************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Villao v. Paz
JONATHAN I. VILLAO v. GRISELL V. PAZ
(AC 48574)
Suarez, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff and granting certain other relief. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in calculating its basic child support award. Held:
The trial court’s child support orders constituted an abuse of its discretion, as the court’s finding as to the presumptive child support award was not supported by the record, and, to the extent that the court indicated that it relied on the parties’ incomes as listed in the defendant’s child support guidelines worksheet in determining the presumptive child support amount, that determination was clearly erroneous as it was not based on the plaintiff’s net income at the time the court issued its decision.
Argued May 18—officially released September 8, 2026
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed
a cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Cirello, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and
granting certain other relief, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Reversed in part; new trial.
Anthony L. Cenatiempo, with whom, on the brief, was
Norman A. Roberts II, for the appellant (defendant).
Alexandra G. Duffy, with whom, on the brief, was
Ingemar Heredia, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Grisell V. Paz, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Jonathan I. Villao. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in
(1) calculating its basic child support award, (2) determining its alimony award, (3) ordering the defendant
to pay attorney’s fees, and (4) fashioning its property
Villao v. Paz
distribution orders.1 We conclude that the court abused
its discretion in determining its child support orders
and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the
trial court and remand the case for a new trial on all
financial orders.2
The following procedural history and facts, as found
by the court, are relevant to this appeal. The parties were married on August 30, 2018, in Stamford. The parties
1
We note that, in her statement of issues, the defendant characterized the claims raised on appeal as follows: “(1) The trial court’s child support order is erroneous requiring reversal and remand on all financial issues . . . . (2) The trial court’s alimony order is erroneous requiring reversal and remand on all financial issues . . . . (3) The trial court erred when it ordered the defendant to pay counsel fees to the plaintiff . . . . [And] (4) [t]he trial court’s property distribution orders are [harmful], erroneous and require reversal and remand on all financial issues.” We have reframed the claims in this appeal for clarity and to more accurately reflect the arguments set forth in the body of the defendant’s brief. See Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170, 173 n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023).
2
Because we conclude that the court erred with respect to its child support orders, we need not reach the defendant’s claims related to the court’s alimony orders, division of property orders, or award of attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Tuckman v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 215, 61 A.3d 449 (2013) (concluding that, because it was uncertain whether trial court’s financial awards would remain intact after reconsidering child support orders and defendant’s available income, entirety of mosaic must be refashioned); Renstrup v. Renstrup, 217 Conn. App. 252, 255 n.2, 287 A.3d 1095 (in light of conclusion that trial court erred with respect to child support and alimony orders, this court declined to reach claims related to trial court’s division of property orders), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915, 290 A.3d 374 (2023).
We note that the defendant’s alimony claim on appeal is that the court improperly awarded future alimony without making an express finding of earning capacity. The court did not make any express findings concerning the basis for its alimony award, including the parties’ available net income or future earning capacity. Although we decline to address this claim, we note that, on remand, an alimony award, if any, must be supported by the evidence and may not be merely speculative. It is well established that “when a trial court has based a financial award . . . on a party’s earning capacity, the court must determine the specific dollar amount of the party’s earning capacity. . . . Awards of alimony and support that are based on earning capacity must be supported by evidence that includes specific amounts of past earnings, or of vocational evidence as to the typical salary of the imputed party’s occupation considering that party’s ability and experience.” (Citation
Villao v. Paz
have two minor children issue of the marriage. On January 9, 2024, the plaintiff commenced this dissolution
action. In his amended complaint dated April 3, 2024,
the plaintiff sought a dissolution of the parties’ marriage, alimony, and an equitable distribution of assets.3 On April 30, 2024, the defendant filed an answer and a
cross complaint in which she claimed that the parties
had entered into a prenuptial agreement and sought
enforcement of the agreement. On December 17, 2024,
the plaintiff filed an amended motion to set aside the
prenuptial agreement.
On January 16, 2025, the court commenced a trial,
which continued over the course of four nonconsecutive
dates. As a preliminary matter, the court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement. On January 16, 2025, the court issued a
written order in which it determined that the plaintiff had met his burden to establish that the prenuptial
agreement should not be enforced pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-36g and, accordingly, granted the plaintiff’s motion.4
On March 3, 2025, the court issued a memorandum of
decision in which it rendered judgment dissolving the
parties’ marriage. In its memorandum of decision, the
court found that the plaintiff was forty-four years old
at the time of trial and had worked full-time in an automotive parts store for twenty years. The court found,
however, that the plaintiff’s employment at the automotive parts store was terminated between the first and
second days of the trial in the present case. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was working for Uber and DoorDash.
According to the court, the plaintiff appeared to be in
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tilsen v. Benson, 347 Conn. 758, 800, 299 A.3d 1096 (2023).
3
On September 13, 2024, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to include a claim for child support.
4
The propriety of the court’s ruling regarding the prenuptial agreement is not at issue in this appeal.
Villao v. Paz
good health. The plaintiff had two other children outside of his marriage to the defendant.
The court found that the defendant was forty years old
at the time of trial and worked as a chiropractor and that she ran her own chiropractic and weight loss clinic until a recent cancer diagnosis. The defendant had been previously diagnosed with cancer, but the cancer returned in
2024, and the defendant began chemotherapy treatment
in July 2024. Over the next few months, she reduced her
hours at work and, by mid-December 2024, had stopped
working completely.
The court further found that the defendant employed
Elma Lucia Gualpa Perez as a nanny and housekeeper.
The court took “particular interest in the events that
caused [Perez] to quit her job working for the defendant. [Perez] asked the defendant to help her set up a bank
account to deposit her pay. [Perez] provided the defendant with her bank app login information to deposit her
paychecks. The bank notified [Perez] that her account was being frozen in the fall of 2024. It appears that the defendant was depositing checks into the account that were not made payable to [Perez]. Some of the checks were drawn
from the defendant’s business, Dr. Paz Weight Loss
Center, and made payable to ‘cash’ or to the defendant’s
relatives. The court could not find, by a preponderance
of evidence, that the defendant was money laundering
or hiding funds, but the activity is very suspicious with no valid explanation provided by the defendant.”
The value of the defendant’s business was in dispute.
The plaintiff offered the testimony of Mark Campbell,
an expert business evaluator, who testified that he was
unable to reconcile the bank statements of the defendant’s business with the business’ financial statements.
The court noted that, “[d]espite the defendant’s reluctance to provide updated financial information through
Villao v. Paz
discovery, [Campbell] gave credible testimony that the
value of the defendant’s business was $154,000.”
The defendant also offered an expert witness, Michael
Plude, to provide an opinion as to the value of her business. Plude valued the business at “(-$231,000).” The
court noted that “[s]ome of the factors that contributed
to the discrepancy were . . . Campbell considered [a Small Business Administration] loan discharged and a loan
from the defendant’s parents as a personal loan, not
a business loan. . . . Plude included those debts in the
business. Another difference between the appraisals was
the impact of the defendant’s cancer, which has caused
her to stop working. . . . Plude found that this drastically decreased the value of the business [whereas] . . . Campbell did not give it as much weight.
“Another distinction between the two experts was
how the bank account statements matched the financial
statements. [Campbell] said he was unable to reconcile the defendant’s bank statements to the financial statements.
[Plude] stated he was able to do so, but there [was] still $30,000 [in] deposits unaccounted for. He also testified
that there was commingling of funds between the business entity and the defendant and that business funds
were used to pay for personal expenses and large amounts
of capital were removed from the business and deposited
into the defendant’s personal accounts. The court took
note of the credible testimony of the defendant’s own
expert about these unusual and suspicious accounting
practices. This behavior is supported by undisputed testimony that the defendant kept large amounts of cash in
her home safe [and] that her customers were encouraged
to pay cash for services, and her failure to report eBay
income on her financial affidavit.”5
The court further noted in its memorandum of decision that “[t]here was also evidence that the defendant
owns a property in Ibarra, Ecuador, worth $250,000. She
5
At trial, the plaintiff testified that he and the defendant sold items on eBay and that “[the defendant] had an account under her business [and] that [they] used to sell a lot of products. . . . She was selling all the
Villao v. Paz
testified that the house was in her brother’s name, but
he put it in her name because he was in financial trouble. This property suddenly appeared on the defendant’s
financial affidavit dated January 24, 2025. She claims
that her family [members] are farmers and lost their harvest, so the house was sold to a buyer for $80,000, with
a life estate to her parents. There was no documentation
or other evidence supporting the defendant’s account of
the ownership of the property.”
The court stated that it was tasked with determining
each party’s assets, debts, income and liabilities. It noted that, “[a]fter evaluating all the relevant evidence, this task is harder in this case than most. Both parties recently left jobs that they have held for a significant period of time. The plaintiff was recently fired from his job of
twenty years and is currently working as an Uber driver.
It is unclear when he will return to steady employment.
The defendant has had to close her practice due to her
cancer treatment and also does not know when, if ever,
she will return to work.
“The task of determining the financial situation of
the parties is further hampered by both parties’ lack of
candor and transparency with the court regarding the
status of their finances. There was testimony of cash
payments, unreported eBay income, and fuzzy accounting practices.”
Thereafter, the court rendered judgment dissolving
the parties’ marriage and issued orders with respect to
alimony, custody,6 child support, and the division of
property. With respect to alimony, the court ordered
that “[t]he defendant shall pay alimony to the plaintiff
in the amount of $750 per month while she is receiving
disability insurance benefits. When the disability benefits nutrition shakes, some . . . weight loss drops, and a lot of other parts from her website where she used to buy all of the products.”
6
The court ordered that the parties shall have joint legal and physical custody of their minor children. It thereafter established a parenting plan. The court’s orders regarding custody and visitation are not at issue in this appeal.
Villao v. Paz
cease, the defendant shall pay the plaintiff 20 percent
of her gross income or $2000 per month, whichever is
greater, from the date of this order through April of
2029. The defendant shall provide her tax returns to the
[plaintiff] on or before April 15 of each year, through
2030. If the defendant underpaid the plaintiff, she must
compensate him for the difference on or before May 31
of the following year. The defendant shall pay alimony
until April of 2029, the death of the plaintiff, or the
remarriage of the plaintiff, whichever occurs first.” The court ordered that “[t]he plaintiff shall pay the defendant wife $1 per year through 2029, the death of either party, or the remarriage of the defendant, whichever occurs
first.” The court further ordered that “the defendant
pay the plaintiff child support in accordance with the
Connecticut child support guidelines of $119 per week.”
The court also ordered that the marital home be sold,
although the defendant may elect to purchase the plaintiff’s interest for $370,000. Additionally, the court
found that the defendant owned the property in Ibarra,
Ecuador, and ordered that the defendant pay to the
plaintiff $50,000, representing his equitable share of
the property.
Regarding attorney’s fees, the court found that “the
defendant’s actions including the slow trickle of disclosure or nondisclosure of relevant information caused
the plaintiff’s counsel to hire private investigators, file motions for contempt and motions to compel, and spend
more time litigating the case [than] necessary.” Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to pay attorney’s
fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.
On May 13, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for
articulation. The defendant requested that the court
articulate “the factual and legal basis supporting: (1)
its child support order; (2) its division of assets and
liabilities; (3) the award of alimony to the plaintiff; and (4) the order of the payment of counsel fees from the
defendant to the plaintiff.” Specifically, the defendant
moved the court to articulate, inter alia, “the trial court’s
Villao v. Paz
factual bases concerning each party’s income to support
its child support award of $119 per week,” “the factual
basis for the court’s conclusion that the defendant could pay 20 percent of her gross income or $2000 per month,
whichever is greater, after her disability income ended,” the factual basis for the court’s determination of the
value of the Ecuador property, and “the legal basis that
provided the court the authority to order the defendant
to pay $25,000 to the plaintiff for his legal fees.”
On May 28, 2025, the court granted the motion in part
and issued a written articulation. In its articulation,
the court stated, inter alia, that the factual basis for its conclusion that each party’s income “supports its child
support award of $119 per week . . . can be found in the
defendant’s child support guideline[s] worksheet . . . .” The court further explained that it “considered the oral
and written arguments of the parties, the relevant evidence and law, the court file, and the credibility of the witnesses, while considering what is fair and equitable
for all parties concerned and the best interest of the
minor child . . . . In evaluating the property distribution, payment of alimony and child support, the court took
into consideration the varied mosaic of all the assets and liabilities held by the parties jointly and individually.” This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth the well settled standard of
review in dissolution matters. “An appellate court will
not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations
cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did,
based on the facts presented. . . . The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly
erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in
the record as a whole. . . . [T]o conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court
either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . In determining whether a trial
court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in
Villao v. Paz
favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse v. Hasse, 221 Conn.
App. 113, 121–22, 300 A.3d 1175 (2023).
I
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly determined its basic child support award. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court erred in (1)
“ordering the parent with the majority of parenting
time to pay child support to the parent with less than
[one] half of the parenting time,” and (2) not ordering
the presumptive child support award. For the reasons
that follow, we conclude that the court’s child support
order constituted an abuse of its discretion.7
“We begin with the child support guidelines; Regs.,
Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 et seq.; and our case
law interpreting the guidelines. General Statutes § 46b84 provides in relevant part: (a) Upon or subsequent to
the . . . dissolution of any marriage . . . the parents of a minor child of the marriage, shall maintain the child
according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance. Any post judgment procedure
afforded by chapter 906 shall be available to secure the
present and future financial interests of a party in connection with a final order for the periodic payment of
child support. . . .
“(d) In determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the
parents to provide such maintenance and the amount
thereof, the court shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of
income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources
7
Because we conclude that the court abused its discretion in determining its basic child support award, we need not address the defendant’s assertion that the court improperly ordered the parent with the majority of parenting time to pay child support to the parent with less than one half of the parenting time.
Villao v. Paz
of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and
needs of the child. . . .
“General Statutes § 46b-215a provides for a commission to oversee the establishment of child support guidelines, which must be updated every four years, to ensure
the appropriateness of criteria for the establishment
of child support awards. General Statutes § 46b-215b
provides in relevant part: (a) The . . . guidelines issued pursuant to section 46b-215a . . . and in effect on the date of the support determination shall be considered in all
determinations of child support award amounts . . . . In
all such determinations, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of such awards which resulted
from the application of such guidelines is the amount to
be ordered. A specific finding on the record at a hearing, or in a written judgment, order or memorandum of decision of the court, that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined under the deviation criteria established
by the Commission for Child Support Guidelines under
section 46b-215a, shall be required in order to rebut the presumption in such case. See also Maturo v. Maturo,
296 Conn. 80, 118, 995 A.2d 1 (2010) ([t]he . . . guidelines shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts within the state . . . ).
“The guidelines consist of the rules, schedule and
worksheet established under [the applicable sections]
of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies for the
determination of an appropriate child support award . . . . Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (5). The guidelines are accompanied by a preamble that is not part of the regulations but is intended to assist in their interpretation. See Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2015),
preamble. The preamble states that the primary purpose
of the guidelines is [t]o provide uniform procedures for
establishing an adequate level of support for children;
id., § (c) (1), p. v; and [t]o make awards more equitable by
Villao v. Paz
ensuring the consistent treatment of persons in similar
circumstances. Id., § (c) (2), p. v.
“Moreover, [§] 46b-215a-5c (a) of the Regulations of
Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part:
The current support . . . contribution amounts calculated under [the child support guidelines] . . . are presumed
to be the correct amounts to be ordered. The presumption regarding each such amount may be rebutted by a
specific finding on the record that such amount would
be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case. . . . Any such finding shall state the amount that would have
been required under such sections and include a factual
finding to justify the variance. Only the deviation criteria stated in . . . subdivisions (1) to (6), inclusive, of subsection (b) of this section . . . shall establish sufficient bases for such findings.8
“Our courts have interpreted this statutory and regulatory language as requiring three distinct findings in order for a court to properly deviate from the child support
guidelines in fashioning a child support order: (1) a finding of the presumptive child support amount pursuant to
the guidelines; (2) a specific finding that application of such guidelines would be inequitable and inappropriate;
and (3) an explanation as to which deviation criteria the court is relying on to justify the deviation.” (Emphasis in original; footnote in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Renstrup v. Renstrup, 217 Conn. App. 252,
260–62, 287 A.3d 1095, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915,
290 A.3d 374 (2023).
In the present case, the court ordered the defendant
to pay the plaintiff child support in the amount of $119
per week “in accordance with the Connecticut child
support guidelines . . . .” The court did not expressly
8
“The criteria enumerated in § 46b-215a-5c (b) of the regulations are: ‘(1) Other financial resources available to a parent . . . (2) [e]xtraordinary expenses for care and maintenance of the child . . . (3) [e]xtraordinary parental expenses . . . (4) [n]eeds of a parent’s other dependents . . . (5) [c]oordination of total family support . . . [and] (6) [s]pecial circumstances . . . .’ ” Renstrup v. Renstrup, 217 Conn. App. 252, 262 n.7, 287 A.3d 1095, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915, 290 A.3d 374 (2023).
Villao v. Paz
make a finding of either party’s net weekly income in its memorandum of decision. In its May 28, 2025 articulation, however, the court stated that the factual basis
for its conclusion that each party’s income supports its
child support award “can be found in the defendant’s
child support guideline[s] worksheet at [Docket] Entry
No. 285.00.” The child support guidelines worksheet at
Docket Entry No. 285.00 was filed by the defendant’s
counsel on January 16, 2025. It lists the defendant’s
gross weekly income as $1581, with a net weekly income
of $1343, and lists the plaintiff’s gross weekly income
as $2200 with a net weekly income of $1758, for a combined net weekly income of $3101. According to the
defendant’s child support guidelines worksheet, the
combined basic child support obligation for two children
is $623. The defendant’s worksheet further indicates
that the presumptive child support obligation for the
plaintiff, the noncustodial parent, is $353 and that the
presumptive child support obligation for the defendant,
the custodial parent, is $270. The court’s finding that
$119 is the presumptive child support award, therefore,
is not supported by the record.9
In addition, the court improperly relied on the defendant’s January 16, 2025 worksheet as reflecting the
plaintiff’s income at the time it issued its memorandum of decision. The defendant’s worksheet, which reflects that
the plaintiff was earning $1758 as net weekly income,
was filed on January 16, 2025, the first day of the trial in the present case. As stated previously in this opinion,
9
It appears that the court obtained the $119 figure from the defendant’s worksheet, in the box titled “[a]mount reserved to support qualified child(ren),” as the defendant’s counsel filled in “$119” as the amount to be reserved by the defendant to support qualified children. A “[q]ualified child” is defined in the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies as a child who is “currently living in the same household with the parent . . . who is a dependent of the parent . . . who is not a subject of the support determination; and . . . for whom the parent has not claimed a deduction under section 46b-215a-1 (1) (I) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.” (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies, § 46b-215a-2c (d) (1) (A). That figure is not related to the presumptive child support amount under the guidelines.
Villao v. Paz
however, the court noted in its memorandum of decision
that the plaintiff’s employment with the automotive
parts store, for which he had worked for twenty years,
was terminated between the first and second days of the
trial in the present case.10 Accordingly, to the extent that the court indicated in its articulation that it relied on the parties’ incomes as listed in the defendant’s child support guidelines worksheet in determining the presumptive
child support amount, that determination was clearly
erroneous as it was not based on the plaintiff’s current
net income at the time the court issued its decision. We
therefore conclude that the court’s child support orders
constitute an abuse of its discretion.
II
We now turn to the issue of the appropriate relief to be
afforded in light of our conclusion that the court abused its discretion in determining its child support orders.
“Individual financial orders in a dissolution action are
part of the carefully crafted mosaic that comprises the
entire asset reallocation plan. . . . Under the mosaic
doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a collection of single disconnected occurrences, but rather
as a seamless collection of interdependent elements.
Consistent with that approach, our courts have utilized
the mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that allows
reviewing courts to remand cases for reconsideration of
all financial orders even though the review process might reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distribution
or child support awards. . . .
“Every improper order, however, does not necessarily
merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s financial orders. A financial order is severable when it is not in any way interdependent with other orders and is not
10
The court also noted in its memorandum of decision that the plaintiff was currently a driver for Uber and DoorDash. The record reveals that, on February 13, 2025, the last day of evidence in the present case, the plaintiff filed a financial affidavit indicating that he was earning $224 in gross income per week as an Uber driver and that his net weekly income was $322.
Villao v. Paz
improperly based on a factor that is linked to other factors. . . . In other words, an order is severable if its impropriety does not place the correctness of the other orders in question. . . .
“Determining whether an order is severable from the
other financial orders in a dissolution case is a highly fact bound inquiry.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) K. S. v. C. S., 232 Conn. App. 163, 197, 334 A.3d 533 (2025).
In the present case, we have concluded that the court
abused its discretion in determining its child support
orders. Because it is uncertain whether the court’s other financial awards will remain intact after reconsidering
the child support orders in a manner consistent with
this opinion, we conclude that the entirety of the mosaic must be refashioned. Accordingly, on remand, the court
must reconsider all of the financial orders, including its alimony orders, property distribution orders, and orders
relating to attorney’s fees.
The judgment is reversed only as to the financial orders
and the case is remanded for a new trial on all financial issues; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.