UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JASON LEOPOLD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 23 - 1935 (SLS)
v.
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE
AGENCY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In March 2023, three banks regulated by the Federal Home Finance Agency (FHFA)
shuttered. In the wake of their collapse, Jason Leopold—a reporter for Bloomberg News—
submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain documents about FHFA’s
oversight of the banks. When FHFA did not respond, Mr. Leopold and Bloomberg sued. For more
than three years, the Parties have worked together to produce and review the requested documents.
Now, both sides seek summary judgment with respect to documents that FHFA has withheld in
full or in part. For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part both motions.
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
“FOIA ‘implement[s] a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’” Informed Consent
Action Network v. NIH, No. 23-cv-926, 2026 WL 585104, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2026) (alteration
in original) (quoting DOJ v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 (1989)).
The statute “requires every federal agency, upon request, to make ‘promptly available to any
person’ any ‘records’ so long as the request ‘reasonably describes such records.’” Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)).
“Agencies must construe FOIA requests liberally and can only withhold or redact documents if
the information requested ‘falls within one of nine statutory exemptions.’” Informed Consent
Action Network, 2026 WL 585104, at *1 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA) v. NIH, 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). These
exemptions demonstrate that the public’s right to information is “not absolute and that disclosure
of certain information may harm legitimate governmental or private interests[.]” Martin v. DOJ,
488 F.3d 446, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). The agency bears the burden of establishing that
an exemption applies and ordinarily “must disclose all reasonably segregable, nonexempt portions
of the requested record(s).” PETA, 745 F.3d at 540 (cleaned up). And the agency must show that
it “reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by” one of FOIA’s nine
exemptions or that disclosure is otherwise prohibited by law. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A).
B. Factual and Procedural Background
The Court draws the facts from the Parties’ Statements of Material Facts and the underlying
materials referenced in those statements. See Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (PSOF),
ECF No. 37-2; Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (DSOF), ECF No. 40-3. The Court
assumes the facts in those statements to be true unless they have been specifically disputed, and it
assumes the truth of other undisputed statements in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see
also LCvR 7(h)(1). 1
Mr. Leopold is an investigative reporter at Bloomberg News. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1.
FHFA is a federal agency that regulates eleven banks in the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB)
1
Local Rule 7(h) provides that “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1).
2
system, as well as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage
Association, and the Office of Finance. See 12 U.S.C. § 4511(b)(2).
In March 2023, three banks in the FHLB system—Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank,
and Silvergate Bank—collapsed. That same month, Mr. Leopold submitted a FOIA request to
FHFA seeking the following records: (1) “FHFA’s internal rating system identifying safety and
soundness for each individual FHLB bank” from January 1, 2018, to the date of search;
(2) “quarterly supervisory reports” for the same period; and (3) “[e]mails, text messages, memos
and letters, referencing [the three banks] . . . includ[ing] any correspondence sent to state officials,
such as Governor Gavin Newsom or anyone on his staff.” PSOF ¶ 7; DSOF ¶ 1. FHFA
acknowledged receipt of the request on April 3, 2023. PSOF ¶ 8.
In July 2023, Mr. Leopold and Bloomberg sued, alleging that FHFA had violated FOIA by
failing to respond to the request. Compl. at 3–4. Over three years have passed since then, during
which FHFA conducted a search that uncovered responsive records, produced some records, and
withheld others in whole or in part under various FOIA exemptions. PSOF ¶¶ 10–15. The Parties
now cross-move for summary judgment. See Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Mot.), ECF No. 37; Def.’s
Opp’n & Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (Cross-Mot.), ECF No. 41; Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n, ECF
No. 42; Def.’s Cross-Reply, ECF No. 44; Pls.’ Sur-Reply, ECF No. 47. Those motions are ripe for
review.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires a court to “grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In a FOIA suit, an agency is entitled to
summary judgment if “no material facts are in dispute” and it establishes that all information
subject to a request has either “been produced . . . or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection
3
requirements.” Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(cleaned up). Typically, an “agency demonstrates the applicability of a FOIA exemption by
providing affidavits regarding the claimed exemptions.” Shapiro v. DOJ, 893 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C.
Cir. 2018). “If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information
with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed
exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the
agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.” ACLU
v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “[A]n agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA
exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs challenge FHFA’s reliance on FOIA Exemptions 4, 5, 6, and 8 to withhold
2,221 records in whole or in part. They argue that FHFA has failed to carry its burden at the
summary judgment stage to furnish adequate factual support for its withholdings. See Pls.’ Reply
& Cross-Opp’n 2–3. And they contend that FHFA did not heed FOIA’s command to “withhold
information . . . only if . . . the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest
protected by an exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). For the most part, the Plaintiffs’
arguments come up short. FHFA has met its burden, except for its Exemption 5 withholdings. 2
2
The Plaintiffs raise two procedural arguments, neither of which changes things. First, they ask the Court to disregard a declaration submitted with FHFA’s opposition, see Wright Decl., ECF No. 40-2, because it was “unsworn and unsigned.” Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 2. But FHFA has since submitted a signed copy and explained that it uploaded the unsigned document in error. See Def.’s Cross-Reply 1; Reuploaded Wright Decl. 16, ECF No. 44-1. Second, the Plaintiffs claim that FHFA’s eight-paragraph Statement of Undisputed Facts fails to comply with Local Rule 7(h) because it does not include the requisite facts and record citations. Despite its length, the statement does not violate Local Rule 7(h), particularly when considered alongside FHFA’s Response to the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, see ECF No. 41-1. See Grimes v. D.C., 794 F.3d 83, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J., concurring) (explaining that “all that the [Local Rules]
4
A. Exemption 8
The Court begins with Exemption 8, which covers 2,056 of the 2,221 withholdings reported
on the Vaughn index. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 16 n.7; Def.’s Cross-Reply 2. It concludes
that FHFA properly invoked Exemption 8 to withhold these records.
Exemption 8 protects information “contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(8). 3 Notwithstanding the
“general rule requiring that [courts] interpret FOIA’s exemptions narrowly,” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar
Ass’n v. SEC, 771 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the D.C. Circuit has “explained time and again that
Exemption 8’s scope is ‘particularly broad,’” id. at 4 (quoting Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. v.
Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Congress enacted Exemption 8 to “ensure the
security of financial institutions” and “safeguard the relationships between the banks and their
supervising agencies.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 796 F. Supp. 2d 13, 37 (D.D.C.
2011). It “address[es] the ‘concern[] that release of bank examination and operating reports could
endanger the fiscal well-being of [] subject banks.’” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 5
(quoting Heimann, 589 F.2d at 537). The text of Exemption 8 reflects that “Congress has
intentionally and unambiguously crafted a particularly broad, all-inclusive definition” of records
that may be withheld, and “it is not [the] function [of courts], even in the FOIA context, to subvert
that effort.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 533.
require” is “submi[ssion] [of] a statement of undisputed material facts and a brief explaining why summary judgment was appropriate”). In any event, a summary-judgment movant may rely on “affidavits or declarations,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), as FHFA has done here. So any purported defect in FHFA’s statement is not dispositive.
3
The Plaintiffs do not dispute that FHFA is an “agenc[y] responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions” under FOIA. See 12 U.S.C. § 4525.
5
Here, the Plaintiffs challenge FHFA’s Exemption 8 withholdings on three related grounds.
They argue that FHFA: (1) failed to specify whether the withheld information is either “contained
in” or “related to” the relevant report, (2) failed to specify the type of report—i.e., whether it is an
examination, operating, or condition report, and (3) failed to demonstrate that certain of the
withheld information is “contained in” or “related to” a report at all. See Pls.’ Reply & CrossOpp’n 17–20. In a nutshell, the Plaintiffs’ view is that FHFA must identify a specific report to
which the withheld information pertains to invoke Exemption 8. But Exemption 8 does not require
such a showing.
The D.C. Circuit has yet to address this question. See Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d
at 7 (declining to reach “the doctrinal question of whether each withheld document must relate to
a specific examination report”). But most courts in this District have rejected the Plaintiffs’ narrow
reading of Exemption 8. Those courts reason that Exemption 8 “covers all material that is ‘related
to’ [examination, operating, or condition] reports, not just reports themselves. Hence, the ‘related
to’ language casts a wide net of non-disclosure over any documents that are logically connected to
an ‘examination, operating, or condition report[.]’” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d
at 62 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)); see also Williams & Connolly LLP v. Off. of the Comptroller
of the Currency, 39 F. Supp. 3d 82, 91 (D.D.C. 2014). Under the majority view, “Exemption 8
does not require the defendant to identify a specific report to which the information relates.” Pub.
Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (emphasis added) (cleaned up); see also Pub. Invs.
Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 7 (noting that courts in this District have concluded that each document
withheld under Exemption 8 “need not” “relate to a specific examination report”); McKinley v.
FDIC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 128, 143–45 (D.D.C. 2010) (McKinley I), aff’d sub nom. McKinley v. Bd.
of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 647 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
6
In support of their reading of Exemption 8, the Plaintiffs rely solely on McKinley v. FDIC,
268 F. Supp. 3d 234 (D.D.C. 2017) (McKinley II). See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17–19. There,
the court required the agency to specify (1) “whether each of the [withheld] documents consists of
information that is directly contained in one of the three enumerated reports, or whether they
include information that is simply related to any such report”; and (2) “whether [the agency]
characterizes the relevant report as an examination report, an operating report, or a condition
report” to invoke Exemption 8. McKinley II, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 245–46. The Plaintiffs posit that
“if the agency must specify the kind of report, the information must pertain to a report of some
kind.” Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 19.
The Court is unpersuaded by McKinley II, which offers little analysis. Instead, it joins the
chorus of courts in this District in holding that an agency need not identify a specific report to
invoke Exemption 8. Controlling Circuit precedent has repeatedly emphasized that the text of
Exemption 8—which includes all documents “contained in or related to examination, operating,
or condition reports”—is “particularly broad [and] all-inclusive.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 533; see
also Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 771 F.3d at 4. Notably absent from the statutory text is any
requirement that an agency identify a specific report to which withheld records relate, clarify the
precise relationship between the withheld information and a particular report, or sort the identified
report into one of Exemption 8’s three categories. And the limited legislative history does not
support the Plaintiffs’ cramped view. See Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 63–70
(examining the legislative history); see also McCullough v. FDIC, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17685,
at *7 (D.D.C. July 28, 1980) (“[T]he legislative history, though limited, strongly implies that all
records, regardless of the source, of a bank’s financial condition and operations and in the
7
possession of a federal agency ‘responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions,’ are exempt.” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, the Court holds that FHFA need not show that withheld records relate to a
specific report. Exemption 8 protects all records “prepared in furtherance of [FHFA’s]
responsibility for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions,” Williams & Connolly
LLP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (cleaned up), and it “extends to any documents received by [FHFA] in
the course of exercising its regulatory responsibilities in relation to the financial institutions whose
information has been withheld,” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (cleaned up). 4
1. Application of Exemption 8
The Court now turns to the records at issue. FHFA invoked Exemption 8 for 2,056
withholdings that fall into five categories: (1) examination reports (final and draft); (2) other
supervision documents (final and draft); (3) materials provided by regulated entities;
(4) correspondence and emails between FHFA and regulated entities; and (5) internal FHFA
correspondence and emails. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 42–50; accord Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 16
(adopting this five-category framework). The Court considers each category in turn.
Exemption 8 undisputedly applies to the first category, which “consists of [draft and final]
examination reports prepared by FHFA as part of its supervision of” regulated entities. Wright
Decl. ¶ 42. Even the Plaintiffs admit as much, though they stop short of conceding this point. Pls.’
4
In their motion, the Plaintiffs say in passing that FHFA “does not specify how the withheld material relates to an entity that FHFA is responsible for regulating”—i.e., the three failed banks that FHFA is no longer regulating. Mot. 15. They later appear to abandon this argument by not responding to FHFA’s arguments on this point. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17–20 (making only the three arguments discussed above). Regardless, Exemption 8 applies irrespective of whether a financial institution remains in operation. See Gregory, 631 F.2d at 898–99; see also Pub. Citizen v. Farm Credit Admin., 938 F.2d 290, 293–94 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[F]or purposes of exemption 8 . . . examination reports need not pertain to an institution that is regulated or supervised by the withholding agency.”). So this argument has no force.
8
Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17 (“Documents in the first category, ‘Examination Reports (final and
draft)’ plausibly qualify [for Exemption 8].”). Exemption 8 straightforwardly protects these
records.
The second category of records also falls within Exemption 8. It encompasses “material
. . . contained in supervisory documents prepared by FHFA in its role as the safety and soundness
regulator” for the regulated entities that it supervises, and “material that was collected and
reviewed by FHFA examiners as part of the agency’s supervisory mission,” Wright Decl. ¶ 45.
Because these records were “prepared in furtherance of [FHFA’s] responsibility for the regulation
or supervision of financial institutions,” they fall within Exemption 8’s scope. Williams &
Connolly LLP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (cleaned up).
The final three categories also qualify for Exemption 8 withholding. The third category
consists of “documents prepared by” regulated entities “and later provided to FHFA . . . in its role
as the safety and soundness regulator for” those entities. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 46–47. The records
“contain material that was collected and reviewed by FHFA examiners as part of the agency’s
supervisory mission.” Id. ¶ 47. Similarly, the fourth and fifth sets of withholdings comprise
communications between FHFA and regulated entities, covering material “shared with and
prepared by FHFA examiners as part of the agency’s supervisory mission,” id. ¶ 49, and
“correspondence and emails exchanged within FHFA as part of the agency’s supervisory mission,”
id. ¶ 50. Exemption 8 “extends to any documents received by [FHFA] in the course of exercising
its regulatory responsibilities in relation to the financial institutions whose information has been
withheld.” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar Ass’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (cleaned up). And it covers all records
“prepared in furtherance of [FHFA’s] ‘responsib[ility] for the regulation or supervision of financial
9
institutions[.]’” Williams & Connolly LLP, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)).
Thus, FHFA’s third, fourth, and fifth categories of withholdings properly invoked Exemption 8.
Stepping back, the Court notes that even if the Plaintiffs are correct that Exemption 8
requires that each withheld document relate to a specific report, this record adequately makes that
showing for many of the documents responsive to the FOIA request. The Plaintiffs sought the
following records from FHFA: the agency’s “internal rating system identifying safety and
soundness for each individual FHLB bank,” “quarterly supervisory reports,” and communications
about the three failed banks. PSOF ¶ 7; DSOF ¶ 1. On this record, FHFA’s “internal rating system
identifying safety and soundness” for each bank is plainly related to FHFA’s obligation to produce
annual reports on the “financial safety and soundness of each regulated entity.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 4521(a)(2). And there can be no genuine dispute that the agency’s “quarterly supervisory
reports” qualify for Exemption 8. See Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 17. On any reading of the
statutory text, Exemption 8 protects the first two categories of requested documents.
2. Foreseeable Harm
Although the agency’s Exemption 8 withholdings fall within the exemption, that does not
end the inquiry. An agency may “withhold information . . . only if the agency reasonably foresees
that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I).
“The foreseeable harm requirement imposes an independent and meaningful burden on agencies”
“to foreclose the withholding of material unless the agency can articulate both the nature of the
harm from release and the link between the specified harm and specific information contained in
the material withheld.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI (Reps. Comm.), 3 F.4th 350,
369 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). When an agency satisfies its burden on “a category-by-category
basis rather than a document-by-document basis . . . the basis and likelihood of that harm must be
10
independently demonstrated for each category.” Id. Agencies must also conduct a segregability
analysis to “consider whether exempt portions of a record could be disclosed without causing
foreseeable harm to the interests protected by [the relevant FOIA exemption].” Rudometkin v.
United States, 140 F.4th 480, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
Determining foreseeable harm to an “interest protected by an exemption” necessarily
entails identifying the interests that the exemption shields. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized,
Exemption 8 protects two main interests. See Leopold v. DOJ, No. 19-cv-3192, 2026 WL 113618,
at *8 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2026). First, “the primary reason for adoption of [E]xemption 8 was to
ensure the security of financial institutions. Specifically, there was concern that disclosure of
examination, operation, and condition reports containing frank evaluations of the investigated
banks might undermine public confidence and cause unwarranted runs on banks.” Heimann, 589
F.2d at 534 (footnotes omitted). In other words, “Congress enacted Exemption 8 to address the
‘concern[] that release of bank examination and operating reports could endanger the fiscal wellbeing of [] subject banks.’” Pub. Invs. Arb. Bar. Ass’n., 771 F.3d at 5 (quoting Heimann, 589 F.2d
at 533). Second, Congress sought to “safeguard the relationship between the banks and their
supervising agencies.” Heimann, 589 F.2d at 534. After all, “[i]f details of the bank examinations
were made freely available to the public and to banking competitors . . . banks would cooperate
less than fully with federal authorities.” Id.
Here, FHFA’s declarants have explained that releasing the “candidly shared” information,
analysis, and discussions “of the financial condition of the regulated entities” withheld under
Exemption 8 “would cause substantial harm” to those entities. Wright Decl. ¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 49, 51;
see also Stallings Decl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 44-2 (“Release of such confidential bank supervisory
information to competitors and the public at large, would stifle candid evaluations of financial
11
institutions, and would harm the relationship between such institutions and their supervisory
agencies.”). Both justifications—harm to regulated banks and disincentivizing cooperation
between banks and regulators—cohere with the interests protected by Exemption 8.
The Plaintiffs resist this conclusion on two primary grounds. First, they attack the
conclusory nature of FHFA’s declarations. The Court agrees that the relevant statements toe the
line of the “boilerplate, unparticularized, and hypothesized assertion[s] of harm” that are
insufficient to sustain a FOIA withholding. Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 371; see Machado Amadis v.
Dep’t of State, 971 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020). But the Court is ultimately persuaded that
FHFA has met its burden. FHFA’s declarations focus on the “financial condition” and
“confidential bank supervisory information” contained in the withheld records. Wright Decl.
¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 49, 51; Stallings Decl. ¶ 36; see Machado Amadis, 971 F.3d at 371 (affirming the
sufficiency of declarations that “specifically focused on the information at issue in the [documents]
under review” and concluding “that disclosure of that information would” harm protected
interests). “In other words, [FHFA has] directly articulated ‘[a] link between the specified harm
and the specific information contained in the material withheld.’” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 371
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 114-391, at 9 (2016)).
Second, the Plaintiffs assert that no harm can foreseeably befall defunct banks. See Pls.’
Reply & Cross-Opp’n 13. Perhaps, but FHFA could reasonably foresee that the disclosure of
records related to shuttered banks could chill disclosure by operational banks. After all, if banks
knew that documents related to FHFA’s supervision could become the object of public scrutiny if
they failed, they might be more reluctant to engage in the candid regulatory cooperation that
Exemption 8 was designed to protect. Similarly, the Plaintiffs argue that no harm could result from
the release of information painting a regulated bank in a positive light. Id. at 21. But FHFA could
12
reasonably foresee that the public disclosure of banks’ closely-held information could provide their
competitors with key insights, putting a damper on future cooperation. See McKinley I, 744
F. Supp. 2d at 143 (noting that one of the purposes of Exemption 8 was “to safeguard the
relationship between the banks and their supervising agencies because if details of the bank
examinations were made freely available to the public and to banking competitors, banks would
cooperate less than fully with federal authorities” (emphasis added)).
In sum, FHFA has furnished sworn declarations articulating the specific harms that it
foresees if the withheld documents are disclosed. And its reasons align with the twin interests
shielded by Exemption 8. FHFA thus “correctly understood the governing legal requirement and
reasonably explained why it was met here.” Machado Amadis, 971 F.3d at 371.
FHFA has also met its burden as to segregability. According to one of FHFA’s declarants,
the agency “reviewed all the withheld exempt information and determined that no additional
information could be segregated and released without causing foreseeable harm to the agency or
the interests protected by the FOIA Exemption being asserted.” Wright Decl. ¶ 53. Sworn agency
declarations are afforded “a presumption of good faith” in FOIA litigation. Shapiro v. DOJ, 944
F.3d 940, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). And at the summary judgment stage, “an agency
claiming a FOIA exemption may carry [its] burden by the production of affidavits.” Evans v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 951 F.3d 578, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Thus, affording FHFA the presumption of
regularity to which it is entitled, the Court is satisfied that it has complied with its segregability
obligation. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of FHFA on Exemption 8.
13
B. Exemption 4
Next up is Exemption 4. FHFA invokes Exemption 4 to withhold 1,292 records. 5 PSOF
¶ 18. The Court concludes that FHFA has met its burden to withhold these records.
Exemption 4 “shields from disclosure ‘trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.’” Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus
Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427, 431 (2019) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)). “When an agency
withholds non-trade-secret information under Exemption 4, it must demonstrate that the withheld
information is ‘(1) commercial or financial, (2) obtained from a person, and (3) privileged or
confidential.’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. DOJ (CREW), 58 F.4th 1255, 1262
(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1982)).
FHFA’s Exemption 4 withholdings fall into the same five categories discussed for
Exemption 8: (1) examination reports (final and draft); (2) other supervision documents (final and
draft); (3) materials provided by the regulated entities; (4) correspondence and emails between
FHFA and regulated entities; and (5) internal FHFA correspondence and emails. Wright Decl.
¶¶ 6–20. FHFA does not claim that any of the withheld information constitutes trade secrets, see
Wright Decl. ¶ 4; Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 6 n.4, so its withholdings must satisfy the three-part
test for non-trade-secret information. The Court addresses each element in turn.
5
FHFA correctly asserts that the “overwhelming majority of documents withheld under Exemption 4 also were withheld under Exemption 8.” Cross-Mot. 11 n.4. It is well-settled that if documents are properly withheld under one exemption, the Court need not determine the applicability of other exemptions. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862–63 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts may uphold agency action under one exemption without considering the applicability of the other.”). But here, not all documents withheld under Exemption 4 were withheld under Exemption 8. See, e.g., Vaughn Index, ECF No. 41-2 (invoking Exemption 4 alone to withhold documents 2131, 2132, 2133, and 2163). The Court therefore considers the propriety of FHFA’s withholdings under Exemption 4.
14
1. Commercial or Financial
First, information withheld under Exemption 4 must be “commercial or financial.” CREW,
58 F.4th at 1262. The “information must be commercial in and of itself; meaning it serves a
commercial function or is of a commercial nature.” Id. at 1263 (cleaned up). “Because FOIA does
not define the word ‘commercial,’” the term takes on its ordinary meaning, so “information is
commercial if it pertains to the exchange of goods or services or the making of a profit.” Id.
“Exemption 4 paradigmatically applies to records that a business owner customarily keeps private
because they actually reveal basic commercial operations, such as sales statistics, profits and
losses, and inventories, or [that] relate to the income-producing aspects of a business.” Id. (cleaned
up). And the D.C. Circuit has “defined commercial information to include, for example, a firm’s
data or reports on its commercial service or its product’s favorable or unfavorable attributes or
information an industry has gathered regarding its competitive strengths and weaknesses.” Id.
at 1265 (cleaned up); see also ISC Grp., Inc. v. DOD, 88-cv-0631, 1989 WL 168858, at *2 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1989) (concluding that Exemption 4 protected an internal corporate investigative report
submitted to an agency that contained “operations statements, financial summaries and forecasts,
inventory and labor data, and other financial analyses”). That said, “not every bit of information
submitted to the government by a commercial entity qualifies for protection under Exemption 4[.]”
Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1290.
Here, FHFA has adequately showed that the withheld information is “commercial or
financial” within the meaning of Exemption 4. FHFA’s sworn declarations state that documents
withheld in each of the five categories contain “confidential commercial and financial
information” provided to the agency by regulated entities that “informed” FHFA’s supervision of
those entities. Wright Decl., ¶¶ 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20; see also Stallings Decl. ¶ 7
15
(explaining that the regulated entities “provide FHFA examiners with detailed information about
their business processes and activities to facilitate the examiners’ analysis of the[ir] operations”).
The first two categories include “Financial Condition and Performance Quarterly Reports,
Quarterly Market Risk Monitoring Reports, Quarterly Mark Risk Profiles, Mortgage Program
Policy and Analysis reports, Collateral Monitoring Profile reports, Credit and Collateral Risk
Modeling Contemporary Unsecured Credit Risk reports and Quarterly Member Credit Profiles.”
Wright Decl. ¶ 6; see also id. ¶ 9 (describing the second category of withheld records as
“includ[ing] Year-End profiles for the Regulated Entities, Financial Performance Reports for the
Federal Home Loan Bank System, Federal Home Loan Bank activity reports, and other
supervisory memoranda and presentations prepared by FHFA with confidential information
provided to the agency by the Regulated Entities”). The third category includes internal
memoranda, presentations, and Board and Committee materials prepared by the regulated entities.
Wright Decl. ¶ 12. And the fourth and fifth categories include communications between the
regulated entities and FHFA that “contain, discuss and analyze confidential commercial
information that FHFA obtained from the regulated entities.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.
These records contain quintessential commercial or financial information encompassed by
Exemption 4. See CREW, 58 F.4th at 1265 (finding that a bank’s internal memoranda,
presentations, and Board and Committee materials “demonstrably pertain[] to the exchange of
goods or services or the making of a profit”). In arguing otherwise, the Plaintiffs say only that
FHFA has not shown that it has withheld exclusively commercial information under Exemption 4.
Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 8. But this argument goes to segregability, not exemption from
disclosure. At bottom, FHFA has a statutory obligation to “oversee the prudential operations of
each regulated entity,” including ensuring that they “maint[ain] [] adequate capital and internal
16
controls” and that their activities “foster liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national
housing finance markets.” 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1). In other words, FHFA’s core responsibility is
to oversee the commercial activities and financial condition of the regulated entities within its
reach. It is unsurprising, then, that much (but not necessarily all) of the information provided to
FHFA by regulated entities in the course of FHFA’s supervision is commercial or financial in
nature. Here, FHFA’s sworn declarations make that clear.
2. Obtained From a Person
Second, Exemption 4 applies only to information “obtained from a person.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4). For FOIA purposes, the term “‘person’ includes an individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency[.]” Id. § 551(2);
accord Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Serv., No. 23-cv-00928, 2025 WL
947472, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025). In other words, “[i]nformation is considered ‘obtained from
a person’ if the information originated from an individual, corporation, or other entity, and so long
as the information did not originate within the federal government.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. DHS,
117 F. Supp. 3d 46, 63 (D.D.C. 2015).
Here, the records obtained from regulated entities were “obtained from a person.” Cf.
Leopold v. DOJ, No. 19-cv-3192, 2021 WL 124489, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021) (applying
Exemption 4 to a report issued by an independent bank monitor). So too are FHFA’s records
incorporating information provided by regulated entities, including FHFA-authored documents
and correspondence. Flyers Rts. Educ. Fund, Inc. v. FAA, 71 F.4th 1051, 1056–57 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(noting that Exemption 4 protects information from third parties “even when the government
incorporates that information into its own documents” and rejecting the argument that “Exemption
4 protects agency-authored materials only where they contain third-party information repeated
17
verbatim, slightly modified, or summarized”); see also Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 615
F.2d 527, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding the redaction from an agency report of “data
supplied to the government from a person outside the government”).
3. Privileged or Confidential
Third, the withheld information must be “privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
As the Supreme Court has explained, information is “confidential” under Exemption 4 only if “it
is customarily kept private, or at least closely held, by the person imparting it[.]” Argus Leader,
588 U.S. at 434; see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d
144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]n assessing customary disclosure, the court will consider how the
particular party customarily treats the information, not how the industry as a whole treats the
information.”). In Argus Leader, the Supreme Court also noted that “information might be
considered confidential only if the party receiving it provides some assurance that it will remain
secret.” 588 U.S. at 434. But the Argus Leader Court did not determine whether such assurances
of secrecy are necessary to invoke Exemption 4. See id. at 434–35. Neither has the D.C. Circuit.
See CREW, 58 F.4th at 1269. So “the current law of the D.C. Circuit . . . is that information is
confidential under Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the
public by the person or entity from whom it was obtained.” Gandhi v. Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., 665 F. Supp. 3d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 2023) (cleaned up). Nonetheless, courts in this
District have considered assurances of secrecy in evaluating the customs and practice of the
submitting party. See, e.g., Humane Soc’y Int’l v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 16-cv720, 2021 WL 1197726, at *5 & n.4 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021) (collecting cases for the proposition
that “even after [Argus Leader], courts in this District have continued to recognize that the
circumstances under which a company submits information to the government bears on whether
18
that information remains confidential”); WP Co. LLC v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
No. 24-cv-1353, 2026 WL 820742, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2026) (applying same).
Here, FHFA has provided sworn declarations attesting to the confidential character of the
withheld information. One declarant states that each document across the five categories withheld
under Exemption 4 “is normally kept confidential” by the regulated entities, “is not released to the
public,” and “was provided to FHFA with the understanding that the information would remain
private.” Wright Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10, 13, 16, 19. Another declarant similarly attests that the regulated
entities “provide [FHFA] examiners with confidential commercial and financial information about
their business operations . . . with the express understanding that FHFA will maintain the
confidentiality of that information as the agency uses the information to conduct its supervisory
analyses” and “knowing that FHFA will protect the confidentiality of nonpublic information
whose release would harm the[ir] business activities.” Stallings Decl. ¶ 7. These declarations
suffice. “[D]eclarations submitted by agency personnel are appropriately considered on a motion
for summary judgment in a FOIA case, as long as they satisfy the personal knowledge requirement
of Rule 56.” Leopold, 2021 WL 124489, at *5; see also Londrigan v. FBI, 670 F.2d 1164, 1174
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that an agency official was competent to testify to “his own observations
upon review of the documents . . . the agency’s procedures with respect to investigations during
his own tenure therewith and earlier practices of which he possesse[d] personal knowledge, and
his personal experiences as an agent to the extent that they bore relevance to the case”). And
“summary judgment on the basis of such agency affidavits is warranted if the affidavits describe
the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate
that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not
controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Mil.
19
Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also ACLU, 628 F.3d at 619
(same).
In urging otherwise, the Plaintiffs argue that FHFA’s declarants lack personal knowledge
of the regulated entities’ confidentiality practices, and that to the extent that their knowledge is
based on the regulated parties’ statements to FHFA, it is inadmissible hearsay. Pls.’ Reply &
Cross-Opp’n 8–10. To be sure, otherwise inadmissible hearsay generally cannot be considered at
summary judgment. 6 Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369
(D.C. Cir. 2000). But here, FHFA’s declarants have attested that their statements are based on
personal knowledge acquired through their official duties. See Wright Decl. 1 (stating that it is
“based upon the knowledge that [the declarant has] acquired through the performance of [] official
duties, [] personal knowledge, and [] review of the responsive agency records”); Stalling Decl.
¶¶ 7–8 (explaining that the declarant has “extensive knowledge of the exchange of information
that is required for supervision of the Regulated Entities” and is “familiar with the agency’s use of
confidential business and financial information provided by the Regulated Entities”). The
Plaintiffs provide no reason why the Court should disregard these statements.
Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs’ cited cases are inapposite. They rely on Government
Accountability Project v. United States Department of Treasury, No. 20-cv-2138, 2025 WL
721734 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2025), where the court excluded an agency affidavit that recounted
“second-hand, summary accounts” of the private party who had submitted the withheld
information. Id. at *3 (cleaned up). And they invoke Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt, 15 F.4th
6
The D.C. Circuit has recognized that declarations in FOIA cases may include otherwise inadmissible hearsay obtained by agency officials from their colleagues. See DiBacco v. Dep’t of the Army, 926 F.3d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Weisberg v. DOJ, 705 F.2d 1344, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But this “intra-agency” hearsay exception is immaterial when, as here, the alleged hearsay consists of statements made by non-agency personnel.
20
1254 (10th Cir. 2021), where the agency declarant simply relayed the submitter’s description of
their confidentiality practices. Id. at 1271–72. Neither provides a basis for excluding the statements
of FHFA’s declarants.
Finally, the Plaintiffs contend that FHFA cannot invoke Exemption 4 to withhold
information about the failed banks because FHFA has not specifically claimed that those banks
customarily and actually kept the information confidential. Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 10–11. But
the Parties do not dispute that FHFA regulated the failed banks before their collapse. See PSOF
¶ 1. Indeed, the purpose of the FOIA request is to uncover information about FHFA’s oversight
(or lack thereof) of the failed banks and whether it contributed to their failure. See Leopold Decl.
¶ 5, Ex. 1, ECF No. 37-3. Viewed in this context, it is difficult to understand why the Court should
distinguish between regulated entities and the now-failed banks—both (presumably) provided the
same types of commercial information to FHFA while under its supervision.
In sum, FHFA has sufficiently shown that the information withheld under Exemption 4
was “confidential or privileged” for purposes of Exemption 4. Because FHFA has demonstrated
that it withheld “commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), its withholdings fall within Exemption 4.
4. Foreseeable Harm
Recall that FHFA must also show that it “reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm
an interest protected by” Exemption 4. 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(8)(A)(i). Although there remains an
“open question as to the scope of the interest Exemption 4 seeks to protect,” Shteynlyuger v. Ctrs.
for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., 698 F. Supp. 3d 82, 123 (D.D.C. 2023), the D.C. Circuit has
long recognized that Exemption 4 is designed to “encourage individuals to provide certain kinds
of confidential information to the Government” and “protect[] persons who submit financial or
21
commercial data to government agencies from the competitive disadvantages which would result
from its publication.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 10 (1966)), abrogated on other grounds by Argus
Leader, 588 U.S. 427; see also Greenspan v. DOT, No. 22-cv-280, 2025 WL 2591784, at *5
(D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2025) (“In the Exemption 4 context, [the foreseeable harm] requirement is met if
disclosure would cause genuine harm to the submitter’s economic or business interests and thereby
dissuade others from submitting similar information to the government.” (quoting CREW v. DOJ,
728 F. Supp. 3d 113, 125 (D.D.C. 2024) (cleaned up)).
Consistent with Exemption 4’s purposes, FHFA’s declarations explain that it invoked
Exemption 4 to withhold each of the five categories of “confidential information obtained from
the Regulated Entities” because releasing those records “would harm the business operations of
the companies, and make it more difficult for FHFA to ensure that the Regulated Entities operate
in a safe and sound manner.” Wright Decl. ¶¶ 8, 11, 14, 17, 20. FHFA also attests that release of
the withheld information would “harm the business activities of the Entities,” Stallings Decl. ¶ 7,
and “harm the relationship between such institutions and their supervisory agencies,” id. ¶ 36. The
business and regulatory-cooperation harms FHFA identifies cohere with the interests that
Exemption 4 protects. Moreover, by describing problems that are unique to the context of
commercial regulation, FHFA’s declarations “articulate both the nature of the harm [from release]
and the link between the specified harm and specific information contained in the material
withheld.” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 369 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 114-391, at 9). By cabining its
withholdings to specific commercial information and explaining why disclosure of that
information would “impede the interests protected” by Exemption 4, Leopold, 94 F.4th at 37,
FHFA has met its burden on foreseeable harm as to its Exemption 4 withholdings.
22
FHFA has also adequately met its burden to “independent[ly] consider[] [] whether any
portion of a document, although exempt, could be segregated and released without causing
foreseeable harm.” Rudometkin, 140 F.4th at 494. Its sworn declaration states that the agency
“reviewed all the withheld exempt information and determined that no additional information
could be segregated and released without causing foreseeable harm to the agency or the interests
protected by the FOIA Exemption being asserted.” Wright Decl. ¶ 22. And as with Exemption 8,
the Plaintiffs offer no evidence to rebut the presumption that FHFA complied with its segregability
obligations. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment to FHFA on Exemption 4.
C. Exemption 5
Turning to Exemption 5, FHFA withheld 1,746 records, PSOF ¶ 21, grouped into three
categories: “(1) draft examination reports, (2) draft supervisory documents, and (3) internal
Agency correspondence and emails[.]” Cross-Mot. 16 (citing Wright Decl. ¶¶ 23–32). Most of
these records were also withheld under Exemption 4 and Exemption 8. But because Exemption 5
is the sole basis for withholding certain documents, the Court must address it. 7
Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “To qualify under this exemption, a document must ‘satisfy two
conditions: its source must be a Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege
against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that
holds it.’” Welter v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 22-cv-3738, 2026 WL 1243400, at *3 (D.D.C.
May 6, 2026) (quoting Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1,
7
For instance, FHFA invokes Exemption 5 as the sole basis for withholding documents 1, 15, 29, 32, 33, 41, 60, and 67. See Vaughn Index.
23
8 (2001)). Relevant here, Exemption 5 includes the deliberative-process privilege. Klamath Water
Users, 532 U.S. at 8. “To carry its burden at summary judgment, the government must demonstrate
that (A) the materials at issue are covered by the deliberative process privilege, and (B) it is
reasonably foreseeable that the release of those materials would cause harm to an interest protected
by that privilege.” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 361; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I).
The Plaintiffs do not dispute that the source of the draft reports and internal emails at issue
is a government agency, “so the remaining questions are whether [FHFA] has proven entitlement
to the privilege as well as reasonably foreseeable harm.” Welter, 2026 WL 1243400, at *3. Because
the Court concludes that FHFA has failed to make a sufficient showing on foreseeable harm, it
need not determine whether the deliberative process privilege applies. See Levin v. Nat’l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., No. 20-cv-3236, 2026 WL 523017, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2026) (same
approach).
“In adopting [the foreseeable harm] requirement in 2016, Congress was especially
concerned about agencies’ overuse of Exemption 5 and the deliberative process privilege[.]”
Mountgordon v. U.S. Coast Guard, 691 F. Supp. 3d 72, 84 (D.D.C. 2023) (cleaned up). A
withholding agency may not satisfy its “independent and meaningful burden” to show foreseeable
harm by “boilerplate and generic assertions that release of any deliberative material would
necessarily chill internal discussions.” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 369–70. Instead, the agency must
“specifically focus[] on the information at issue in the [documents] under review.” Machado
Amadis, 971 F.3d at 371. For example, the D.C. Circuit rejected as “scanty” the following
foreseeable-harm description:
Disclosure of [material containing or prepared in connection with the formulation
of opinions, advice, evaluations, deliberations, policies, proposals, conclusions, or
recommendations] would have an inhibiting effect upon agency decisionmaking
and the development of policy because it would chill full and frank discussions
24
between agency personnel and decision makers regarding a decision. If agency
personnel know that their preliminary impressions, opinions, evaluations, or
comments would be released to the general public, they would be less candid and
more circumspect in expressing their thoughts, which would impede the fulsome
discussion of issues necessary to reach a well-reasoned decision.
Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 370.
Here, FHFA’s generic description mirrors the foreseeable-harm analysis rejected by the
Circuit. With respect to each of the three categories of records withheld under Exemption 5,
FHFA’s declaration states simply that “release would have a chilling effect on the willingness of
FHFA officials to provide candid and complete comments on draft documents being prepared by
FHFA,” Wright Decl. ¶¶ 26, 28, or “would have a chilling effect on the willingness of agency
officials to record and share their thoughts, opinions and deliberations on decisions to be made by
the Agency,” id. ¶ 30. These “assertions [that] describe general and hypothetical harms, such as
‘chilled’ internal collaborations . . . could apply to the release of almost any government document
covered under the deliberative process privilege.” Levin, 2026 WL 523017, at *6; see also Am.
Oversight v. DHS, 691 F. Supp. 3d 109, 117 (D.D.C. 2023) (finding a statement that releasing
drafts would “discourage the expression of candid opinions . . . between agency personnel” and
“adversely impact the quality of internal policy decisions” insufficient to show foreseeable harm
because those “objections could apply to basically any withheld draft”). Because FHFA’s
explanation of the foreseeable harm that would result from disclosure of the withheld documents
“just mouth[s] the generic rationale for the deliberative process privilege itself,” Reps. Comm, 3
F.4th at 370, FHFA does not meet its burden.
When an agency fails to meet its burden to show foreseeable harm, a court may order
another Vaughn index or supporting affidavit. See, e.g., Ams. for Fair Treatment v. USPS, 663
F. Supp. 3d 39, 63 (D.D.C. 2023). But given the history of this case, the Court declines to give
FHFA another bite at the apple. FHFA has had two opportunities during briefing alone to support
25
its Exemption 5 withholdings. At every turn, FHFA has parroted the same conclusory explanation
for the reasonably foreseeable harm that would result from disclosing the documents in question.
This litigation has gone on for more than three years, and the Court will not prolong it further. See
Occupational Safety & Health L. Project, PLLC v. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-cv-2028, 2022 WL
3444935, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2022) (considering the duration of litigation in determining
whether to provide the government a “second chance . . . to justify its withholding”); see also S.
All. for Clean Energy v. Dep’t of Energy, 853 F. Supp. 2d 60, 78 (D.D.C. 2012) (“In the context
of FOIA litigation, information has a short shelf-life within which it can be useful to the requesting
party[.]”). Thus, the Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to the documents withheld
solely under Exemption 5. At this point, FHFA must release them.
D. Exemption 6
Finally, FHFA invokes Exemption 6, which protects “personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). But the Parties seem to have resolved their Exemption 6 disputes.
FHFA’s Vaughn index contained 32 Exemption 6 assertions—25 redactions of personal
information of government and bank employees and seven records withheld in full. See PSOF
¶ 23–24; Pls.’ Reply & Cross-Opp’n 4; Wright Decl. ¶ 33. The Plaintiffs do not challenge the 25
redactions. See DSOF ¶ 6. And of the seven records withheld in full, the Plaintiffs have dropped
their challenges to six of them. See Pls.’ Sur-Reply 7 (stating that the Plaintiffs no longer challenge
the withholding of documents 1381, 2061, 2065, 2066, 2067, and 2090). Thus, the Plaintiffs’ sole
remaining challenge is to document 1252. See id. But the Defendant’s Cross-Reply states that
“document 1252 will be released.” Def.’s Cross-Reply 10. That resolves the matter.
26
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, with respect to Exemption 4 and Exemption 8, the Court denies
the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 37, and grants FHFA’s Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 41. With respect to Exemption 5, the Court grants the Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 37, and denies FHFA’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF. No. 41. With respect to Exemption 6, the Court denies both motions, ECF Nos.
37, 41, as moot.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: September 11, 2026
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