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Khan v. Khan
LISA KHAN v. AHMED KHAN
(AC 47435)
Cradle, C. J., and Elgo and Eveleigh, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed and the defendant cross appealed from the trial court’s postjudgment orders awarding the plaintiff child support and postmajority educational support arrearages and denying the defendant’s motions for contempt and modification of the parties’ postmajority educational support agreement. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court failed to award her a certain accrued child support arrearage. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court failed to find that the plaintiff wilfully violated any of its various orders. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the defendant owed the plaintiff child support and postmajority educational support arrearages, as the court calculated those amounts based on the facts before it, including the testimonial and documentary evidence, the parties’ incomes and the child support guidelines.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motions for contempt and to modify the postmajority educational support order, as the court found that the plaintiff’s ability to comply with the court’s various orders was erratic and irresponsible, not wilful, and the continued disparity between the parties’ annual incomes did not warrant modification of the educational support order.
Argued May 21—officially released September 8, 2026
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, where the court, Westbrook, J.,
rendered judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief in accordance with the parties’
settlement agreement; thereafter, the court, Klau, J.,
granted the defendant’s motion to modify child support and the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s motions for
contempt, denied the defendant’s motion to modify the
parties’ postjudgment educational support agreement
and granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel payment
of certain of their children’s postjudgment educational
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Khan v. Khan
costs, and the plaintiff appealed and the defendant
cross appealed to this court; subsequently, the court,
Klau, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for reargument
and vacated its orders; thereafter, the court, Klau, J.,
granted the plaintiff’s motions for payment of certain
child support arrearages and postmajority educational
expenses, ordered the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for certain educational costs, and denied the defendant’s motions for contempt and to modify the parties’
postjudgment educational support agreement, and the
plaintiff filed an amended appeal and the defendant filed an amended cross appeal. Affirmed.
Lisa Khan, self-represented, the appellant-appellee
(plaintiff).
Dara P. Goings, with whom was P. Jo Anne Burgh,
for the appellee-appellant (defendant).
Opinion
ELGO, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter, the
self-represented plaintiff, Lisa Khan,1 appeals and the
defendant, Ahmed Khan, cross appeals from the orders of
the trial court resolving several of the parties’ motions in a memorandum of decision filed July 18, 2024.2 Although
1
In these appeals, we are mindful of the plaintiff’s status as a selfrepresented litigant. We further note that “[t]his court has always been solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants and, like the trial court, will endeavor to see that such a litigant shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and fairly heard so far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party. . . . Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done. . . . For justice to be done, however, any latitude given to pro se litigants cannot interfere with the rights of other parties, nor can we disregard completely our rules of practice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marlow v. Starkweather, 113 Conn. App. 469, 473, 966 A.2d 770 (2009).
2
The plaintiff, on her amended appeal form, identified both the court’s February 16 and July 18, 2024 orders as the subject of her appeal. In its July 18, 2024 memorandum of decision, the court specifically indicated that its February 16, 2024 orders were “supersed[ed] . . . in full” by the court’s July 18, 2024 orders. Any claim of error regarding the propriety of the court’s February 16, 2024 orders, therefore, is moot. See, e.g., Shear v. Shear, 235 Conn. App. 769, 772–74, 347 A.3d 290
Khan v. Khan
the plaintiff raises multiple claims on appeal, only two
merit substantive discussion—namely, her contention
that the court erred by failing (1) to award her child
support arrearages accrued between November 2018
and February 2019, and (2) to accurately calculate the
postmajority educational support arrearages pertaining
to the parties’ children.3 On cross appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion (1) in
failing to find that the plaintiff wilfully violated any
of the court’s various orders pursuant to the defendant’s various motions for contempt and (2) denying the
defendant’s motion to modify the parties’ postmajority
educational support agreement. We affirm the orders of
the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of
(2025); State v. Santiago, 219 Conn. App. 44, 55–56, 293 A.3d 977, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1028, 295 A.3d 944 (2023).
3
Although the plaintiff identified nine issues in the statement of issues in her principal appellate brief, she briefed only seven claims of error. Accordingly, two of the plaintiff’s claims are inadequately briefed and we decline to consider them. See, e.g., Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman, 234 Conn. App. 45, 72 n.16, 343 A.3d 781, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809 (2025).
In her appellate brief, the plaintiff also contends that the court (1) “fail[ed] to enforce the plain and unambiguous language of the marital separation agreement by failing to order the defendant [to] reimburse the plaintiff for past children’s medical and extracurricular expenses since 2015,” (2) “fail[ed] to execute the plain and unambiguous language of [the marital settlement agreement], which holds the defendant responsible for 90 percent of private school expenses,” (3) “acted with bias by punitively vacating its support award of February 16, 2024, and replacing it with new and unexplained orders,” (4) “improperly delegated judicial [decision-making] authority to the defendant to determine the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s visitation with her natural child,” and (5) “erred by failing to grant leave for the plaintiff to have her complaint heard before the court.” Many of these claims are inadequately briefed; see, e.g., C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022); or moot. See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789, 805–807, 213 A.3d 467 (2019); A. A.-M. v. M. Z., 225 Conn. App. 46, 54, 313 A.3d 1288 (2024). Additionally, the plaintiff’s framing of these claims often mischaracterizes the court’s actual resolution of the parties’ various postdissolution motions. To the extent these claims are reviewable, we conclude that they are without merit.
Khan v. Khan
the claims before us. “The parties married in 1993 and
divorced in 2012. The defendant . . . is a neurosurgeon.
The plaintiff . . . is presently employed as a teacher and tutor. . . .
“When the parties divorced, they entered into a marital settlement agreement dated September 5, 2012 . . . .
The parties agreed to share legal custody of the children, who would live permanently with the [plaintiff].
The [defendant] agreed to pay $3970 in monthly child
support and pay 80 percent ‘of the expenses for camp,
lessons, tutoring, sports, extracurricular and similar
involvements of the children, with the [plaintiff] to be
responsible for the remaining 20 percent, provided that
any such expense of $1000 or more be incurred only after
written agreement of the parties.’ . . .
“The [defendant] also agreed to pay the [plaintiff]
alimony of $6250 per week, which would terminate
‘upon the remarriage of [the plaintiff], the death of
either party, or May 1, 2022, whichever occurs first,
this termination provision to be nonmodifiable.’ . . .
The [marital settlement agreement] alimony provision
set forth a detailed ‘true up’ process for adjusting the
[defendant’s] alimony obligation to reflect changes in
his annual income. . . .
“The [marital settlement agreement] also included
an educational support order. ‘For the first ten years
hereafter [i.e., until September 5, 2022] . . . the parties shall be equally responsible for the costs of a college
education for each of the children. The [Connecticut
Higher Education Trust (CHET)]4 funds set aside for
each child shall be allocated equally between the parties and shall be applied to college costs for each such child as each party elects. After the expiration of [ten] years, [the 4
CHET is a “state-sponsored 529 college savings program. The Connecticut State Treasurer is the trustee of CHET. CHET accounts help families plan and save for college in a tax-advantaged investment vehicle. CHET features state and federal tax free earnings and withdrawals on qualified higher education expenses.” Connecticut Office of the Treasurer, Resources for Youth, available at https://portal.ct.gov/ott/ financial-wellness/financial-planning (last visited September 2, 2026).
Khan v. Khan
defendant] shall be responsible for the costs of a college education for each child, pursuant to [General Statutes
§] 46b-56c . . . unless the parties agreed otherwise, and set forth the children’s obligations to qualify for college support payments. . . .
“On September 19, 2017, the court approved the parties’ stipulation to modify the [defendant’s] child support and alimony obligations. . . . The stipulation provided for the [defendant] to pay $3400 in monthly child support
and $226,323.45 in annual alimony.” (Citations omitted;
footnote added.)
The parties thereafter engaged in extensive motions
practice. Relevant to these appeals, the defendant moved
to modify the court’s child custody and visitation orders on February 28, 2019, and on October 22, 2022. The
parties also filed numerous motions for contempt and
for modifications regarding child support and postmajority educational support, which the court referred to
generally as the parties’ “financial motions.” The court
thereafter bifurcated the proceeding to address the child custody and financial issues separately.
The court issued a memorandum of decision resolving the parties’ child custody motions on August 8,
2022. Therein, the court found that the plaintiff had
engaged in a series of erratic and inexplicable behaviors regarding travel with the parties’ then minor children,
frequently moving, including a period of transience with
a then minor child in Kansas, and that her parental fitness caused two of their children to “not feel safe at the [plaintiff’s] home.”5 The court found that “it is not in
the minor children’s best interests to live with the [plain5
As a preamble to its findings of fact, the court stated: “The court has already noted the high conflict nature of this postjudgment litigation. Both parties presented extensive testimony and documentary evidence in support of their respective positions. Much of the evidence is unflattering to both parties. It is not necessary to describe in detail, or even to summarize, all the evidence the parties presented. Nor will the court make specific findings concerning all factual issues that were the subject of testimony. To do so, particularly in a public opinion, would serve only to inflict unnecessary pain on the parties and expose them to ridicule.”
Khan v. Khan
tiff] or for the parties to have joint legal custody.” The court thereafter ordered, inter alia, that the defendant
shall have sole legal and primary custody of the parties’ minor children.6 Additionally, the court ordered that,
“[p]ursuant to Practice Book § 25-26 (g) and the court’s
inherent authority to prevent frivolous and vexatious
pleadings, the [plaintiff] shall not file any further postjudgment motions, including contempt motions, unless
accompanied by a request for leave to file such motion.
The request for leave must conform to the requirements
of . . . § 25-26 (g).”7
The court issued a separate memorandum of decision
resolving the parties’ various financial motions on February 16, 2024. On February 23, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue,8 claiming, inter alia, that the court
erred in its calculations regarding child support and
postmajority educational support arrearages. On April
25, 2024, the court initially agreed to reconsider only
We agree and similarly decline to detail the extent of the “unflattering” postdissolution behavior engaged in by both parties.
6
The parties had six children together. Their youngest child was born in December 2007 and has since reached the age of majority. See General Statutes § 1-1d (defining “ ‘age of majority’ ” as eighteen years of age). Because the parties’ children have each attained the age of majority, any claim regarding custody or visitation of those children is therefore moot. See, e.g., A. A.-M. v. M. Z., 225 Conn. App. 46, 54, 313 A.3d 1288 (2024).
7
The trial court’s effort to dissuade the parties from further engaging in litigation regarding their divorce pursuant to its order that the plaintiff seek leave prior to filing additional postdissolution motions is admirable. See Strobel v. Strobel, 92 Conn. App. 662, 665, 886 A.2d 865 (2005) (“Our review of the record reflects the sad accuracy of [the court’s] observation that the parties herein have filed barrages of repetitive and abusive motions in an apparently ceaseless war of hostility and vindictiveness toward one another and that those motions are not only abusive to the system but, more importantly, to their now teenage son. The court’s efforts to limit the battle are praiseworthy.”).
8
The plaintiff titled her motion, “Motion for Correction of Numerical Errors,” and the court referred to it as a motion to reargue, presumably based on the substance of that motion, the relief sought and the sections of the rules of practice cited by the plaintiff therein. We similarly refer to the plaintiff’s motion as a motion to reargue. See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, 200 Conn. App. 505, 520, 238 A.3d 823, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 973, 240 A.3d 1055 (2020).
Khan v. Khan
certain orders in its February 16, 2024 ruling. However,
“[u]pon further reflection . . . it [decided that it] would reconsider its February 16, 2024 ruling and orders in
their entirety.” The court subsequently issued a ruling
and orders on July 18, 2024, that superseded the February 16, 2024 orders in their entirety.
Pursuant to its July 18, 2024 ruling, the court, inter
alia, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $43,168
in child support arrearage and $8692.85 in postmajority
educational support arrearage for a total of $51,860.85.
In response to a motion for contempt filed by the defendant, the court ordered the plaintiff to reimburse the
defendant for $51,227 in nonrefundable tuition he paid
to the Kent School because the plaintiff pressured one
of the parties’ then minor children to unenroll from the
Kent School after that tuition was paid. Collectively, the court’s orders resulted “in a net obligation of $633.85
owed by the [defendant] to the [plaintiff].” These appeals followed.
I
THE PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL
A
The plaintiff claims that the court erred by “failing
to hold the defendant responsible for admitted support
arrearages accrued between November 2018 [and] February 2019.” We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. Pursuant to the defendant’s motion to modify
the custody and support order, the court found that
a substantial change in circumstances existed, on the
basis of some of the parties’ minor children reaching
the age of majority and the actual primary residences
of the parties’ then minor children from September 19,
2017, the date of the previous operative child support
order, to April 18, 2022, the date that the defendant
received primary physical custody of the parties’ remaining minor children pursuant to an interim order. The
court thus determined, on the basis of that substantial
Khan v. Khan
change in circumstances, the stipulated amount the
defendant owed to the plaintiff, the parties’ respective
gross and net incomes, and the child support guidelines
established pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-215a,
that the defendant owed a net child support arrearage
of $43,168 to the plaintiff.
We begin with our standard of review and other relevant legal principles. In domestic relations cases, the
trial court has broad discretion, and we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its
action. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 224 Conn. App.
45, 54–57, 311 A.3d 235, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 902,
312 A.3d 585 (2024). “We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and will not disturb an
order of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion or findings lacking a reasonable basis in the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quindazzi v. Quindazzi, 56
Conn. App. 336, 338, 742 A.2d 838 (2000).
On the basis of our careful review of the record, we
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the child support arrearage of $43,168 to the
plaintiff. The court specifically calculated the amount of child support each party owed on the basis of the facts of the case, considering testimonial evidence, documentary
evidence, the parties’ incomes and the child support
guidelines. We therefore conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in calculating the child support arrearage.
B
The plaintiff next claims that the court erred by failing to accurately calculate the postmajority educational
support arrearages. We disagree.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that,
when the parties “divorced in 2012, [they] agreed to
share equally the costs of college for ten years, i.e.,
until September 2022. Thereafter, they agreed that
the [defendant] would be solely responsible for paying
college costs.” In response to the defendant’s motion to
Khan v. Khan
modify that agreement, the plaintiff asked “the court to
order the [defendant] to pay his share of college expenses for their son . . . who is currently at [the University of Connecticut]. The [defendant] argue[d] that he has paid
100 percent of [the parties’ daughter’s] college costs
and propose[d] a true up of [their children’s] college
expenses.”
The court found that the parties were each responsible
for one half of their children’s college costs from September 5, 2012, to September 5, 2022, pursuant to the
postmajority educational support order incorporated into
the parties’ marital settlement agreement. Two of the
parties’ children attended college during that time. The
court found that the defendant had paid for all of their
daughter’s college costs at the University of California at Santa Barbara since 2021. The court also found that the
defendant had paid $8000 to North Carolina State University, which was refunded to the plaintiff after their
son withdrew from that university and transferred to
the University of Connecticut. Thereafter, the plaintiff
paid the son’s tuition to the University of Connecticut.
The court found, on the basis of the defendant’s credited testimony and the documentary evidence in the record,
that the defendant owes the plaintiff $8692.85 “to true
up what both parties have paid toward the college costs
of [their children] through September 5, 2022.”
In reviewing a court’s orders in a domestic relations
case, the trial court employs broad discretion, and we
allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the court, provided the court’s findings have a reasonable basis in the record. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Marshall, supra, 224 Conn. App. 54–57; Quindazzi v.
Quindazzi, supra, 56 Conn. App. 338.
On the basis of our careful review of the record, we
conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering an educational arrearage of $8692.85 to the
plaintiff. The court credited the defendant’s testimony
and relied on documentary evidence in the record to reach
Khan v. Khan
its conclusion. We therefore conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in calculating the postmajority
educational support arrearage.9
II
THE DEFENDANT’S CROSS APPEAL
A
The defendant first claims that, in acting on his various motions for contempt, the court abused its discretion by
failing to find that the plaintiff had wilfully violated any of the court’s orders. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are necessary for our resolution of this claim. The defendant filed numerous motions for contempt regarding the
plaintiff’s move to Kansas with a then minor child and
for legal fees connected with subsequent proceedings
regarding his ex parte motions to modify custody. The
defendant also filed motions for contempt regarding
the plaintiff’s alleged violations of various custody and parenting orders.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the
plaintiff had suffered “a breakdown during COVID[-19],
and she is likely to continue to make erratic, irresponsible decisions unless she engages a mental health professional. The court does not find any of [the] alleged contumacious conduct to have been wilful . Moreover, although the
court’s previous orders giving the [defendant] sole legal and physical . . . custody of the minor children were based on the best interests of the children, the court understands that those orders have had a devastating effect
on the [plaintiff]. Imposing further monetary sanctions,
9
To the extent the plaintiff argues that the court erred because she has paid for some of the children’s college expenses after September 5, 2022, the court’s order explicitly holds the defendant responsible for all of the children’s college expenses after September 5, 2022. The court’s order, furthermore, solely addresses arrearage for costs paid prior to September 5, 2022. Because the issue of costs allegedly paid after September 5, 2022, was not before the court, we decline to address it in this appeal.
Khan v. Khan
including legal fees, would be unnecessar[ily] punitive.
The court will not pour salt in the [plaintiff’s] wounds.”10
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for contempt under a two part analysis. First, we must determine whether the order “was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. . . .
This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . . Second . . . we must then determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the
trial court’s determination of whether the violation was
wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding. . . . A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to determine whether the
court abused its discretion in [finding] that the actions or inactions of the [party] were in contempt of a court
order.”11 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham
v. Graham, 222 Conn. App. 560, 570–71, 306 A.3d 499
(2023). Moreover, we note that the trial court sits in a
superior position to assess a witness’ demeanor, attitude and credibility. See, e.g., Hallock v. Hallock, 228 Conn. App. 81, 104–105, 324 A.3d 193 (2024).
On our careful review of the record, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
find the plaintiff in contempt. The court found that
the plaintiff’s mental state was fragile due to both the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic at the time and the various postdissolution proceedings. The court specifically
found that the plaintiff’s decision-making regarding
her ability to comply with the court’s various orders was erratic and irresponsible, not wilful. See, e.g., Mathews v. Mathews, 232 Conn. App. 571, 580, 336 A.3d 517
(2025) (“[A] court may not find a person in contempt
without considering the circumstances surrounding
the violation to determine whether such violation was
10
The court also incorporated by reference its findings in the August 8, 2022 memorandum of decision regarding the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s temporary move to and transience in Kansas.
11
The parties do not dispute that the court orders at issue were clear and unambiguous.
Khan v. Khan
wilful. . . . [A] contempt finding is not automatic and
depends on the facts and circumstances underlying it.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Mindful that a
contempt finding is a fact-intensive inquiry and of the
superior position in which the trial court sits regarding witness testimony; see, e.g., Hallock v. Hallock, supra,
228 Conn. App. 104–105; we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in declining to find the plaintiff in contempt.
B
The defendant next claims that the court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to modify the postmajority educational support order. We disagree.
The parties agreed, pursuant to their marital settlement agreement, that the parties would share the cost
of postmajority education equally until September 2022
and that the defendant would be solely responsible for
paying college costs after September 2022. The defendant
subsequently filed a motion to modify the postmajority
educational support order and requested that the court
modify the parties’ agreement so that, after September
2022, both parties continue to share the cost of their
children’s college educations equally.
In acting on that motion, the court found that, although
the defendant’s yearly income has decreased and the
plaintiff has “managed her expenses and investments
wisely” to the point where she has acquired substantial
postdissolution assets, the defendant’s annual income
nonetheless “vastly exceed[ed]” the plaintiff’s annual
income. The court further found that the plaintiff’s
annual income was “unlikely to increase significantly
in the coming years.” The court thus determined that,
although the defendant “has met his burden of proving
a substantial change in the parties’ financial circumstances since [their separation],” the continued disparity between the parties’ annual income did not warrant
a modification of the postmajority educational support
order. Accordingly, the court denied the defendant’s
motion to modify.
Khan v. Khan
The court considered the parties’ annual incomes, the
postdissolution changes to the parties’ respective net
worth, and the marital settlement agreement in its discretionary determination to deny the defendant’s motion
to modify the parties’ postmajority educational support
order. On the basis of our careful review of the record,
we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
in denying that motion.
The July 18, 2024 orders are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.