United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1443
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
MALIK D. PARSONS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Aframe, Thompson, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
James L. Sultan, with whom Rankin & Sultan, was on brief, for
appellant.
Randall Ernest Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, Appellate Division,
was on brief, for appellee.
September 11, 2026
DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted
Defendant-Appellant Malik Parsons on one count of conspiracy to
distribute illegal drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one
count of possession with intent to distribute those drugs in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), and
(b)(1)(B)(vi). The district court subsequently sentenced Parsons
to eighty-four months' imprisonment. Parsons challenges his
convictions and sentence on two grounds. First, he contends that
the district court abused its discretion by admitting an improper
lay opinion by a law enforcement agent regarding his culpability.
Second, he contends that the district court clearly erred by
(1) applying a two-level upward adjustment to his offense level
for possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1),
and (2) declining to apply a two-level zero-point-offender
downward adjustment to his offense level under U.S.S.G.
§ 4C1.1(a). We reject each challenge and affirm Parsons's
convictions and sentence.
I.
On November 30, 2021, a grand jury indicted Parsons and
his co-defendant, Malik Bean-Bousseau, on various charges related
to a drug-trafficking conspiracy. Those charges included:
(1) conspiracy to distribute (and possess with intent to
distribute) forty grams or more of fentanyl and five hundred grams
or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One);
- 2 -(2) possession with intent to distribute the same amounts of drugs
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii), and
(b)(1)(B)(vi) (Count Two); (3) possession of firearms in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Three); and (4) possession of a firearm
with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(k) (Count Four). Bean-Bousseau pled guilty to Counts One,
Two, and Four and received a sentence of seventy-months
imprisonment. Parsons, on the other hand, proceeded to trial on
Counts One and Two.1
At Parsons's trial, the government presented its case
through several law enforcement witnesses and exhibits, including
video surveillance, photographs, and evidence seized during an
August 2, 2021, search of Apartment A-311 (the "Apartment") -- a
unit in a multi-unit complex in Mansfield, Massachusetts -- as
well as drugs seized from Bean-Bousseau while he was leaving the
Apartment that day. We recount the relevant evidence below.
The government's principal witness was Detective
Supervisor Anthony Lattanzio of the Mansfield Police Department.
He testified about his experience with drug investigations,
including his involvement in "hundreds of drug arrests" and
1The government dismissed Counts Three and Four as to
Parsons prior to trial.
- 3 -familiarity with the appearance, packaging, and distribution of
drugs like fentanyl and cocaine. Based on his experience, he
testified that a "stash house" refers to the "location that's
primarily used to hide drugs and package drugs and has a primary
distribution location." Detective Lattanzio further testified
that, in March 2021, he began surveilling the Apartment. During
that surveillance, he saw Bean-Bousseau and Parsons at the
Apartment "[o]n a near daily basis" and noted that each "had keys
to the [A]partment," although neither was listed on the lease for
it. Detective Lattanzio never observed the individual who had
signed the lease at the Apartment during his investigation.
Detective Lattanzio also obtained a warrant to install two cameras
on the premises -- one on the building exterior, and the other in
the interior hallway facing the Apartment -- which operated
between May 26 and August 2, 2021. Video from those cameras showed
that Bean-Bousseau and Parsons accessed the Apartment almost
daily; that Parsons spent the night at the Apartment about once a
week; that Parsons visited the Apartment sometimes by himself and
other times with Bean-Bousseau; and that Bean-Bousseau would
"rare[ly]" bring guests to the Apartment, but no guests visited
the Apartment when neither Bean-Bousseau nor Parsons were present.
Of note, video surveillance showed Parsons arriving at
the Apartment on May 31 and exiting the next day with a clear
plastic bag that appeared to be knotted at the top and contain a
- 4 -white substance, which Detective Lattanzio explained "is
consistent with packaging narcotics." Moreover, on June 4,
Parsons exited the Apartment while counting multiple clear plastic
bags each containing a white substance. At various times,
Detective Lattanzio also observed Parsons brushing himself off
after leaving the Apartment and putting on clothes in the hallway
or parking lot, which Lattanzio testified is consistent with
"clean[ing] himself off" after "packaging powdery substances such
as cocaine and fentanyl." Detective Lattanzio last observed
Parsons visiting the Apartment for approximately twenty minutes on
July 31, two days before law enforcement searched the Apartment;
Parsons changed his clothes while there. Photos taken by law
enforcement at the time of their August 2 search depicted clothes
hanging in a bedroom closet, along with a few items on the shelf
and a bag on the floor.
In addition to his surveillance of the Apartment,
Detective Lattanzio testified regarding other evidence obtained
during the investigation. That included (1) a pre-paid cellphone
recovered from a trash pull at the apartment complex that was
originally obtained by Bean-Bousseau and Parsons at Target -- a
"burner" phone that Detective Lattanzio explained is commonly
"used by drug dealers to avoid detection by law enforcement";
(2) GPS tracking data of Parsons's car showing "numerous pull-offs
and stops that were conducted for short periods of time," including
- 5 -several stops in parking lots at apartment complexes;
(3) surveilled car trips in which Detective Lattanzio observed
Bean-Bousseau and Parsons conduct numerous "hand-to-hand
transactions" after leaving the Apartment; (4) a trash bag thrown
away by Parsons at the apartment complex that contained parts of
plastic bags with white residue, which tested positive for
fentanyl; 2 (5) items seized during the August 2 search of the
Apartment that Detective Lattanzio identified as "used in the
production of narcotics," including measuring cups, parts of a
blender, a sifter, Pyrex bowls, pots, two scales, and lactose;
(6) approximately 697 grams of cocaine in a box under the kitchen
sink and approximately 273 grams of cocaine in a bag in a bedroom
closet of the Apartment; and (7) a knife, $2,820 in cash, and
multiple bags of drugs -- containing approximately 126 grams of
fentanyl and thirteen grams of cocaine base -- found on
Bean-Bousseau's person after he left the Apartment on August 2.3
Towards the close of his direct examination, over
defense counsel's objection, Detective Lattanzio provided the
following testimony concerning Parsons's use of the Apartment:
2 One of the government's forensic chemists, Adriana DiLalla,
analyzed the residue on the bags recovered from that trash pull
and testified that the residue contained fentanyl.
3 The government's other forensic chemist, Christopher
Benitendo, analyzed the substances found during the August 2
search, both in the Apartment and on Bean-Bousseau's person, and
testified that they contained fentanyl and cocaine.
- 6 -Q: Based on what we saw during this trial and
everything we've learned, how do you
believe the apartment was being used?
A: I believe it was being used as a stash
house to package and distribute illegal
narcotics.
Q: Who was using that stash house?
MS. HACKETT [defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A: Malik Bean and Malik Parsons.
On January 24, 2025, a jury convicted Parsons of both
Counts One and Two. The district court sentenced Parsons to
eighty-four months' imprisonment, to be followed by four years of
supervised release. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Parsons challenges both his convictions and
his sentence. As for his convictions, Parsons argues that the
district court abused its discretion by permitting Detective
Lattanzio to testify that he believed Parsons used the Apartment
as a stash house. As for his sentence, Parsons argues that the
district court clearly erred both by applying a two-level upward
adjustment to his offense level for possession of a dangerous
weapon and by declining to apply a two-level zero-point-offender
downward adjustment to his offense level. For the reasons below,
each challenge fails.
- 7 -A. Admission of Testimony
Parsons first argues that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting Detective Lattanzio's testimony that
Bean-Bousseau and Parsons were "using" the Apartment as a "stash
house" to package and distribute drugs. Parsons contends that the
testimony was an improper lay opinion by a law enforcement agent
that the evidence supported a guilty verdict. He specifically
gives four reasons why: (1) the government elicited Detective
Lattanzio's statements; (2) the government asked Detective
Lattanzio to base his answer on "everything [they've] learned";
(3) the testimony supported the government's theory while cutting
against Parsons's; and (4) the testimony constituted an expression
of opinion based on the totality of evidence.
We review the district court's admission of lay opinion
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Pontz, 132 F.4th 10, 19 (1st Cir.
2025); see Fed. R. Evid. 701. But even if the district court
abused its discretion, we apply a harmless error standard to
determine if a non-constitutional evidentiary error -- like
improperly admitting lay opinion testimony -- warrants judicial
relief. See United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516 (1st
Cir. 2011). Such an error is harmless where "it is 'highly
probable that [it] did not influence the verdict.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5, 23 (1st Cir. 2011)). "The
- 8 -government bears the burden to establish harmlessness, and the
inquiry requires a case-specific examination of factors that
include 'the centrality of the tainted material,' its prejudicial
impact, and any other indications that 'the error affected the
factfinder's resolution of a material issue.'" Meises, 645 F.3d
at 24 (quoting United States v. Flores-De-Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 27
(1st Cir. 2009)). "For criminal cases, the strength or weakness
of the government's evidence of guilt is normally the most
important integer in the harmlessness equation." United States v.
Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 338 (1st Cir. 2019). We "may find an
error harmless when the properly admitted evidence, in and of
itself, furnished overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt."
Id.; see United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F.3d 85, 97 (1st Cir.
2008) (holding that admission of hearsay testimony from law
enforcement agent was harmless error when "ample evidence was
subsequently offered" to support drug-conspiracy conviction).
The government concedes that Detective Lattanzio's
testimony "raises concerns" under our precedent because it
identifies Parsons as a user of the apartment that functioned as
a "stash house," effectively offering the conclusion that Parsons
distributed illegal drugs. "Testimony by a law enforcement agent
constitutes impermissible overview testimony when it effectively
opines that a defendant is guilty based on the totality of
information gathered in the agent's investigation." United States
- 9 -v. Agramonte-Quezada, 30 F.4th 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting
United States v. García-Sierra, 994 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2021))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.
Pérez-Vásquez, 6 F.4th 180, 199 (1st Cir. 2021) ("In describing
his investigation, an officer may not make 'conclusory statements
about the defendant's culpability.'" (quoting United States v.
Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2012))). While there
appear to be sound reasons for the government's concession, we
need not definitively resolve that issue here because any error in
admitting Detective Lattanzio's challenged testimony was harmless.
An extensive array of unobjected-to testimony and
evidence supported Parsons's convictions. For instance, video
surveillance of the Apartment, GPS data and physical surveillance
of Parsons's activities outside the Apartment, and drugs and drug
paraphernalia recovered from the Apartment all supported the
conclusion that the Apartment was a stash house. Surveillance
also revealed that Parsons was a "user" of the stash house: he had
a key for the Apartment; he visited the Apartment almost
daily -- including without Bean-Bousseau -- and stayed overnight
weekly; he carried substances appearing to be drugs outside of the
Apartment; he disposed of items containing drug residue in the
apartment complex's trash facility; and he executed hand-to-hand
transactions after leaving the Apartment. All this "evidence,
- 10 -standing alone, supplied overwhelming proof" of Parsons's
participation in the drug conspiracy. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d at 339.
Parsons counters that because Detective Lattanzio's
testimony comprised eighty percent of the testimony presented by
the government, it "had no case" without him. Parsons does not,
however, challenge the majority of Detective Lattanzio's
testimony, including his testimony concerning the methods used for
packaging and distributing drugs, such as "[h]and-to-hand
transactions"; the role of "stash houses" to serve as facilities
for "hid[ing] drugs and packag[ing] drugs" and "primary
distribution location[s]"; his observations of Parsons leaving the
apartment holding bags containing a white substance that appeared
to be drugs and executing hand-to-hand transactions with
customers; and the drugs and drug paraphernalia recovered from the
Apartment, where Parsons regularly visited and stayed overnight.
All this testimony -- to which Parsons did not object at
trial -- supports his drug-possession and conspiracy convictions.
Because Detective Lattanzio's testimony concerning the
use of the Apartment was thus "only one small piece" of the
evidence supporting Parsons's convictions, "[t]he jury plainly
would have drawn the same conclusion without" it.4 United States
4 Although Parsons concedes that "the government's other
evidence against [him] was substantial," he insists that "it was
far from overwhelming." He points to the fact that he visited
the Apartment only once in the two weeks before it was searched by
- 11 -v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 319 (1st Cir. 2004). Accordingly,
even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
challenged testimony -- a question that we do not need to decide
today -- any error was harmless because "it is 'highly probable
that [it] did not influence the verdict.'"5 Sanabria, 645 F.3d at
516 (internal quotation omitted).
law enforcement; that at the time of the search, only Bean-Bousseau was present at the Apartment and there were no drugs in plain view; and that none of the packages of drugs seized by law enforcement
were tested for fingerprints. In our view, these facts do not
disturb the "ample evidence" supporting Parsons' convictions.
United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F.3d 85, 97 (1st Cir. 2008).
5 Parsons primarily relies on two cases to support his
proposition that the admission of the testimony was not harmless:
United States v. Meises, 645 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011), and United
States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 665 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 2011). But these
cases are readily distinguishable. First, Meises and
Vazquez-Rivera both involved multiple inadmissible statements, and
the combined effects of these statements had to be considered.
Here, we only have the statement by Detective Lattanzio -- that
they were using the apartment as a "stash house" -- mentioned
above. Second, a central component to the court's decision in
Meises was that "the contested statements were not 'cumulative of
other compelling proof'" of the defendants' guilt. 645 F.3d at 25
(quoting United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537, 546 (1st Cir.
2007)). Rather, the inadmissible statements were "central to the
prosecution's case." Id. Here, Detective Lattanzio's statement
is cumulative of other compelling proof. Outside of his statement,
the government elicited a breadth of testimony from Detective
Lattanzio on how his team conducted the investigation, as well as
from other officers detailing the more than 270 grams of cocaine
base and supplies consistent with packaging drugs for distribution
recovered from the Apartment. All of which the jury could use to
determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Parsons used the
apartment as a drug stash house.
- 12 -B. Offense Level Calculation
Parsons separately contests his sentence, challenging
the district court's calculation of his offense level under the
Sentencing Guidelines. As recounted in Parsons's Presentence
Report (PSR) and the parties' sentencing memoranda, the search of
the Apartment additionally yielded two firearms -- one in a
sweatshirt hanging in the bedroom closet and the other in a shoebox
in that closet. Over the objections of defense counsel, the
district court adopted the PSR's recommendations to (1) apply a
two-level sentencing enhancement to Parson's offense level under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) based on the finding that firearms were
possessed in connection with the drug trafficking, and (2) deny a
two-level reduction to his offense level available to certain
zero-point offenders under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 based on the same
finding. Parsons challenges each application of the guidelines.
Claims, as here, that the district court erred in
applying the guidelines are procedural in nature. See United
States v. Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611, 616 (1st Cir. 2025). We
review preserved procedural-reasonableness claims under a
"multifaceted abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. (quoting United
States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2020)).
"Under that standard, we review the sentencing court's
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo, its factfinding for clear error, and its exercise of judgment
- 13 -for abuse of discretion." Id. We uphold the district court's
application of the guidelines to Parsons.
1. Possession-of-Dangerous-Weapon Enhancement
Parsons first argues that the district court erred by
applying a two-level enhancement to his offense level under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). That provision allows for such an
enhancement "[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was
possessed" during the course of a drug-trafficking offense.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); United States v. Nuñez, 840 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2016). "The government has the initial burden of
establishing" by a preponderance of the evidence "that the
defendant possessed a weapon during the commission of the offense."
Nuñez, 840 F.3d at 5; see United States v. Elliott, 113 F.4th 168,
173 (1st Cir. 2024).6
6If the government meets its burden to establish possession,
"the enhancement attaches unless the defendant can show that it
was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the crime." United States v. Nuñez, 840 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2016); see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11.
Parsons suggests that the district court improperly
considered this application note when determining whether
possession of firearms by his co-defendant was reasonably
foreseeable to him -- a finding that is an alternative to a finding of constructive possession by Parsons that would also support
application of the firearms enhancement. See United States v.
Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611, 626 (1st Cir. 2025). The record
shows, however, that the district court merely referenced the
application note in a question to the parties, not that it relied
on the note for that part of its analysis. In any event, we hold
that the record supports a finding of constructive possession, and
need not rely on any finding of reasonable foreseeability.
- 14 -The government may show such possession "by showing that
the defendant had 'constructive possession' of the weapon." United
States v. Sylvestre, 78 F.4th 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting
United States v. Davis, 909 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2018)).
"Constructive possession is present 'when a person knowingly has
the power at a particular time to exercise dominion and control
over' an object," and "may be proven by circumstantial evidence."
Id. (quoting United States v. Nuñez, 852 F.3d 141, 145 (1st Cir.
2017)). "Both 'actual knowledge' and 'intent to control' 'may be
proven by circumstantial evidence.'" Id. (quoting Davis, 909 F.3d
at 18). "'[E]vidence of an individual's control over the area where
the contraband is found' is 'valid circumstantial evidence of
constructive possession.'" Id. (quoting Davis, 909 F.3d at 19).
"[M]ere presence with or proximity to weapons or association with
another who possesses a weapon," on the other hand, "are not enough
to prove constructive possession." United States v.
Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 2009). Moreover,
"[c]onstructive possession may be sole or joint and may be achieved
Parsons separately requests that we "reconsider" the
application note's legal effect altogether, because "some circuits
have declined to rely on U.S.S.G. commentary as authoritative"
following the Supreme Court's holding in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S.
558 (2019). But because Parsons has not developed this argument,
we deem it waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17
(1st Cir. 1990).
- 15 -directly or through others." United States v. Akinola, 985 F.2d
1105, 1109 (1st Cir. 1993).
Here, the evidence supports a finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that Parsons constructively possessed the firearms
recovered from the Apartment in connection with his
drug-trafficking offenses. Specifically, Detective Lattanzio's
testimony established, based on several months of surveillance
during the course of the drug-trafficking activity, that Parsons
had keys to the Apartment; that Parsons visited the Apartment on
a "near daily" basis, both with Bean-Bousseau and on his own; that
Parsons stayed overnight at the Apartment approximately weekly;
that the renter listed on the lease was never observed at the
Apartment; that at least one of Parsons and Bean-Bousseau always
accompanied guests into the Apartment; and that two days before
law enforcement searched the Apartment, Parsons was inside for
approximately twenty minutes and changed his clothes before he
left.
All this evidence supports a finding that Parsons
exercised control over the Apartment and, specifically, the
bedroom, given that he regularly spent the night at the
Apartment -- presumably sleeping in the bedroom -- and also
changed there -- presumably using the closet, where clothes were
hanging. Moreover, the contents of the closet were sparse,
supporting an inference that Parsons was aware of the limited
- 16 -contents inside, including the two firearms, during his regular
overnight stays over the course of months.
Parsons's control over the bedroom and its closet, in
turn, supports that he "knowingly ha[d] the power . . . to
exercise dominion and control over" the firearms inside it.
Sylvestre, 78 F.4th at 36; see Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d at 13
(affirming finding that defendant had constructive possession of
a backpack found inside the closet of a bedroom where he slept and
kept some personal belongings, even though his friend owned the
house); United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir.
2007) (affirming finding that defendant had constructive
possession of firearms stored inside a car where the evidence
showed, in part, that he was friends with the car's owner and had
access to the keys and opportunity to drive the car).
The extensive evidence of Parsons's personal involvement
in drug distribution from the Apartment, discussed above, further
supports a finding that he constructively possessed the firearms
during the course of his drug trafficking activity. That is
because Parsons's connection to the drug business and use of the
Apartment as a stash-house "provides a compelling motive for
possessing the gun, namely, to protect his drugs and drug money."
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 99 (1st Cir. 2002); see United
States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 504 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining
that the "intention to exert dominion and control over [a] firearm"
- 17 -could be inferred based on the nature of drug transactions because
the defendant "could well have intended to use the gun for
protection in the event of trouble with one of [his] crack sales").
Here, law enforcement found more than one-half kilogram of drugs
during their search of the Apartment, which supports a motive for
Parsons to use the firearms for protection, especially given that
third parties -- who could attempt to seize the drugs or otherwise
put the operation in jeopardy -- visited the Apartment.
Because the record supports a finding of constructive
possession by a preponderance of the evidence, the district court
did not err in applying a two-level enhancement to Parson's
offensive level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).7
2. Zero-Point-Offender Reduction
Parsons next argues that the district court erred by
declining to apply the zero-point-offender reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a). That provision, appended to the guidelines
in November 2023, provides for a downward adjustment of two offense
levels for a defendant who has zero criminal history points and
satisfies other criteria, including -- relevant here -- that he
7For completeness, we note that the district court appeared,
at times, to apply this enhancement based on a finding of
reasonable foreseeability. Other times, however, the district
court found that Parsons constructively possessed the firearm, a
finding which would also support the application of this
enhancement. As our analysis makes clear, we rely on this latter
determination in affirming the district court's application of the
sentencing enhancement.
- 18 -"did not possess, receive, purchase, transport, transfer, sell, or
otherwise dispose of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce
another participant to do so) in connection with the offense."
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(7). Despite noting "a paucity of reported
case law interpretating or applying this recent provision,"
Parsons contends that the district court improperly conflated the
analysis under the sentence reduction with that for the
firearm-possession enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1),
relying on the same finding of foreseeability in determining that
he "possessed" a firearm. Parsons insists that the district court
should have instead construed § 4C1.1(a)(7) in line with precedent
construing the identically worded safety-valve provision,
§ 5C1.2(a)(2), such that it would apply so long as he did not
personally possess the firearms at issue. As we explain above,
however, the record supports a finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that Parsons did have constructive possession of the
firearms; even under Parsons's proposed construction, then,
§ 4C1.1(a)(7) still would not apply to him. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in declining to reduce his offense level
on that basis.8
As mentioned above, the district court appeared, at times,
8
to rely on a finding of foreseeability in applying the enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). But again, as we also mentioned
above, the court separately found that Parsons constructively
- 19 -III.
For these reasons, we affirm Parsons's convictions and
sentence.
possessed the firearm. And as our analysis makes clear, we rely
on that determination in resolving this issue.
- 20 -