In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00134-CV
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER CANNON AND
STACIE LYNETTE CANNON AND IN THE INTEREST OF W.C.C., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 6th District Court
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 93216
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final divorce decree terminating the marriage of William
Christopher Cannon and Stacie Lynette Cannon.
At an August 8, 2025, hearing, William and Stacie each testified that they had come to an
agreement regarding both property division and indefinite support for the parties’ adult-disabled
son. They sought entry of an agreed decree based on the terms recited at the hearing. The trial
court made an oral pronouncement consistent with the testimony. This appeal is about what
happened after that.
On appeal, William argues that (1) the final decree was not sufficiently definite,
informed, or reliable to support the judgment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for continuance; and (3) the evidence is legally insufficient for a finding that his adult
son was disabled as a basis for establishing his indefinite support obligations. We affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
I. Applicable Facts
During the August 8, 2025, hearing, the trial court noted it was scheduled for a hearing
on temporary orders for the pending divorce; however, counsel for both parties stated that there
was a final agreement. Both parties appeared in person with their trial counsel. Both Stacie and
William testified that they agreed with the final proposed decree, including provisions dividing
the parties’ property and requiring William to provide support for the parties’ adult-disabled son.
Stacie testified that their son is on the autism spectrum, that he is never going to be able to live
on his own, that he lives with her, and that they are taking care of each other. William testified
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that he heard the agreement, that he understood Stacie was asking for support “based upon the
idea that [his] child is disabled,” that he could have demanded additional proof of disability, but
that he wanted the trial court to “go ahead and grant the divorce [that day] and follow the
agreement.” The trial court accepted that agreement and read the material terms in open court.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that William’s trial counsel would prepare the
final decree.
On October 2, 2025, Stacie filed a motion to sign the decree of divorce and attached a
proposed agreed final decree, stating that the proposed final decree was sent to William’s trial
counsel on September 15, 2025, and the terms in the proposed final divorce decree conformed
with the trial court’s oral pronouncement at the August 8 hearing. On October 24, 2025,
William’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw, alleging that she was “unable to effectively
communicate with William” “consistent with good attorney‑client relations.” On November 6,
2025, Stacie filed a first amended motion to sign decree of divorce,1 stating that she sent the
proposed order to William’s trial counsel on September 15, 2025, and incorporated changes
requested by William. On November 12, 2025, the trial court signed an order setting a hearing
on the motion for withdrawal of William’s trial counsel and an order on the motion to sign on
November 18, 2025.
On April 29, 2026, William filed a motion to supplement the clerk’s record. An
attachment to that filing shows an email sent on November 17, 2025, the day before the hearing
on the motion to withdraw. The email was sent by William to the Lamar County District Clerk
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Stacie’s counsel also filed a second amended motion to sign on November 10 that stated the same.
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requesting that she file William’s motion for continuance, objection to the proposed final
decree,2 notice of non-concurrence (divorce decree), notice of dispute of record, and notice of
non-concurrence (trial counsel’s motion to withdraw). In that same email, William asserted,
among other things, that he only received the order setting the hearing on the motion to withdraw
and proposed final decree that week. William also requested that the Lamar County District
Clerk bring the motions to the attention of the trial court prior to the scheduled hearing the next
day.
Also included as an attachment is an email from the Lamar County District Court
Administrator on November 17, 2025, acknowledging receipt of William’s submissions stating,
“Received.” In another attachment, a motion for continuance, William argued that (1) his trial
counsel “withdrew without providing him a copy of the decree prior to its filing, and without
advising him regarding its contents, implications, or accuracy”; (2) he has not had adequate time
to obtain new counsel; (3) he lacked access to the hearing record; and (4) he needed a
continuance to protect his due process rights to review filings and without that, it would impair
his ability “to be heard and to present his position accurately.”
On November 18, 2025, the trial court signed an order allowing William’s trial counsel to
withdraw.3 On the same date, the trial court also signed and filed the proposed agreed final
decree of divorce. Neither William’s trial counsel’s nor William’s signature is on the agreed
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In the motion, William argued that (1) he “did not review, approve, or sign the proposed [f]inal [d]ecree”; (2) the proposed final decree does not reflect his understanding of the “prior appearance”; (3) the “decree omits marital property acquired during the marriage and reflected in county records”; (4) the “decree contains provisions relating to an adult child outside the Court’s jurisdiction”; (5) his trial counsel “did not prepare the decree as represented”; and (6) he “recently became unrepresented and has not had adequate time to obtain new counsel.” 3
There is no transcript of the November 18, 2025, hearing in the record before us.
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final divorce decree. The decree includes findings that the parties’ adult son “requires
substantial care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and will not
be capable of self‑support,” that the disability existed or was known to exist before his eighteenth
birthday, and that both parents have a duty to support him. The decree orders William to pay
$2,400.00 per month in adult-disabled support and includes a $9,000.00 judgment for childsupport arrears. William appeals.
II. The Decree is Sufficiently Definite
In his first issue, William argues that the final decree was not “sufficiently definite,
informed, and reliable” to support judgment because “the record does not establish when any
such written agreement was finalized, whether [William] reviewed and verified the final written
terms, or whether the written decree accurately reflects the agreement recited at the August 8
proceeding.”
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“An agreed judgment should be construed in the same manner as a contract.” Gulf Ins.
Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex. 2000). “[W]hether the contract is
sufficiently definite to be enforceable . . . [is a] legal issue[] to be reviewed de novo by this
Court.” Chavez v. McNeely, 287 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no
pet.); see Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996) (“The question
of whether a contract is ambiguous is one of law for the court.”).
“Reducing a decision to final judgment has three phases: (1) rendition; (2) signing; and
(3) entry.” Baker v. Bizzle, 687 S.W.3d 285, 291 (Tex. 2024). “A judgment’s ‘rendition’ is ‘the
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judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law upon the matters at
issue.’” Id. at 292 (quoting Coleman v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912)). “Rendition of
judgment requires a present act, either by spoken word or signed memorandum, that decides the
issues on which the ruling is made.” Id. “If the judge’s words only indicate an intention to
render judgment in the future or to provide guidelines for drafting a judgment, the
pronouncement cannot be considered a present rendition of judgment.” Id. “Words reflecting
the judge’s present declaration of a decision are necessary, but not sufficient, to effect the
rendition of a judgment.” Id. “Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially
announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced
publicly.” Id. (quoting Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002)).
Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that “no agreement between
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed[,]
and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of
record.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. The Texas Supreme Court has “generally treated Rule 11
agreements as separate and distinct from agreed judgments entered thereon.” In re Vaishangi,
Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding). “Rule 11 equates a
written divorce agreement with the ‘open court and entered of record’ portion of the rule.” Rich
v. Rich, No. 01-03-00078-CV, 2003 WL 21027940, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
May 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tex.
App.—1993, writ. denied)).
When parties dictate a settlement agreement on the record (creating an
enforceable agreement under Rule 11) and the trial court approves it on the
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record, such a settlement agreement does not constitute an agreed judgment unless
“[t]he words used by the trial court . . . clearly indicate the intent to render
judgment at the time the words are expressed.”
In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 259 (alteration in original) (quoting S & A Rest. Corp. v.
Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam)).
B. Analysis
William argues that “the record does not establish when any written agreement was
finalized, whether [William] reviewed and verified the final written terms, or whether the written
decree accurately reflects the agreement recited at the August 8 proceeding.”
First, the written decree establishes when the decree was finalized because it states, “This
divorce judicially PRONOUNCED AND RENDERED in court at Paris, Lamar County, Texas
on August 8, 2025, and further noted on the court’s docket sheet on the same date, but signed on
11/18/25.” See Henry v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-09-00065-CV, 2010 WL 598594, at *5
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 18, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Henry v. Cullum Cos.,
891 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied)) (“The rendition of the trial
court’s decision, whether in open court or by official document of the court, is the critical
moment when the judgment becomes effective.”).
Second, the decree is not required to state that William reviewed it prior to signing
because his assent was shown by his testimony at the hearing. Here, the trial court indicated its
intent for its oral rendition to establish a final judgment when the trial court approved the
agreement, dictated the material terms on the record, and used present-tense terms such as “[t]he
Court is going to order . . . .” See Vela v. Salas, No. 13-20-00424-CV, 2022 WL 2976444, at *5
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n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re
J.P., No. 13-18-00648-CV, 2020 WL 103858, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan.
9, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“holding that ‘because the trial court rendered judgment on that
day, Mother’s subsequent attempts to withdraw her consent were futile’”)) (stating that “we have
previously held that where a divorce settlement agreement is read into the record, approved of
and granted on the record, and the parties subsequently submit a decree only signed by one party,
the trial court does not abuse its discretion in entering the judgment and thereafter denying a
motion for new trial on the basis that the entry of judgment lacked a party’s signature”); see also
Henry, 2010 WL 598594, at *4–6. The record also reflects that the court reporter transcribed the
hearing. Rich, 2003 WL 21027940, at *2 (“When the court reporter transcribed the decree, this
act memorialized the agreement and gave it the same legal effect as a written agreement signed
by the parties.”).
Third, William argues that the decree does not show “whether the written decree
accurately reflects the agreement recited at the August 8 proceeding.” Once the trial court
rendered the final decree, signing the final written decree was a ministerial act. Henry, 891
S.W.2d at 792. William had his trial counsel at the hearing as well as a substantial portion of
time between the rendition and the motion to sign; his trial counsel provided feedback to Stacie
that was incorporated into the final agreed decree. William testified that he understood the
agreement, knew he could demand additional proof, and nevertheless asked the trial court to
grant the divorce that day and to “follow the agreement.” William did not object at the final
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hearing when the trial court made its oral pronouncement at the end of the hearing. 4 See Bartee
v. Bartee, No. 11-18-00017-CV, 2020 WL 524909, at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 31, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (The wife “did not object to the entry of the final divorce decree before it was
signed or otherwise notify the trial court that she had withdrawn her consent to the agreement.”).
On appeal, William does not state how any material terms in the written decree differed from the
pronouncement in the proposed agreed decree or the oral pronouncement. See id. at *10 (“When
a trial court renders judgment on the parties’ settlement agreement, the judgment must be in strict
compliance with the terms of the agreement.”). William merely argues that he did not review it
prior to signing, which is not required when he states his agreement on the record at the hearing.
We overrule William’s first issue.
III. No Entitlement to a Continuance
In his second issue, William argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for continuance based on his trial counsel withdrawing from his case.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion.
BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002); see Raoger Corp.
v. Myers, 711 S.W.3d 206, 209 (Tex. 2025). “A trial court ‘abuses its discretion when it reaches
a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’”
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Even if William properly filed the objection, the trial court was not precluded from signing the decree without William’s signature since William attempted to file the objection after the trial court rendered the final decree. See Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995) (“Although a court cannot render a valid agreed judgment absent consent at the time it is rendered, this does not preclude the court . . . from enforcing a settlement agreement complying with Rule 11 even though one side no longer consents to the settlement.”); Clanin v. Clanin, 918 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ) (holding that a post-rendition objection is not timely when the party did not object when the trial court rendered the judgment).
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BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 800 (quoting Johnson v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916,
917 (Tex. 1985) (orig proceeding)).
B. Applicable Law
Rule 251 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[n]o application for a
continuance shall be heard before the defendant files his defense, nor shall any continuance be
granted except for sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by
operation of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 251. “[M]otions for continuance generally must be in writing,
state the specific facts supporting the motion, and be verified or supported by an affidavit.” In re
Marriage of Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
“When a motion for continuance does not comply with the rules, e.g., when the motion is
unwritten or unsupported by verified facts, appellate courts generally presume the trial judge did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.” Id. “When . . . the ground for a continuance is
the withdrawal of counsel, the movant must show that the failure to be represented at trial was
not due to [his] own fault or negligence.” Id. “The ‘absence of counsel will not be good cause
for a continuance or postponement of the cause when called for trial, except it be allowed in the
discretion of the court, upon cause shown or upon matters within the knowledge or information
of the judge to be stated on the record.’” Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 253).
C. Analysis
As a general rule, when a motion for continuance is in writing but not supported by an
affidavit, we presume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. In re
T.C.H., No. 06-16-00054-CV, 2016 WL 7175291, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 8, 2016,
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no pet.) (mem. op.). “However, this general rule is not applied to pro se movants who . . . have
had their attorney withdraw.” Antolik v. Antolik, No. 06-18-00096-CV, 2019 WL 2119646, at *6
(Tex. App.—Texarkana May 15, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “Nevertheless, when the basis
of the pro se motion for continuance is the withdrawal of his attorney, the movant must show that
the withdrawal was not due to the movant’s own fault or negligence.” Id. (citing Pjetrovic v.
Home Depot, 411 S.W.3d 639, 645 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.)).
Here, the motion to withdraw expressly states that William’s trial counsel was unable to
effectively communicate with William in a manner consistent with good attorney‑client relations
and that William had consented to her withdrawal. William did not file any objection to the
withdrawal, did not appear at the hearing to contest it, and offered no evidence that the
withdrawal resulted from circumstances beyond his fault or negligence. In such a case, the
record before us supports the presumption that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Pandozy v. Shamis, 254 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.).
We overrule William’s second issue.
IV. Evidence Sufficient for Adult Support
In his third issue, William argues that the evidence is legally insufficient for support for
their disabled-adult son. He argues that the record contains only lay testimony and no medical
records, expert testimony, disability determinations, or other objective evidence.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
“A court’s order of child support will not be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining
party can show a clear abuse of discretion.” Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011) (quoting
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Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)). “A trial court abuses its
discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or
principles.” Id. (citing Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109). “A trial court also abuses its discretion by
failing to analyze or apply the law correctly.” Id. “To determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support its decision, we
consider whether the trial court (1) had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion
and (2) erred in its application of that discretion.” Nunez v. Nichols, No. 03-24-00263-CV, 2026
WL 1171408, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin April 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of a
child for an indefinite period and may determine the rights and duties of the
parents if the court finds that:
(1) the child, whether institutionalized or not, requires substantial care
and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and
will not be capable of self-support; and
(2) the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist,
on or before the [eighteenth] birthday of the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.302(a) (Supp.).
B. Analysis
Expert testimony was not required to substantiate court-ordered support for a disabled
adult. Lay testimony and undisputed admissions can be sufficient to establish that an adult child
requires substantial care and supervision. See In re T.A.N., No. 07-08-00483-CV, 2010 WL
58334, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo [Panel Op.] Jan. 8, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.C., No.
13-15-00486-CV, 2016 WL 3962713, at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 21,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The testimony was based on the witnesses’ personal observations
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derived from having provided daily care for Daniel over the course of many years.”); In re
L.J.M., No. 13-13-00367-CV, 2014 WL 3053209, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
July 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
During the August 8 hearing, the trial court read the material terms into the record,
including adult support. Stacie testified that their son is on the autism spectrum, that he will
never be able to live on his own, that he lives with her, and they care for each other. William did
not object to that testimony or to any disability finding at the hearing. William expressly
acknowledged, on the record, that he understood Stacie was asking for child support based upon
the idea that their son was disabled, that he could have demanded a separate hearing and “forced
proof,” but that he wanted the trial court to grant the divorce and follow the agreement. Stacie’s
and William’s testimony support the trial court’s findings.
We overrule William’s third issue.
V. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jeff Rambin
Justice
Date Submitted: June 17, 2026
Date Decided: September 4, 2026
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