TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-26-00514-CV
Sandra Martinez, Appellant
v.
Capital One, N.A. successor by merger to Discover Bank, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TOM GREEN COUNTY
NO. 25C031-L2, ANDREW GRAVES, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sandra Martinez, filed this pro se interlocutory appeal on June 2, 2026, from the
trial court’s May 27, 2026 order denying her post-trial “Motion to Vacate Order Appointing
Receiver, Motion to Compel Arbitration, and Related Post-Judgment Filings.” In response to this
Court’s letter questioning our jurisdiction, Martinez contends that she is pursuing an interlocutory
appeal of a trial court order denying a motion to compel arbitration. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code §§ 51.016, 171.098(a)(1). For the reasons explained, we will dismiss this appeal for want
of jurisdiction.
In the underlying suit for unpaid credit-card debt, the trial court granted final
summary judgment in favor of Capital One, N.A., successor by merger to Discover Bank, on
January 5, 2026. Martinez did not appeal the judgment. The trial court appointed a receiver to
collect on the judgment and denied Martinez’s motion to vacate the receiver’s appointment. More than four months after the judgment was signed, and when the collection process had begun,
Martinez moved to “Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration” alleging that
her credit-card contract contained an arbitration clause. The trial court denied the motion.
Martinez challenges the denial of her motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceedings, even though the underlying suit had been fully adjudicated by the final summary
judgment on the merits and there was no ongoing litigation to redirect to arbitration. “A case is
moot when it would have no practical effect on an existing controversy.” Shattuck LLC v. Kleypas,
No. 03-20-00396-CV, 2020 WL 6478416, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (per curiam) (concluding that when trial court signed final judgment during pending
interlocutory appeal from order denying motion to compel arbitration, “the purpose of an
interlocutory appeal [was] mooted by the final judgment,” and proper vehicle for review of order
denying motion to compel arbitration was appeal from final judgment). Here, reversal of the order
denying arbitration would have no effect on the final summary judgment that preceded it. All
claims in the underlying suit had been resolved when the order denying Martinez’s motion to
compel arbitration was signed, thus, there was no need for arbitration. See Halliburton Co. v. KBR,
Inc., 446 S.W.3d 551, 557–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“To be sure, there
would be no need for arbitration if all claims between the parties had been resolved when the order
[denying application to compel arbitration] was signed.”). Martinez’s interlocutory appeal from
the order denying her motion to compel arbitration is moot. And she did not appeal from the final
summary judgment. 1
1 Attempted appeal of the January 5, 2026 final summary judgment in her June 2, 2026 notice of appeal would have been untimely. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1.
2
Further, any justiciable dispute as to the denial of Martinez’s motion to vacate the
appointment of the receiver became moot when the trial court signed an order on June 3, 2026,
terminating the receivership and discharging the receiver. See White v. Cascade Cap., LLC,
No. 14-25-00957-CV, 2026 WL 2164226, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 28, 2026,
no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“Because the trial court terminated the receivership, a judgment from this
court cannot have a practical effect on an existing controversy between the parties and the appeal
is thus moot.”); Senior Care Living VI, LLC v. Preston Hollow Cap., LLC, 695 S.W.3d 778, 787
n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (concluding receivership issue was moot
where receiver was discharged during pendency of appeal); see also Glassdoor, Inc. v. Andra Grp.,
LP, 575 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. 2019) (stating that case becomes moot during pendency of
litigation if issues presented are no longer live or parties lack legally cognizable interest in
outcome); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(2).
“Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies.” NCAA
v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). When a case is moot, we must dismiss it for want of
jurisdiction. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2022).
Thus, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: August 31, 2026
3