IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
)
DEVIN MOORE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, ) No. 25-1461
)
v. ) Filed: September 3, 2026
)
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________ )
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs are correctional officers at Federal Correctional Institution Fort Dix (“FCI Fort
Dix” or “Institution”) who seek compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for time spent engaged in pre- and post-shift activities. The
Government filed a partial Motion to Dismiss, contending that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under
the FLSA with respect to the time Plaintiffs spend undergoing a security screening and walking
through a controlled entrance, known as a sally port, to enter the secured confines of the Institution
before their shifts begin. Also before the Court are Plaintiffs’ two Motions for Leave to File Notice
of Supplemental Authority. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the Government’s Motion
to Dismiss and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motions for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental Authority.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Under the FLSA, qualifying employers are required to compensate at one and one-half
times the employees’ regular rate all non-exempt employees who work in excess of 40 hours per
week. 29 U.S.C. § 207; see also 5 C.F.R. § 551.501 (2026). The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 251 et seq., later amended the FLSA to clarify that employees are not entitled to
compensation for “activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to [the employees’] principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). A principal activity is one the employees were
“employed to perform.” Id. § 254(a)(1). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
employees may be entitled to compensation under the FLSA for “[a]ctivities performed either
before or after the regular work shift . . . if those activities are an integral and indispensable part
of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed and are not specifically
excluded.” Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). If an employer fails to comply with the
FLSA, its employees may sue to recover unpaid overtime wages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
B. Factual Background
FCI Fort Dix is a low security correctional institution in New Jersey housing more than
4,000 male inmates. Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9, ECF No. 1. “The Institution is staffed 24 hours per day,
365 days per year by correctional officers, including Plaintiffs.”1 Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs characterize
their principal activity as “maintaining the safety and security of the Institution, inmates, and staff,”
which they perform by “searching for and eliminating contraband (including searching themselves
at the staff-dedicated screening site), maintaining constant vigilance to monitor for contraband and
to ensure that nothing out of the ordinary is occurring, and immediately addressing any issues[,]
including[] correcting inmate behavior and interacting with inmates.” Id.
Posts at the Institution requiring 24-hour staffing are separated into three consecutive eighthour shifts performed by different officers. Id. ¶ 12. For these eight-hour shifts, there is no paid
overlap, such that officers are required to be at their assigned post with all equipment and pertinent
1
Due to staff shortages, non-custody workers—such as those assigned to food services, unit counselors, and correctional systems staff—may be augmented and assigned to correctional officer posts. ECF No. 1 ¶ 35. Plaintiffs allege that when these non-custody workers are assigned to correctional officer posts, they perform the same uncompensated activities as correctional officers. Id. ¶ 36. Thus, these non-custody workers, to the extent they are augmented and assigned to correctional officer posts, are included as plaintiffs in this matter. See id.
2
post information by the scheduled start of their shift. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs allege that when they are
assigned to a shift on a 24-hour post, they perform uncompensated overtime work both before and
after their scheduled paid shift. Id. ¶ 14. According to Plaintiffs, this uncompensated time totals
at least 15–30 minutes per shift. Id. ¶ 15.
Plaintiffs specifically seek compensation for time spent: (1) undergoing a mandatory staff
security screening in the front lobby, id. ¶ 19; (2) collecting and donning duty belts and other
mandatory equipment, id. ¶ 20; (3) passing through the Control Center sally port and flipping their
accountability chit, id. ¶ 22; (4) walking to their assigned posts within the Institution, id. ¶ 23;
(5) exchanging information and equipment with the outgoing officer, id. ¶ 25; and (6) performing
these same activities—exchanging information and equipment, walking to the Control Center, and
exiting the prison—at the end of their shifts, id. ¶¶ 31–32.
Plaintiffs describe the security screening process as requiring officers to check themselves
for contraband before passing through an upright metal detector. Id. ¶ 19. According to Plaintiffs,
this screening is essential to prevent weapons and other contraband from entering the Institution.
Id. Plaintiffs must then collect and don their duty belts on the other side of the metal detector, as
the belts contain metal chains and chits that would trigger the security alarm. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiffs
next pass through the sally port, a secure entryway where they are identified and cleared by the
Control Center officer and “flip their accountability chit signifying that they are on duty and inside
the secured confines of the Institution.” Id. ¶ 22. Once they pass through the sally port, Plaintiffs
are locked within the secured confines of the Institution along with the inmates. Id. Accordingly,
as Plaintiffs walk to their posts, they must supervise and monitor inmates, including observing and
correcting inmate behavior, responding to inmate questions, checking for security breaches,
searching for contraband, running to locations where body alarms sound, and responding to
3
emergencies as they arise. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiffs note that upon entering the Institution they are, at
all times, in uniform and identifiable as correctional officers. Id. Once Plaintiffs reach their posts,
they inspect, account for, and exchange equipment such as radios, oleoresin capsicum spray (i.e.,
pepper spray), keys, and handcuffs with the outgoing officer. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs then discuss all
necessary information with the outgoing officer before starting their shift. Id. Once their shift has
ended, Plaintiffs exchange information and equipment with the incoming officer and walk through
the Institution to exit at the Control Center, during which time they continue to be responsible for
supervising and monitoring inmates, observing and correcting inmate behavior, looking for
contraband, and responding to emergencies. Id. ¶¶ 31–32.
C. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 2, 2025, seeking unpaid compensation they
are allegedly owed, plus interest. Id. at 13. The suit was brought as a collective action by Devin
Moore, a correctional officer at FCI Fort Dix, who sued on behalf of himself and other similarly
situated employees. Id. ¶ 1.
On December 12, 2025, the Government filed a partial Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) for failure to state a
claim. Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss Part of Compl., ECF No. 10. According to the Government,
Plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation under the FLSA for the time they spend clearing the
security screening and passing through the sally port prior to their shift, as such activities are
neither the principal activities Plaintiffs are employed to perform nor integral and indispensable to
those principal activities. Id. at 6. At this stage, the Government does not challenge Plaintiffs’
claim for compensation with regard to the other pre-shift activities alleged in the Complaint—i.e.,
Plaintiffs’ donning of duty belts and other equipment, the walk to their posts, and their exchange
4
of information and equipment with the outgoing officer—nor does the Government challenge
Plaintiffs’ claim for compensation with regard to their various post-shift activities.
Plaintiffs filed their response on January 9, 2026, arguing that clearing the security
screening and passing through the sally port are principal activities because both are essential to
ensuring the safety and security of the inmates, staff, and Institution. Pls.’ Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot.
to Dismiss Part of Compl. at 19–25 (security screening), 30–33 (sally port), ECF No. 11. Plaintiffs
additionally claim that passing through the sally port and flipping their accountability chit is
compensable, at a minimum, as part of their continuous workday because the Government does
not challenge their claim to compensation for time spent donning their duty belts, a principal
activity that precedes the officers’ passing through the sally port. Id. at 25–30. In the alternative,
Plaintiffs request that the Court defer ruling on the Government’s Motion to Dismiss until after
discovery, as further factual development is necessary and a partial dismissal would not narrow
discovery. Id. at 13–15. The Government filed its reply on January 23, 2026, reiterating its
arguments for partial dismissal and contending that the continuous workday rule does not apply in
the federal sector. See Reply in Supp. of Gov’t’s Mot. to Dismiss Part of Compl. at 5–6, ECF No.
12. The Court held oral argument on June 18, 2026. See Min. Entry, June 18, 2026. Accordingly,
the Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
After the parties’ briefing but before oral argument, Plaintiffs filed two Motions for Leave
to File Notice of Supplemental Authority. See ECF Nos. 13, 14. Plaintiffs’ first motion, filed on
March 10, 2026, directs the Court’s attention to Hodge v. North Carolina Department of Adult
Correction, No. 5:19-cv-478-BO, 2026 WL 579933 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2026), a case that reviewed
North Carolina correctional officers’ claims to overtime pay under the FLSA and found that the
officers’ principal activity was maintaining the safety and security of the institution. ECF No. 13
5
at 1–2; Hodge, 2026 WL 579933, at *2. Plaintiffs’ second motion, filed on March 19, 2026, points
the Court to Stroup v. United States, 180 Fed. Cl. 346 (2026), a recent Court of Federal Claims
case that denied a similar motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff-correctional officers
sufficiently stated a claim under the FLSA for time spent clearing a security screening and passing
through a sally port. ECF No. 14 at 2–3; Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 353–54. The Government filed
its Response to Plaintiffs’ Notices of Supplemental Authority on April 2, 2026, arguing that
(1) Hodge is irrelevant, as it did not involve federal correctional officers undergoing a security
screening and clearing a sally port, ECF No. 15 at 1, and (2) Stroup erred in several respects, and
thus the Court should not follow it, id. at 1–5. Plaintiffs filed their reply on April 7, 2026, arguing
that the Government failed to explain why the Court should not consider Hodge and Stroup in
ruling on the pending Motion to Dismiss. Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Mots. for Leave to File Notice
of Suppl. Auth. at 1, ECF No. 16.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court may dismiss a complaint if it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” RCFC 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. When deciding a RCFC 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept facts alleged in the complaint as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464
F.3d 1325, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Court, however, is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d
849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In making its decision, the Court
6
may consider the complaint itself, exhibits attached to the complaint, “documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Todd
Constr., L.P. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 100, 114 (2010) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rts. Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)), aff’d, 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for relief under the FLSA with regard to the
activities challenged by the Government. As for the time Plaintiffs spend undergoing the security
screening, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Complaint plausibly establishes at the pleading stage that
the security screening is integral and indispensable to Plaintiffs’ principal activities, though not a
principal activity itself. As for the time Plaintiffs spend passing through the sally port and flipping
an accountability chit, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged entitlement to
compensation for this time as well, since employers are required to compensate their employees
for all walking time that falls between the employees’ first principal activity and last principal
activity of the workday. To the extent they are instructive, the Court considers the cases cited in
Plaintiffs’ Notices of Supplemental Authority, as well as the Government’s responses to those
cases.
A. Plaintiffs Sufficiently Set Forth Their Principal Activities.
As discussed, Plaintiffs are only entitled to compensation under the FLSA for their
principal activities and activities that are integral and indispensable to such principal activities.
See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)–(2). Plaintiffs allege that their principal activity is “maintaining the
safety and security of the Institution, inmates, and staff.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. The Government,
however, claims that “[m]aintaining safety and security . . . is not a principal activity,” but rather
7
“the aspirational goal of the principal activities that plaintiffs are employed to perform.” ECF No.
10 at 12. The Court finds this dispute to be inconsequential.2
Although “maintaining safety and security” alone may be an overbroad description of
Plaintiffs’ principal activities, Plaintiffs have also provided the Court with examples of more
discrete, specific activities they perform in order to ensure the safety and security of the Institution.
See ECF No. 1 ¶ 10 (alleging that Plaintiffs’ responsibilities include “searching for and eliminating
contraband (including searching themselves at the staff-dedicated screening site), maintaining
constant vigilance to monitor for contraband and to ensure that nothing out of the ordinary is
occurring, and immediately addressing any issues including[] correcting inmate behavior and
interacting with inmates”). Courts have found similar descriptions of correctional officers’
principal activities sufficient. See Adegbite v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 495, 505 (2021) (finding
that “providing ‘security’ . . . is a sufficient description” of the plaintiffs’ principal activities
because the plaintiffs provide specific activities “in elucidating the ‘security’ [they] provide”);
Alkire v. United States, 158 Fed. Cl. 380, 390 (2022) (“Given the detail in Plaintiffs’ Complaint,
there is no reason to penalize Plaintiffs for using a general catch-all as shorthand for the variety of
activities they mention.”); Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 352 (dismissing the Government’s argument that
2
In its reply, the Government appears to read Plaintiffs’ Complaint as expecting compensation for every activity nebulously related to safety and security. See ECF No. 12 at 11 (arguing that “any time that correctional officers spend locking their personal vehicle in the prison parking lot, making sure their shoes are tied, putting out cigarettes, or a number of other activities . . . are not compensable simply because one can connect those activities in some theoretical sense to ‘safety and security’”). The Government urges the Court to instead focus on the activities it has specifically challenged in deciding its Motion to Dismiss. See id. at 14 (“The issue in this case is about the legally untenable arguments advanced by [P]laintiffs in making a claim under the FLSA for the two pre-shift activities.”). The Government makes too much of Plaintiffs’ alleged principal activity of “maintaining safety and security”—Plaintiffs are clearly seeking compensation for discrete activities, and, as the Government challenges two of those activities, they will be the focus of the Court’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.
8
maintaining security is merely an “aspirational goal” because “a principal activity can also describe
principal duties in the aggregate and include the numerous activities they are employed to
perform”); Hodge, 2026 WL 579933, at *2 (“It can fairly be said that a correctional officer’s
principal job responsibility is to supervise offenders and maintain the safety and security of
offenders and others inside the facility.”). Accordingly, these activities are sufficiently specific
such that the Court does not take issue with Plaintiffs’ use of the phrase “maintaining safety and
security” as a way to summarily describe Plaintiffs’ principal activities.
B. Plaintiffs Sufficiently State a Claim for Compensation Under the FLSA for Time
Spent Undergoing the Security Screening.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a claim for compensation with regard
to time spent undergoing the security screening.3 As alleged by Plaintiffs, they are responsible for
ensuring a contraband-free environment and accordingly must continuously monitor themselves
and others to prevent contraband from entering the Institution. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. Although not
a principal activity itself, at the pleading stage, the Court finds it plausible that undergoing the
security screening is integral and indispensable to Plaintiffs’ principal activity of maintaining the
safety and security of FCI Fort Dix.
3
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with the Government that Plaintiffs misstate the pleading standard by claiming that the Court “should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief.” ECF No. 11 at 16 (emphases in original) (quoting Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). As the Government correctly points out, see ECF No. 12 at 9–10, the “no set of facts” standard derived from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), is outdated, as the Supreme Court in Twombly clarified that plaintiffs must do more to sufficiently state a claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (stating that Conley’s “no set of facts” language does not set forth “the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival” and is instead “best forgotten”); see also Alkire, 158 Fed. Cl. at 389 n.10 (similarly noting that the plaintiffs incorrectly relied on the outdated Conley standard by citing Sommers Oil). Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim under the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard.
9
1. Plaintiffs Have Not Plausibly Alleged that Undergoing Security Screening Is a
Principal Activity Because It Is Not the Work Plaintiffs Were Employed to
Perform.
Under the FLSA, a principal activity is defined as an activity that the employee was
employed to perform. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). Though Plaintiffs contend that “[u]ndergoing a preshift security screening . . . is compensable as it is the ‘productive work’ that the Plaintiffs are
employed to perform—i.e., their principal activity of ensuring the safety and security of the
inmates, the staff, the Institution, and the public,” ECF No. 11 at 19, their arguments in support of
that claim largely indicate that the security screening is at most integral and indispensable to
Plaintiffs’ principal activities, rather than a principal activity itself. See, e.g., id. (claiming that
security screening at a prison is “directly tied to” correctional officers’ duty to ensure safety and
security by controlling contraband (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (“[K]eeping contraband out is part
of the Plaintiffs’ principal activities” and the “security screening is . . . an essential contraband
check[.]”). To the extent that Plaintiffs’ arguments can be read as contending that undergoing the
security screening is plausibly a principal activity itself, the Court is unconvinced.
Plaintiffs were not employed to undergo security screenings, see ECF No. 10 at 11, and
although Plaintiffs claim their principal activity is maintaining safety and security, defining their
principal activity in such a fashion does not mean that everything that furthers that aim is the work
Plaintiffs were employed to perform. Cf. Alkire, 158 Fed. Cl. at 391 (accepting the plaintiffs’
claim that they were employed to maintain prison security but still finding that undergoing security
screening is not the work the plaintiffs were employed to perform); Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v.
Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 35 (2014) (determining that the security screening at issue was not the workers’
principal activity because the employer “did not employ its workers to undergo security
screenings”). The security screening may be an important aspect of maintaining safety and
security at the Institution, but that would be reason to deem it an “integral and indispensable”
10
activity, rather than a principal activity itself. For the purpose of compensation under the FLSA,
however, such a distinction is ultimately immaterial, as employees are entitled to compensation
for both their principal activities and the activities that are integral and indispensable to those
principal activities. See Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 33.
2. Plaintiffs Have Plausibly Alleged that Undergoing the Security Screening Is
Integral and Indispensable to Plaintiffs’ Principal Activity of Controlling
Contraband In Order to Maintain the Safety and Security of FCI Fort Dix.
Although undergoing the security screening is not a principal activity, Plaintiffs have
sufficiently pled that the security screening is integral and indispensable to Plaintiffs’ principal
activity of ensuring the safety and security of the Institution, as the security screening is plausibly
essential for the officers to maintain a contraband-free environment.
An integral and indispensable activity is one that is “an intrinsic element of [the employee’s
principal activities] and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform those
activities.” Id. at 35. Such integral and indispensable activities are treated as part and parcel of
the employee’s principal activities and thus are compensable under the FLSA. Id. at 33. “To meet
[the integral and indispensable] test, it is not enough that a given activity is required by the
employer or done for the employer’s benefit.” Alkire, 158 Fed. Cl. at 389. Rather, the employee
must show that the activity is “integral and indispensable . . . to the productive work that the
employee is employed to perform.” Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 36 (emphasis in original).
Here, the Government contends that the security screening is not integral to Plaintiffs’
principal activities because “being searched for contraband is distinct from searching for
contraband.” ECF No. 10 at 14–15 (emphases in original) (citing Medrano v. United States, 159
Fed. Cl. 537, 545 (2022)). According to the Government, it is insufficient that the security
screening serves a similar purpose as Plaintiffs’ principal activity of searching for contraband, as
a shared purpose does not make one activity integral and indispensable to another. See id. at 15–
11
16. The Government also argues that the security screening is not indispensable to Plaintiffs’
principal activities because “[n]othing suggests that plaintiffs’ ability to perform their work would
be impaired if they were not screened on any given day, compared to if they were screened.” Id.
at 16. The Government instead claims that the safety of the Institution “depends on whether
employees follow policy or introduce contraband, not on whether they are screened.” Id. Thus,
as long as the officers do not introduce contraband, the Government contends that FCI Fort Dix
could eliminate the security screenings without impacting Plaintiffs’ principal activities. Id. at 17.
As support, the Government cites Integrity Staffing, a FLSA case in which the Supreme
Court held that warehouse employees were not entitled to compensation for time spent passing
through a security screening aimed at preventing employee theft. 574 U.S. at 35. In Integrity
Staffing, the Supreme Court reasoned that the warehouse workers were employed to retrieve and
package products, and undergoing a screening to prevent theft was neither intrinsic nor
indispensable to that work. Id. Because the warehouse workers “could skip the screenings
altogether without the safety or effectiveness of their principal activities being substantially
impaired,” time spent undergoing the screening was not compensable overtime. Id. at 38
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Though the Government contends that the same is true here, the Court disagrees that
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not meet the pleading standard. As this Court has previously held,
security screenings at a federal prison are more closely related to the principal activities of
correctional officers than theft screenings are to the principal activities of warehouse employees.
Alvarez v. United States, No. 20-1533C, 2021 WL 6163405, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2021) (finding
that security screenings in a prison “are not as far removed from Plaintiffs’ alleged principal
activities as was the case in Integrity Staffing”); see also Alexander v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl.
12
512, 525 (2021) (noting that “there is a clear distinction between what is integral and indispensable
for warehouse workers, and what is integral and indispensable for prison guards”); Stroup, 180
Fed. Cl. at 353 (noting that other courts denying similar motions to dismiss in FLSA cases “have
recognized the specialized role of security workers”); ECF No. 11 at 20 (Plaintiffs “begin ensuring
that contraband is not entered into the Institution” at the security screening). Thus, unlike Integrity
Staffing, it is not as apparent from the allegations pled that Plaintiffs “could skip the screenings
altogether without the safety or effectiveness of their principal activities being substantially
impaired.” 574 U.S. at 38 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Instead, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations
as true—as the Court must at this stage—it appears at least plausible that the officers would not be
able to safely and effectively ensure the prison maintains a contraband-free environment absent
the security screenings. See Alexander, 156 Fed. Cl. at 525 (holding at the dismissal stage that
“the court is not convinced . . . that the security screenings for personnel and for persons who work
at a facility which houses more than 4,300 inmates, including some who are violent offenders,
should be discounted” as not integral and indispensable); see also ECF No. 10 at 14
(acknowledging that the security screening ensures that officers “enter the prison ‘clean’”).
As alleged in their Complaint, Plaintiffs are tasked with ensuring the safety and security of
the Institution by, among other means, controlling contraband. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. Specifically,
Plaintiffs must continuously search for contraband and eliminate it where found. Id. Though the
Government argues that the Institution could dispense with the screening as long as Plaintiffs
follow prison rules and do not introduce contraband, see ECF No. 10 at 16–17, the Court finds that
qualification to be significant. The security screening allegedly protects against not only officers
who intentionally violate prison policy by introducing contraband, but also against the inadvertent
introduction of contraband. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the introduction of contraband
13
to the Institution, including via inadvertent means, would prevent them from safely and effectively
performing their principal activities. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 19; see also Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at
38 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the security screenings did not promote the safety and
effectiveness of the workers’ principal activities). Of course, at the merits stage, Plaintiffs must
prove their allegations. And following discovery, the Government may be able to show that
Plaintiffs have not met their burden to prove that the security screening is integral and
indispensable to the officers’ principal activities—but the Government has not demonstrated as
much based on the Complaint alone, accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true. See Baytos v. United
States, No. 21-1085C, 2022 WL 598742, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 28, 2022) (“If discovery shows that
Plaintiffs could perform their principal duties effectively without the security screenings, the
Government may well prevail on summary judgment or at trial on that basis. But it cannot prevail
now.”).
As for the Government’s argument that being screened, in contrast to screening others, is
not compensable work, the Court finds such a distinction immaterial. It is true that the officers
conducting the security screening seem to be engaged in a principal activity, as screening for
contraband is the type of work correctional officers are employed to perform. Yet that does not
necessarily mean that Plaintiffs’ act of undergoing the screening cannot also be compensable as
an integral and indispensable activity because the FLSA does not distinguish between active and
passive work. See Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 354 (“[E]ven passive activities can be considered
compensable work when they constitute tasks the person is employed to perform.”); Aguilar v.
Mgmt. & Training Corp., 948 F.3d 1270, 1278 n.6 (10th Cir. 2020) (“Both ‘searching for’ and
‘being searched for’ contraband involve keeping contraband out of the prison and maintaining a
secure prison environment.”); Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (“[A]n
14
employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to
happen.”). Thus, the mere fact that the officer on the other side of the screening is being
compensated for his time does not signify to the Court that Plaintiffs cannot show entitlement to
compensation as well.
In drawing this distinction between searching and being searched, the Government
emphasizes that “Plaintiffs can search for contraband even if they themselves are not screened.”
ECF No. 10 at 14–15 (quoting Medrano, 159 Fed. Cl. at 545); id. at 16 (“Nothing suggests that
[P]laintiffs’ ability to perform their work would be impaired if they were not screened on any given
day, compared to if they were screened.”). At this stage in the litigation, however, the Court cannot
definitively make such a conclusion. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs,
United Pac. Ins., 464 F.3d at 1327–28, it is at least plausible that Plaintiffs’ efforts to search
inmates for contraband and perform other principal activities, like responding to emergencies,
would be ineffective and potentially dangerous if they themselves had contraband. See ECF No.
1 ¶¶ 9, 10, 19 (noting that FCI Fort Dix houses inmates convicted of federal crimes, including
violent offenders, and that Plaintiffs are responsible for ensuring these inmates do not possess
contraband, a task they could not perform without the screenings, which help to guarantee a
contraband-free environment); see also Aguilar, 948 F.3d at 1279 (emphasizing that the
inadvertent or intentional introduction of weapons or contraband into the prison would prevent an
officer from safely and effectively maintaining custody and discipline of inmates). Ultimately, as
this Court has previously noted, “[w]hether an activity is compensable under the FLSA often
comes down to the particular job at issue and the particular facts of each case.” Adair v. United
States, No. 20-1148C, 2021 WL 6163407, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 30, 2021). After reviewing
Plaintiffs’ allegations, the Court finds that they satisfy the pleading standard and that discovery is
15
warranted before the Court can conclusively determine whether the security screening is in fact
integral and indispensable to Plaintiffs’ principal activities as correctional officers.
Additionally, on balance, the majority of the caselaw favors denial of the Government’s
motion. See Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 352–54; Adair, 2021 WL 6163407, at *5–6; Adegbite, 156
Fed. Cl. at 506–07; Alexander, 156 Fed. Cl. at 524–26; Alvarez, 2021 WL 6163405, at *5–6;
Baytos, 2022 WL 598742, at *6–7.4 Indeed, in 2021, this Court denied two motions to dismiss
filed by the Government in similar FLSA cases, holding that the plaintiff-correctional officers
plausibly alleged entitlement to compensation for time spent undergoing security screening. See
Adair, 2021 WL 6163407, at *5–6; Alvarez, 2021 WL 6163405, at *5–6. In the following years,
there has not been a significant shift in the caselaw such that the Court can hold that security
screenings at correctional facilities are, as a matter of law, non-compensable under the FLSA.
Therefore, the Court rejects the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim seeking
compensation for the time spent undergoing the security screening.
C. Because the Continuous Workday Rule Applies in the Federal Sector, Plaintiffs
Sufficiently State a Claim to Compensation Under the FLSA for Time Spent
Passing Through the Sally Port and Flipping an Accountability Chit.
The parties dispute whether passing through the sally port and flipping an accountability
chit is itself a principal activity or integral and indispensable to Plaintiffs’ principal activities.
Though the Court issues no opinion as to whether this activity is individually compensable,
4
Some courts have granted motions to dismiss similar security-screening claims. See Medrano, 159 Fed. Cl. at 545–46 (undergoing a security screening is not an integral and indispensable activity because correctional officers “can search for contraband even if they themselves are not screened” and because “it is not the screening that makes it possible for [the officers] to do their jobs, but following prison rules that forbid contraband” (emphasis in original)); Alkire, 158 Fed. Cl. at 391–92 (same); Lewis v. MHM Health Profs., LLC, 696 F.Supp.3d 707, 716–18 (E.D. Mo. 2023) (applying Medrano in the context of prison healthcare workers seeking compensation for time spent undergoing security screening). For the reasons already discussed, however, the Court finds that dismissal is not warranted in the case at hand.
16
Plaintiffs have nonetheless stated a sufficient claim to compensation because Supreme Court
precedent dictates that the continuous workday rule applies and Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
that they enter the sally port after their workday has commenced.
Under the continuous workday rule, employers must compensate employees for all time
between the beginning of their first compensable activity and their last compensable activity of the
workday. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005); see also 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2)
(excluding from compensation preliminary or postliminary activities “which occur either prior to
the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time
on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities”); 29 C.F.R.
§ 790.6(b) (2026) (Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation defining “workday” as: “the period
between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee’s principal
activity or activities”). Here, the Government’s motion does not challenge Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim
with regard to the time the officers spend donning their duty belts, the step that occurs immediately
prior to the officers’ passing through the sally port. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 22. Accordingly, assuming
that Plaintiffs succeed in their claim for compensation, Plaintiffs’ donning of their duty belts would
start their continuous workday such that Plaintiffs would be entitled to compensation for the time
they spend passing through the sally port and flipping their accountability chit.
The Government argues that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the continuous workday rule because
it has been “rejected by this Court,” ECF No. 10 at 18, and “does not apply to federal employees
in the same way that it applies to other workers from the private sector,” ECF No. 12 at 21. The
Government cites an Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) regulation that purportedly rejects
the continuous workday rule for federal employees, id., as it dictates that: “Time spent in
preliminary or postliminary activities is excluded from hours of work and is not compensable, even
17
if it occurs between periods of activity that are compensable as hours of work.” 5 C.F.R.
§ 551.412(b) (2026). The Government highlights the distinction between this OPM regulation and
the DOL regulation, ECF No. 12 at 21, as OPM—not DOL—administers the FLSA for federal
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 204(a), (f) (assigning administration of the FLSA to DOL for private
sector employees and OPM for federal sector employees). Thus, the Government argues that
Alvarez and its continuous workday holding do not dictate the compensability of Plaintiffs’ FLSA
claim, which is instead governed by OPM’s formulation of the rule.
Plaintiffs cite Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37, and Bridges v. United States, 54 F.4th 703, 706–07
(Fed. Cir. 2022), as support for the applicability of the continuous workday rule in the federal
sector. According to Plaintiffs, Alvarez held that any walking time that takes place after an
employee’s first principal activity and before the end of his last principal activity is compensable,
ECF No. 11 at 30; and Bridges, contrary to the Government’s characterization, see ECF No. 10 at
18–19, affirmed the applicability of the continuous workday rule in the federal sector, ECF No. 11
at 28–29. As further explained below, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs—the Supreme Court’s
decision in Alvarez establishes that the continuous workday rule is derived from the FLSA itself,
a holding that was not undermined by Bridges and which applies to federal employees regardless
of how one interprets the OPM regulation cited by the Government.
1. The Supreme Court’s Holding in Alvarez Dictates That the Continuous Workday
Rule Is Based in the FLSA and Thus Applies in the Federal Sector.
In Alvarez, the Supreme Court determined that workers at a meat processing plant were
entitled to compensation for the time spent walking from the locker room to the production floor,
as it was subsequent to the workers’ first principal activity—donning their protective gear—and
the FLSA mandates compensation for time spent walking if it falls between an employee’s first
principal activity and last principal activity. 546 U.S. at 37. Because the plaintiffs were private
18
sector employees, DOL’s regulations applied. See id. at 28–29. Though Alvarez noted that the
continuous workday rule was adopted in a DOL regulation defining “workday,” the Court based
its holding in the FLSA itself and used the DOL regulation merely as further support.
The Government disagrees, contending that Alvarez was a “FLSA matter between two
private parties not involving the Federal government” and thus “appl[ied] Title 29 Department of
Labor Regulations.” ECF No. 12 at 22; see also ECF No. 15 at 4 (arguing that “Alvarez’s ruling
is limited to private sector employees and did not examine the continuous workday theory as
applie[d] to Federal employees”). The Court finds the Government’s reading of Alvarez to be
unsupported.
As cited in Alvarez, the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes compensation for time spent
“walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity
or activities which such employee is employed to perform.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (emphasis
added). Thus, the relevant inquiry under the FLSA is whether the walking time at issue precedes
the commencement of the employees’ first principal activity. The Supreme Court in Alvarez
rejected the employer’s argument that some activities are “sufficiently ‘principal’ to be
compensable [under § 254(a)(2)], but not sufficiently principal to commence the workday [under
§ 254(a)(1)],” 546 U.S. at 34, citing its previous opinion in Steiner, 350 U.S. at 252–53, which
held that indispensable and integral activities are themselves principal activities for purposes of
entitling an employee to compensation under the FLSA. The employer in Alvarez accordingly
could not prevail on the argument that donning equipment was a principal activity for purposes of
compensation, but not for purposes of dictating when the workday began, after which walking
became compensable. 546 U.S. at 33. The Court ultimately held that:
[T]he locker rooms where the special safety gear is donned and doffed are the
relevant “place of performance” of the principal activity that the employee was
19
employed to perform within the meaning of § 4(a)(1). Walking to that place before
starting work is excluded from FLSA coverage, but the statutory text does not
exclude walking from that place to another area within the plant immediately after
the workday has commenced.
Id. at 34.
This analysis demonstrates that Alvarez based its holding regarding the compensability of
walking time in the Portal-to-Portal Act itself, which was specifically enacted to clarify what type
of travel time is compensable under the FLSA. See id. at 33–34 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1)
and (2)); see also id. at 34 (noting that “[w]alking to [the locker room] before starting work is
excluded from FLSA coverage, but the statutory text does not exclude walking from that place to
another area within the plant immediately after the workday has commenced” (emphasis added)).
Consequently, the continuous workday rule is not just supported by an inapplicable DOL
regulation, but also the FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act, such that Alvarez’s holding
has equal force in the federal sector.
To the extent the Supreme Court cited the DOL regulation setting forth the continuous
workday rule, it did so solely as additional support for its statutory interpretation. See id. at 35
(noting at the end of its statutory analysis section that DOL regulations support the production
workers’ view that “when donning and doffing of protective gear are compensable activities, they
may also define the outer limits of the workday”). Furthermore, even when addressing the DOL
regulations, Alvarez specifically noted that the DOL’s continuous workday rule was promulgated
“consistent to [the Supreme Court’s] prior decisions interpreting the FLSA.” Id. at 28–29
(emphasis added). This indicates that the continuous workday rule is based in the statute itself
rather than the DOL regulation alone.
Additionally, when the employer in Alvarez pointed to language in the DOL regulations
that purportedly undermined the Court’s conclusion that the employees’ walking time during the
20
workday was compensable, the Court dismissed such evidence as unexplained and inconsistent:
“Whatever the correct explanation . . . may be, [the employer’s cited language] is not sufficient to
overcome the clear statements in the text of the regulations that support our holding. And it surely
is not sufficient to overcome the statute itself, whose meaning is definitively resolved by Steiner.”
Id. at 37 (emphasis added). Thus, even when addressing the DOL regulations, the Supreme Court
made clear that its holding was based in the FLSA.
As applied here, Alvarez indicates that the time Plaintiffs spend passing through the sally
port and flipping their accountability chit is plausibly compensable under the continuous workday
rule. Indeed, the facts of the case at hand largely mirror those in Alvarez. In Alvarez, the
employees’ first principal activity was donning their protective equipment. See id. at 32.
Similarly, here, Plaintiffs allege—and the Government does not dispute at this stage—that the
donning of their duty belts is a principal activity. ECF No. 1 ¶ 20. Then, like the Alvarez
employees who sought compensation for the time spent walking from the locker rooms to the
production floor, 546 U.S. at 32, Plaintiffs seek compensation for the time they spend walking
through the sally port and flipping their accountability chit on the way to their post in the secured
confines of the Institution, ECF No. 1 ¶ 22. Accordingly, just as the Alvarez plaintiffs were entitled
to compensation for the walking time that followed the donning of their protective gear, 546 U.S.
at 37, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged entitlement to compensation for the walking time that
follows the donning of their duty belts.
In sum, while no party in Alvarez disputed the validity of the continuous workday rule as
set forth in the DOL regulation, instead disputing how the rule should be interpreted, see id. at 29,
the Supreme Court nonetheless based its holding in the FLSA itself and appeared to view the
DOL’s continuous workday rule as a codified extension of its own precedent interpreting the
21
statute. See id. at 28–29 (stating that the Portal-to-Portal Act “[did] not purport to change this
Court’s earlier descriptions of the terms ‘work’ and ‘workweek,’ or to define the term ‘workday,’”
and that DOL’s continuous workday rule was promulgated “consistent to [the Supreme Court’s]
prior decisions interpreting the FLSA”); id. at 37 (holding that “during a continuous workday, any
walking time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first principal activity and before
the end of the employee’s last principal activity is excluded from the scope of [§ 254(a) of the
Portal-to-Portal Act], and as a result is covered by FLSA” (emphasis added)). Accordingly,
because Alvarez represents the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FLSA, the Court is bound to
apply the continuous workday rule. See Garner v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 756, 759 (2009)
(“[B]inding precedent includes the manner in which the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
interpret statutes and administrative regulations.”); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d
1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There can be no question that the Court of Federal Claims is required
to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court, our court, and our predecessor court, the Court of
Claims.”).
2. The Federal Circuit in Bridges Did Not Undermine the Supreme Court’s Holding
in Alvarez.
Both parties also claim Bridges supports their position. In that case, the Federal Circuit
held that correctional officers were not entitled to compensation for travel time between their
primary shift at a prison and their secondary shift at a nearby hospital. The Government reads
Bridges as finding the continuous workday rule inapplicable in the federal sector, as the Circuit
relied on 5 C.F.R. § 551.412(b), the OPM regulation asserted by the Government here. ECF No.
12 at 23 (citing Bridges, 54 F.4th at 707). In contrast, Plaintiffs believe that Bridges “clearly
recognized that the continuous workday doctrine applies in the federal sector.” ECF No. 11 at 28–
29 (citing Bridges, 54 F.4th at 706–07). The Court finds that Bridges did not go as far as the
22
Government claims and instead found the continuous workday rule inapplicable based on a very
different set of facts. It did not find that the continuous workday rule is categorically inapplicable
to federal employers.
In Bridges, the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiff-correctional officers’ claim for
compensation because it found that their travel time did not constitute travel during a continuous
workday. 54 F.4th at 705. In so holding, the Circuit did not find that the continuous workday rule
applies differently in the federal sector, as the Government suggests, see ECF No. 12 at 22–24.
Instead, the Circuit emphasized that “[t]ravel during a ‘continuous workday’ must [] be
compensated under the FLSA.” Bridges, 54 F.4th at 706–07 (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37).
The problem for the plaintiffs in Bridges was their definition of “continuous workday.” See id. at
707. Though the plaintiffs argued that their two shifts together formed a continuous workday, the
Circuit rejected such an interpretation, noting that “Congress, OPM, and the Supreme Court” all
define “a ‘continuous workday’ by the start and stop of ‘principal activities.’” Id. Thus, as
contemplated by § 551.412(b), some workdays are noncontinuous, with two blocks of
compensable work each bookended by principal activities that are separated by a non-compensable
activity. Id. (citing 5 C.F.R. § 551.412(b)).
In a footnote, the Circuit clarified that “OPM and the Supreme Court follow the same
definition” of continuous workday. Id. at 707 n.5. In referring to the Supreme Court, the Circuit
specifically cited Alvarez, which, as this Court has already explained, set forth the continuous
workday rule as a matter of statutory interpretation. See id. (citing Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37). The
Circuit’s repeated citation to Alvarez and its affirmance that the OPM regulations do not contradict
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “continuous workday” indicate that the Circuit did not find
the continuous workday rule inapplicable, or differently applicable, in the federal sector. See
23
Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 357 (observing that Bridges “directly adopts Alvarez’s interpretation of
‘continuous workday’ for federal employees”).
Rather, the Circuit explained why the continuous workday rule did not apply under
Bridges’s unique facts. See 54 F.4th at 708 (“[T]he officers’ travel between shifts does not occur
during a ‘continuous workday’ as defined by both OPM and DOL.”). The officers’ travel in
Bridges was simply nearer to what Congress intended to exclude from the FLSA through the
Portal-to-Portal Act—travel to and from the worksite. See id. at 706 (“The Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 indicates that the officers’ travel in this case is at least one step removed from their principal
activities.”); id. at 708 (finding that the officers essentially sought compensation for time
commuting, which is “precisely contrary to the Portal-to-Portal Act’s instruction that commuting
time . . . is not covered by the FLSA”). Because employees are generally not entitled to
compensation for travel time to and from the places where they perform their principal activities,
the plaintiffs’ travel time between one shift at the prison and a separate second shift at the hospital
was not compensable pursuant to the Portal-to-Portal Act. See id. at 706.
In sum, the Government points to no language in Bridges rejecting or differentiating the
applicability of the continuous workday rule in the federal sector.5 Instead, in citing Alvarez, the
Federal Circuit in Bridges clearly contemplated circumstances in which the continuous workday
rule applies such that travel or walking time is compensable—this was the case in Alvarez, just as
5
In its reply, the Government emphasizes that “the Federal Circuit [in Bridges] affirmed [the lower court’s] decision in its entirety” and notes that the lower court rejected the plaintiffs’ “continued workday” theory based on 5 C.F.R. § 551.412(b). ECF No. 12 at 22. The Government’s citation to the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion is unconvincing, as it is the reasoning of the Federal Circuit, and not the Court of Federal Claims, that is binding. See W. Coast Gen. Corp. v. Dalton, 39 F.3d 312, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that Court of Federal Claims decisions, “while persuasive, do not set binding precedent for separate and distinct cases in that court”).
24
it is here. At oral argument, the Government’s counsel contended that “if the Federal Circuit meant
for the continuous workday [rule] to apply . . . it would have been a bit more clear.” Oral Arg. Tr.
at 56:10–13, ECF No. 20. The Court finds the converse to be true—if the Federal Circuit did not
read Alvarez as being authoritative in the context of federal employment, it would have been much
clearer that the continuous workday rule does not apply. Rather than doing so, the Federal Circuit
explained that the plaintiffs’ claim simply did not involve a continuous workday. See Bridges, 54
F.4th at 707–08.
Looking at the facts of both Bridges and Alvarez, it is clear that the case at hand resembles
the latter far more than the former. Plaintiffs are not seeking compensation for travel time between
exiting the prison at the end of their first shift and arriving at a new location for their second shift.
Instead, Plaintiffs seek compensation for the time they spend walking from the area of FCI Fort
Dix where they don their duty belts, through the controlled entrance of the sally port, and into the
secured confines of the Institution, all during one continuous shift. See Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 356
(similarly distinguishing Bridges). Because this walking time is much more akin to the employees’
walk from the locker rooms to the production floor in Alvarez, Plaintiffs’ claim for compensation
survives the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.
3. OPM Regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.412 Does Not Indicate That the Continuous
Workday Rule is Inapplicable, and to the Extent It Can Be Read in Such a Manner,
It Would Conflict With the FLSA.
The Government argues that “OPM regulations exclude time spent performing preliminary
and postliminary activities from compensable hours of work ‘even if it occurs between periods of
activity that are compensable as hours of work.’” ECF No. 12 at 21 (quoting 5 C.F.R.
§ 551.412(b)). Thus, the Government contends that the time officers spend passing through the
sally port “is not compensable even if a compensable activity precedes it.” Id. Instead, the
Government urges the Court to review each pre-shift activity individually, determining whether it
25
is a principal activity itself or integral and indispensable to a principal activity. See ECF No. 20
at 21:6–11, 18–22; id. at 25:12–16.
The Court disagrees with the Government’s broad reading of § 551.412(b). Most
importantly, assuming the Government’s reading of § 551.412(b) is correct, the regulation
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FLSA in Alvarez. See Doe No. 1 v. United
States, 129 F.4th 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“OPM regulations pursuant to the FLSA are valid
if they are consistent with the statute and, to the extent they differ from DOL regulations, any
differences are justified by legitimate reasons.”); Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 358 (“To the extent that
[§ 551.412(b)] contradicts the continuous workday holding in Alvarez, it is invalid.”).6 Because
the Court has determined that the continuous workday rule is based in the FLSA itself, see supra
§ III.C.1, it cannot be undermined or overridden by an OPM regulation. The regulation should
thus be read more narrowly. As the Federal Circuit held in Bridges, at the very least, § 551.412(b)
properly prevents employees from seeking compensation for travel time that is bracketed by two
continuous workdays. See 54 F.4th at 707 & n.5.
The Government’s interpretation of § 551.412(b) would also make administration of the
FLSA much more difficult, if not impracticable, as federal employers would be expected to
determine whether each individual pre- or post-liminary activity is compensable and how much
time the employee spends on that discrete activity. To illustrate, a federal employer could be
6
In addressing Stroup, the Government argues that the court “fundamentally undermine[d] OPM’s independent statutory authority” by applying the continuous workday rule as it was set forth in Alvarez. ECF No. 15 at 4. OPM’s exercise of its authority, however, must be consistent with the statute. Doe No. 1, 129 F.4th at 1367. As the court in Stroup correctly recognized, 180 Fed. Cl. at 357–58, Alvarez made clear that the continuous workday rule is supported by the Supreme Court’s longstanding interpretation of the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act. See 546 U.S. at 28–29. Thus, neither Stroup nor this Court “undermine OPM’s authority” in adhering to the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation. See Garner, 85 Fed. Cl. at 759.
26
required to pay overtime compensation for the donning of equipment, but not the walk through the
sally port, then required to pay for the walk through the prison, but not for the exchange of
information with the outgoing officer. See ECF No. 20 at 25:17–26:23. As the court noted in
Stroup, the Government’s interpretation of a “continuous workday” thus illogically indicates that
“five principal activities separated by non-principal activities, no matter how trivial, would
transform into five discontinuous workdays.” 180 Fed. Cl. at 356. The Court does not find this to
be the best reading of the OPM regulation or the FLSA itself. The Government’s attempt to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ FLSA claim based on the cited OPM regulation is consequently unavailing.
To be sure, the Court of Federal Claims has split on the question of whether the continuous
workday rule applies in FLSA cases involving federal employees. Like this Court, a number of
judges have found that the continuous workday rule is equally applicable in the federal sector. See
Stroup, 180 Fed. Cl. at 357 (“Ultimately, Bridges confirms the continuous workday rule applies to
federal workers . . . .”); Adegbite, 156 Fed. Cl. at 510 (noting that “all the intermediary activities”
alleged by the plaintiffs “would likely be compensable under the continuous workday rule”);
Alexander, 156 Fed. Cl. at 531 (similar); see also Adair, 2021 WL 6163407, at *6 n.3 (noting that
the continuous workday rule is applicable in the federal sector); Alvarez, 2021 WL 6163405, at *6
n.4 (same).
Other judges have taken the view that the continuous workday rule either does not apply
or applies differently in the federal sector.7 See Aitken v. United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 356, 368–69
(2022) (holding that “the continuous workday rule does not apply” (citing Bridges v. United States,
156 Fed. Cl. 129, 134 (2021))); Baytos, 175 Fed. Cl. at 368–69 (finding that the plaintiffs’
7
With the exception of Baytos, 175 Fed. Cl. 360, the cited opinions were filed before the Federal Circuit issued its holding in Bridges, and thus they relied on the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion in that case.
27
“arguments regarding compensability based on the continuous workday doctrine fail as a matter
of law” because the continuous workday rule does not apply to federal employees in the same way
it does to employees in the private sector); Medrano, 159 Fed. Cl. at 544 n.11 (stating that “the
continuous workday rule does not apply to federal employees in the same way that it does to other
workers”); Alkire, 158 Fed. Cl. at 396 (same). In a post-trial opinion, the Aitken court addressed
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bridges, emphasizing that the Circuit “rejected the
inference . . . that the ‘continuous workday’ includes everything between the first and last principal
activity in some generally work-related period.” Aitken v. United States, 172 Fed. Cl. 377, 407–
08 (2024). Though acknowledging that the factual scenario in Bridges differed from that in Aitken,
where officers were claiming compensation for activities that took place in one location prior to
the start of their scheduled shift, Aitken found the reasoning of Bridges “no less applicable.” Id.
at 408. Thus, the court held that “if any of [the officers’] activities are not independently
compensable as principal activities, they do not become compensable merely because they are
‘book-ended by principal activities.’” Id. (quoting Bridges, 54 F.4th at 707); see also ECF No. 12
at 24 (noting that Aitken involved facts identical to those at hand and still followed Bridges).
This Court respectfully disagrees. Dismissing the applicability of the continuous workday
rule in the federal sector is too broad a reading of Bridges, and one that fails to give sufficient
respect to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Alvarez, which the Bridges court made sure to clarify
as being consistent with its opinion. See supra § III.C.2. Contrary to the Government’s argument
and the holding in Aitken, the differing facts in the case at hand are significant, and their similarity
to Alvarez compel the Court to find that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled the applicability of the
continuous workday rule.
Particularly at the dismissal stage, where the Court must assume Plaintiffs’ alleged facts
28
are true and where numerous questions remain to be fleshed out in discovery as to whether/how
the continuous workday rule will apply in the context of this specific case, the Government has
not demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ claim fails to meet the pleading standard. On the face of the
Complaint, the Court finds it at least plausible that Plaintiffs are entitled to the compensation they
seek, considering that the officers pass through the sally port only after they have donned their
duty belts, which, for the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes is a principal activity that
commences the workday.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Part of the Complaint
(ECF No. 10) is DENIED and Plaintiffs’ Motions for Leave to File Notice of Supplemental
Authority are GRANTED (ECF Nos. 13, 14). Consistent with RCFC 12(a)(4)(A)(i), the
Government shall file its responsive pleading by no later than September 17, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 3, 2026 /s/ Kathryn C. Davis
KATHRYN C. DAVIS
Judge
29