TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00394-CV
Rhonda Cherie Martin, Appellant
v.
David Lee Martin, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF BURNET COUNTY
NO. 54302, THE HONORABLE CODY HENSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rhonda Cherie Martin, appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s final
divorce decree ending her marriage to David Lee Martin. 1 The parties have two children from
the marriage, both of whom had turned eighteen before the trial court signed the decree. For the
following reasons, we affirm the decree.
BACKGROUND
Rhonda filed for divorce in September 2022. On February 3, 2025, Rhonda’s
attorney filed an agreed motion to withdraw as counsel, indicating that she and Rhonda had
reached a mutual agreement for the withdrawal and that the case was set for a final trial on
April 10, 2025. The trial court signed an order on February 5, 2025, granting the motion to
withdraw. David filed an original counterpetition for divorce on March 11, 2025, followed by a
1 Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names. first amended counterpetition on April 2, 2025. David’s amended counterpetition added a claim
for fraud, in which David alleged that just two weeks prior, Rhonda had fraudulently procured
his signature on quitclaim deeds concerning community property. Also on April 2, Rhonda filed
a pro se motion to continue the April 10 hearing, contending that she needed more time to hire
another attorney and a chance to mediate with David. On April 9, 2025, Rhonda’s new attorney
filed an entry of appearance and a motion for continuance, representing that she needed
additional time to gather and review the file, evidence, pleadings, and orders to prepare for trial.
On April 10, 2025—the date the case was set for a bench trial—the trial court heard Rhonda’s
continuance motion and denied it on the record, and trial commenced. The trial court signed its
final divorce decree on May 21, 2025, and Rhonda perfected this appeal.
DISCUSSION
In the “issues presented” section of her brief, Rhonda summarily lists five issues
and several sub-issues, but those issues and sub-issues are not all addressed in the argument
section of her brief with substantive arguments supported by legal authority or citations to the
record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (requiring briefs to contain, among other items, clear and
concise argument for contentions made, supported by citations to record and authority).
Although we liberally construe pro se pleadings, we still must hold pro se litigants to the same
standards and rules as those represented by counsel. See Housing Auth. of City of Austin
v. Elbendary, 581 S.W.3d 488, 491 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.). Therefore, we do not
address the issues and sub-issues in Rhonda’s brief that contain no substantive arguments
supported by legal authority or citations to the record. See Mamoe v. Mamoe, No. 03-23-00258-CV, 2024 WL 4137329, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 11, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Farkas
2
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 03-14-00716-CV, 2016 WL 7187476, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin
Dec. 8, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In the absence of appropriate record citations or a substantive
analysis, a brief does not present an adequate appellate issue.”). We proceed, therefore, to
address the issues that Rhonda has adequately briefed, to the extent we understand them, and
accordingly re-order and re-number her issues.
Rhonda first argues that the trial court improperly “forced a final trial setting”
without her receiving adequate or proper notice of David’s amended counterpetition and abused
its discretion by not granting her motion for continuance after she retained new counsel only two
days before trial. To support her argument about not receiving adequate notice of the amended
counterpetition, she states that because the pleading was filed less than thirty days before trial, it
violated the “mandatory notice thresholds” in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245. However,
Rule 245 does not speak to the timelines for amended pleadings and does not support Rhonda’s
argument. 2 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 245 (“Assignment of Cases for Trial”). In a related argument,
Rhonda contends that she did not receive proper notice of the amended counterpetition because
David served the pleading via email rather than “traditional paper mail” as her “explicit written
directive on record” required. But see id. R. 21a (“Methods of Service”). She does not support
this argument with legal authority, and the record citation she provides does not support it either.
We therefore overrule the argument.
As to her argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion
for continuance, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion. We will not disturb a trial
2 Nor does the record indicate that Rhonda preserved this complaint: she did not file a motion to strike David’s amended counterpetition, assert that the amendment caused her surprise or prejudice, or cite the amended counterpetition as a basis to support her motion for continuance. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 63 (“Amendments and Responsive Pleadings”); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (“Preservation; How Shown”).
3
court’s denial of a continuance unless the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion.
BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (citing Villegas
v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches
a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id.
“In exercising its discretion over whether to grant or deny a continuance due to the withdrawal of
counsel, a trial court may consider the entire procedural history of a case.” In re Harrison,
557 S.W.3d 99, 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); see also Tex. R. Civ.
P. 253 (“Except as provided elsewhere in these rules, absence of counsel will not be good cause
for a continuance or postponement of the cause when called for trial, except it be allowed in the
discretion of the court . . . .”). Although Rhonda argues in her brief that she “acted with utmost
diligence to secure” new counsel after her prior counsel withdrew, she does not cite evidence in
the record supporting such diligence. The record demonstrates that the case had been pending
for two and a half years when it went to trial and that Rhonda had over two months to secure new
counsel after the court granted her prior counsel’s motion to withdraw. We cannot conclude on
this record that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. We overrule Rhonda’s
first issue.
Rhonda next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in making its just and
right property division because of David’s “fraud on the community estate” by “covertly
submit[ting] modification paperwork to the State of Texas to separate a pending storm insurance
repair claim totaling exactly $10,612.10.” She also complains about the trial court’s “illegal
divestiture” of her separate property with respect to a mobile home. She explains that “title to
the mobile home was completely redeemed under federal bankruptcy law because the underlying
lien debt was discharged via the bankruptcy track, and [she] paid the entire $5,000 redemption
4
amount herself using exclusive separate trust funds.” Although she cites portions of the clerk’s
record, sections of the Texas Family Code, and case law, Rhonda does not explain how those
citations and authorities support her contentions or demonstrate any error by the trial court, nor
can we discern how those citations are relevant to or support her contentions. We accordingly
overrule her second issue.
Rhonda lastly argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
disqualify David’s counsel because the law firm representing him allegedly had a conflict of
interest by representing both David and, in a separate matter, “K.R.” Rhonda contends that K.R.
was a “primary material witness” in this case, David’s employer, and “the beneficiary of
executed caregiver documents” signed by David and Rhonda. Rhonda contends that she was
harmed by this conflict of interest because David thereby obtained “tactical custody advantages
and property controls,” citing temporary orders regarding child support and the divorce decree
generally. 3 As best we understand her argument, Rhonda appears to be contending that the trial
court should have disqualified David’s attorneys sua sponte, as she cites no motion to disqualify
in the clerk’s record, and we have not found one. Without an objection, request, motion to
disqualify, or any indication in the record that Rhonda made the trial court aware of her
complaint as to allow the court the opportunity to remedy the alleged conflict of interest, Rhonda
has not preserved her complaint for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1
(error-preservation rule). We overrule Rhonda’s third and final issue.
3 To the extent that by any of her issues Rhonda is challenging temporary orders rendered by the trial court, those issues were mooted by rendition of the final decree, and we therefore do not address them. See In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021); Erlewine v. Erlewine, No. 03-06-00308-CV, 2007 WL 2462042, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s final divorce decree.
Karin Crump, Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Theofanis and Crump
Affirmed
Filed: August 27, 2026
6