FIFTH DIVISION
BROWN, C. J.,
MERCIER, P. J., and EPPS, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
September 9, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1102. IN THE INTEREST OF C. S., a minor child.
EPPS, Judge.
In this dependency proceeding, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) of minor child
C. S. appeals the juvenile court’s order approving a change of placement of the child
from the care of foster parents to the care of fictive kin, and denying the GAL’s
objection to the placement change. As more fully explained below, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
When C. S. was born in April 2025, she tested positive for cocaine, fentanyl,
and THC and had to be placed in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at the hospital.
The parents left C. S. at the hospital and were thereafter unreachable. A month later,
the Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) sought protective custody of C. S. At the same time, DFCS also sought protective custody of C. S.’s
three older half-siblings. The mother left these children in the care of their maternal
grandmother in February 2025 and had not been in contact with them since.
The juvenile court found all four children dependent in August 2025 and placed
them in DFCS’s temporary legal custody. The older children remained with their
maternal grandmother. The grandmother was unable to care for C. S. due to the
child’s medical needs, however, so DFCS placed C. S. with a foster family after she
left the hospital.
Subsequently, C. S.’s paternal grandmother contacted a longtime friend of hers,
Petrina Harris, and her husband, Franklin Harris, about C. S. and asked if they were
interested in caring for the child. In November 2025, DFCS notified the parties of its
intent to move C. S. from her foster placement to placement with the Harrises.1 DFCS
treated the Harrises, who are not an approved foster home, as a fictive kin placement.
C. S.’s GAL filed an objection to the placement change, contending the Harrises do
not qualify as fictive kin because they had no relationship with C. S. or her half1
DFCS had first considered placing the child with a cousin in Ohio, but decided against it because of concern over the difficulties of maintaining C. S.’s relationship with her half-siblings.
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siblings and had not seen the father in over ten years. The GAL further contended that
the change in placement would not be in C. S.’s best interests as she had bonded with
the foster parents, who were experienced in handling her medical conditions. The
juvenile court held a hearing on the objection to the placement change, at which it
heard testimony from the Harrises, the foster mother, the maternal grandmother, and
the DFCS caseworker.
At the hearing the Harrises testified that Mrs. Harris knew the paternal
grandmother for approximately fifty years, and the father referred to Mr. Harris as
“uncle” growing up. The Harrises had not seen the father for over 10 years and never
met any of his children or their mothers. The father requested that the Harrises serve
as a placement for the child. After agreeing to serve as a placement, the Harrises met
C. S. for the first time at court.
After the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order approving the change in
placement. The court concluded that the Harrises qualified as fictive kin under OCGA
§ 15-11-2(33), noting their longstanding relationship with the father’s family and the
fact that the father referred to Mr. Harris as “uncle.” Additionally, the juvenile court
noted that “the intent of the Juvenile Code is to give preference to placement with
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those who are either family or stand in the stead of family,” citing OCGA §
15-11-135(e)(l),2 and that “[a]s with one’s blood-relatives, the fact that one may not
have seen the other for many years does not dissolve the ties that underpin the
relationship.” The juvenile court further found that placement with the Harrises was
in the best interests of C. S. because it would support C. S.’s connection to her family,
half-siblings, community, and cultural background and could facilitate reunification
if the father were eventually able to care for the child. We subsequently granted the
GAL’s application for interlocutory appeal,3 and this appeal ensued.
The GAL asserts that the trial court erred in finding the Harrises met the
requirements of fictive kin, where they had no “substantial and positive relationship
with” C. S. We agree.
OCGA § 15-11-2(33) defines “fictive kin” as “a person who is not related to the
child by blood, marriage, or adoption but who prior to his or her placement in foster
2
OCGA § 15-11-135(e)(1) provides that “[i]n any case in which a child is taken into protective custody of DFCS ... DFCS shall give preference for placement to an adult who is a relative or fictive kin over a nonrelated caregiver, provided that such relative or fictive kin has met all requirements for a DFCS relative or fictive kin placement and such placement is in the best interests of the child.
3
See In the Interest of C. S., a minor child, Case No. A26I0093 (Dec. 23, 2025).
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care is known to the family, has a substantial and positive relationship with the child,
and is willing and able to provide a suitable home for the child.” Here, the parties
dispute how the phrase “has a substantial and positive relationship with the child”
should be interpreted. The juvenile court acknowledged that C. S. had no relationship
with the Harrises, but reasoned that the child had no relationship with anyone prior
to her placement with the foster parents. The court further noted that neither the
statute nor case law specifically defines the qualities or parameters of what a
substantial and positive relationship is with respect to a child. Given this fact, and
because infants have not yet had an opportunity to develop relationships, the juvenile
court concluded that in cases involving infants, the statute should be read as requiring
only a substantial and positive relationship between the fictive kin and the child’s
family, rather than with the child herself. As a result, the court found that, in light of
their long-standing relationship with C. S.’s paternal grandparents and their past
relationship with the child’s father, the Harrises qualified as fictive kin.
DFCS contends that the juvenile court’s interpretation of the statutory
language at issue is the correct one, arguing that the plain statutory language does not
require a person to have a pre-existing substantial relationship with the child to qualify
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as fictive kin. Rather, the statute requires only that fictive kin have a relationship with
the child’s family that pre-dates the child’s placement in DFCS custody. Conversely,
the GAL argues that the juvenile court’s interpretation of the statute constitutes legal
error, as it ignores unambiguous statutory language.
“When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the
General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”Deal v. Coleman, 294
Ga. 170, 172–73(1)(a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). Consequently, “we must afford the
statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the
context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and
reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Ware County
Bd. of Educ. v. Taft, 350 Ga. App. 848, 850 (830 SE2d 326) (2019). And “if the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we simply apply the statute as
written.”CPF Investments, LLLP v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 330 Ga. App. 744,
746 (769 SE2d 159) (2015). See also Deal, 294 Ga. at 173(1)(a) (“[I]f the statutory text
is ‘clear and unambiguous,’ we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our
search for statutory meaning is at an end.”).
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Under the plain language of the statute, a person may qualify as fictive kin only
if: (1) the person is known to the family; (2) the person has “a substantial and positive
relationship with the child”; and (3) the person “is willing and able to provide a
suitable home for the child.” OCGA § 15-11-29(33) (emphasis added). Thus, despite
the juvenile court’s conclusion to the contrary, the unambiguous statutory language
defines fictive kin as a person who has a substantial and positive relationship with the
child at issue, and not merely with the child’s family. Moreover, the requirement that
fictive kin have a relationship with the child applies regardless of the child’s age – i.e.,
the statute makes no distinction between a child and an infant. Had the legislature
wanted to make such a distinction, it could have done so,4 and we must assume that
the absence of such a distinction was intentional, rather than inadvertent. See Deal,
294 Ga. at 172–73(1)(a). In any event, neither the juvenile court nor this Court is at
4
Other jurisdictions have written their statutes to indicate that when the child is an infant, the relationship can be with that child’s family. Arkansas, for example, requires that fictive kin “has a strong, positive, and emotional tie or role in the (i) Child’s life; or (ii) Child’s parent’s life if the child is an infant.” Ark. Code Ann. §9-28-108. See also S. C. Code Ann. §63-7-2320(A)(3) (in South Carolina fictive kin is an individual “who has an emotionally significant relationship with the child or the child’s family”); Iowa Code Ann. §232.2(24) (in Iowa fictive kin means a person who “has an emotionally positive significant relationship with the child or the child’s family”).
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liberty to amend the plain statutory language at issue by drawing a distinction between
infants and children. See Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593(2) (37 SE2d 774)
(1946) (appellate courts “must frequently construe the language of a statute, but such
courts may not substitute by judicial interpretation language of their own for the clear,
unambiguous language of the statute, so as to change the meaning”); In the Interest of
J. M. A., 340 Ga. App. 155, 160 (796 SE2d 773) (2017) (same). See also In the Interest
of T. F. N., Jr., 341 Ga. App. 247, 253(1) (799 SE2d 591) (2017) (appellate courts
“cannot amend a statute by interpreting its language so as to change the otherwise
plain and unambiguous provisions”) (punctuation omitted).
Moreover, requiring a substantial and positive relationship between fictive kin
and infants who might be placed in their care does not lead to an absurd result.
Instead, applying the statute as written furthers one of the primary purposes of
Georgia’s dependency statute – i.e., it serves “[t]o ensure that the health, safety, and
best interests of a child [is] the paramount concern in all dependency proceedings.”
OCGA § 15-11-100(4). See also In the Interest of M. J. H., 366 Ga. App. 872, 874-75
(884 SE2d 559) (2023) (“we emphasize that Georgia’s juvenile code must be ...
construed to reflect that the paramount child welfare policy of this state is to
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determine and ensure the best interests of its children”) (punctuation omitted). This
is because under Georgia law, fictive kin stand in the same stead as blood relatives, and
therefore fictive kin placements involve far less oversight and less stringent
assessments than placements in licensed foster homes.5 Consequently, the
requirement that fictive kin have a substantial and positive relationship with an infant
child serves to further the best interests of the child – i.e., it helps to ensure the child
is being placed in a safe and caring environment.
Applying the statutory language to the current case, the undisputed evidence
showed that the Harrises had no relationship with C. S. at the time the juvenile court
made its decision to place her in their care.6 Nor did they have a relationship with any
5
See Georgia DHS, “Waiver of Non-Safety Approval Standards for Kinship Foster Homes” Policy, Number 22.6, https://pamms.dhs.ga.gov/dfcs/cws/22 06/#codes-references accessed August 9, 2026; Georgia DHS, “Kinship Assessment,” Policy Number 22.3, https://pamms.dhs.ga.gov/dfcs/cws/22-03/ accessed August 9, 2026.
6
Because it is undisputed the Harrises never had a relationship with C. S. at the time of the juvenile court’s order, we need not decide whether, as DFCS contends, the phrase “prior to his or her placement in foster care” modifies only the “known family” requirement and not the remaining two criteria in OCGA § 15-11-29(33) concerning “a substantial and positive relationship with the child,”and willingness and ability to provide a suitable home.
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of C. S.’s half-siblings or her mother. Indeed, the Harrises admitted that they had
never even met the mother. Moreover, the Harrises had not seen C. S.’s father in
more than ten years, and had no present relationship with him. Given these
circumstances, the juvenile court erred in ignoring the plain language of OCGA § 15-11-2(33) and finding the Harrises qualified as fictive kin under that statute. We
therefore reverse the juvenile court’s order, and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed, and case remanded. Brown, C. J., and Mercier, P. J., concur.
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