Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00376-CV
Autumn LEE,
Appellant
v.
Eric LUNDQUIST,
Appellee
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023-CI-25240
Honorable Monique Diaz, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 26, 2026
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART
Appellant Autumn Lee appeals from the final decree of divorce, arguing that the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the jury’s findings that (1) 100% of 9018 Wellwood LLC is
community property, and (2) Appellee Eric Lundquist is entitled to a reimbursement awards of
$86,338.15 and $68,863.15. She also argues the trial court erred in giving a jury charge that
allowed classification of separate property as community property. Autumn further argues that the
trial court erred in modifying the terms of 9018 Wellwood LLC, when the limited liability
04-25-00376-CV
company was not a party before the trial court. Finally, Autumn argues the final decree “constitutes
an abuse of discretion by creating a punitive and disproportionate division of the marital estate.”
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
Autumn and Eric were married on October 3, 2019, and separated on or about November
2023. During the marriage, on July 12, 2022, they formed 9018 Wellwood LLC. Pursuant to the
LLC’s Operating Agreement, Autumn acquired a 64% membership interest, and Eric acquired a
36% membership interest. Eight days after the LLC was formed, the parties acquired a duplex
located at 9018 Wellwood. On September 22, 2022, they conveyed the property to 9018 Wellwood
LLC, making the duplex the LLC’s sole asset.
The divorce was tried to a jury and centered primarily on the characterization of the parties’
interests in the LLC and the duplex. 1 Autumn contended that the Wellwood property was
purchased with her separate funds and argued that she could trace her 64% membership interest in
the LLC to the duplex, which was purchased with separate property funds. She also argued that
she was entitled to one half of Eric’s 36% membership interest as community property. Eric
responded that the issue was ownership of the LLC membership interests, not the real property,
and that the membership interests were created before the LLC acquired the property.
The jury found that the parties’ membership interests in 9018 Wellwood LLC were entirely
community property. The jury also found that Eric’s separate estate conferred a benefit on the
community estate in the amount of (1) $68,863.15 for payment of the mortgage on the Palmer
View property, and (2) $86,338.00 for payment of federal income tax debt during the marriage.
The trial court signed a final decree of divorce, which appointed a receiver for the Palmer View
1
Before trial, the parties agreed to certain stipulations, including the characterization of certain property and the assumption of some debts.
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property and directed the receiver to ensure the property is listed for sale immediately and sold
expeditiously. The trial court directed that the proceeds from the sale should be distributed as
follows: 35% of the sales price to Autumn and 15% of the sales price to Eric, “off the top, to
compensate for their respective separate interests,” with the “remaining net sales proceeds”
awarded to Eric. The trial court awarded Eric control of the LLC, directing him to wind up and
dissolve the company, satisfy its liabilities, and distribute the remaining net proceeds 60% to Eric
and 40% to Autumn. The trial court found that Eric’s separate estate was entitled to reimbursement
from the community estate, as determined by the jury and that the “reimbursement claim has been
satisfied as part of the just and right division of property set forth” in the decree.
Autumn timely perfected this appeal.
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE LLC AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In her first issue, Autumn challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
finding that the parties’ membership interests in 9018 Wellwood LLC (“the LLC”) are entirely
community property. In a decree of divorce, a trial court must “order a division of the estate of the
parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each
party.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. “All marital property is . . . either separate or community.” In re
Marriage of Allbritton, No. 07-24-00119-CV, 2025 WL 1792843, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
June 27, 2025, no pet.) (quoting Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1977))
(alteration in original). Community property is “property, other than separate property, acquired
by either spouse during marriage.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.002. Property of a spouse owned before
marriage, as well as property acquired during marriage by gift, devise, or descent, is the separate
property of that spouse. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.001(1), (2). The
court may divide only the spouses’ community property and has no authority to divest a spouse of
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separate property. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985); Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d
195, 204 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); see also Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363
(Tex. 2011) (“Trial courts can only divide community property, and the phrase ‘estate of the
parties’ encompasses the community property of a marriage, but does not reach separate
property.”).
In reviewing a trial court’s division of the community property, we presume the trial court
“properly exercised its discretion.” Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 203. Thus, the party challenging the
division of community property “bears the burden of demonstrating from the evidence in the
record that the trial court’s division was so unjust and unfair as to be an abuse of discretion.” Id.
The factfinder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given the
testimony. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819-21 (Tex. 2005). An abuse of
discretion does not occur where the trial court bases its decisions on conflicting evidence and some
evidence supports its decision. See In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding).
“Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to
be community property,” rather than separate property. TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003(a). At trial, a
party claiming that property is separate property must rebut the community property presumption
by proving the necessary facts by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 3.003(b); see Pearson, 332
S.W.3d at 363 (explaining that to rebut community property presumption, a party “must trace and
clearly identify the property in question as separate by clear and convincing evidence”). “‘Clear
and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of
the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”
TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007. Thus, to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in its
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division of the parties’ estate, we begin with the presumption that the property owned by Autumn
and Eric upon dissolution of marriage is community property, a presumption that Autumn could
overcome only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 3.003; Lara
v. Medina, No. 09-25-00011-CV, 2026 WL 2116974, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 23, 2026,
no pet. h.); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
In general, characterization of property is determined by the time and circumstances of its
acquisition, often referred to as the “inception of title” doctrine. See Garcia v. Mascorro, No. 04-21-00394-CV, 2023 WL 2588189, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 22, 2023, no pet.); Blair
v. Blair, 642 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.); Rivera v. Hernandez, 441
S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied). Inception of title occurs “when a party
first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.” Rivera, 441 S.W.3d
at 420; see Winkle v. Winkle, 951 S.W.2d 80, 88 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1997, writ
denied) (same). In accordance with this doctrine, “[i]f the inception of title predated the marriage,
then the property may be characterized as separate property,” but “if the inception of title occurred
after the marriage began, then the property is generally” considered to be community property.
Willett v. Rodriguez, No. 03-16-00084-CV, 2017 WL 2417831, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 2,
2017, pet. denied). “The major consideration in determining the characterization of property as
community or separate is the intention of spouses as shown by the circumstances surrounding the
inception of title.” Winkle, 951 S.W.2d at 88. Thus, even property purchased during the marriage
may be considered separate property if the evidence clearly demonstrates that it was purchased
with separate property funds. See Rivas v. Rivas, 452 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014,
no pet.) (“Where an asset is purchased during marriage with monies traceable to a spouse’s
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separate estate, the asset may appropriately be characterized as separate property.”); Rivera, 441
S.W.3d at 419-20 (same).
To demonstrate that property was purchased with separate property funds during the
marriage, the party claiming the property as her separate property shoulders the burden of tracing
the source of the funds used to purchase the property, and must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the property used to make the purchase was her separate property. See Rivera, 441
S.W.3d at 419-20, 425; Warriner v. Warriner, 394 S.W.3d 240, 247-49 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012,
no pet.). In satisfying this burden, a party must typically present some form of documentary
evidence to support his claim, as the party’s mere testimony that separate property was used to
purchase the property is insufficient without some form of corroboration. See Warriner, 394
S.W.3d at 248 (explaining that party’s testimony about characterization of property “must be
supported by other evidence”); see also Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 139 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“As a general rule, the clear and convincing standard is
not satisfied by testimony that property . . . is separate property when that testimony is contradicted
or unsupported by documentary evidence tracing the asserted separate nature of the property.”);
Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)
(“Mere testimony that property was purchased with separate property funds, without any tracing
of the funds, is generally insufficient to rebut the community presumption.”); Ganesan v.
Vallabhaneni, 96 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) (holding evidence
insufficient to overcome presumption of community property where husband’s testimony and
exhibits failed to provide account numbers, statements of accounts, dates of transfers, amounts
transferred into and from accounts, sources of funds, or any asset tracing).
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The evidence at trial showed that 9018 Wellwood LLC was formed on July 12, 2022. That
same day, Eric and Autumn executed an Operating Agreement under which Eric purchased 360
membership units, representing a 36% ownership interest, and Autumn purchased 640 membership
units, representing a 64% ownership interest. Because both the LLC and the membership interests
were acquired during the marriage, the membership interests are presumed to be community
property. See TEX. FAM CODE § 3.003. Accordingly, Autumn bore the burden at trial to rebut that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id.
Because Autumn had the burden of proof at trial to rebut the community property
presumption by clear and convincing evidence, in bringing a legal sufficiency challenge to the
factfinder’s implicit finding that she failed to meet that heightened burden at trial, she must show
on appeal that the evidence conclusively proves that she, in fact, rebutted the community property
presumption as a matter of law. 2 See Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 425 (explaining that if the appellant
challenges the trial court’s characterization of property as community, on appeal the appellant must
prove that the separate property status was established as a matter of law); Prosper Florida, Inc.
v. Spicy World of USA, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 661, 675 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no
pet.) (explaining that in sufficiency challenges, “the standard of review varies depending on
whether [the appellant] or his adversary bore the burden of proof at trial” and that “[i]f the appellant
had the burden of proof at trial, then he must show that the evidence conclusively proves the
findings required to support the judgment he seeks”). The record reflects that the real property
2
If the factfinder had instead determined the property in question was separate property, the standard of review enunciated in Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207, would have applied. Under that standard, the appellate court first determines whether the finding of separate property is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; see In re Marriage of Ramsey, 487 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) (stating that when the finding challenged must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, the appellate court applies a heightened standard of review in its sufficiency analysis). If the finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the appellate court then determines whether the characterization error caused the trial court to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207.
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located at 9018 Wellwood was not acquired until July 20, 2022, eight days after the LLC was
formed and the membership interests were issued. The property was not conveyed to the LLC until
approximately two months later, on September 22, 2022, when Eric and Autumn transferred it to
the LLC by Special Warranty Deed. Nevertheless, Autumn argues that she purchased the
Wellwood property with her separate funds and that, because the property is the LLC’s sole asset,
she has traced her alleged separate property interest into the LLC. In essence, Autumn focuses on
ownership of the real property rather than ownership of the LLC membership interests and
contends that she is entitled, not only to her 64% membership interest, but also to one-half of Eric’s
remaining 36% membership interest.
Autumn’s tracing theory fails for two reasons. First, the chronology of the transactions
defeats her argument. The membership interests were issued before the Wellwood property was
acquired and more than two months before the Wellwood property was conveyed to the LLC.
Accordingly, the Wellwood property could not have been the consideration used to acquire
Autumn’s membership interest. Second, even assuming the Wellwood property was Autumn’s
separate property before it was conveyed to the LLC, that fact does not establish that her interest
in the LLC was separate property.
“[W]hen property is conveyed to an entity such as a partnership or limited liability
company, it becomes the property of the entity and loses its separate or community character.” In
re Marriage of Hudson, No. 06-18-00011-CV, 2018 WL 4656288, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Sept. 28, 2018, no pet.); see In re Marriage of Nash, 644 S.W.3d 683, 708 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2022, no pet.) (same); see also Lifshutz v. Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d 9, 27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2006, pet. denied). Therefore, “property owned by a limited liability company is neither the
community property nor the separate property of its members and, as a result, is not subject to
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award or division in divorce.” Mason v. Mason, No. 03-17-00546-CV, 2019 WL 1967166 at *6
(Tex. App.—Austin May 3, 2019, no pet.). Applying these principles, we conclude that while the
Wellwood property is owned by the LLC, it is neither separate property nor community property
and cannot be subject to an award or division in a divorce. See Mason, 2019 WL 1967166 at *6;
Marriage of Hudson, 2018 WL 4656288, at *3.
For these reasons, Autmn cannot trace her separate property ownership of the Wellwood
property through its transfer to the LLC because, upon its transfer to the LLC, Autumn no longer
held an ownership interest in the Wellwood property. See Mason, 2019 WL 1967166 at *6
(explaining that “when the funds were transferred from [husband] and [wife]’s community estate
to [the LLC], the funds lost their community character and became the property of the LLC”);
Lifshutz, 199 S.W.3d at 27 (explaining that “[w]hen an individual partner contributes property into
a partnership, the partner loses individual interest in the property and, since the partnership itself
is the new owner, the property can no longer be classified as separate or community,” and therefore
because the “partnership property does not retain a separate character, distributions from the
partnership are considered community property, regardless of whether the distribution is of income
or of an asset”). The relevant property interest in the divorce is therefore the parties’ membership
interests in the LLC, not direct ownership of the Wellwood property itself. We thus conclude that
Autumn has failed to show that the evidence conclusively proves she rebutted the community
property presumption. See Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 425. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is
legally sufficient to support the finding that the LLC is entirely community property.
JURY CHARGE
Autumn argues that “the trial court abused its discretion in giving a defective jury charge
that allowed classification of separate property as community property.” She argues the jury
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charged “omitted the fact that the character of property is determined at the time of acquisition by
the character of the consideration paid for the property.” She further contends the charge “failed
to properly instruct on burden of proof when undisputed tracing evidence was present” and that
the charge “lacked adequate limiting instructions regarding irrelevant character evidence and
commented on the weight of the evidence by providing specific dollar amounts for reimbursement
claims.” Autumn, however, has failed to preserve this issue for appeal.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 272 requires that before the jury charge is read to the jury,
objections to the jury charge be presented to the trial court in writing or dictated to the court
reporter in the presence of the trial court and opposing counsel. TEX. R. CIV. P. 272. “All objections
not so presented shall be considered as waived. See id. Rue 274 provides that a “party objecting to
a charge must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds of the objection.” Id.
R. 274. Under Rule 278, failure to submit a question, definition, or instruction “shall not be deemed
a ground for reversal of the judgment” unless its submission, “in substantially correct wording,”
was requested in writing and “tendered by the party complaining of the judgment.” Id. R. 278.
Autumn neither filed a proposed jury charge nor offered one for the record. She did not
present any proposed questions, definitions, or instructions to the trial court. The record does not
reflect that she objected to the jury charge or that she proposed any instructions, definitions, or
questions. Indeed, the record does not reflect that Autumn brought any of her complaints about the
jury charge to the trial court’s attention. She has thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal. See
In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) (holding that under procedural rules, “the failure
to raise a complaint at trial to a jury charge waives review of that complaint on appeal”); In re
K.N.S., No. 12-25-00171-CV, 2025 WL 3724545, at *9 (Tex. App.—Tyler Dec. 23, 2025, pet.
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denied) (holding that appellant waived complaint about jury charge error because appellant “did
not object orally or in writing to the jury charge or its instructions during the charge conference”).
THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER OF WIND-UP AND SALE OF LLC
Autumn further argues that the trial court erred in modifying the terms of 9018 Wellwood
LLC, when the limited liability company was not a party before the trial court. We agree.
The trial court ordered that Eric will assume sole management and control of 9018
Wellwood, LLC for the purpose of winding up the company, selling all company property, paying
all company liabilities, and distributing the remaining proceeds in a proportion of sixty percent to
Eric and forty percent to Autumn. As stated above, “a limited-liability company is a separate legal
entity, and property owned by such a company is neither the community property nor the separate
property of its members.” See Bravo v. Bravo, No. 05-24-00419-CV, 2025 WL 2053579, at *8
(Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2025, pet. denied). “The business property that is subject to division
is the interest in the limited-liability company itself, not the company’s specific assets.” Id.
(emphasis ordered)
As “[a] trial court is authorized to divide only the parties’ community estate,” the trial court
had authority only to divide Autumn’s and Lee’s community interest in the LLC. Id. The trial
court had no authority to order the wind up and dissolutions of the LLC itself, a separate entity
that was not before it. See id. at *8-9; see also Touponse v. Touponse, No. 02-20-00285-CV, 2021
WL 2753504, at * 5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 1, 2021, no pet.) (holding that because a trial
court is authorized to divide only the parties’ community estate, the trial court “clearly abused its
discretion by characterizing the real properties owned by [the LLC] as part of the community estate
and, thereafter, awarding them to [the husband] as his separate property”). For this reason, we find
Eric’s argument that Autumn invited error unpersuasive, as the trial court had no authority to order
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the LLC to wind up and dissolve. See Bravo, 2025 WL 2053579, at *8; Touponse, 2021 WL
2753504, at * 5. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Eric to assume full
management and control of the LLC for the purpose of winding up the LLC, selling all the property
of the LLC, and paying all of the LLC’s liabilities.
REIMBURSEMENT AWARDS TO ERIC
Autmn also challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding
that Eric was entitled to reimbursement awards, arguing that Eric failed to trace the source of the
funds used to his separate property. The jury found that Eric’s separate estate conferred a benefit
on the community estate in the amount of $86,338.00 for payments toward tax debt during
marriage and in the amount of $68,863.15 for payments made toward the mortgage for the Palmer
View property. In the final decree, the trial court, in conformity with the jury’s verdict, found that
Eric’s separate estate was entitled to reimbursement from the community estate, and stated that
Eric’s “reimbursement claim ha[d] been satisfied as part of the just and right division of property.”
Section 3.402 of the Family Code provides for a claim for reimbursement “when one or
both spouses use property of one marital estate to confer on the property of another marital estate
a benefit which, if not repaid, would result in unjust enrichment to the benefited estate.” TEX. FAM.
CODE § 3.402(a). Section 7.007 further provides that in a decree of divorce, the trial court shall
determine the rights of both spouse in a claim for reimbursement and shall apply equitable
principles to determine “whether to recognize the claim after taking into account all the relative
circumstances of the spouses,” and to “order a division of the claim for reimbursement, if
appropriate, in a manner that the trial court considers just and right, having due regard for the rights
of each party.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.007.
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We review a trial court’s award of reimbursement for abuse of discretion. See Marin v.
Marin, No. 03-22-00013-CV, 2023 WL 2776296, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2023, no pet.).
“If some evidence supports the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion.” Id. “Great
latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable principles to a claim for
reimbursement.” Id. “An equitable claim for reimbursement is not merely a balancing of the
ledgers between the marital estates.” Id. “The discretion to be exercised in evaluating a claim for
reimbursement is equally as broad as that discretion subsequently exercised by the trial court in
making a ‘just and right’ division of the community property.” Id. “The legal sufficiency of the
evidence is a relevant factor in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id.
“The rule of reimbursement is purely an equitable one.” Id. at *5. “A right of
reimbursement arises when funds of one estate” “are used to benefit another estate” without that
estate receiving some benefit. Id. A spouse seeking reimbursement must show (1) that a
contribution was made by one marital estate to another, (2) that the contribution was reimbursable,
and (3) the value of the contribution. Id.; see Zeptner v. Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“The party claiming reimbursement bears the burden of
establishing the net benefit to the payee estate.”). At trial, Eric sought reimbursement, claiming
that his separate funds were used to benefit the community estate. On appeal, Autumn argues that
no evidence supports the trial court’s decision to award Eric reimbursement based on Eric’s
separate funds being used to benefit the community estate.
To establish that his separate property was used to benefit the community estate, Eric had
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the funds used to pay the taxes and the mortgage
were derived from his separate property. See In re T.E.R., No. 05-24-00014-CV, 2025 WL
1771837, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 2025, no pet.) (“The party pleading a claim for
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reimbursement has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the expenditures
or improvements were made by the party’s separate property and that they are reimbursable.”);
Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612 (“Tracing involves establishing the separate origin of the property
through evidence showing the time and means by which the spouse originally obtained possession
of the property”). Because the jury determined that Eric had met his burden at trial to show he was
entitled to reimbursement by clear and convincing evidence, in reviewing Autumn’s legal
sufficiency challenge to Eric’s reimbursement award, we “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm
belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *7 (citing In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2002)); see also Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207. If we determine
there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that Eric’s separate property was used to benefit
the community estate, we then determine whether the characterization error caused the trial court
to abuse its discretion in the overall division of the community estate. See Viera, 331 S.W.3d at
207.
As noted, to satisfy the clear and convincing burden of tracing, a party must typically
present some form of documentary evidence to support his separate property claim, as a party’s
mere testimony that separate property was used to purchase the property is insufficient without
some form of corroboration. See Warriner, 394 S.W.3d at 248; Graves, 329 S.W.3d at 139;
Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d at 316. Additionally, when separate and community property have been
commingled so that they cannot be resegregated and identified, the community-property
presumption prevails. Goyal v. Hora, No. 03-19-00868-CV, 2021 WL 2149628, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Austin May 27, 2021, no pet.) (citing McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex.
1973)); see Rivera, 441 S.W.3d at 423 (explaining that a party may plead that a brokerage account
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is separate property, “but income earned and dividends paid—if not clearly traced—will result in
characterization of the account as community property due to commingling”). Further, “[g]aps in
account statements can make tracing evidence less than ‘clear and convincing.’” Goyal, 2021 WL
2149628, at *9. “We resolve any doubt as to the character of property in favor of community
status.” Id. at *6.
We begin with the presumption that the funds used by Eric toward the tax debt and the
Palmer View mortgage are properly characterized as community property. See TEX. FAM. CODE §
3.003(a); Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612. Eric argues that he overcame the community presumption by
establishing through tracing that the funds used were separate property. See TEX. FAM. CODE §
3.003(a); Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612. For the following reasons, we disagree.
According to Eric, the funds that were used to pay the taxes and the Palmer View mortgage
originated from a USAA account and were his separate property because they originated from his
VA disability benefits and military retirement benefits earned prior to the marriage. At trial, Eric
testified that approximately 90% of his earnings from his work in Ukraine were deposited into a
separate Wells Fargo account. However, he acknowledged that, because of the nature of his work,
some of his Ukraine earnings may have been deposited into the USAA account for emergencies
or necessities. Eric explained that while he was working in Ukraine, he was frequently transferring
money to pay for medical supplies and that fraud alerts sometimes disrupted those transactions,
which created the possibility that some of his Ukraine earnings were deposited into the USAA
account. Eric and his father also testified that Eric borrowed $46,000 from his father to pay tax
obligations and that Eric contributed an additional $46,000 from his USAA account toward those
taxes. Other than testimony, Eric provided no documentation of the tax loan from his father. Thus,
the only evidence offered to establish the separate property character of the USAA account
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consisted of Eric’s testimony, corroborated with testimony from his father, and limited
documentary exhibits.
The documentary evidence Eric did provide failed to trace the funds in the USAA account
to separate property sources. “Respondent’s Exhibit 9,” a December 2024 mortgage statement for
the marital residence on Palmer View, established only the existence and status of the mortgage
obligation. “Respondent’s Exhibit 10” summarized mortgage payments made from the USAA
account, and “Respondent’s Exhibit 11” consisted of the underlying USAA bank statements
reflecting those mortgage payments. These exhibits demonstrated that mortgage payments and
payments in general were made from the USAA account, but they did not identify the source of
the funds deposited into the USAA account. None of the exhibits included records of VA disability
payments, military retirement deposits, transfer histories, deposit records, account statements
showing the origin of the funds, or any other tracing documentation linking the account balance to
Eric’s alleged separate property. Accordingly, neither Eric’s testimony nor his documentary
evidence provides the type of clear, specific, and traceable financial evidence necessary to rebut
the community property presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See In re T.E.R., 2025
WL 1771837, at *4 (holding that wife “failed to sufficiently trace her separate property and
establish she was entitled to reimbursement by clear and convincing evidence”). We therefore
conclude the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Eric’s separate funds were used to benefit
the community estate in the amounts of $86,338.00 and $68,863.15, and the trial court erred in
using those reimbursement awards in its determination of a “just and right” division of the
community estate. See In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *10; Marin, 2023 WL 2776296, at *4;
Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207. Further, based on the amount of the reimbursement awards and the
record before us, we cannot conclude that the legally insufficient awards had only a minimal
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impact on the “just and right” division of the community estate. See Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 741;
Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 207.
“Once reversible error affecting the ‘just and right’ division of the community estate is
found, the court of appeals must remand the entire community estate for a new division.” Jacobs,
687 S.W.2d at 733; see also Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 741 (relying on Jacobs). We therefore reverse
the trial court’s division of property and remand this cause to the trial court for a new division of
the community estate. See In re T.E.R., 2025 WL 1771837, at *10; Zeptner, 111 S.W.3d at 741. 3
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the winding up and dissolution of
the LLC, we reverse the portion of the final decree that appointed Eric to assume full management
and control of 9018 Wellwood, LLC for the purpose of winding up and selling all property of the
LLC. Further, because the trial court erred in considering reimbursement awards to Eric in its
determination of a “just and right” division of the community estate, we reverse the trial court’s
final decree regarding the community-property division and remand the entire community estate
for a new division of the community estate. We affirm that portion of the final divorce decree
granting the parties a divorce.
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
3
Having determined that we must remand for a new division of the community estate, we need not decide Autumn’s issue regarding whether the trial court abused its discretion “by creating a punitive and disproportionate division of the marital estate.”
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