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J.T. v. M

2026-09-09

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

09-SEP-2026

02:04 PM

Dkt. 163 OP

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

---oOo---J.T., Petitioner-Appellee, v.

M.R., Respondent-Appellant

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

(Consolidated with No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX)

APPEAL FROM THE FAMILY COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

(CASE NO. 2PA211000129)

September 9, 2026

HIRAOKA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCCULLEN AND GUIDRY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J.

In this highly contentious paternity action, M.R.

(Mother) appeals from several post-judgment orders entered by the

Family Court of the Second Circuit.1 We hold that the family court abused its discretion by: (1) denying Mother's motion to

remove a special master, which ultimately deprived her of due

process and access to justice; (2) concluding that Mother was a

vexatious litigant and imposing sanctions; and (3) modifying

1

The Honorable Lance D. Collins presided over the post-judgment proceedings.

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

legal custody without applying the Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 571-46(b) best-interest-of-the-child factors or entering

findings of fact and conclusions of law. We vacate the postjudgment orders at issue and remand to the family court with

instructions.

I. BACKGROUND

Mother and J.T. (Father) are Child's natural parents.

Father petitioned for custody, visitation, and support. The

family court entered the October 28, 2022 Judgment Regarding

Custody, Visitation, and Support After Trial.2 Mother and Father

were awarded joint legal and physical custody, with equal

timesharing.

Within a year, Mother and Father both moved for postjudgment relief. Mother requested sole legal and physical

custody of Child and amendment of the timesharing and holiday

schedule. Father requested sole legal and physical custody of

Child, amendment of the holiday schedule, and an order that Child

could not travel out of state.

The family court appointed a child custody evaluator.

The custody evaluator's April 30, 2024 report stated "there has

not been any evidence presented that should warrant a change from

the last court order with regard to Physical and Legal custody."

The evaluator didn't believe a collaborative co-parenting

approach was possible because Mother and Father could not

communicate. "[P]arallel parenting with strictly ordered

structure" which would "mitigate the need for any communication

2

The Honorable Loren K. Tilley II presided.

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beyond major decision making" was recommended should joint

custody be continued.

Mother's counsel withdrew in September 2024. On

September 19, 2024, Mother (representing herself) filed a Motion

to Address Illegal Drug Use by Father's Caregivers and Family

Members. On October 17, 2024, the family court orally ordered:

"Neither party shall be under the influence of any unprescribed

medication or illegal drug in the presence of the minor child."

Mother was directed to submit a form of order, but it doesn't

appear she did.

On October 16, 2024, Mother filed a Motion to Compel

Discovery and Set Deposition Dates and Deadline for

Interrogatories. On October 23, 2024, Mother filed requests for

answers to interrogatories to Father and to ten non-parties. The

family court denied Mother's motion and struck the

interrogatories to the non-parties.3

Trial on Mother's and Father's 2023 motions for postjudgment relief was held on December 11 and 12, 2024. The family

court entered its January 22, 2025 Order Granting in Part

Father's Motion for Post-Decree Relief. Joint legal and physical

custody was continued, but Father was given tie-breaking

authority for major decisions about Child. If Mother disagreed

with Father's decision she was to present the issue to a special

master. The special master was to prepare a proposed order for

the family court. If Father's decision was affirmed, Mother was

to pay the special master's costs. If Father's decision was

3

Interrogatories may only be served on parties. Hawai #i Family Court Rules Rule 33(a).

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overruled, Father was to pay the special master's costs. If

Father's decision was affirmed in part, the special master was to

recommend apportionment of costs.

On January 24, 2025, the family court entered the Order

Appointing Special Master. A lawyer was appointed to be the

special master.

Also on January 24, 2025, the family court entered an

order denying Mother's motion for post-judgment relief and motion

to address illegal drug use.

On January 29, 2025, Mother moved for "reconsideration

of the judgment entered on January 24, 2025," apparently

intending to refer to the January 22, 2025 Order. Mother

separately moved for a new trial. The family court entered

orders denying reconsideration and denying a new trial.

Mother appealed from the January 22, 2025 Order and the

January 24, 2025 order appointing special master, creating

CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. We granted Mother's motion to proceed in forma

pauperis. A copy of our order was filed in family court on

March 13, 2025.

On March 31, 2025, Mother filed a motion to remove the

special master.

On April 7, 2025, Mother moved for recusal of the

family court judge.

On April 15, 2025, Father moved for sole legal custody

of Child and an order designating Mother a vexatious litigant.

Mother filed an objection to Father's motion and a separate

motion to strike Father's motion.

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The family court held an evidentiary hearing on

April 17, 2025. The court orally denied Mother's motion for

recusal. It orally denied Mother's motion to remove the special

master, found the motion "was made in bad faith and frivolous,"

and sanctioned Mother $100 to be paid to Father's counsel. The

court continued the evidentiary hearing to May 22, 2025, and

orally awarded Father temporary sole legal custody of Child.

A written order denying Mother's motion for recusal was

entered on April 17, 2025. The record does not contain a written

order denying Mother's motion to remove the special master or

imposing the $100 sanction on Mother.

On April 22, 2025, Mother requested findings of fact

and conclusions of law on the April 17, 2025 orders, moved for

reconsideration of the oral order denying her motion to remove

the special master and imposing sanctions, and moved for

reconsideration of the oral temporary legal custody order.

On May 6, 2025, Mother filed an Emergency ex Parte

Motion to Stay Enforcement of April 17, 2025 Order Pending

Evidentiary Hearing or Trial.

On May 7, 2025, Mother subpoenaed a police officer to

appear at the May 22, 2025 continued evidentiary hearing.

On May 8, 2025, the family court entered orders denying

Mother's motions for reconsideration and her motion to stay

enforcement.

On May 9, 2025, the family court entered an order

denying Mother's request for findings of fact and conclusions of

law.

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On May 19, 2025, the family court entered an order

awarding "temporary sole legal custody" of Child to Father. The

order also "temporarily suspended" the special master process

"due to Father being awarded temporary sole legal custody, as

there is no need for Father's tie-breaking authority to be

reviewed."

The continued evidentiary hearing on Father's motion

for sole legal custody of Child and to designate Mother a

vexatious litigant was held on May 22, 2025. During the hearing

the family court addressed the police officer who Mother

subpoenaed:

You are excused from your subpoena at this time. We do not

have an evidentiary hearing set today, and so I'm not sure

why exactly you were subpoenaed, but you are excused. And

I'm also going to be issuing a sanction to [Mother] in the

amount of $150 payable forthwith to the County of Maui for

issuing the subpoena to -- improperly to Sergeant Kuamo #o

and taking time out of his morning to have to be here. All

right.

On May 27, 2025, the family court entered its Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Determining [Mother] to Be

a [sic] HRS § 634J-l "Vexatious Litigant."

Mother appealed, creating CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. We granted

Mother's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and consolidated her

appeals.

The Order Regarding Continued Hearing and [Mother]'s

Motion to Strike Father's Motion for Post-Decree Relief was

entered on August 19, 2025. It denied Father's motion and

"awarded temporary joint legal custody" of Child to Mother and

Father, with Father having "tie breaking authority." The order

also "temporarily suspended" the special master process and

provided:

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5. [The family] Court sanctioned [Mother] $150.00 to be

paid by [Mother] forthwith to the County of Maui.

6. The [family] Court Ordered for any approved NonEvidentiary Motion filed by [Mother], a security of

$2500 and any approved evidentiary motion filed by

[Mother], a security of S7,500 to be paid by [Mother]

and held in trust with the Clerk of the Court.

II. POINTS OF ERROR

Mother's opening brief was filed by an attorney from

the Hawai#i Appellate Pro Bono Program. It states three points

of error: (1) the family court erred by appointing a special

master, denying Mother's motion to remove the special master, and

denying Mother's motion for reconsideration; (2) the family court

erred by designating Mother a vexatious litigant and imposing

sanctions; and (3) the family court erred by modifying legal

custody without announcing or entering findings of fact.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The "family court possesses wide discretion in making

its decisions and those decisions will not be set aside unless

there is a manifest abuse of discretion." Hamilton v. Hamilton,

138 Hawai#i 185, 197, 378 P.3d 901, 913 (2016). The family court

abuses its discretion if it disregards rules or principles of law

or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant;

fails to exercise its equitable discretion; or its decision

clearly exceeds the bounds of reason. Id.

We review the appointment or removal of a special

master for abuse of discretion. In re Est. of Damon, 119 Hawai#i

500, 503, 199 P.3d 89, 92 (2008).

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We review the imposition of sanctions for abuse of

discretion. LaPeter v. LaPeter, 144 Hawai#i 295, 304, 439 P.3d

247, 256 (App. 2019).

We review a vexatious litigant determination for abuse

of discretion. Trs. of Est. of Bishop v. Au, 146 Hawai#i 272,

278, 463 P.3d 929, 935 (2020).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The family court abused its discretion by

denying Mother's motion to remove the special

master.

Father contends Mother's challenges to the special

master orders are moot because the family court "suspended the

special master process and intends to remove it once it has

jurisdiction again." The issue is not moot because the family

court "temporarily suspended" the special master process; it did

not remove the special master or rescind the special master

procedure. And Mother's motion to remove the special master was

the basis for the family court fining Mother and finding her a

vexatious litigant.

Hawai#i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 53 provides:

(a) Appointment. The court may appoint a . . .

special master . . . to perform specific acts and/or obtain

specific evidence to assist the court.

(b) Compensation. A master (except a volunteer

settlement master) shall be compensated as determined by the

court, and shall be paid out of any fund or subject matter

of the action, which is in the custody and control of the

court, or by one or more of the parties themselves, as the

court may direct. . . .

(c) Reference. A reference to a master shall be made

for good cause. A party may move for the appointment of a

master. The court may appoint a master on its own

initiative after affording the parties an opportunity to be

heard.

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(e) Report. The order of reference to a master shall

specify the date by which the master's report shall be

completed, served on all parties, and filed with the court.

No party requested a special master. Appointment of a

special master was not addressed during the trial on Mother's and

Father's post-judgment motions. The family court ordered it on

its own during the December 26, 2024 post-trial hearing, without

first seeking input from the parties. The court stated:

So the Court is going to adopt Father's proposed parenting

plan with some modifications.

The first is that the parents will have joint legal

custody of the minor's [sic] [Child]. But Father will have

a [sic] tie-breaking authority. If Mother disagrees with

Father's decision, she will address her disagreement to a

Special Master who I'm going to appoint by filing a written

request and presenting all evidence to that Special Master.

And after a hearing from the parties, the Special Master

will prepare a recommended findings and conclusions and a

decision in the form of a proposed order. And the Special

Master will file the recommendations and proposed order and

either party will have 10 days to take exceptions to the

recommendations in the proposed order otherwise the order

will be filed as the Court's decision. If Father's decision

is upheld, then Mother shall pay the cost of the Special

Master. If Father's decision is upheld in part, the Special

Master will also include recommendations for the equitable

apportionment of costs. And if Father's decision is

overruled, Father will pay the cost of the Special Master.

The family court explained to Mother:

I have created a Special Master process so that his -- if

you disagree with [Father's] decision, that you have the

ability to not have to wait 18 months to have somebody make

a decision that you have a -- should be less expensive and

more convenient process to have actual disputes resolved by

somebody in a much quicker time so that you don't have to

wait a long time to have an evidentiary hearing before a

judge.

Mother expressed concern she couldn't afford the

special master fees, but the family court told her she'd only

have to pay if the special master disagreed with her:

[MOTHER]: -- my concern is the disparity between

income between the two parties. And at this point, like,

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I'm -- need to file for some sort of exemption from fees

because I can't afford -- I proposed a free parenting

therapist through my insurance which was denied and proposed

a couple free parenting therapists through my insurance

which have been denied. But I can't afford any payment of

any Special Masters or any payment of anybody else at this

point because I --THE COURT: Well, I know and that's the thing is that

-- but this only comes into play if you actually have a

legitimate dispute with -- if you get to the point where you

folks don't agree, [Father] makes a call and breaks the tie

that you don't agree with, this process only comes into play

at that time. And you're only responsible for the costs if

the -- if the Special Master completely agrees with [Father]

and doesn't agree with you. So it's really under -- it

should be under normal co-parenting circumstances, a process

that's never used. But it's entirely up to you. If you

feel like you need to dispute every single thing that he

does, then it's going to end up -- you know, there's going

to be a cost to it. But I'm ordering this because I think

that this is a -- it's in the best interest of your child to

have what I consider to be the sort of disputes between

co-parents resolved quickly and more efficiently than having

these long drawn out court processes where things don't get

resolved for a long time.

The January 22, 2025 Order provided:

2. SPECIAL MASTER. If Mother disagrees with a tie

breaking decision made by Father she may address her

disagreement to the Special Master by filing a written

request and presenting all evidence to the Special

Master.

a. After a hearing on the disagreement the Special

Master will prepare a written finding and

conclusion with a decision. The written finding

shall be filed with the court in the form of a

Proposed Order.

b. Either Party will have ten days to make an

exception to the recommendations otherwise the

Order will be filed as the courts [sic]

decision. If either Party disagrees with the

recommendations they may request a hearing with

the Family Court.

c. If Father's decision is upheld then Mother shall

pay the costs of the special master. If

Father's decision is upheld in part then the

Special Master will include recommendations on

the apportionment of costs. If Father's

decision is overruled then Father shall pay the

cost of the Special Master.

d. A separate Order naming the Special Master will

be filed with the Courts. If the appointed

Special Master is unable or unwilling to

continue with their appointment the Parties can

file a Non-Hearing Motion for the appointment of

a new Special Master if they cannot agree on a

new Special Master.

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The January 22, 2025 Order did not specify the date by

which the special master's report must be completed, as required

by HFCR Rule 53(e), despite the family court's stated rationale

that "it's in the best interest of your child to have . . .

disputes between co-parents resolved quickly[.]"

Mother's Motion to Remove Special Master was filed on

March 31, 2025. She argued:

[The special master] requires a $1,500 retainer before

beginning work. This financial requirement stands in direct

contradiction to the appellate court's order granting Mother

in forma pauperis status. The denial of Mother's request

for a fee waiver creates an access to justice issue,

effectively barring her from participation due to inability

to pay.

o The current arrangement establishes a "pay-toplay" dynamic, where only the party who can

afford the retainer is guaranteed participation.

o This dynamic disproportionately impacts Mother,

a self-represented litigant with proven

financial limitations, and violates the

principle of equal access to justice.

o The Special Master's refusal to consider a

waiver or sliding scale, even when informed of

the [in forma pauperis] ruling, effectively

excludes Mother from full participation in a

court-ordered process.

(emphasis in original).

Mother pointed out she had proposed a no-fee "qualified

licensed therapist" as a special master during the post-trial

hearing, but the family court appointed a lawyer instead.

The record does not contain an order disposing of

Mother's Motion to Remove Special Master. However, during the

April 17, 2025 hearing on Father's motion to have Mother declared

a vexatious litigant, this exchange took place:

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THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me ask you this. If you

were unwilling to participate in the Special Master process,

are you -- do you have an objection to [Father] having sole

legal custody of your child?

[MOTHER]: I'm very willing to participate in the

Special Master process, but I would like a Special Master

that I can afford. I can't afford $1,500 and --THE COURT: Okay. Well -- well, let me ask you,

[Mother]. What is the issue that [Father] has -- what is

the issue that [Father]'s made a tie-breaking on [sic] that

you don't agree with?

[MOTHER]: I -- I don't -- I -- we haven't had an

issue --THE COURT: Okay.

[MOTHER]: Okay. Wait. Can we pick -- can I --THE COURT: I'm -- no, no, no. Stop. Stop. No. I'm

denying your motion and I'm sanctioning you a $100 for

filing the motion. I find that it's frivolous and made in

--[MOTHER]: Okay.

THE COURT: -- bad faith. No, and we're not having a

discussion about it --[MOTHER]: Which motion --THE COURT: -- no.

[MOTHER]: -- are you denying?

THE COURT: Your motion to -- motion to remove Special

Master for conflict of interest and financial hardship. I'm

denying it --[MOTHER]: Okay. And --THE COURT: No, no –-[MOTHER]: -- may I please --THE COURT: No, don't --[MOTHER]: -- may I please finish --THE COURT: -- no -- stop.

[MOTHER]: -- what I'm saying?

THE COURT: No. No. You cannot. I'm finding that

that motion was frivolous and it was made in bad faith. The

-- you don't even have a conflict yet and --[MOTHER]: I do. I --THE COURT: -- no, no, no. You -- no more. I already

asked you --[MOTHER]: I -- you didn't --12

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THE COURT: -- and you said --[MOTHER]: -- let me finish what I'm saying.

THE COURT: No, no, I don't want you to say anymore

because I'm finding that this motion was made in bad faith

and frivolous. No, I don't want to hear anymore about this.

[MOTHER]: I'd like to please state one thing for the

--THE COURT: No.

[MOTHER]: -- record, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't -- I don't want to hear it. I

don't want to hear it right now. You -- I think what you

are not appreciating that this is a very expensive process.

So every time that you file something, especially like these

motions like the discovery motion which was completely not

based on the rule, and I denied it without a hearing to

avoid everybody having to go through the expense of having

to oppose it. And then you -- then you use it as a basis to

say that I should be removed as the judge when I'm trying to

save you and the other side money. No, this motion to

remove the Special Master, if there's no dispute --[MOTHER]: There was, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- and you're already --[MOTHER]: I would like to please state -- please.

THE COURT: Okay. What's the dispute that absolutely

--[MOTHER]: I have sent two e-mails to [Father]. We

had Jewish holidays that past -- the holiday of Purim and

the holiday of Passover. And as a legal joint tie-breaking

authority, he has the legal -- that's a -- access to

religion is a legal concern. And my request was for him to

bring the child to temple to participate. I didn't ask for

custody. I asked for the child to participate in the Purim

holiday at the temple, and I asked again for the Passover,

and those were sent within over a month ago.

THE COURT: All right. I am maintaining that this

motion was frivolous and filed in bad faith. This issue you

raised when I made my ruling, and I already determined what

the holiday schedule was. So there isn't a dispute that he

has tie-breaking authority over it. I had already ruled on

that, so I am maintaining that this motion was made in bad

faith and was frivolous, and I am going to sanction you

$100.

[MOTHER]: So how do we -- how do I get access to a

Jewish holiday, then?

THE COURT: I can't give you legal advice, but, you

know, your -- you -- in your other motion you said there's

res judicata. In your objections, you say there's res

judicata. And what the Court's already decided, the Court's

already decided. But you're now here arguing the exact

opposite that apparently if I make a decision that it's

always open to reinterpretation or further proceedings but

[Father] can't do that. So, you know, I'm not going to tell

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you what you should do or what you can do. But I'm just

telling you the motion that you filed regarding the Special

Master was made in bad faith and it's frivolous, and I'm

sanctioning $100 for filing it and I'm denying it.

On April 22, 2025, Mother moved for reconsideration of

the oral order denying her motion to remove the special master

and imposition of the $100 sanction. Attached to the motion was

an email from the special master's office stating, "We do not

work without a retainer up front."

The family court denied reconsideration. The order

incorrectly stated the "appointment of the Special Master

complies with the requirements of Rule 53, HFCRs." The order

also stated:

The arguments regarding financial hardship are without

merit. Mother would not be financially responsible for any

meritorious issue in dispute between the parents that she

may raise through the Special Master. She would only be

responsible ultimately for issues that lack merit.

[Mother]'s contention that she has not been given due

process lacks merit.

We hold that the family court abused its discretion by

denying Mother's motion to remove the special master. Doing so

deprived Mother of due process and access to justice. The

special master required that Mother pay a $1,500 retainer before

he would work on a dispute over Father's tie-breaking authority.

Even if the special master recommended the family court rule in

Mother's favor (so that Father would have to reimburse Mother's

payment of the retainer fee), Mother is indigent (she was granted

in forma pauperis status in these appeals) and unable to pay the

retainer fee up front. Her hands were tied because she could be

sanctioned if she moved for relief from Father's decision without

following the special master procedure.

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[A] parent's right to the care, custody, and control of the

parent's child is a fundamental liberty interest protected

by the United States and Hawai#i constitutions and entitled

to due process protection. In a child custody context, we

have specifically stated that the State may not deprive a

parent of the fundamental liberty interest in the care,

custody, and control of a child

without providing a fair procedure for the

deprivation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has

said that parental rights cannot be denied

without an opportunity for them to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner .

DJ v. CJ, 147 Hawai#i 2, 17, 464 P.3d 790, 805 (2020) (quoting In

Re Doe, 108 Hawai#i 144, 157, 118 P.3d 54, 67 (2005)).

Under these circumstances, the special master procedure

deprived Mother of her constitutional right to due process and of

access to the courts. See Doe v. Doe, 118 Hawai#i 293, 307, 188

P.3d 807, 821 (App. 2008) (noting that "the State's imposition of

substantial filing and other fees upon indigents seeking divorces

was held to deny them due process") (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 n.5 (1982) (citing Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971))). The family court thus

abused its discretion by denying Mother's motion to remove the

special master. If Mother paid the $100 sanction, the family

court shall on remand order repayment to Mother.

B. The family court abused its discretion by

determining that Mother was a vexatious

litigant and imposing sanctions.

Father's April 15, 2025 motion for post-decree relief

requested a determination that Mother was a vexatious litigant.

HRS § 634J-1 (2016) provides in part:

"Vexatious litigant" means a plaintiff who does any of the

following:

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(3) In any litigation while acting in propria

persona, files, in bad faith, unmeritorious

motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts

unnecessary discovery, or engages in other

tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to

cause unnecessary delay[.]

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

Determining [Mother] to Be a [sic] HRS § 634J-l "Vexatious

Litigant" was entered on May 27, 2025. The order included a $150

sanction against Mother, to be paid to the County of Maui, for

serving a police officer with a subpoena to appear at the May 22,

2025 continued hearing on Father's motion. The family court

found and concluded:

Respondent [Mother] is a "person who commences,

institutes or maintains litigation or causes it to be

commenced, instituted, or maintained" and therefore a

Plaintiff as defined by HRS § 634J-l.

The conclusion was wrong. HRS § 634J-1 defines

"vexatious litigant" as "a plaintiff who does any of the

following . . . ." HRS § 634J-1 states:

"Plaintiff" means the person who commences, institutes or

maintains litigation or causes it to be commenced,

instituted, or maintained, including an attorney at law

acting on the attorney's own behalf.

This paternity action was commenced by Father. Mother

is the respondent. "HRS § 634J-1's definition of 'plaintiff'

does not encompass a litigant who maintains litigation by filing

motions in the litigant's capacity as a defendant." Au, 146

Hawai#i at 280, 463 P.3d at 937.

The legislative history of HRS chapter 634J demonstrates

that the inclusion of the bad faith requirement in HRS

§ 634J-1(2) and (3) was intended to limit the definition of

vexatious litigant to those plaintiffs who attempt to

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relitigate in bad faith and who intentionally abuse the

system by filing frivolous claims or deliberately cause

unnecessary delay.

Id. at 281–82, 463 P.3d at 938–39 (emphasis added).

Mother, as the respondent, could not be a vexatious

litigant under HRS § 634J-1 even if she, "while acting in propria

persona, files, in bad faith, unmeritorious motions, pleadings,

or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in

other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause

unnecessary delay[.]" The family court's determination that

Mother was a vexatious litigant "disregarded rules or principles

of law or practice to the substantial detriment of" Mother. Au,

146 Hawai#i at 278, 463 P.3d at 935.

But we caution that the limitations of HRS § 634J-1 do

not give self-represented litigants who are not plaintiffs free

reign to engage in inappropriate behavior. Other remedies are

available to opposing parties. See, e.g., Hawai#i Rules of Civil

Procedure Rules 11(c), 16(f), 26(h), 30(d)(3), and 37; HFCR

Rules 2.1, 11, 26(g)(2), 30(d)(3), 37, 58(c), 94(f), and 94.1(c).

The family court also abused its discretion by

sanctioning Mother $150 for serving a police officer with a

subpoena to appear at the May 22, 2025 continued hearing. "The

court's sanction order must inform the person sanctioned of the

authority pursuant to which the sanction was imposed." LaPeter,

144 Hawai#i at 309, 439 P.3d at 261. The family court failed to

state its authority for imposing the sanction.

And a court may not sanction a party "without a

specific finding of bad faith" based on "clear and convincing

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evidence." Id. Here, the family court stated, "We do not have

an evidentiary hearing set today[.]" But during the April 17,

2025 evidentiary hearing, when the court discussed a continuance,

Mother stated "I'd like to call the witnesses, the police

officers that are being cited[.]"

The family court set the continued hearing for

"May 22nd at 11:30."

Mother asked, "And is that an evidentiary hearing? Is

that -- what is the May 22nd? Is that just a continuance to set

. . . the hearing or?"

The court responded, "It's just a continuance of the

motion."

During the April 17 hearing both parties were sworn and

testified. Neither party rested. The family court did not close

the evidentiary part of the hearing and never told Mother it

would not receive evidence during the continued hearing. On this

record, sanctioning Mother for issuing a subpoena for the

continued hearing, without citing authority for the sanction or

making findings that Mother had acted in bad faith, was a clear

abuse of discretion.

The May 27, 2025 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

and Order Determining [Mother] to Be a [sic] HRS § 634J-l

"Vexatious Litigant" is vacated. If Mother paid the $150

sanction, the family court shall on remand enter an order

directing repayment to Mother.

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C. The family court abused its discretion by

modifying joint legal custody without making

best-interest-of-the-child findings and

conclusions under HRS § 571-46.

The 2022 Judgment awarded Mother and Father joint legal

custody. They were to "mutually make major decisions regarding"

Child. The custody evaluator's 2024 report stated there was no

evidence warranting a change of physical or legal custody. The

January 22, 2025 Order modified legal custody by giving Father

tie-breaking authority over major decisions for Child. Mother

contends the family court erred by modifying legal custody

without making written findings about Child's best interests.

HRS § 571-46 (2018) establishes criteria and procedures

for awarding custody and visitation based on the best interests

of the child. Subsection (a) lists seventeen "standards,

considerations, and procedures" to guide the family court in

awarding or modifying custody. Subsection (b) lists sixteen nonexclusive factors that the family court "shall consider" to

determine "what constitutes the best interest of the child" under

the statute.

1. The January 22, 2025 Order.

During the December 26, 2024 hearing, Mother asked the

family court why it was giving Father tie-breaking authority.

The court explained:

THE COURT: Well -- yeah, and I feel that some of your

actions are unreasonable and were detrimental to the child.

So while I agree that the way that Father handled the

Kamehameha Preschool issue probably wasn't ideal, I don't

think it was in the best interest of your child to prevent

your child from being possibly admitted to the Kamehameha

Preschool. So that is just one example, but I do feel that

your child is suffering by this sort of high conflict

parenting that's going on between you and [Father], and I

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feel unbalanced from the evidence that was presented that if

one of you has to have tie-breaking authority, I think that

he at this moment is in the better position to make that

decision. But I have created a Special Master process so

that his -- if you disagree with his decision, that you have

the ability to not have to wait 18 months to have somebody

make a decision that you have a -- should be less expensive

and more convenient process to have actual disputes resolved

by somebody in a much quicker time so that you don't have to

wait a long time to have an evidentiary hearing before a

judge.

[MOTHER]: Would you feel comfortable sharing any

other actions that you felt were unreasonable or detrimental

to the child?

THE COURT: I'm not going to put all of my findings

on the record today --[MOTHER]: Okay.

THE COURT: -- so. But I -- you know, having sat

through the thing is I -- I think, you know, in my view, I

-- there's no question that both of you care about your

child very much. However, I -- and this is, of course, my

view and my review of the evidence, in my view it seems that

in addition to the concerns about your child that there is

something extra going on in how you co-parent that has to do

with [FATHER] and not your child. And I think that that is

slightly bending the antenna about good co-parenting, and so

that's something if -- I'm not going to order you to, you

know, go into therapy about it, but that would be something

that would be a suitable topic for a therapist. And I don't

think you're doing anything with malintent, but I do think

that there's -- that there's something involving [FATHER]

that is contaminating your ability to best and effectively

co-parent. And so that is the concern that I have, but I

feel that it's a relatively minor concern that can be

addressed in the way that I proposed it, and so that you

have an immediate process to resolve any, like reasonable

disputes, you know, where he may have made the wrong call.

That's why I'm doing the Special Master process so that you

folks have a more -- less expensive and a quicker way of --if there are real disputes, to resolve them.

The family court did not announce findings of fact or

conclusions of law applying the HRS § 571-46(b) "best interests

of the child" factors during the hearing.

The January 22, 2025 Order did not contain findings or

conclusions applying the HRS § 571-46(b) factors.

After Mother filed her notice of appeal, the family

court did not enter the requisite findings of fact and

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conclusions of law to enable meaningful appellate review under

HFCR Rule 52(a).4

On this record, we conclude the family court abused its

discretion by giving Father tie-breaking authority — modifying

legal custody — without making findings of fact or conclusions of

law applying the HRS § 571-46 "best interests of the child"

standards, considerations, procedures, and factors.

2. The temporary sole legal custody orders.

During the April 17, 2025 evidentiary hearing the

family court orally awarded Father temporary sole legal custody

of Child. Mother asked, "what was the reasoning -- the legal

reasoning for temporarily granting sole legal custody [to

Father]?" The family court responded:

THE COURT: Based on the credibility of the witnesses

and the testimony that was provided, in the Court's view, it

is in the best interest of the child temporarily to have

Father have sole legal custody until we can address the

matter substantively on May 22nd at 11:30.

The family court did not reference or analyze any of

the HRS § 571-46(b) "best interests of the child" factors. The

court actually acknowledged it had not "substantively" addressed

the matter of legal custody.

The May 8, 2025 Order Denying [Mother]'s Motion for

Reconsideration of Temporary Legal Custody Order Entered

April 17, 2025 did not contain findings or conclusions or an HRS

§ 571-46(b) analysis.

4

HFCR Rule 52 provides:

(a) . . . . [U]pon notice of appeal filed with the

court, the court shall enter its findings of fact and

conclusions of law where none have been entered, unless the

written decision of the court contains findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

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The May 19, 2025 Order Granting in Part Father's Motion

for Post-Decree Relief, Filed April 15, 2025 "awarded temporary

sole legal custody" of Child to Father, but did not contain

findings or conclusions or an HRS § 571-46(b) analysis.

The family court failed to enter findings of fact and

conclusions of law under HFCR Rule 52(a) after Mother filed her

second notice of appeal.

Father argues the issue of temporary sole legal custody

is moot because the family court eventually restored joint legal

custody. The capable of repetition, yet evading review exception

to the mootness doctrine applies here. See Hamilton ex rel.

Lethem v. Lethem, 119 Hawai#i 1, 5, 193 P.3d 839, 843 (2008).

On this record, we conclude the family court abused its

discretion by awarding Father temporary sole legal custody

without making findings of fact and conclusions of law applying

the HRS § 571-46(b) "best interests of the child" factors. That

is especially so because the family court modified legal custody

against the written recommendation of the child custody

evaluator.

3. The temporary international travel ban.

The 2022 Judgment allowed Child to travel interstate

subject to conditions, and reserved the issue of international

travel "until further order from the Family Court." Father's

motion for post-judgment relief requested an order prohibiting

all out-of-state travel with Child.

The transcripts of the December 11 and 12, 2024 trial

and the December 26, 2024 post-trial hearing do not contain

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evidence, argument, or a ruling about Child's international

travel. Yet, the January 22, 2025 Order stated: "Once the minor

child turns 8 years old the Parties shall be allowed to travel

internationally with the child provided any international travel

shall require 60 days advanced notice." The January 22, 2025

Order contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law or other

explanation for the decision.

We conclude the family court abused its discretion by

ordering a travel restriction that was neither litigated nor

stipulated to by the parties, and for which no HRS § 571-46(b)

best-interests-of-the-child analysis appears in the record.

4. Mother's arguments about Child's health

insurance and child-related tax credits

lack merit.

Mother argues the "January 22, 2025 Order omits the

child's health insurance provision entirely, which was previously

included in the 2022 Judgment." Mother is correct.

Mother argues the January 22, 2025 "Order does not

clearly address allocation of child-related tax credits." Mother

is correct; the January 22, 2025 Order does not address

allocation of child-related tax credits at all.

Father points out that the January 22, 2025 Order did

not modify the 2022 Judgment's provisions about Child's

healthcare coverage or the schedule for claiming child tax

credits. Father is correct.

Mother's argument that the family court should be

ordered to "clarify and address the health insurance provision

through written findings" and enter an "express ruling" on the

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child tax credits "grounded in findings under HRS § 571-46(b)"

are without merit. The provisions in the 2022 Judgment about

Child's healthcare coverage and the schedule for claiming child

tax credits remain in effect.

V. CONCLUSION

The following post-judgment orders are vacated: (1) the

January 22, 2025 Order Granting in Part Father's Motion for PostDecree Relief; (2) the January 24, 2025 Order Appointing Special

Master; (3) the May 8, 2025 Order Denying [Mother]'s Motion for

Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Remove Speical [sic]

Master and Imposing Sanctions; (4) the May 19, 2025 Order

Granting in Part Father's Motion for Post-Decree Relief; (5) the

May 27, 2025 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

Determining [Mother] to Be a [sic] HRS § 634J-1 "Vexatious

Litigant"; and (6) the August 19, 2025 Order Regarding Continued

Hearing and [Mother]'s Motion to Strike Father's Motion for

Post-Decree Relief, Filed April 15, 2025, Held May 22, 2025.

This case is remanded to family court. On remand, the

family court shall enter orders for return of the $100 and $150

sanctions imposed on Mother to the extent Mother has paid them.

A different judge should preside over any further proceedings.

On the briefs:

/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka

Darwin Peng, Presiding Judge

for Respondent-Appellant

M.R. /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen

Associate Judge

Benjamin E. Lowenthal,

Sarah M. Nishioka, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry for Petitioner-Appellee Associate Judge

J.T.

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