UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BENJAMIN HALL THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-03344 (AHA)
v.
JOHN FRANCIS MCCABE, JR., et al.,
Defendants.
Memorandum Opinion
Benjamin Hall Thomas sues the District of Columbia, Judge John Francis McCabe, Jr., and
attorney Gregory Nugent, asserting claims arising from the D.C. Superior Court’s issuance of a
temporary protection order and civil protection order restricting Thomas’s contact with his wife
and children. See ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 8–14, 62–146; ECF No. 3-1 at 1–3. According to the amended
complaint, Judge McCabe signed the challenged civil protection order and Nugent represented
Thomas’s wife in the protection order proceedings. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 115. Thomas asks for
the orders to be expunged, for 750,000 dollars, for declarations that his constitutional rights were
violated, and other relief. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that this court
lacks jurisdiction to hear these claims and that Thomas fails to state a claim. ECF Nos. 10, 22. The
court agrees and dismisses the case.1
To survive dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must show that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear their
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As required at this stage, the court accepts the amended complaint’s well-pled allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in Thomas’s favor. Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
claim. See Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court must “assume
the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally,
granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,’ and upon
such facts determine jurisdictional questions.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir.
2005)). And to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). The court “must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true,” though
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In cases like this involving an unrepresented or “pro se” litigant, the court is careful to give
extra leeway. The court evaluates the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive
to a motion to dismiss.” Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Of
course, an unrepresented plaintiff still “must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atherton v. District of Columbia, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C.
Cir. 2009)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the plaintiff must furnish “more
than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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Thomas’s case must be dismissed because his claims challenge a state court decision that
this court does not have jurisdiction to review. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district
courts may not hear “cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state
court.” Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). This prevents federal
courts from considering issues that are “so ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court decision
that ‘the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision.’” Stanton
v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483–
484 n.16). Federal jurisdiction is barred even when the plaintiff claims “that the state judgment
itself violates the [plaintiff’s] federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06
(1994). Here, Thomas’s claims effectively challenge the D.C. Superior Court’s decision to issue
protection orders against him. See ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 62–146. Those claims are barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine, and this court does not have jurisdiction to review them. See Johnson, 512 U.S.
at 1005–06; see also T.M. v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1745, 1748
(holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred suit claiming plaintiff’s due process rights were
violated by state court order).
Thomas argues his claims challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which the
court issued the protection orders, not the Superior Court’s orders themselves. See ECF No. 29 at
5. But even “a constitutional claim pled as a general attack may be so ‘inextricably intertwined’
with a state court decision that ‘the district court is in essence being called upon to review the statecourt decision.’” Stanton, 127 F.3d at 75 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483–484 n.16). Here, all
of Thomas’s claims and the injury he asserts stem from the protection orders issued against him
and the conditions imposed by them, and this court would need to review the D.C. Superior Court’s
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decision to evaluate his claims. They are therefore “inextricably intertwined” with the D.C.
Superior Court’s decision. Id.
To the extent Thomas’s claims against Nugent as an attorney can be viewed as independent
of the D.C. Superior Court’s decision, they fail to state a claim. Thomas’s constitutional claims
cannot proceed against Nugent because they apply only to state actors, while the amended
complaint identifies Nugent as “a private attorney.” ECF No. 3 ¶ 115; see Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). And Thomas’s remaining claims against Nugent are based
on conclusory allegations. See ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 114–35; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining
that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice” to state a claim).
For these reasons, the court grants the motions to dismiss. A separate order accompanies
this memorandum opinion.
AMIR H. ALI
United States District Judge
Date: September 10, 2026
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