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Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
EUGENE EDWARDS v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47821)
Suarez, Clark and Westbrook, Js.*
Syllabus
The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of various crimes in connection with a robbery, appealed following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his habeas petition. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that his trial counsel, E, did not render ineffective assistance. Held:
The habeas court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to the petitioner’s claims that E rendered ineffective assistance in failing to adequately investigate and challenge the DNA evidence presented at trial and in failing to adequately investigate whether there were vehicles in the area of the robbery, other than the petitioner’s vehicle, that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle, as the petitioner failed to prove that E performed deficiently or that E’s allegedly deficient performance resulted in any prejudice to the defense.
The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining, on relevancy grounds, the objection of counsel for the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, to the petitioner’s testimony concerning his knowledge of fingerprint evidence at the time that he rejected a plea offer, as the claim was not raised in the petitioner’s amended habeas petition, and the petitioner did not argue before the habeas court, or on appeal, that his proffered testimony was relevant to his claim that E had failed to conduct an adequate investigation.
Argued April 20—officially released September 8, 2026
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland
and tried to the court, Wagner, J.; judgment denying the
petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
J. Patten Brown III, for the appellant (petitioner).
Christopher A. Alexy, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Susan M. Campbell, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
Opinion
CLARK, J. The petitioner, Eugene Edwards, appeals,
following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal, from the judgment of the habeas court denying
his amended petition for a writ for habeas corpus. On
appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly
(1) concluded that his trial counsel, Christopher Eddy,1
did not render ineffective assistance, and (2) precluded
him from testifying regarding “plea negotiations and an
undisclosed fingerprint report.” We affirm the judgment
of the habeas court.
The following facts, as set forth by our Supreme Court
in its decision on the petitioner’s direct appeal, are relevant to our disposition of the present appeal. “On June
22, 2012, the victim, Lieslotte Worysz, went grocery
shopping at a Stop and Shop grocery store in Rocky
Hill. After completing her shopping, she returned to her
home in Wethersfield. While driving home, the victim
noticed a motor vehicle driving behind her. The victim
testified that the vehicle was a Chrysler 300 and that
she was able to identify its make and model because she
and her husband previously owned Chryslers and ‘were
into cars.’ The victim further stated that the vehicle was ‘fairly new’ and a ‘light color,’ explaining as follows:
‘[It] follow[ed] me [at] a distance . . . and I admired [it]. I figured gee, the grill, everything is beautiful. I like it.’
“Upon returning home, the victim used a remote to
open the door to her attached garage and parked her
vehicle inside. The victim noticed that the vehicle that
had been following her home was parked behind her in
the driveway. As the victim was about to exit her vehicle, the [petitioner], who was the driver of the vehicle that
had followed her, approached her in the garage, held
a black gun to her stomach and demanded money. The
victim said to the [petitioner], ‘why are you doing this
to me? I didn’t do nothing to you,’ and tried to exit her
1
Although the petitioner was also represented by Damian Tucker at his criminal trial, the petitioner’s claims relate only to Eddy’s performance at trial.
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
vehicle, but the [petitioner] pushed her back down into
the driver’s seat and said, ‘[Y]ou shut up. If you’re going to scream. I’m going to hurt you. I’m going to shoot you.’ The [petitioner] then took the victim’s remote and closed
the garage door with both of them inside. The [petitioner] grabbed the victim’s pocketbook and took the money that
was inside. He also took the victim’s diamond ring, wedding band, watch, and keys. Afterward, the [petitioner]
opened the garage, threw the victim’s keys and remote
on the driveway, and left the scene. The victim picked
up the items that the [petitioner] had discarded, went
into her house, and called the police.
“When the police arrived, they took several photographs of the scene. The victim told [the] police about the Chrysler 300 and provided a description of the driver,
but she could not identify him in a photographic array.
Detectives Christopher Morris and James Darby of the
Wethersfield Police Department processed the scene
and the victim’s belongings for fingerprints and DNA
analysis. They obtained several latent fingerprints from
the driver’s door of the victim’s vehicle and swabbed the
victim’s vehicle, remote, and wallet for DNA analysis.
“Darby processed the driver’s side of the victim’s vehicle for fingerprints because the victim ‘had reported that as she was exiting [her vehicle], she was robbed and made
by the suspect to sit back down inside [her vehicle].’ Darby took six ‘hinge lifters’ and marked the locations for each lift. Morris sent the lifts to the Hartford Police Department, which found no matches. Morris then took the lifts
to the state forensic laboratory. John Brunetti from the
state forensic laboratory testified regarding his analysis of two latent partial prints obtained from the victim’s
vehicle. He concluded that they matched, respectively,
the [petitioner’s] left middle and index fingers.
“Thereafter, Morris went to the grocery store where
the victim had been shopping and obtained the security
video from the parking lot. Upon reviewing the video,
Morris noted a white vehicle following the victim out of
the parking lot. Upon further review of the video, Morris
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
and the other officers noted several characteristics about that vehicle, namely, a black scuff mark on the rear
bumper, an E-ZPass or some other form of transponder
device on the front windshield, and a third brake light
in the center of the vehicle’s trunk that did not appear
to be functioning properly. The vehicle had a Connecticut license plate on the front bumper, but officers were
unable to obtain the plate number from the security
video. Morris later showed the video to employees of a
Chrysler dealership, who confirmed that the vehicle in
the video was a Chrysler 300.
“On June 25, 2012, Morris shared information about
the case with other police departments and the media in
order to obtain investigative leads from members of the
public. The report released by the media described the
perpetrator of the crime as a [B]lack male between thirty
and forty years old, approximately five feet ten inches
to six feet tall, medium build and short black hair. The
report also described the vehicle allegedly used in the
robbery, including that it may have had an E-ZPass or
other form of transponder device on the front windshield.
“The New Britain Police Department provided Morris
with information on three white Chrysler 300 vehicles
that had some contact with the police, including one
that belonged to the [petitioner]. On June 25 [2012], the
same day that the media released information about the
robbery, Morris drove to the [petitioner’s] address in
New Britain and photographed his white Chrysler 300.
Morris noticed that the [petitioner’s] vehicle had a black scuff mark on its rear bumper, which was consistent
with the mark on the vehicle in the surveillance video.
Morris then ran the vehicle’s plate number through the
license plate reader database and discovered that the
Newington police had photographed the [petitioner’s]
front license plate on June 1, 2012. Morris also discovered that the [petitioner’s] father, Eugene Edwards, Sr.,
had an E-ZPass account and that the transponders can
easily be transferred between vehicles.
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
“On June 27, 2012, two days after the media released
the report of the robbery, Morris asked Officer Ronald
Floyd of the Wethersfield Police Department to conduct
further surveillance on the [petitioner’s] vehicle. Floyd
drove to the [petitioner’s] house in New Britain and took
several photographs of the [petitioner’s] vehicle, which
was parked approximately 200 yards from the house in
a school parking lot. Floyd’s photograph of the front of
the [petitioner’s] vehicle showed that it no longer had a
front license plate and that material from the front bumper where the license plate screws had been placed was
protruding, which indicated that the plate had recently
been removed. Floyd observed two vertical marks on
the front windshield, just below the rearview mirror,
which were consistent with leftover adhesive from an
E-ZPass or other similar transponder device. In Floyd’s
photograph, there was a New York Giants bumper sticker
on the rear bumper, which was not in the photograph
of the [petitioner’s] vehicle taken two days earlier. In
addition, the photograph taken by Floyd showed that
white paint had been applied to the black scuff mark on
the rear bumper.
“On June 28, 2012, officers drove to the [petitioner’s]
home in New Britain to execute a search warrant. Inside
the [petitioner’s] house, the officers found the front
license plate to the [petitioner’s] Chrysler 300, which
had been hidden underneath the seat cushion of a sofa.
The officers also discovered a black handheld BB gun in
a bedroom closet.
“The [petitioner] remained outside while the police
searched his home. The [petitioner] also volunteered
information about his vehicle to Detective Michael Patkoske of the Wethersfield Police Department. The [petitioner] said that the scratches on his rear bumper had
been there since he had purchased the vehicle, that the
New York Giants bumper sticker had been on his rear
bumper since 2011, and that he never had an E-ZPass
account. The [petitioner] also told Patkoske that his front license plate was under the couch and that it had been
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
knocked off the car as a result of a motor vehicle accident in New York in 2011. The officers did not, however,
observe any damage to the front of the [petitioner’s] car
or on the license plate found in the home. The police seized the [petitioner’s] vehicle as evidence, and, after further inspection, they determined that the third brake light on
the vehicle was functioning properly. The [petitioner’s]
nephew, Justin Collins, testified that the [petitioner] had told Collins to tell the police that the BB gun was his if the police asked.
“On July 3, 2012, Patkoske called the [petitioner] and
asked him if he would be willing to speak with him about
his vehicle and his whereabouts in June, 2012. Although
they had not discussed the dates of the [robbery] . . . the [petitioner] told Patkoske ‘I wasn’t even here . . . when
all that stuff was going on, whenever that happened.’
He said that he was in North Carolina from June 19 to
June 22 for his aunt’s funeral and that he was with his
girlfriend, Caryn Prince, in Virginia from June 1 to June
9, but he was not confident of the dates. The [petitioner] gave Prince’s cell phone number to Patkoske and told
him to check with her on the dates of the Virginia trip.
Patkoske then called Prince twice on that same day to
confirm the [petitioner’s] whereabouts. In between those
two telephone calls, the [petitioner] called Prince and
told her that the police ‘were trying to frame him’ and
that, if the police called her, she should say that ‘he was with [her].’ Prince told Patkoske that she was with the
[petitioner] in Virginia in May, not in June. Patkoske
later learned that the [petitioner] was in Connecticut on
June 22, 2012, because he had obtained a receipt from a
retail store showing that the [petitioner] had transacted
business in Connecticut on that date.
“On September 19, 2012, the [petitioner] appeared
at the Wethersfield police station and was placed under
arrest. The [petitioner] maintained that he was not the
perpetrator of the robberies, and he told Morris that he
had ‘the wrong tall, thin [B]lack male,’ and that ‘no one
picked him out of a lineup . . . .’ ” (Citation omitted.)
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
State v. Edwards, 325 Conn. 97, 101–106, 156 A.3d
506 (2017).
The petitioner was subsequently charged with and,
following a five day jury trial, convicted of home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a)
(2), robbery in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), larceny in the second degree
in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a123 (a) (3), and assault of an elderly person in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61a (a) (1).2 Id., 106. The petitioner was represented at trial by Eddy
and Damian Tucker.
On direct appeal, our Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of conviction. Id., 101. Thereafter, the petitioner initiated the present habeas action. On July 11,
2022, the petitioner filed the operative amended petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. In the amended petition,
the petitioner alleged that Eddy provided ineffective
assistance in failing (1) to adequately investigate and
challenge the fingerprint and DNA evidence presented
against the petitioner at trial, and (2) to adequately
investigate whether vehicles other than the petitioner’s
matched the description of the vehicle used in the crimes
for which he was convicted.3 The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a response on July 22,
2022, leaving the petitioner to his proof. The habeas
court, Wagner, J., conducted a trial on October 4, 2023,
2
In a case arising out of a separate incident that occurred in Berlin, the petitioner was also charged with home invasion in violation of § 53a-100aa (a) (2), robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (2) and larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 53a-123 (a) (3). State v. Edwards, supra, 325 Conn. 101 n.1. The state filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, which the trial court granted. Accordingly, “[t]he trial court consolidated the two cases for trial. After trial, the jury acquitted the [petitioner] of all charges arising out of the incident in Berlin.” Id.
3
In count three of the amended petition, the petitioner also alleged that Eddy was ineffective for failing to challenge the joinder of the case underlying the present habeas case with the case arising from the Berlin incident. See footnote 1 of this opinion. The petitioner withdrew this claim at the habeas trial and, thus, it is not relevant to this appeal.
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
at which the petitioner’s counsel called Eddy, Tucker,
Attorney Brian Carlow, the petitioner’s expert witness,
and the petitioner as witnesses. The petitioner submitted
the underlying criminal transcripts into evidence. The
parties also filed posttrial briefs.
On May 20, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. With regard to both of the petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, the court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove his claims because he failed to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies. Thereafter, the court granted the petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying the petitioner’s habeas petition. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set
forth as necessary.
I
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court
improperly concluded that Eddy did not render ineffective assistance for having failed (1) to adequately investigate and challenge the DNA evidence presented against
the petitioner at trial and (2) to adequately investigate a list of other vehicles that Eddy received during discovery that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle.
Before analyzing the petitioner’s claims, we set forth
the applicable law and the standard of review governing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. “The habeas
court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual
findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless
they are clearly erroneous. . . . The application of the
habeas court’s factual findings to the pertinent legal
standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and
fact, which is subject to plenary review. . . .
“Furthermore, it is well established that [a] criminal
defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and
effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of
criminal proceedings. . . . This right arises under the
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut
constitution. . . . As enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984)], this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. . . . A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists of two components: a performance prong and a
prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong . . .
the petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s
representation was not reasonably competent or within
the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. . . . In addition, in order to demonstrate that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced
his defense, the petitioner must establish that counsel’s
errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of
a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson
v. Commissioner of Correction, 313 Conn. 360, 375–76,
98 A.3d 23 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v.
Semple, 574 U.S. 1176, 135 S. Ct. 1453, 191 L. Ed. 2d
403 (2015). “A court can find against a petitioner, with
respect to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
on either the performance prong or the prejudice prong
. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brian S. v.
Commissioner of Correction, 172 Conn. App. 535, 539,
160 A.3d 1110, cert. denied, 326 Conn. 904, 163 A.3d
1204 (2017).
“With respect to the performance prong of Strickland,
we are mindful that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment
of attorney performance requires that every effort be
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s
perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . There are
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any
given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys
would not defend a particular client in the same way.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[S]trategic
choices made after thorough investigation of law and
facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; [but] strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the
extent that reasonable professional judgments support
the limitations on investigation.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 540.
“In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is
possible a reasonable doubt might have been established
if counsel acted differently. . . . Instead, Strickland asks whether it is reasonably likely the result would have
been different. . . . This does not require a showing that counsel’s actions more likely than not altered the outcome, but the difference between Strickland’s prejudice
standard and a more-probable-than-not standard is slight
and matters only in the rarest case. . . . The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Anderson
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 313 Conn. 376.
A
We first address the petitioner’s claim that the court
improperly concluded that Eddy did not render ineffective assistance in failing to adequately investigate
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
and challenge the DNA evidence presented against the
petitioner.4
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to the petitioner’s claim. At the petitioner’s underlying criminal trial, the prosecutor presented testimony from Daniel Renstrom, a forensic science examiner
in the DNA division of the state forensic laboratory,
relating to DNA testing conducted on samples collected
from the victim’s garage door opener and wallet. Renstrom testified on direct examination that he performed
DNA testing on the samples collected from the crime
scene and then prepared reports of his findings. Specifically, he testified that he was able to develop DNA profiles from the samples collected from the garage opener and
wallet and compared those profiles against the known
DNA profile of the petitioner, and that the petitioner was eliminated as a contributor to the DNA profiles developed
from the samples collected from the crime scene.
On cross-examination by Eddy, Renstrom testified
that the sample collected from the garage door opener
was a mixture of DNA, meaning there were “two or
more persons’ DNA included in [the] sample,” and that
the petitioner was eliminated as a contributor to that
mixture. Renstrom further testified that the petitioner
was eliminated as a contributor to the DNA sample collected from the victim’s wallet. He then clarified that
4
In the heading of a separate section of his principal appellate brief, the petitioner also asserts that Eddy provided ineffective assistance in failing to “meaningfully investigate and challenge the DNA and fingerprint evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Neither the body of the petitioner’s principal brief nor his reply brief, however, addresses any claim regarding Eddy’s investigation of the fingerprint evidence. As a result, to the extent the petitioner intended to pursue a claim that Eddy was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and counter the fingerprint evidence presented by the state at trial, we deem such a claim to be abandoned. “We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558, 706 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908, 713 A.2d 829 (1998).
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
“[t]he elimination statement means that their DNA is
not present or it’s not present to a detectable level for
our testing.” Ultimately, the results of the state forensic laboratory’s analysis were that the DNA sample from
the garage door opener was a mixture and that the DNA
samples from the opener and the wallet “lacked detection of a Y chromosome,” which means that they did not
contain male DNA, “thereby excluding the petitioner as
a source of the DNA.” Thus, there was no DNA evidence
presented at trial connecting the petitioner to the crime
scene. The defense did not present an independent DNA
expert at the underlying criminal trial.
During the habeas trial, both Eddy and Tucker testified. Eddy testified that, in preparation for the trial, he retained a DNA expert, William Wallace, who “went to
the Connecticut state lab, and . . . observed the testing to ensure the . . . accuracy of the [DNA] sample.” He testified that Wallace’s findings were that the DNA that the
state was able to obtain from the crime scene “was only
female DNA” and “exclude[d] male DNA . . . .” When
asked whether Wallace presented this evidence at trial,
Eddy testified that “the report that was authored by the
Connecticut state lab” also “excluded [the petitioner]
from his DNA being on the item seized relative to the
Wethersfield case” and that the fact that the petitioner
was excluded “was helpful to us.” Accordingly, Eddy testified that he did not present an independent DNA expert.
Instead, he elected to cross-examine and elicit testimony
from Renstrom that the petitioner was excluded as a
contributor to the DNA collected from the crime scene.
At the habeas trial, Tucker testified that he did not
consult with a DNA expert for the petitioner’s case, as
he was brought on right before trial, and that most of the “investigation was done prior to [him] coming on since
the case had been pending for quite some time.” He further testified that, if a DNA expert had been consulted,
it is possible that he might not have been aware of that.
The petitioner also presented expert testimony from
Carlow, a criminal defense attorney with a private
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
practice specializing in postconviction work who previously served as a public defender for the state of Connecticut for twenty-one years and then as Deputy Chief
Public Defender for eleven years. Carlow was called to
testify “on how . . . trial [counsel] failed to properly utilize the DNA evidence and failed to adequately cross-examine
the state’s DNA expert.” Carlow testified that he had
reviewed the records in this case, including the reports
relating to the DNA evidence. His testimony focused on
how DNA testing can establish whether a contributor to
a DNA sample is male or female. He then testified that
he would not rely on the conclusions of the state’s expert witness that the DNA samples collected from the crime
scene did not contain male DNA because it is possible for
evidentiary samples to degrade and “[t]here is a lot of
support in [the state’s] results, which support that the
Y chromosome very easily could have dropped out and,
therefore, would not be detectible.” He further testified that it is possible for male DNA to be present in an
evidentiary sample even if DNA testing does not detect
a Y chromosome. Thus, he testified that the DNA report
prepared by Renstrom “does not exclude the possibility
that there was a male contributor to the DNA sample[s].”
In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that Eddy rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the DNA
evidence. The court found that Eddy retained Wallace as
a DNA expert and that Wallace “analyzed the evidence
and confirmed the state lab’s findings that the sample
did not contain male DNA. Defense counsel used this
information in conjunction with the state lab’s findings
to support the petitioner’s defense at trial.” The court
concluded that the petitioner failed to prove how Eddy’s
performance in that regard was objectively unreasonable.
The court further concluded that the petitioner failed to
prove that he was prejudiced by Eddy’s decisions not to
conduct additional investigation or to call an independent DNA expert because “[t]he petitioner did not present
testimony from . . . [a] DNA [expert] that would have
effectively countered the state’s evidence at trial . . .
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
[and, therefore] has failed to make a showing as to how
this evidence would have been helpful in his defense.”
“The right to the effective assistance of counsel applies
no less to the investigative stage of a criminal case than it does to the trial phase.” Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 1, 32, 188 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied
sub nom. Connecticut v. Skakel, 586 U.S. 1068, 139 S.
Ct. 788, 202 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2019). “[E]ffective assistance of counsel imposes an obligation [on] the attorney to
investigate all surrounding circumstances of the case and
to explore all avenues that may potentially lead to facts
relevant to the defense of the case. . . . In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. . . . If counsel makes strategic
decisions after thorough investigation, those decisions
are virtually unchallengeable . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft v. Commissioner
of Correction, 159 Conn. App. 537, 547, 124 A.3d 1,
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 910, 128 A.3d 954 (2015). “In
the same vein, when counsel’s failure to proceed with an
investigation is due not to professional or strategic judgment but, instead, results from oversight, inattention
or lack of thoroughness and preparation, no deference
or presumption of reasonableness is warranted.” Skakel
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 35.
“[T]he reasonableness of any particular investigation
necessarily depends on the unique facts of any given case
. . . .” (Citation omitted.) Id., 33. “The reasonableness
of an investigation must be evaluated not through hindsight but from the perspective of the attorney when he
was conducting it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Norton v. Commissioner of Correction, 132 Conn. App.
850, 858–59, 33 A.3d 819, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 936,
36 A.3d 695 (2012).
In the present case, the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to prove that Eddy’s decisions not to conduct further investigation into the DNA
evidence or to present testimony from an independent
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
DNA expert were objectively unreasonable. The habeas
court found that Eddy retained the services of Wallace,
a DNA expert who concurred with the state forensic
laboratory’s findings that the DNA samples taken from
the evidence at the scene did not contain male DNA and
that the petitioner was excluded as a contributor to the
samples. The habeas court further found that, after
learning that Wallace concurred with Renstrom’s findings and that those findings were beneficial to the petitioner, Eddy elicited testimony from Renstrom that the
DNA samples collected from the crime scene excluded the
petitioner as a contributor. Thus, in preparation for the
petitioner’s criminal trial, Eddy did consult with an independent DNA expert and then reasonably decided not to
call that expert as a witness but, rather, to cross-examine the state’s witness in order to elicit testimony helpful to the petitioner’s defense. Under such circumstances, we
cannot conclude that the habeas court erred in concluding that Eddy’s decisions not to conduct further investigation into the DNA evidence or to present testimony
from an independent DNA expert were not deficient. See
Stephen S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn.
App. 801, 816–17, 40 A.3d 796 (“[w]e cannot conclude
that [trial counsel’s] performance was deficient when he
consulted with an expert witness regarding the victim’s
physical examination, yet reasonably concluded not to use
the expert witness at trial after determining that such
testimony would not benefit the petitioner’s defense”),
cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012).
Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that Eddy
performed deficiently, the petitioner cannot prevail
because the habeas court properly determined that the
petitioner failed to demonstrate that Eddy’s allegedly
deficient performance resulted in any prejudice to the
defense. We reiterate that the petitioner has the burden
of showing what benefit additional investigation or the
presentation of an expert witness would have revealed.
See Eastwood v. Commissioner of Correction, 114 Conn.
App. 471, 481, 969 A.2d 860 (decision not to call any
witness, including expert witness, “does not constitute
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
ineffective assistance unless there is some showing that
the testimony would have been helpful in establishing
the asserted defense” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 292 Conn. 918, 973 A.2d 1275 (2009);
Holley v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App.
170, 175, 774 A.2d 148 (2001) (“[t]he burden to demonstrate what benefit additional investigation would have
revealed is on the petitioner”). Here, the petitioner did
not present any evidence to show how further investigation of the DNA evidence or the presentation of a DNA
expert witness would have been beneficial to the petitioner’s defense. Therefore, the habeas court properly
concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that
he was prejudiced by Eddy’s decisions not to conduct
additional investigation or to present testimony from
an independent DNA expert. Accordingly, we conclude
that the habeas court properly denied the writ of habeas
corpus with respect to the petitioner’s claim that Eddy
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately
investigate and challenge the DNA evidence presented
at trial.
B
The petitioner next claims that the court incorrectly
concluded that Eddy did not render ineffective assistance
in failing to adequately investigate whether there were
other vehicles in the area that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle. Specifically, he argues that Eddy’s performance was deficient because, although Eddy’s
investigation “established that the [petitioner’s] vehicle was not a complete match to the suspect’s vehicle,” Eddy
failed to adequately investigate a list disclosed by the
state in discovery of other vehicles that were registered
in Connecticut and matched the general description of
the suspect’s vehicle. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner’s claim. At the habeas trial, Eddy testified that the petitioner was identified as a suspect
in the case because the petitioner possessed a “white
Chrysler 300,” which was “the same car or a similar
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
car [to] the one . . . described by the . . . [victim].” Eddy testified that, “because the motor vehicle in question
that was captured on surveillance cameras . . . did not
have a brake light that was illuminated,” he “tasked [an]
investigator with taking photographs of the vehicles that
had been seized by the Wethersfield Police Department.”
Eddy further testified that he went with the investigator
who “took photographs of the vehicle in question as it
was when it was at the impound lot of the Wethersfield
Police Department . . . [a]nd . . . made a point of documenting that the brake light was illuminated” because,
in the surveillance videos of the suspect’s vehicle, “the
brake light was not functioning . . . .” Eddy also testified that the police provided him with a list of other Chrysler 300s registered in the state, but that he could not recall whether he asked the investigator to investigate any of
the vehicles on that list. Tucker testified that, by the time he joined the petitioner’s case, most of the investigation had been completed, that he “specifically didn’t do an
investigation into the car,” and that he “believe[d] that
it was done prior to [him] coming on.”
The petitioner testified at the habeas trial that he was
identified as a suspect because of his vehicle and that
Eddy showed him the list of other Chrysler 300s that
the police had provided. The petitioner further testified
that the list contained “over 300” Chrysler 300s and that
he asked Eddy to investigate the other vehicles’ owners
but, to his knowledge, only one additional owner was
investigated.
In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that Eddy
rendered ineffective assistance in connection with his
investigation into other vehicles in the area that may
have matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle.
The court found that Eddy had “hired an investigator in
the petitioner’s case and tasked her with photographing
an illuminated brake light on the petitioner’s vehicle
for purposes of highlighting a difference between the
petitioner’s car and the car seen on the surveillance
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
footage.” The court further found that Eddy “received
a list of matching vehicles, and at least one owner from
the list was investigated.” The court concluded that, “[i]n light of the requirement that this court indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . the petitioner failed to prove that . . . Eddy’s investigation efforts constituted deficient performance.” The court
further concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by Eddy’s failure to conduct additional
investigation into the list of vehicles because he “failed to present any evidence that would have benefitted him
had . . . Eddy further investigated the other vehicles.”
As we previously explained in this opinion, “counsel
has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taft
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 159 Conn. App.
547; accord Skakel v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
329 Conn. 32. We also reiterate that “[t]he petitioner
had the burden of establishing that [counsel’s] investigation fell outside the wide range of professional conduct
considered reasonable . . . .” Jordan v. Commissioner of
Correction, 197 Conn. App. 822, 863, 234 A.3d 78 (2020),
aff’d, 341 Conn. 279, 267 A.3d 120 (2021). Thus, to
establish his claim that Eddy had performed deficiently
in his investigation, it was the petitioner’s burden to
demonstrate that Eddy had failed to adequately investigate whether any of the vehicles on the list matched the
description of the suspect’s vehicle and that such decision was objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., id. (“it was the
petitioner’s burden to show that [trial counsel] did not
attempt to investigate various witnesses’ accounts of
the shooting” (emphasis in original)).
In the present case, the habeas court properly concluded
that the petitioner failed to prove that Eddy performed
deficiently in connection with his investigation into the
vehicles that were included on the list that the state had provided. As we have stated previously in this opinion,
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
Eddy testified that he could not recall if he asked his
investigator to investigate whether any of the vehicles
on the list he received from the state matched the suspect’s vehicle. Although the petitioner testified that, to his knowledge, only one of the vehicles on the list was
investigated, the petitioner did not present any evidence
to indicate that there were any other vehicles on the list that matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle
such that additional investigation would have been warranted. Moreover, the petitioner failed to introduce the
list into evidence during the habeas trial. In the absence of such evidence, the petitioner could not meet his burden to overcome the presumption that Eddy had acted
reasonably in focusing his trial strategy on attempting
to distinguish the petitioner’s car from the one identified in surveillance videos. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the habeas court erred in determining that the
petitioner failed to establish that Eddy’s investigation
relating to the list of automobiles was deficient.
Furthermore, even if we assume arguendo that Eddy
performed deficiently in failing to sufficiently investigate the vehicles that appeared on the list that the state had provided, the habeas court also properly concluded
that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by such deficiency. The petitioner offered no
evidence at the habeas trial to suggest that additional
investigation would have uncovered evidence helpful to
his defense. Although the petitioner argues that he was
prejudiced by Eddy’s failure to conduct further investigation because there were “hundreds of similar vehicles
that could be an exact match with the suspect’s vehicle,”
the petitioner did not present any evidence that any vehicle on the list would, in fact, have matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the petitioner’s argument is grounded in speculation that, if
Eddy had conducted additional investigation, he might
have discovered exonerating evidence. “Mere conjecture
and speculation are not enough to support a showing of
prejudice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eastwood v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 114 Conn.
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
App. 479; see also Ostolaza v. Warden, 26 Conn. App.
758, 765, 603 A.2d 768 (petitioner’s burden of showing
prejudice “is not met by speculation but by demonstrable
realities”), cert. denied, 222 Conn. 906, 608 A.2d 692
(1992). The petitioner, therefore, has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by any alleged failure of Eddy to
investigate the list of other vehicles. Accordingly, we
conclude that the habeas court properly denied the writ
of habeas corpus with respect to the petitioner’s claim
that Eddy rendered ineffective assistance in connection
with his investigation of the vehicles that appeared on
the list of vehicles provided by the police.
II
The petitioner’s final claim is that the habeas court
abused its discretion by sustaining the respondent’s
objection on relevancy grounds to the petitioner’s testimony relating to his knowledge of a fingerprint report at
the time he rejected the state’s plea offer. The petitioner argues that such testimony was relevant to demonstrate
that he was not fully informed concerning the fingerprint
evidence when he rejected a plea offer presented by the
state.5 We conclude that such a claim was not raised in
the petitioner’s amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and, accordingly, that the habeas court did not
abuse its discretion in sustaining the respondent’s objection on relevancy grounds.
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. At the habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel sought to elicit testimony from the petitioner
5
Although the respondent argues that this claim was not properly preserved in the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal, we conclude that the evidentiary claim is reviewable because the habeas court granted the petition for certification and our review of this claim would not result in any demonstrable prejudice to the respondent. See McClean v. Commissioner of Correction, 103 Conn. App. 254, 258, 930 A.2d 693 (2007) (reviewing evidentiary rulings of habeas court that were not included in petition for certification because, “[i]n the absence of demonstrable prejudice . . . the terms of the court’s grant of certification will not limit the specific issues subject to appellate review”), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 913, 943 A.2d 473 (2008).
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
relating to his knowledge of fingerprint evidence at
the time he rejected a plea offer made by the state. The
respondent’s counsel objected to that line of questioning
on relevancy grounds, and the habeas court sustained
the objection on the basis that the petitioner had not
alleged any claim that Eddy had performed deficiently
in advising him about the plea offer and, therefore, the
proffered testimony did not relate to any of the claims
alleged in the amended petition.
“We review the [habeas] court’s decision to admit
[or exclude] evidence, if premised on a correct view of
the law . . . for an abuse of discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the
[habeas] court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest
abuse of discretion. . . . The [habeas] court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy [and admissibility] of
evidence . . . . In order to establish reversible error on an evidentiary impropriety . . . the [petitioner] must prove
both an abuse of discretion and a harm that resulted from
such abuse.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glen
S. v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 152,
161–62, 307 A.3d 951, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 951, 308
A.3d 1038 (2024).
“Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material
to the determination of the proceeding more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1. As it is used in our code, relevance encompasses two distinct concepts, namely, probative value and materiality. . . . Conceptually relevance addresses whether the evidence makes the existence of
a fact material to the determination of the proceeding
more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. . . . In contrast, materiality turns upon what is at issue in the case, which generally will be determined by the pleadings and the applicable substantive law. . . . If evidence is relevant and material, then it may be admissible. . . . Relevance does not exist in a vacuum. . . . To determine whether a fact is material . . . it is necessary to
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
examine the issues in the case, as defined by the underlying substantive law, the pleadings, applicable pretrial
orders, and events that develop during the trial. Thus,
relevance of an offer of evidence must be assessed against the elements of the cause of action, crime, or defenses
at issue in the trial. The connection to an element need
not be direct, so long as it exists. . . . It is the obligation of the party seeking to have the evidence admitted to
demonstrate its relevance to the habeas court. . . . Unless such a proper foundation is established, the evidence . . . is irrelevant.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Angel C. v. Commissioner of Correction,
226 Conn. App. 837, 845–46, 319 A.3d 168, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 908, 323 A.3d 1091 (2024).
Accordingly, to determine whether the court properly sustained the respondent’s objection on relevancy
grounds, we must first construe the claims in the petitioner’s operative amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. “[T]he interpretation of pleadings is always a
question of law for the court . . . . Our review of the
[habeas] court’s interpretation of the pleadings therefore is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lorthe
v. Commissioner of Correction, 103 Conn. App. 662, 669,
931 A.2d 348, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d 696
(2007). “A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is in the
nature of a pleading . . . . [T]he modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. . . . [T]he [petition] must be read in its entirety in such a
way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to
the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. . . . As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed
and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the
[petition] is insufficient to allow recovery.” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) White
v. Commissioner of Correction, 236 Conn. App. 67, 85,
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
347 A.3d 214 (2025), cert. granted, 354 Conn. 901, 348
A.3d 813 (2026).
We conclude that the operative amended petition did
not allege a claim of ineffective assistance pertaining to counsel’s plea advice and that the court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion in sustaining the respondent’s
objection to the petitioner’s testimony. The first count of the amended petition relates to Eddy’s alleged failure “to challenge and pursue the fingerprint and DNA evidence
presented against the petitioner at trial.” Specifically,
in count one, the petitioner alleged that, “[h]ad [Eddy],
pursuant to [his] knowledge, skill, and training, pursued
and challenged DNA and fingerprint evidence presented
against the petitioner at [his] trial, it is possible that the petitioner would have been found not guilty for the
crimes accused against [him] by a jury.” The petitioner’s
allegations specifically pertain to Eddy’s investigation
of the evidence, the impact of that investigation on the
petitioner’s criminal trial, and Eddy’s challenges to the
state’s presentation of that evidence at the criminal trial. The second count of the amended petition does not reference the fingerprint evidence at all but, rather, relates to Eddy’s alleged failure to investigate whether any vehicles on the list provided by the police matched the description of the suspect’s vehicle.6 The amended petition includes
no allegation that Eddy failed to inform the petitioner
about certain evidence or the strength of his case before
he rejected the state’s plea offer. Moreover, the petitioner did not argue before the habeas court, and does not argue
on appeal, that his proffered testimony concerning his
knowledge of the fingerprint evidence was relevant to
the claims alleged in counts one and two that Eddy failed
to conduct an adequate investigation. Accordingly, we
conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
habeas court to sustain the respondent’s objection to
6
As explained previously; see footnote 3 of this opinion; the petitioner withdrew count three of the petition, which alleged that Eddy was ineffective in failing to object to the joinder of the case underlying the present habeas petition with the case pertaining to the Berlin incident.
Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction
the petitioner’s testimony concerning his knowledge of
fingerprint evidence at the time he rejected the plea offer.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.