampton
would have been killed in the shootout. As such, the trial court was responding to a separate point
of argument—raised by Hampton himself—and made no connection between the misstatement and
imposed sentence. See Thompson v. Commonwealth, No. 1161-21-4, slip op. at 5 (Va. Ct. App.
July 19, 2022) (affirming a defendant’s sentence when the trial court misspoke during sentencing
but “nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the [trial] court imposed a more severe sentence
because of the misstatement”).8 Additionally, the trial court provided several separate
justifications for its sentence unrelated to self-defense before entering its judgment. Indeed, the trial
court repeatedly stated at the sentencing hearing that it was focused on the nature of the shootout
and how it put many innocent bystanders in grave danger, indicating that its “[decision] was based
on a correct application of the law.” Yarborough, 217 Va. at 979. Moreover, the trial court did not
continuously reassert the inaccurate burden of proof throughout the hearing; it stated the inaccuracy
twice in a single moment of dialogue, indicating that the consideration was not “given significant
weight.” Lawlor, 285 Va. at 213 (quoting Landrum, 282 Va. at 352). Finally, the trial court
repeatedly cited the correct burden of proof at both the post-trial bail hearing (e.g., “[T]he jury
agreed that [the Commonwealth] didn’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt [that Hampton was
8
While not binding, unpublished cases may be cited as persuasive authority. See Rule 5A:1(f); see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 371, 383 n.4 (2023).
- 18 -guilty], and you and I both know that that’s how that goes.”) and the sentencing hearing (e.g.,
“The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt means that the jury couldn’t beyond a reasonable doubt
find [Hampton guilty].”). Accurate statements like these indicate that the trial court’s sentence, in
fact, “was based on a correct application of the law.” Yarborough, 217 Va. at 979.
A single misstatement of law does not automatically amount to an abuse of discretion.
Treating such a statement as “a doctrinal ‘royal flush,’” Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29, 46
(2017), does not comport with prior holdings that no reversible error occurs when “we can be
satisfied the [decision] was based on a correct application of the law,” “even though an incorrect
theory may also have been considered by the court,” Yarborough, 217 Va. at 979; see Milam, 65
Va. App. at 467. Nor is it consistent with the foundational principle that this Court may “ignore the
effect of an erroneous ruling when an error clearly has had no impact upon the verdict or sentence in
a case.” Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 288, 296 (1998); see Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712,
720 (1957) (“It is elementary that in order to constitute reversible error the ruling of the trial court
must be material and prejudicial to the interests of the party complaining of it.”). Instead, Hampton
needed to show that the trial court’s misstatement was not “harmless misspeak.” Milam, 65
Va. App. at 467. Hampton’s mere identification of the misstatement is insufficient given the
context in which the misstatements were made.
Finally, we are assured that the trial court’s sentence was not “guided by erroneous legal
conclusions” because the court took the time to correct its misstatements and reassess its sentence at
a reconsideration hearing. Porter, 276 Va. at 260 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100). Our caselaw
endorses the general practice that a lower court may correct errors in its final judgment, or even
“change its mind,” as long as it still has jurisdiction over the case.9 Robbins v. Robbins, 48
9
There are some limited means by which a trial court can correct non-substantive errors in its judgment even after it has become final. See Code § 8.01-428(B) (authorizing trial courts to correct “[c]lerical mistakes . . . at any time”).
- 19 -Va. App. 466, 474 (2006) (quoting Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 853 (1991)); see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. McBride, 302 Va. 443, 449 (2023) (“One . . . background principle[] is the
recognized authority of a court to reconsider an erroneous or flawed decision.”). Courts that
undergo self-evaluation while having jurisdiction to do so ought to be celebrated, as “[t]he
principles of justice obviously require that what has been done amiss should be set right” while the
case remains “in the breast of the judges of the court.” Henry Campbell Black, Treatise on the Law
of Judgments: Including the Doctrine of Res Judicata § 153 (2d ed. 1902) (quoting 3 Edward Coke,
The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England § 438 (1628)). Indeed, “the people of the
Commonwealth . . . entrust their judges to correctly apply their legal training, experience, and
expertise when resolving the questions put to them for decision.” Sroufe v. Waldron, 297 Va. 396,
402 (2019). By correcting and reassessing the record while maintaining jurisdiction over a case,
trial courts simply apply “the[ir] best efforts, reasoned judgment, and good faith” to render accurate
decisions in all respects. Id. Hence, the fact that the trial court here retained jurisdiction over the
case, identified its own misstatements, and then reassessed its sentence in light of the corrections
supports that Hampton’s sentence was not the result of an abuse of discretion.
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, Hampton was required to identify “clear evidence”
in the record, Yarborough, 217 Va. at 978, that the trial court was “guided by” its erroneous
statement of law—one that it made in the context of responding to the argument of Hampton’s
counsel, was not reiterated at any other time in the sentencing hearing, and was set against proper
sentencing considerations—when fashioning its sentence, Porter, 276 Va. at 260 (quoting Koon,
518 U.S. at 100). Not only that, Hampton needed to point to sufficiently clear evidence so
“reasonable jurists could not differ,” Khine, 82 Va. App. at 558 (emphasis added) (quoting Swann,
290 Va. at 197), that the trial court was “guided by” its erroneous legal statement when sentencing
Hampton, Porter, 276 Va. at 260 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100). Hampton failed to do so.
- 20 -Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made its mere “harmless misspeak.”
Milam, 65 Va. App. at 467; see Yarborough, 217 Va. at 979.
3. The trial court did not improperly weigh mitigating evidence when it sentenced
Hampton.
Hampton’s final assertion is that the trial court failed to properly weigh mitigating evidence
during the sentencing hearing. Hampton specifically contends that the trial court “did not properly
review the facts” when sentencing Hampton and that its remarks at the post-trial bail hearing and
during sentencing illustrated that it “was more focused on penalizing Hampton” by being in “pursuit
of its own personal views on Hampton carrying a firearm to defend himself.”10
Trial courts “ha[ve] a duty to consider mitigating evidence along with other evidence in
determining the appropriate sentence.” Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 569 (1998). During
sentencing, mitigating evidence is ordinarily weighed against evidence illustrating the “nature of
the offense, the defendant’s background, and the surrounding circumstances.” Minh Duy Du,
292 Va. at 563. “If a trial court does not find mitigation evidence compelling when weighed against
other evidence in the case, it is ‘not required to give controlling effect to’ that evidence.” Stambler
v. Commonwealth, 88 Va. App. 198, 221 (2026) (quoting Sheets v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App.
706, 718 (2024)). Additionally, “[b]arring clear evidence to the contrary, this Court will not
10
We asked both parties at oral argument about this Court’s holding in Jackson v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. App. 722, and how it affects this case. This Court in Jackson—which was decided after Hampton filed his opening brief—held that a sentencing-judge’s remarks can, under specific circumstances, “undermine[] the constitutional due process guarantee of a neutral and detached arbitrator.” 86 Va. App. at 754-55. Hampton, however, continued to focus the inquiry at oral argument on whether the trial court abused its discretion and not on whether the trial court committed a due-process violation. Even if Hampton wished to pursue a due-process argument, he did not comply with Rule 5A:18 because he never raised a due-process argument before the trial court, nor did he assert either exception to Rule 5A:18 in his opening brief. See Swanson v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 147, 157 n.7 (2010) (“Appellant did not make . . . any due process argument[] to the trial court[] and, therefore, th[at] argument is procedurally defaulted.”); see also Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc) (stating that this Court “will not consider” either exception to Rule 5A:18 “sua sponte” (emphasis omitted)). We therefore do not analyze whether the trial court’s remarks here amounted to a due-process violation.
- 21 -presume that a trial court purposefully ignored mitigating factors in blind pursuit of a harsh
sentence.” Bassett v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 580, 584 (1992).
Here, Hampton did express remorse and apologized to Hawkins’s family during allocution,
even though the jury acquitted him of any responsibility for his death. But the trial court was not
required to “find such evidence compelling when weighed against other evidence.” Guest v.
Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 187, 197 (2023). In this case, that “other evidence,” id., illustrated
that Hampton armed himself, approached Hawkins’s apartment, and engaged in a shootout in
broad daylight. There were innocent bystanders, including children, who were at risk of being
shot. Hampton had an extensive criminal record and was a convicted felon who was barred from
possessing a firearm, despite his subjective reason for carrying one. He then fled the scene and
did not report the shooting to law enforcement, failing to turn himself in for over four months.
Further, although the jury acquitted Hampton of any crime involving malice, it still convicted
him of two felonies and a misdemeanor—crimes that carry the potential for, in total, up to 10
years and 12 months of active incarceration. See Code §§ 18.2-56.1(A), -279, -308.2(A).
Hence, there was ample evidence weighing against the mitigating evidence present in this case.
Moreover, contrary to Hampton’s assertion, the record indicates that the trial court did
consider mitigation evidence. The trial court expressly considered the fact that he was acquitted on
several charges as mitigating, noting that “[i]t would be wrong . . . to sentence [Hampton] to 11
years when a jury of his peers” rejected several of the charged crimes. The trial court also
recognized that a contributing factor as to why Hampton was armed at the apartment was that
Anglin called him saying Hawkins had “threatened” his son. However, even with the trial court
explicitly considering these mitigating facts, it still was not required to “find such evidence
compelling when weighed against” evidence of the circumstances supporting his conviction.
Guest, 78 Va. App. at 197. Nor was it even required to list out which mitigating factors it found
- 22 -to be compelling or unpersuasive. See Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 500 (2015)
(“Absent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court is not required to give findings of fact
and conclusions of law.’” (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982))); see
Bassett, 13 Va. App. at 584. These considerations further undercut Hampton’s argument.
Finally, the trial court’s statements regarding felon-in-possession charges and the facts
surrounding the shootout fail to establish “clear evidence” that it acted “in blind pursuit of a harsh
sentence.” Bassett, 13 Va. App. at 584. True, the trial court at the post-trial bail hearing stated, “I
despise these felons with convictions in possession of a firearm cases.”11 Nonetheless, the trial
court elsewhere at the post-trial bail hearing still emphasized its focus was on facts the jury
found in finding Hampton guilty of the felon-in-possession charge, which included the fact that
Hampton unlawfully possessed a firearm. The trial court, in fashioning its sentence, also
continuously reiterated at the sentencing hearing that its decision was based on Hampton’s
conduct and the danger it posed to neighbors and children at the apartment complex.
Additionally, even with its statement about the charge, the trial court imposed less active time for
Hampton’s felon-in-possession conviction than his unlawfully discharging a firearm at an
11
The trial court did clarify at the reconsideration hearing that this remark was “really let[ting] the Commonwealth know [it] ha[d] no idea why . . . the[] [Commonwealth] constantly break[s] these [charges] down.” But the context of the remark during the post-trial bail hearing renders that clarification somewhat curious. Recall that the trial court stated:
I am going to tell you, Mr. Hampton, I think you may just be in the
position of being unlucky enough to have maybe the wrong judge.
I despise these felons with convictions in possession of a firearm
cases. I do, because this is what’s happening on our streets.
It is unclear to this Court how the trial court was “really” referring to the Commonwealth when, at the beginning of its remarks, the trial court expressly addressed its statements to “Mr. Hampton.” The trial court’s explanation further conflicts with the trial court’s statement because the statement seems targeted at the conduct underlying the charge (i.e., unlawfully possessing a firearm) and not the Commonwealth’s prosecutorial decisions. However, as we explain below, we still conclude that the trial court still did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Hampton.
- 23 -occupied dwelling conviction—indicating that the trial court was not acting in accordance with
any purported animus about felon-in-possession charges. Indeed, there is no evidence that the
trial court’s remark—which was made at an entirely separate hearing—bore any connection to
the trial court’s ultimate sentence. Hence, taken together, “reasonable jurists could . . . differ,”
Khine, 82 Va. App. at 558 (quoting Swann, 290 Va. at 197), in assessing whether the trial court’s
remark constituted “clear evidence,” Bassett, 13 Va. App. at 584, supporting Hampton’s allegation
that the trial court sentenced him “in pursuit of its own personal views on Hampton carrying a
firearm to defend himself.”
Moreover, while the trial court used strong language in expressing its frustration toward
Hampton and his conduct, using such language does not, by itself, amount to an abuse of discretion.
See Jackson, 86 Va. App. at 746 (“A judge’s expressions of concern about community violence,
victim impact, and public safety are not, on their own, improper.”). Under the abuse-of-discretion
standard, “the court has a range of choice” in how it exercises its discretion. Lawlor, 285 Va. at
212-13. One of those discretionary choices is a judge’s choice of words while sentencing a
defendant. And our Supreme Court has previously highlighted that, in certain situations, “it is
neither surprising nor inappropriate that the record contains emotional language” during a
sentencing determination.12 Prieto v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 149, 165 (2012). Hence, we cannot
conclude that describing a defendant’s conduct in harsh terms is beyond the “range of choice,”
Lawlor, 285 Va. at 212-13, afforded to trial courts when sentencing a defendant—unless there is
“clear evidence,” Bassett, 13 Va. App. at 584, that its statements were so severe that “reasonable
jurists could not differ” in their infirmity, Khine, 82 Va. App. at 558 (emphasis added) (quoting
12
However, “in some cases, saying too much is as detrimental as saying too little.” Pilati v. Pilati, 59 Va. App. 176, 181 (2011). “The correct balance depends on the unique context of each case, the informative value of an explanation, and the possibility of inflaming an interminable dispute with an overly detailed explanation.” Id.
- 24 -Swann, 290 Va. at 197). And here, Hampton fails to make that showing. Thus, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in its use of language in describing Hampton’s conduct and
its impact. See Prieto, 283 Va. at 165 (“It is not required nor desired that judges of the
Commonwealth possess the ability to utterly set aside all human emotion while discharging their
duties.”); cf. Slayton, 185 Va. 357, 368 (“That a court . . . severely criticizes the testimony of a
witness which it rejects[] does not show that its conclusion was actuated by bias or prejudice.”).
Therefore, the trial court properly fulfilled its “duty to consider mitigating evidence along
with other evidence in determining the appropriate sentence, Reid, 256 Va. at 569, and Hampton
failed to adduce “clear evidence” that the trial court improperly weighed mitigation evidence or that
the court was “in blind pursuit of a harsh sentence,” Bassett, 13 Va. App. at 584. We are thus
compelled to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
“Criminal sentencing decisions are among the most difficult judgment calls trial judges
face.” Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 563. That being said, “[i]t is true that trial judges in this State do
not enjoy that freedom of action sometimes elsewhere accorded.” Nelson v. Commonwealth, 153
Va. 909, 920 (1929). “[B]ut in Virginia they are something more than moderators” and can, at
times, make remarks from the bench during sentencing, even if those remarks include insignificant,
nonprejudicial misstatements. Id.
In this case, the trial court did what it was entitled to do: consider the “nature of the
offense, the defendant’s background, and the surrounding circumstances,” Minh Duy Du, 292
Va. at 563, balance those considerations against “any mitigating factors presented by the
defendant,” Khine, 82 Va. App. at 558 (quoting Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36
(2000)), and not give an “irrelevant or improper factor . . . significant weight” or make “a clear
error of judgment,” Lawlor, 285 Va. at 213 (quoting Landrum, 282 Va. at 352). It did so even
- 25 -while making limited misstatements of law that the record illustrates did not influence the ultimate
sentence. See Parsons, 154 Va. at 852. Hampton thus has not sufficiently identified “clear
evidence” in the record, Yarborough, 217 Va. at 978, to overcome the “presumption of correctness”
the trial court’s ruling has on appeal, Riggins, 263 Va. at 448. Therefore, because the trial court did
not abuse its discretion during sentencing, we affirm its judgment.
Affirmed.
- 26 -