UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. Criminal Action No. 25-179 (JEB)
RONALD AIKEN,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ronald Aiken is charged with a single count of felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). With trial set for late September, the Government moves to
introduce evidence of his prior gun conviction in its case-in-chief via Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) and, in the event that he testifies, to impeach him, under Rule 609, with that conviction as
well as two others for drug possession. The Court will permit the Government to admit much of
the firearms evidence in both its case-in-chief and for impeachment purposes. It will not,
conversely, permit impeachment with the drug convictions.
I. Background
On June 10, 2025, Metropolitan Police Department officers pulled over the vehicle
Aiken was driving. See ECF No. 43 (Mot.) at 1. During the encounter, Defendant stated, in
reference to a backpack inside of the vehicle, “Sir, that bookbag, it has my sister’s beer in it. She
just got out. I just dropped her off at the house.” Id. at 2. An officer searched the backpack and
found various pill bottles not in Defendant’s name, mail addressed to him, and a loose round of
ammunition. Id. at 4–5. Officers proceeded to search the car and located a firearm wedged
between the backseat and the trunk. Id. at 6–7. The car was registered to Aiken, though during
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his detention hearing, he proffered that the vehicle was registered to him as a favor to his
nephew, who had too many tickets to be able to register a car. See ECF No. 51 (Reply) at 3–4.
Aiken is charged with a single count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See ECF No. 1
(Indictment) at 1. The Government has now filed a Motion pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence 404(b) and 609 relating to the following prior convictions: (1) a 2023 conviction for
felon in possession of a firearm; (2) a 2023 conviction for possession of a Schedule I or II
controlled substance; and (3) a 2023 conviction for possession of liquid PCP. It seeks to admit
only the prior gun conviction under Rule 404(b) and to impeach Defendant with all three, should
he testify, under Rule 609.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of any crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character” — in other words, that a person has a propensity to commit a bad
act. Such evidence is, however, admissible for other purposes, including “proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); see also United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1436 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (“[A]ny purpose for which bad-acts evidence is introduced is a proper purpose so long
as the evidence is not offered solely to prove character.”).
Evidence that withstands scrutiny under Rule 404(b) may nevertheless be inadmissible
under Rule 403 if the risk of “unfair prejudice” associated with it — including the forbidden
propensity inference — “substantially outweigh[s]” its probative value. “[E]vidence of other
crimes or acts having a legitimate nonpropensity purpose . . . may nevertheless contain the seeds
of a forbidden propensity inference,” and thus “Rule 403’s balancing of prejudice and
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probativeness may still bar the introduction of [the] evidence.” United States v. McGill, 815
F.3d 846, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rule 403’s
“requirement that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value calls on
[the court], in close cases, to lean towards admitting evidence.” United States v. Straker, 800
F.3d 570, 589 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Rule 609 authorizes the admission and use of certain prior criminal convictions to
impeach a witness. This Circuit “has recognized that ‘all convictions that meet the Rule
609(a)(1) threshold are at least somewhat probative of credibility.’” United States v. Anderson,
174 F. Supp. 3d 104, 106 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049,
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc)). Felony convictions “must be admitted in a criminal case in
which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to that defendant,” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B), and any conviction “must be admitted if the
court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving — or the
witness’s admitting — a dishonest act or false statement.” Id. at 609(a)(2). In conducting the
balancing test under Rule 609(a)(1)(B), a court considers, inter alia, “the nature of the crime, the
time of conviction, the similarity of the past crime to the charged crime, the importance of the
defendant’s testimony, and the degree to which the defendant’s credibility is central to the case.”
United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
III. Analysis
A. Rule 404(b)
The Government first seeks to admit evidence of Defendant’s prior gun conviction. See
Mot. at 9–15. It argues that because Aiken will likely dispute that he knowingly possessed the
ammunition recovered from the backpack and the firearm recovered from the trunk of his car, his
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prior conviction is probative of his knowledge, intent, and the absence of mistake or accident
under Rule 404(b). Id. at 11, 14. The prior conviction is specifically probative in this
constructive-possession case, the Government argues, because it shows not only Defendant’s
familiarity with firearms, but also the “distinct concealment method.” Id. at 14. That is, “[i]n
both instances, the firearm was not tossed in the vehicle compartment but was instead
deliberately wedged into a tight gap within the vehicle’s cabin — the first instance being
between the driver’s seat and console, and this instance being [between] the trunk and rear
passenger seat.” Id.
Under the “well established ‘two-step analysis’ used in this [C]ircuit to determine the
admissibility of prior bad acts,” courts must first decide whether the evidence is “probative of
some material issue other than character” and then determine whether the evidence is barred by
other “general strictures limiting admissibility,” the most important of which is Rule 403. United
States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080–81 (D.C. Cir. 1992). For the first part of the
analysis, courts must consider whether the prior-crimes evidence “tend[s] to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of this action . . . more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 946
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401).
To begin, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(1)(g), the Government must prove that Defendant
possessed a firearm. Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622, 626 (2015). Such possession
can be either actual or constructive. Id. Here, the Government is advancing only a constructivepossession theory. See Reply at 2. In cases of constructive possession, “[b]ecause the dominion
and control must be knowing,’ ‘mere proximity or accessibility to contraband is not enough[,]
and there must be ‘testimony connecting the defendant with the incriminating circumstances.”
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United States v. Garner, 396 F.3d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). The Government thus
must prove that Aiken “knew of[] and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over,”
the weapon. United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
When the theory of possession is constructive, this Circuit has held that prior firearm possession
by a defendant is probative of his knowledge and intent to possess a weapon. See, e.g., United
States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 794–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“A prior history of intentionally
possessing guns . . . is certainly relevant to the determination of whether a person in proximity to
such a chattel on the occasion under litigation knew what he was possessing and intended to do
so.”); cf. Linares, 367 F.3d at 946–48 (excluding prior-conviction evidence because jury
considered only actual possession, not constructive possession).
Defendant counters that the Government seeks to introduce evidence of his prior
conviction exclusively to argue or imply that he has a propensity to possess firearms. See ECF
No. 49 (Opp.) at 4–6. Aiken attempts to distinguish this case from others in the Circuit, arguing
that the Government’s task of proving constructive possession in those cases was more difficult
because a third party owned the property where the firearms were found. See Opp. at 9–10. In
United States v. Jefferson, 2021 WL 6196988 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2021), for example, the firearm
at issue was recovered from a car registered in someone else’s name, and in United States v.
McCarson, 527 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2008), the firearm was recovered from the defendant’s
girlfriend’s home. As a result, Defendant suggests, evidence of the prior gun possession was
particularly probative. See Opp. at 9–10. The Government’s ability to prove constructive
possession here, conversely, would be easier, Defendant maintains. Id. at 10.
The question, however, is not whether the Government’s efforts to prove constructive
possession would be easier, but instead whether the evidence makes the existence of a fact of
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consequence “more likely.” Linares, 367 F.3d at 946. Indeed, Rule 404(b) “is a rule of inclusion
rather than exclusion” and is “quite permissive.” United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Here, that standard is easily met. In any event, a closer look
at the facts reveals stronger parallels to those cases than Defendant suggests. True, the firearm at
issue was found inside a car registered to Aiken, and the ammunition was located inside a bag
containing his mail. Aiken may therefore argue that those facts much more strongly point to
knowledge than in Jefferson and McCarson. Still, the pill bottles located in the bag were not
prescribed to him, see Mot. at 4, he claimed that the beer can belonged to his sister, who he said
had just exited the car, id. at 2, and he asserted that the backpack in which the ammunition was
found belonged to his girlfriend. See Reply at 3. At the detention hearing, moreover, Defendant
proffered that “the vehicle was only registered to [him] as a favor to his nephew[,] who had too
many tickets to be able to register a car.” Mot. at 3–4. He therefore might well argue that (1) the
vehicle was not in his sole possession and in effect belonged to his nephew, and (2) many items
in the car, including the firearm and ammunition, did not belong to him. Because those
arguments would hamper the Government’s ability to prove constructive possession, the prior
gun conviction is highly relevant here.
The fact that in both of Aiken’s arrests the firearm was lodged in a tight gap within the
vehicle also supports admission of the evidence for a non-propensity purpose. The Government
may use the facts underlying his prior conviction — where officers found a pistol lodged
between the driver’s seat and center console, see Mot. at 8 — to argue that Defendant’s
possession of a firearm wedged between the trunk and backseat was knowing because he
previously used a similar tactic to store his weapon. Although in the earlier conviction the
firearm was found in plain view near the driver’s seat, not in the trunk, see Opp. at 7, it was
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nevertheless wedged next to a seat in the vehicle. See Mot. at 8. A jury could find the factual
parallels between Defendant’s prior conviction and present charge probative for knowledge,
rather than propensity purposes.
Last, the mere possibility that the prior conviction might be inferred as relating to
Aiken’s character does not demand exclusion. Rule 404 “does not prohibit character evidence
generally, only that which lacks any purpose but proving character.” Bowie, 232 F.3d at 930
(emphasis added). As evidence of his prior conviction may be offered for non-propensity
purposes — namely, that he knowingly possessed the firearm in question — it is admissible
under Rule 404(b).
The analysis does not stop here. Even if an item of evidence withstands scrutiny under
Rule 404(b), it still must pass muster under Rule 403 — and here, it does. The probative value
of Defendant’s prior conviction is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
In general, “Rule 403 tilts, as do the rules as a whole, toward the admission of evidence in close
cases, even when other crimes evidence is involved.” Cassell, 292 F.3d at 795 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
There is no doubt that “manifest prejudice can result when the jury is informed of a prior
conviction that is similar to the charged offense.” United States v. Coleman, 552 F.3d 853, 860
(D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. James, 555 F.2d 992, 1001 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (“[Jurors]
will very naturally believe that a person is guilty of the crime with which he is charged if it is
proved to their satisfaction that he has committed a similar offense, or any offense of an equally
heinous character.”). But Rule 403 renders evidence inadmissible only if it presents a risk of
“unfair prejudice” or prejudice that is “compelling or unique” sufficient to substantially outweigh
its probative value. United States v. Appiah, 2020 WL 3469688, at *7 (D.D.C. June 25, 2020)
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(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Such risk here does not
rise to that level.
Defendant relies on United States v. Burns, 2025 WL 1078781 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 2025), to
argue the contrary. Burns, to start, is not binding on this Court; in any event, it is
distinguishable. There, the Government planned to prove actual possession through evidence
that officers had witnessed the defendant remove a gun from his side and throw it over a fence,
and the defendant intended to counter by arguing that he threw something else. Id. at *6. Judge
Jia Cobb excluded prior-robbery evidence that the Government sought to admit under Rule
404(b), explaining that the D.C. Circuit has typically allowed evidence of prior gun convictions
where the defendant has an argument that someone else possessed the gun and therefore the
Government needs the prior-conviction evidence to prove knowledge. Id. at *6–7. Such
evidence was not relevant in Burns, Judge Cobb concluded, as it solely concerned the
defendant’s actual possession. Id. This, by contrast, is a constructive possession case where
knowledge is the main disputed element and the “other-crimes evidence . . . is relevant” to
knowledge. Id. at *7. In addition, the prejudicial effect here is much lower than in Burns
because the Government is attempting to admit one — not three — prior convictions, and the
conviction is not one of a violent nature. See Mot. at 8.
Finally, probative value “may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives.” Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997). The probative value may be “discount[ed]” if
an alternative has “substantially the same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair
prejudice.” Id. at 182–83. Here, however, there is no alternative piece of evidence with the
same or greater probative value tending to make the knowledge element more probable.
Defendant contends that the Government has “ample other evidence, outside of Aiken’s prior
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firearm conviction, relevant to proving its theory of constructive possession,” such as the car’s
registration in his name and mail addressed to him located inside the backpack. See Opp. at 10.
But it is equally likely that Defendant will use the other items in the car not in his name to assert
that he did not knowingly control the firearm. The Court will therefore permit the Government
to introduce evidence that Aiken was previously convicted of a firearm offense and that the gun
in that case was wedged between the seat and console of his car. The Government may not
introduce other evidence regarding the prior case, including the recovery of drugs. Nor may it
introduce evidence that the conviction was for felon in possession because that would indicate
that he has previously been convicted of another separate felony. The earlier felony was for
possession of liquid PCP — which would have limited probative value here — and disclosure to
the jury that Aiken was previously convicted of another felony would be excessively prejudicial.
B. Rule 609
The Government next seeks, should Defendant testify, to impeach him pursuant to Rule
609 with his prior convictions for (1) felon in possession of a firearm; (2) unlawful possession of
a Schedule I or II controlled substance; and (3) attempted unlawful possession of liquid PCP.
See Mot. at 15. Both drug convictions are felonies.
As an initial matter, because the Court has already permitted the Government to introduce
facts related to Defendant’s prior firearm conviction in its case-in-chief under Rule 404(b), there
is no added prejudice in permitting it to impeach him with those same facts. See United States v.
Moore, 75 F. Supp. 3d 444, 456 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases in which courts declined to find
added prejudice from Government’s use of prior conviction for Rule 609 purposes when court
had already deemed prior conviction admissible under Rule 404(b)). Although the probative
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value of that conviction may well be relatively low as to credibility, it is not outweighed by
prejudicial impact, as is required by Rule 609 for exclusion.
As to the drug convictions, the Government argues that “all felonies have some probative
value” and that such convictions are particularly probative where a defendant’s credibility is a
central issue in the case. See Mot. at 17. The “serious nature of the defendant’s prior offenses,”
it contends, “may be considered by the jury as indicative of his lack of veracity as it is probative
of the defendant’s respect for the law and is directly relevant to an examination of credibility.”
Id. Aiken responds that, should he testify, his prior convictions would have no bearing on his
ability to tell the truth. See Opp. at 12. Felonies that do not demonstrate dishonesty are
“minimally probative of a witness’s credibility under Rule 609,” he asserts. Id. at 13. Defendant
has the better of this argument.
The relevant inquiry is whether the probative value of a prior conviction outweighs the
prejudice to the defendant. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). Courts have looked to the following
factors in this balancing test: “[T]he nature of the crime, the time of conviction, the similarity of
the past crime to the charged crime, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and the degree
to which the defendant’s credibility is central to the case.” Jackson, 627 F.2d at 1209. The Court
looks at each of the five factors, some in combination.
The first and third — i.e., the nature of the crimes and the similarity of the past crime to
the charged crime — weigh against the Government. This Circuit “has instructed that ‘all
felonies have some probative value on the issue of credibility,’ although the precise value will
depend on what the felony is and how stale the felony has become.” Moore, 75 F. Supp. 3d at
455 (quoting Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1062). The most significant are crimes of deception. In
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court explained that “acts of deceit,
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fraud, cheating, or stealing . . . are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a
man’s honesty and integrity. Acts of violence, on the other hand, . . . generally have little or no
direct bearing on honesty and veracity.” Id. at 940 (footnote omitted).
Many cases have tested — and reinforced — this proposition. In Lipscomb, the
defendant was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. The Circuit admitted
evidence of his prior robbery conviction for impeachment purposes. See 702 F.2d at 1073. In
doing so, it distinguished the robbery conviction from narcotics possessions, writing, “Robbery
is generally less probative than crimes that involve deception or stealth.” Id. at 1070–71. It also
noted that “[s]uch conduct reflects more strongly on credibility” than “simple narcotics or
weapons possession.” Id.
Other decisions have similarly deemed a prior conviction for distribution of a controlled
substance inadmissible under Rule 609 because “narcotics distribution is not a crime of
dishonesty or false statement.” Jennings v. Thompson, 792 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2011); see
also United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that “[defendant’s] prior
felony conviction, involving as it did only ‘unlawful distribution of a controlled substance,’ did
not involve ‘dishonesty or false statement’ within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2)”); United States
v. Millings, 353 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“We are not persuaded by the government’s
argument that the offenses of carrying a pistol without a license and possessing narcotics involve
‘some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to
testify truthfully.’”). Here, Defendant’s prior drug convictions do not involve explicit dishonest
acts or false statements. Their probative value is thus low. It is true that when the nature of the
prior crime is distinct from the instant offense, prejudicial impact may be lessened because it is
unlikely that the jury will confuse the two and consider one as evidence bearing on the other.
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See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 2025 WL 1795125, at *5 (D.D.C. June 30, 2025). Even so, the
relative insignificance of drug possession to credibility means that these factors weigh in Aiken’s
favor.
The time of conviction, factor two, is not at issue here. Defendant’s 2023 convictions for
unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance and attempted unlawful
possession of liquid PCP both satisfy the ten-year limit for admissibility. See United States v.
Pettiford, 238 F.R.D. 33, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2006).
The last two factors — the importance of Defendant’s testimony and his credibility to the
case — weigh in favor of admission for impeachment purposes, but they are not dispositive.
When a defendant’s credibility is particularly important to a trial, courts have found that the
factor weighs in favor of admitting prior conviction evidence, at times despite the conviction not
involving dishonesty. See, e.g., Anderson, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 108. In Anderson, the court found
that the defendant’s testimony would be particularly important because the case arose out of the
recovery of a firearm and ammunition from under a bed as opposed to on the defendant’s person.
Id. As this is true here as well, Aiken might argue that he did not possess the contraband, and his
credibility is therefore important to the case.
This factor was not dispositive in Anderson, however, and the same result obtains here.
In Anderson, the court held that despite the importance of the defendant’s credibility, “the
convictions involve[d] crimes of impulse rather than crimes that weigh more heavily on a
witness’ [sic] credibility,” and thus the probative value of admission did not outweigh the
prejudicial effect. Id. As the value of the drug-conviction evidence is similarly slight, it will be
excluded.
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IV. Conclusion
The Court, accordingly, will grant the Government’s 404(b) Motion as to Defendant’s
prior firearm offense — provided the Government not disclose to the jury that the offense was
for felon in possession — grant the Government’s 609 Motion as to Defendant’s prior firearm
offense to the same extent, and deny the Government’s 609 Motion as to the two narcotics
convictions. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: September 9, 2026
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