Apex Elastics, LLC v. Tucker, 2026 NCBC 76.
NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
WAKE COUNTY 25CV044481-910
APEX ELASTICS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND OPINION ON MOTION
v. TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE
AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO
JOSEPH TUCKER; THE FILTER TRANSFER
SHOP, LLC; and KIRK DEVERICK,
Defendants,
v.
THOMAS W. LEWIS,
Third-Party Defendant.
1. This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendants Joseph
Tucker and the Filter Shop, LLC (“TFS” and, with Tucker, “Movants”) to dismiss or
transfer for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 14).
2. Movants contend that venue is improper in Wake County under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4) and, alternatively that transferring the action to Gaston County
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(2) would promote the ends of justice and would be
more convenient for the witnesses likely to be called in the matter. (ECF No. 14).
3. The motion has been fully briefed, and the Court in its discretion
resolves the motion on the briefing pursuant to Rule 7.4 of the Business Court Rules.
BCR 7.4.
4. Having considered the motion, all appropriate matters of record, the
written arguments of counsel for the parties, and applicable law, the Court DENIES
the motion as set forth below. 1
Envisage Law, by Anthony J. Biller, Allison Joelle Harvill, and Jay
Calvin Thomas, for Plaintiff Apex Elastics, LLC and Third-Party
Defendant Thomas W. Lewis.
The Neece Law Firm, PLLC, by Robert E. Wall, for Defendants The Filter
Shop, LLC and Joseph Tucker.
Defendant Kirk Deverick, pro se. 2
Houston, Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
5. Plaintiff Apex Elastics, LLC is a North Carolina limited liability
company owned and managed by third-party defendant Thomas W. Lewis. Plaintiff
is “in the textile business” and owns specialized knitting equipment used to
manufacture personal protective equipment, such as face masks, for medical use.
(ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 1, 8–10). Both Lewis and Plaintiff are residents of Wake County,
North Carolina. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 1; ECF No. 23, ¶ 2).
6. Defendant TFS is a North Carolina limited liability company co-owned
by defendants Tucker and Kirk Deverick, though Tucker serves as its “managing
1 The Court notes that Movants’ motion and their supporting memorandum are single spaced
and do not comply with the formatting requirements of the Business Court Rules. BCR 3.5 (“Except for exhibits and other supporting materials, documents filed with the Court must be letter size . . ., double-spaced, formatted with a margin of at least one inch on each side, and prepared using a proportionally spaced font with serifs that is no smaller than 12-point and no larger than 14-point in size.”). This alone is an adequate basis on which to deny or strike either filing, though the Court, in its discretion, elects to also address the merits of the matter. BCR 7.1(c).
2 There is no indication in the record that defendant Deverick has been served at this time. member [and] principal.” (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 2–4, 12). Tucker and Deverick are residents
of Gaston County, North Carolina, and TFS is also based in that county. (ECF No. 3,
¶¶ 2–4, 12).
7. In late 2023 or early 2024, Plaintiff—through Lewis—purportedly
entered into an oral joint venture agreement with defendants Tucker, Deverick, and
TFS for purposes of increasing the manufacturing capacity at TFS’s facilities using
Plaintiff’s equipment. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 12–16; ECF No. 23, ¶ 5). That venture is
referred to variously as “Apex Medical,” “Apex Medical Supplies,” and “Apex Medical
Products.” (ECF No. 23, ¶¶ 7–9).
8. Apex Medical’s operations were split between Wake County and Gaston
County. Day-to-day operations and manufacturing were handled by Tucker and
Deverick, who resided and operated in Gaston County, (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 2, 4, 14(a)),
while “business development, sales, and customer relationship” were handled by
Lewis, who resided and operated in Wake County, (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 1, 14(b); ECF No.
23, ¶¶ 8–9). As part of day-to-day operations, Tucker represented himself as Apex
Medical’s Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer and “maintained
exclusive control over all [Apex Medical’s] financial records in TFS’s QuickBooks
system.” (ECF No. 3, ¶ 28).
9. Eventually, Plaintiff moved some of its manufacturing equipment to
TFS’s facilities in Gaston County. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 14(d), 16, 18, 19, 26, 79).
10. Later, in February 2025, the parties established a joint bank account at
South State Bank for Apex Medical’s deposits and expenses. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 39). However, the account was opened in Plaintiff’s name and used Plaintiff’s Wake
County, North Carolina address. (ECF No. 23, ¶ 10).
11. Throughout 2024 and 2025, Defendants’ actions purportedly led to
manufacturing and shipping delays on behalf of Apex Medical, which resulted in Apex
Medical’s default on several orders and led several major clients to terminate their
relationship with Apex Medical. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 42–45).
12. Unsurprisingly, the parties’ relationship soured. Defendants contend
that Plaintiff owes debts exceeding $100,000.00 in connection with the parties’
business relationship. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 55–56). Plaintiff, on the other hand, asserts
that Defendants have variously commingled funds, overcharged Plaintiff, refused to
provide accounting records, misrepresented their roles to third parties, allowed liens
to be placed against Plaintiff’s personal property, and refused to return that personal
property to Plaintiff despite Plaintiff’s demand. (ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 22–62).
13. Around October or November 2025, “Tucker informed Apex [Elastics]
and Deverick that he wanted to wind up” Apex Medical, and the joint venture
thereafter ended in November 2025, after having commenced around March 2024.
(ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 16, 49).
14. Plaintiff filed this action on 10 December 2025, asserting purported
causes of action for (i) a declaratory judgment, (ii) conversion, (iii) replevin, (iv) breach
of contract, (v) unjust enrichment, (vi) quantum meruit, (vii) breach of fiduciary duty,
(viii) the right to an accounting, (ix) dissolution and winding up, (x) constructive
fraud, (xi) unfair or deceptive acts in violation of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes, (xii) fraud in the inducement/fraudulent concealment, and (xiii)
embezzlement/obtaining property by false pretenses. (See generally ECF No. 3).
15. In at least ten of the thirteen causes of action, Plaintiff seeks, or
otherwise indicates that it has suffered, monetary damages. (E.g., ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 74
(seeking damages of more than $25,000 for alleged conversion), 87 (seeking damages
of more than $25,000 for alleged breach of contract), 90 & 93 (alleging unjust
enrichment of approximately $606,436.01 and seeking “damages”), 98 (asserting
“reasonable value” of “approximately $30,000” for services for quantum meruit cause
of action), 102 (for alleged breach of fiduciary duty, asserting “damages in an amount
to be proved at trial but in excess of $25,000 including loss of equipment access and
control, loss of profits and revenue, loss of customer relationships, conversion of
equipment and funds, fraudulent overbilling, and irreparable harm to business
operations”), 103 (seeking “punitive damages”), 113–14 (asserting putative cause of
action for dissolution and winding up but asserting a “right to damages for breach of
the agreement” and seeking, among other things, “damages for Defendants’ wrongful
conduct causing dissolution”), 122 (seeking damages of more than $25,000 for alleged
constructive fraud), 129–30 (seeking damages of more than $25,000 and punitive
damages for alleged violations of Chapter 75 for unfair or deceptive conduct), 136–38
(seeking “damages including loss of equipment, loss of profits, conversion of funds,
fraudulent overbilling, and business disruption,” “damages to be determined to move
the equipment,” and “punitive damages” for alleged fraud in the inducement and
fraudulent concealment), 146 (seeking “to collect the amount of money taken which is in excess of $25,000, along with consequential damages, punitive damages, and
attorneys’ fees” for alleged embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses)).
16. By contrast, Plaintiff arguably refers to recovery of its alleged property
at issue in connection with only two of its causes of action (conversion and replevin).
(E.g., ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 74 (seeking injunctive relief “regarding any further conversion
or use of its property”), 80 (asserting that Plaintiff “is entitled to have the property
delivered back into its possession”)). 3
17. In its prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks (i) injunctive relief prohibiting
delivery of equipment to creditors, enjoining commingling of equipment, and
enjoining disposition of assets (the first three requests), (ii) a constructive trust of the
equipment at issue (fourth request), (iii) injunctive and declaratory relief for the
return of the equipment and a declaration that Defendants’ creditors have no rights
in the equipment (fifth request), (iv) an accounting of “joint venture or partnership
financials” (sixth request), (v) dissolution and winding up of the purported joint
venture or partnership (seventh request), (vi) an award of “actual and compensatory
damages, punitive damages and statutory damages” (eighth request), (vii) “treble
damages and attorneys[’] fees” under Chapter 75 (ninth request), (viii) “costs of
litigation, attorneys’ fees as permitted by law, and pre and post judgment interest”
(tenth request), and (ix) any other relief the Court might grant. (ECF No. 3 at 23–24).
18. Movants have since answered the operative verified complaint. (ECF
No. 16).
3 Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment regarding ownership of the equipment but not
concerning possession or repossession of the equipment. (ECF No. 3, ¶ 65).
II. ANALYSIS
19. “[T]ransfer is the appropriate mechanism under Rule 12(b)(3) to move
an action from one North Carolina judicial district to another.” PCS Phosphate Co. v.
Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 2026 NCBC LEXIS 45, at *11 n.9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 19,
2026) (citing Aldridge v. Kiger, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 85, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 3,
2016)). Thus, “regardless of whether the motion is styled as a motion to ‘dismiss’ or
to ‘transfer,’ the Court’s resolution of the motion is ultimately the same to the extent
the motion is filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3).” Id. at *11 n.8 (citing Coats v. Sampson
Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 264 N.C. 332, 334 (1965)).
20. A defendant may move to transfer venue if, among other things, (i) “the
county designated for that purpose is not the proper one,” or (ii) for “the convenience
of witnesses and [if] the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-83(1)–(2).
21. Here, Movants argue that this action should be transferred to Gaston
County under § 1-76(4) and § 1-83(1) on the basis that this is purportedly an action
for the recovery of personal property in Gaston County, such that Wake County is not
the proper county of venue, and, alternatively, that this action should be
discretionarily transferred to Gaston County under § 1-83(2) for the convenience of
the witnesses and to promote the interests of justice. (See generally ECF No. 15). The
Court addresses each argument in turn.
a. Sections 1-76(4) and 1-83(1): Proper County of Venue Based on
Sole or Primary Relief Demanded
22. If an action is filed in a county other than one permitted by applicable
law and a party properly moves to change venue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(1), the
trial court must transfer the case to the county of proper venue. Thompson v. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co., 140 N.C. App. 115, 122 (2000).
23. Under § 1-76(4) of the North Carolina General Statutes, actions
generally “must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part
thereof, is situated” if they are for the “[r]ecovery of personal property when the
recovery of the property itself is the sole or primary relief demanded.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-76(4) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Dubose v. Harpe, 239 N.C. 672, 674 (1954)
(applying statute to proceeding involving partition of personal property).
24. In cases other than those for which a specific venue is designated by
statute (such as when § 1-76 applies, for example), venue is generally otherwise
proper, and the action must be tried,
in the county in which the plaintiffs or the defendants, or any of
them, reside at its commencement, or if none of the defendants
reside in the State, then in the county in which the plaintiffs, or
any of them, reside; and if none of the parties reside in the State,
then the action may be tried in any county which the plaintiff
designates in the plaintiff's summons and complaint, subject to
the power of the court to change the place of trial, in the cases
provided by statute[.]
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82.
25. Movants contend that venue in this matter is governed by § 1-76(4)
because “the primary relief sought [in this action] is the recovery of personal property
located in Gaston County.” (ECF No. 15 at 3–4).
26. “In determining whether an action is one governed by section 1-76, the
court must look to the allegations of the complaint and the principal object of the
action.” Centura Bank v. Miller, 138 N.C. App. 679, 681 (2000) (citing McCrary Stone
Serv. v. Lyalls, 77 N.C. App. 796, 799 (1985)). 4
27. Thus, even when a complaint requests recovery of personal property,
such a request does not invoke § 1-76(4) when it is ancillary to the “primary purpose
of the complaint,” particularly if that primary purpose “is to recover monetary
damages.” Id. at 681–82 (determining that § 1-76(4) did not apply even though the
plaintiff’s prayer for relief requests “an Order that Defendants immediately
surrender any an[d] all property held pursuant to any lease, promissory note or deed
4 The Court may consider matters outside the allegations of the complaint in resolving other
Rule 12(b)(3) motions and motions to transfer on the basis of forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Terry v. The Cheesecake Factory Restaurants, Inc., 253 N.C. App. 216, 220 (2017) (analyzing a Rule 12(b)(3) motion under § 1-83 and noting that “Defendant’s brief at least implies that we may look no further than the complaint, which is incorrect since both this Court and the trial court may consider other verified parts of the record.”). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(3) motion made on the basis of § 1-76(4), however, the Court of Appeals has made clear that “consideration is limited to the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint.” McCrary Stone Serv., 77 N.C. App. at 799. This limitation aligns with the plain language of § 1-76(4), which specifically concerns the “sole or primary relief demanded,” thereby invoking the allegations of the complaint (i.e., demand) at issue. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4) (emphasis added). To that end, the Court reaches its determination with respect to § 1-76(4) based on the “allegations of the complaint and the principal object of the action” and confines its analysis accordingly. Centura Bank, 138 N.C. App. at 681; McCrary Stone Serv., 77 N.C. App. at 799; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4). Regardless, in this case, the Court’s analysis––and the result––would be the same whether the Court limited its consideration to the allegations of the complaint or opened its consideration to all verified allegations, as both sets of information make clear that this action is not one in which the recovery of personal property is the sole or primary relief sought.
of trust” between the parties because the “primary purpose of the complaint” was “to
recover monetary damages”); M & J Leasing Corp. v. Habegger, 77 N.C. App. 235,
237 (1985); see also House Chevrolet Co. v. Cahoon, 223 N.C. 375, 377 (1943)
(analyzing an older version of the statute and reaching similar determination); Klass
v. Hayes, 29 N.C. App. 658, 661 (1976) (declining to apply statute to an action for
rescission of a contract that could have resulted in the return of stock and noting that
the alternative relief requested was damages for breach of fiduciary duty); Davis v.
Smith, 23 N.C. App. 657, 660 (1974) (declining to transfer stock-related action under
§ 1-76(4)).
28. The terms “sole” and “primary” are not defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4). In such situations, “[u]ndefined words are accorded their plain meaning so long
as it is reasonable to do so,” and, in determining a word’s plain meaning, North
Carolina courts have “‘used standard, nonlegal dictionaries as a guide.’” Midrex
Techs. Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Rev., 369 N.C. 250, 258 (2016) (citations and internal
punctuation omitted); Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. Indus. Comm’n, 256 N.C.
App. 614, 621 (2017) (“When a statute employs a term without redefining it, the
accepted method of determining the word's plain meaning is not to look at how other
statutes or regulations have used or defined the term—but to simply consult a
dictionary.” (citation omitted)); PCS Phosphate Co., 2026 NCBC LEXIS 45, at *14.
29. The common meaning of the term “primary” is “of first rank, importance,
or value.” Primary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/primary (last visited 9 September 2026). Moreover, the ordinary meaning of the term “sole” is “being the only one.” Sole, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sole (last visited 9 September 2026).
30. Here, as described above, Plaintiff asserts thirteen causes of action, at
least ten of which revolve around allegations of monetary damages and requests to
recover monetary damages. (E.g., ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 74 (seeking damages of more than
$25,000 for alleged conversion), 87 (seeking damages of more than $25,000 for alleged
breach of contract), 90 & 93 (alleging unjust enrichment of approximately
$606,436.01 and seeking “damages”), 98 (asserting “reasonable value” of
“approximately $30,000” for services for quantum meruit cause of action), 102 (for
alleged breach of fiduciary duty, asserting “damages in an amount to be proved at
trial but in excess of $25,000 including loss of equipment access and control, loss of
profits and revenue, loss of customer relationships, conversion of equipment and
funds, fraudulent overbilling, and irreparable harm to business operations”), 103
(seeking “punitive damages”), 113–14 (asserting putative cause of action for
dissolution and winding up but asserting a “right to damages for breach of the
agreement” and seeking, among other things, “damages for Defendants’ wrongful
conduct causing dissolution”), 122 (seeking damages of more than $25,000 for alleged
constructive fraud), 129–30 (seeking damages of more than $25,000 and punitive
damages for alleged violations of Chapter 75 for unfair or deceptive conduct), 136–38
(seeking “damages including loss of equipment, loss of profits, conversion of funds,
fraudulent overbilling, and business disruption,” “damages to be determined to move
the equipment,” and “punitive damages” for alleged fraud in the inducement and fraudulent concealment), 146 (seeking “to collect the amount of money taken which
is in excess of $25,000, along with consequential damages, punitive damages, and
attorneys’ fees” for alleged embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses)).
31. The gist of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the relationship at issue was an
oral joint venture gone awry and that the joint venture should be wound down and
dissolved, that Plaintiff should be monetarily compensated for Defendants’ alleged
wrongdoing, and, in addition, that Plaintiff should be permitted to recover personal
property that it contends belongs to Plaintiff. (See generally ECF No. 3).
32. While injunctive relief related to the recovery of Apex Elastic’s claimed
personal property is unquestionably part of the sought in complaint, it is neither the
sole nor the primary relief sought in the complaint. (See generally ECF No. 3).
33. Most of the relief that Plaintiff seeks is unrelated to Apex Elastic’s
claimed property and its return and, instead, concerns matters directly affecting the
parties’ alleged joint venture or damages arising from the purported joint venture or
related business relationships. (See generally ECF No. 3).
34. Plaintiff’s prayer for relief reflects as much, with Plaintiff seeking
myriad forms of relief, including monetary damages (consisting of compensatory
damages, treble damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest),
dissolution and winding up of the joint venture, an accounting of the joint venture’s
financials, and equitable relief (in the form of injunctive relief, a constructive trust,
and declaratory relief concerning the equipment at issue). (ECF No. 3 at 23–24).
35. Despite Movants’ conclusory contention that “additional claims included
in Plaintiff[’]s complaint are ancillary to that objective and do not alter the venue
analysis,” (ECF No. 15 at 4), considering the totality of Plaintiff’s complaint, it is
apparent that its requests for injunctive relief and for recovery of its purported
personal property are not the “sole or primary” relief demanded. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4); (ECF No. 3 at 23–24).
36. Accordingly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-76(4) does not apply.
37. Instead, because Plaintiff is a resident of Wake County, North Carolina,
(ECF No. 3, ¶¶ 1, 12), venue is statutorily appropriate in Wake County pursuant to §
1-82. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-82 (providing for venue “in the county in which the plaintiffs
or the defendants, or any of them, reside at its commencement” if venue is not
otherwise set by a different statute); Valleygate Dental Surgery of Charlotte v. Farrell,
2025 NCBC LEXIS 134, at *5–6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2025) (determining that
plaintiff LLC’s county of residence was an appropriate venue).
38. To the extent Movants’ motion is premised upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(1), venue is proper in Wake County, and the motion is appropriately DENIED.
b. Section 1-83(2): Convenience of Witnesses and Ends of Justice
39. Alternatively, Movants contend that the Court should transfer this
action to Gaston County as a more appropriate venue because Defendants, TFS’s facility, and “all” of Movants’ potential unnamed witnesses are located there. (ECF
No. 15 at 4–5).
40. In addition to the statutory provisions addressed above, a trial court
may, in its discretion, change the place of trial “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(2);
Godley Constr. Co. v. McDaniel, 40 N.C. App. 605, 607 (1979).
41. “There is no ‘bright line’ test” in evaluating the trial court’s use of its
discretion in determining whether to transfer venue under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(2).
Zetino-Cruz v. Benitez-Zetino, 249 N.C. App. 218, 226 (2016).
42. Indeed, “the trial court has not manifestly abused its discretion in
refusing to change the venue for trial of an action pursuant to G.S. 1-83(2) unless it
appears from the matters and things in evidence before the trial court that the ends
of justice will not merely be promoted by, but in addition demand, the change of venue
. . . or that failure to grant the change of venue will deny the movant a fair trial[.]”
Godley, 40 N.C. App. at 608–09. Thus, even if the ends of justice might be promoted,
the Court is generally not required to transfer venue based only on that consideration.
See id.
43. Here, considering all appropriate matters of record, the Court
determines that Movants have failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that “the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change”
and that transfer is otherwise appropriate. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-83(2).
44. As an initial matter, under the North Carolina Business Court Rules
and the Case Management Order in this action, all pretrial proceedings (including
hearings) in this action will be heard at the North Carolina Business Court in
Raleigh, Wake County, North Carolina unless the Court orders otherwise. (ECF No.
31, ¶ 6(a)); BCR 6.2. Alternatively, hearings may be conducted in other locations
ordered by the Court or may be conducted by remote teleconference if so ordered by
the Court. (ECF No. 31, ¶ 6(b)); BCR 6.2. Thus, the practical effect of Movants’ motion
is that, even if it is granted, it will ultimately change only the trial venue.
45. In support of their motion, the totality of Movants’ argument is a single
(single-spaced) paragraph as follows:
In the case at bar, all Defendants, witnesses, equipment, and
documents are located in or near Gaston County. Wake County
has no nexus to the dispute. Trying this case in Wake County
would impose unnecessary burden and expense. Plaintiff’s
complaint specifically alleges incidents occurring at Defendant’s
Gaston County facility where employees of Defendant were
present and witnessed said interactions. Defendant anticipates
calling individuals with specific knowledge of these interactions
and others as witnesses, all of which reside in, or around, Gaston
County. Transfer of this case from Wake County to Gaston
County is independently warranted and would promote the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice as outlined under
N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-83(2). Defendant hereby requests that the
Court, in its discretion, transfer this matter to Gaston County
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-83(2).
(ECF No. 15 at 5).
46. Movants have provided no affidavit, declaration, or other substantive
evidence in support of their motion or their arguments. Movants do not identify the
“witnesses” that they contend “are located in or near Gaston County” who have “specific knowledge” of the case, nor do they explain why “[t]rying this case in Wake
County would impose unnecessary burden and expense.” (ECF No. 15 at 5). Instead,
Movants’ one-paragraph argument is entirely conclusory in nature.
47. Even if Movants’ argument were supported by substantive evidence and
if Movants had met their burden to demonstrate that justice would be “promoted” by
a change of venue, Movants have failed entirely to provide any argument or evidence
showing that justice “demand[s]” a change of venue or that Movants would be denied
a fair trial by maintaining venue in Wake County. Godley, 40 N.C. App. at 608–09;
see also Heustess v. Bladenboro Emergency Servs., Inc., 249 N.C. App. 486 (2016)
(affirming denial of motion to transfer venue).
48. Plaintiff, on the other hand, has provided an affidavit from Lewis and
various accompanying exhibits indicating that the alleged joint venture sent
customers invoices using Plaintiff’s address in Apex, Wake County, North Carolina
and Plaintiff’s bank account with a Wake County address and that at least two
identified vendors and potential witnesses are located in Magnolia, Duplin County,
North Carolina, and Burlington, Alamance County, North Carolina, both of which are
geographically closer to Wake County than Gaston County. (See generally ECF Nos.
23, 23.1–23.6). 5 Given Movants’ failure to provide any supporting evidence or other
basis for their argument, this evidence does not change or otherwise affect the Court’s
5 The Court takes judicial notice of these geographic proximities. N.C. R. Evid. 201; State v.
Cannon, 254 N.C. App. 794, 797–98 (2017) (concluding that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of “the geographic distance between cities, the modes of travel between cities, the commercial aspects of their local area,” and similar distance and commute-related information (citations omitted)).
analysis but merely reinforces the propriety of permitting this action to proceed in
Wake County.
49. Therefore, to the extent Movants’ motion is premised upon N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-83(2), the Court determines in the exercise of its discretion that the motion
is appropriately denied. See Valleygate Dental Surgery, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 134, at *8
(“Defendants have not shown that conducting trial in . . . Plaintiff’s venue of choice
and an appropriate venue under the law, would substantially further the convenience
of witnesses, promote the ends of justice, ‘demand’ transfer, or otherwise deprive any
party of a fair trial.” (citation omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
50. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion.
SO ORDERED, this 9th day of September 2026.
/s/ Matthew T. Houston
Matthew T. Houston
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases