FILED
Sep 10 2026, 8:58 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
David Charles,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
September 10, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-102
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court
The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D03-2404-FC-1
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 1 of 11
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] For a number of years, David Charles subjected multiple children to frequent
physical and sexual abuse, which, for some, was often intermingled. The State
charged him with, and he was convicted of, ten counts of Class C felony child
molestation for acts involving Victim #1 and Victim #2. Charles contends that
the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that his acts involving Victim
#2 were perpetrated with the intent to arouse his sexual desires. Because we
conclude otherwise, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Charles and his wife had reason to come into frequent and repeated contact
with Victim #1, Victim #2, Victim #3, Victim #4, and Witness #1 (collectively,
“the Children”). Victim #1 was born in November of 1994. Victim #2 was
born in December of 1996.
[3] The Children, who were afraid of Charles, would “always scatter” when they
heard his vehicle approaching his home because they “[j]ust didn’t want to be
present when he walked in the door” because if he “was in the wrong mood, [it]
didn’t usually end well for” them. Tr. Vol. II pp. 52, 78. In addition to when
he was in a bad mood, Charles would beat the Children if they did not
complete certain tasks, assigned to them by Charles, before “he got home[.]”
Tr. Vol. II p. 78. Charles treated the Children as if they were “something to
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 2 of 11
control and rule over … that needed to be disciplined and corrected … daily.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 76.
[4] Charles claimed to have a biblical basis “for all of his behavior.” Tr. Vol. II p.
53. He would “quote scripture” allegedly stating that “the blueness of the
wound cleanses all evil. Meaning … [that] if [the Children] weren’t bruised,
then [they] weren’t learning [their] lessons.” Tr. Vol. II p. 53. Charles “was
not happy with a spanking unless it left a bruise.” Tr. Vol. II p. 53.
[5] Charles would use a paddle, a belt, a switch (or handle) from the miniblinds, 1
an electrical cord, or a 2x4 piece of wood wrapped in electrical tape to beat the
Children. The beatings often took place in the presence of the other Children.
On one occasion, Charles struck Victim #3 so hard with a 2x4 that he broke her
arm. Victim #1 later recalled that
[his] spankings were not like normal spankings. He would make
us pull down our pants, or sometimes we would just be
completely naked for whatever reason, and he would spank us
with a belt usually or a two by four that he covered in I think like
electrical tape or something like that. And he would wet
specifically the belt because it would make it sting more. And he
would just spank us, just like go at it. Like, the beatings were
brutal.
We always had bruises all over our body. And I have a specific
memory of one of my bruises being so bad that I bled and he
made it a point after my spanking to, like, touch it and … talk
1
Victim #3 testified that Charles “really liked” the handles from the blinds because “[t]hose left really good
welts.” Tr. Vol. II p. 54.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 3 of 11
about how it was bleeding and that he – that’s how he knew he
spanked me hard enough.
Tr. Vol. II p. 108.
[6] At times, Charles would take the girls into a room individually for private
beatings. During these private beatings, the girls were instructed to “disrobe”
and “bend over in front of” Charles. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. The private beatings
coincided with other types of sexual abuse involving “lots of touches” and socalled wrestling matches during which the girls would be subjected to “lots of
boob grabs and sexual positions.” Tr. Vol. II p. 56. Charles would “leer” at the
girls before touching them inappropriately. Tr. Vol. II p. 108. He would beat
them until welts, bruises, or blood appeared on their bodies and, afterwards,
would “grope” the bruising that he had caused. Tr. Vol. II p. 108.
[7] The girls described the private beatings as “sexually motivated spankings,”
forcing them “to be completely naked and … wetting the belt as if it was a
whip” on them. Tr. Vol. II p. 116. The beatings occurred daily and Charles
was “often wearing very short athletic shorts and no underpants [while
disciplining the girls] so his penis was exposed many times, often erect.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 56. Charles smiled and was “excited” and “happily engaged” while
beating them. Tr. Vol. II p. 56. In describing the beatings as sexual in nature,
Victim #2 noted that disciplining a child does not require the child to be naked
and that Charles would take time to examine their naked bodies before he
“start[ed] whacking.” Tr. Vol. II p. 157. Victim #2 described Charles as
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 4 of 11
having enjoyed being “dominant. Like very domineering. Like he enjoyed our
fear. He enjoyed hitting us and being in power over us.” Tr. Vol. II p. 158.
[8] Charles also frequently viewed pornography in the presence of the Children that
involved bondage and beatings, which left the participants “bound, [ ] bruised[,]
and bloody.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65. D.C. would “drape a blanket over the computer
monitor and his head while he watched porn.” Tr. Vol. II p. 65. The Children,
however, “[c]ould hear” the pornography and could see that Charles’s penis
“was always erect. His blanket never covered his whole body.” Tr. Vol. II p.
65. After watching the pornography, Charles would tickle the girls and touch
them inappropriately underneath their clothing on their chest, buttocks, and
vaginas.
[9] Charles began sexually abusing Victim #1 when she was seven years old.
While the inappropriate touching and tickling ended when she was about
twelve years old, the “sexual spanking” continued until she was sixteen. Tr.
Vol. II p. 114. When tickling Victim #1 near her vagina with his fingers,
Charles told her that “sometimes girls are ticklish there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109.
Charles would frequently “spoon” with Victim #1, during which times she “felt
him get hard” with an erection after he had pulled her body back against his.
Tr. Vol. II p. 110.
[10] The sexual abuse began for Victim #2 when she was approximately six years
old and then stopped when she was approximately twelve years old because
Charles had become “very compulsively obsessed” with then-fifteen-year-old
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Victim #4 and “was very much zeroed in on her[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 162, 163.
Charles would tickle Victim’s #2’s “upper thigh, … chest area, butt[ock]s, just
all over the body.” Tr. Vol. II p. 156. The “touching of [Victim #2’s] private
areas … under the guise of tickling” occurred over 100 times, sometimes when
she was alone with Charles, and other times when she was in the presence of
the other Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 159. On one occasion, Charles forced Victim
#2 to sit on his lap and look at pornography on his computer while she could
feel “his erect penis … touching her behind.” Tr. Vol. II p. 155. Even after the
sexual abuse ended, the physical abuse continued, and Victim #2 later
recounted that having observed Charles beating and sexually abusing the other
Children had been very traumatic.
[11] The Children were coached not to tell anyone about their home life and to lie if
asked about any abuse. Despite the Children having been instructed not to
report Charles’s behaviors, Victim #4 reported the abuse in 2007, 2008, and
2015. The reports were eventually “inactivated” and Goshen Police Detective
Joshua Havens later admitted that the early reports of abuse had not been
handled well by the police department. Tr. Vol. II pp. 22, 23.
[12] In 2021, Victim #4 died after struggling with alcoholism. In September of
2022, the remaining Children reported the abuse they had experienced at the
hand of Charles to the police. Each was interviewed and recounted consistent
memories of the physical and sexual abuse that they had suffered as children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 6 of 11 [13] On April 22, 2024, the State charged Charles with ten counts of Class C felony
child molesting. Counts one through five referred to acts involving Victim #1,
which were alleged to have occurred “between January 1, 2001 and December
31, 2007[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 7, 8. Counts six through ten referred
to acts involving Victim #2, which were also alleged to have occurred “between
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2007[.]”2 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 8.
[14] Following a bench trial, the trial court found Charles guilty as charged. The
trial court subsequently imposed an eight-year sentence for each conviction, all
of which were ordered to run consecutively, with an aggregate of seventy years
executed in the Department of Correction and ten years suspended to
probation.
Discussion and Decision
[15] Charles contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove Counts
VI through X, which, again, outlined acts relating to Victim #2.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
2
The State did not charge Charles for acts involving Victim #4 because she was deceased and did not charge
Charles for acts involving Victim #3 and Witness #1 because the applicable statute of limitations had
expired.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 7 of 11
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations,
emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor
reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable
factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958
(Ind. 2016).
[16] With regard to Victim #2, the State alleged that Charles committed five
separate acts of Class C felony child molesting “between January 1, 2001 and
December 31, 2007[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 8. At the time, “[a] person
who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, perform[ed] or submit[ted]
to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent
to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person,”
committed Class C felony child molesting. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (2000). In
challenging his convictions for Counts VI through X, Charles contends that the
State failed to prove that he had acted with the intent to arouse or to satisfy his
sexual desires. We disagree.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 8 of 11 [17] “Intent, being a mental state, can only be established by considering the
behavior of the relevant actor, the surrounding circumstances, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Richardson v. State, 856 N.E.2d
1222, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. “The intent element of child
molesting may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred
from the actor’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such
conduct usually points.” Bowles v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000). “It
is reasonable for a jury to infer that the touching did occur and that the intent
did exist without a direct showing of both elements.” Altes v. State, 822 N.E.2d
1116, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Moreover, the intent to arouse or
satisfy sexual desires may be inferred from evidence that the accused
intentionally touched a child’s genitals or an area that was in close proximity to
the child’s genitals. See Kirk v. State, 797 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied; Nuerge v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1043, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans.
denied; Lockhart v. State, 671 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). A
conviction for child molesting does not require touching of the genitals or
breasts, and a trier-of-fact may reasonably infer the requisite intent from an act
of actively rubbing the victim’s naked skin. See Altes, 822 N.E.2d at 1122.
“[W]e may not substitute our own judgment for that of the jury” when it comes
to the question of intent. Richardson, 856 N.E.2d at 1227–28. “The testimony
of a sole child witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for molestation.”
Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 9 of 11 [18] In challenging his convictions relating to Victim #2, Charles contends that the
State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he had touched or
fondled Victim #2 with the intent to arouse either his or her sexual desires.
Victim #2 testified that Charles would tickle her “upper thigh, … chest area,
butt[ock]s, just all over the body.” Tr. Vol. II p. 156. The “touching of [her]
private areas … under the guise of tickling” had occurred over 100 times,
sometimes when she was alone with Charles, and other times when she was in
the presence of the other Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 159. On at least one other
occasion, Charles had forced her to sit on his lap and look at pornography on
his computer while she could feel “his erect penis … touching her behind.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 155.
[19] The trial court, acting as the trier-of-fact, reasonably inferred Charles’s intent to
arouse or satisfy his sexual desires from his act of touching Victim #2’s breasts,
buttocks, and upper thigh, which is an area which was in close proximity to
Victim #2’s genitals. See Kirk, 797 N.E.2d at 841. Moreover, in addition to
Victim #2’s testimony, Victim #1 and Victim #3 provided consistent testimony
outlining Charles’s arousal while punishing and touching each of the girls
inappropriately and the sexual nature of his actions. The trial court also could
have reasonably inferred that Charles had intended to arouse himself from the
natural and usual sequence of his conduct based on the collective testimony of
Victim #1, Victim #2, and Victim #3. See Bowles, 737 N.E.2d at 1152.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 10 of 11
Charles’s contention to the contrary is nothing more than an invitation to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.3 See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.
[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J. and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Marielena Duerring
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Capital and Habeas Litigation
Amelia Austin
Certified Legal Intern
Indianapolis, Indiana
3
Charles claims, for the first time on appeal, that Victim #2’s testimony regarding her prior statements to
police was not substantive evidence that was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Even assuming that this
claim is true, we note that Victim #2 provided other unchallenged testimony outlining Charles’s acts and the
record contains ample other unchallenged evidence of his intent to arouse himself.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-CR-102 September 10, 2026 Page 11 of 11