[Cite as State v. Loyd, 2026-Ohio-3546.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 2025-CA-82
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 25-CR-428
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
MATTIE CHANTE LOYD : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 11, 2026, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE
HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
OPINION
CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-82
CHRIS BECK, Attorney for Appellant
JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee
LEWIS, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Mattie Chante Loyd appeals from her conviction of
robbery, which followed a jury trial in the Clark County Common Pleas Court. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On June 3, 2025, Loyd was indicted by a Clark County grand jury on one count
of robbery, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2); one count of
strangulation, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(2); and one count of
strangulation, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(3). Loyd pleaded not
guilty to all three counts.
{¶ 3} On June 23, 2025, the State filed a bill of particulars in which it stated, in part:
That on or about May 24, 2025, in the area of East John Street and Selma
Road, Springfield, Clark County Ohio, the defendant did attack the victim [T.H.]
on the street and began to strangle him and strike him in the face while
demanding money and going through the victim’s pockets. Officers arrived
on scene and the defendant lied about their identity. The defendant was
found in possession of the victim’s phone. The victim suffered several injuries
from the defendant’s attack.
{¶ 4} A jury trial was held in October 2025. T.H., the victim, testified. He was 76
years old at the time of the trial and was retired from the United States Army. In the early
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morning of May 24, 2025, T.H. went to the Sunoco gas station on Selma Road and Sunset
Avenue in Springfield, Ohio, to buy a bottle of soda pop. On his way home from Sunoco,
he was attacked from behind by Loyd. T.H. gave the following account of what happened:
Okay. I was attacked from the back. A lady jumped on my back. Of
course, I wasn’t expecting that and went to the ground. I fell to the ground,
and I think she was mad about something. I didn’t understand what was going
on. And first thing I said, I said, hey, I don’t have any money. I have no
money on me at all. And she was mad about something and I had no idea.
And I said I don’t have any money; and when I realized what was going on, I
believed I started to holler help, help, help, because the intersection there was
traffic going to and fro.
And she, the more I kind of -- she began to put her arms around my
neck and tried to strangle me and cut my air supply off; and I managed to get
loose and she put her hand over my nose and my mouth and she was getting,
traffic was coming by and I’m hollering, “Help, help.” And a guy on a
motorcycle stopped and said: Hey, let that man up. And he didn’t say
anything and I think he was the one that called the police. I’m not sure, but
I’m pretty positive he did. And but I kept hollering for help and she put her
knee -- as I was down on the ground, she put her knee on my neck and then
put all her weight on her knee on my neck.
And it dawned on me, I said this person’s trying to kill me and but,
luckily, I think it was a life saver the police showed up when they did; and she
stopped, stopped what she was doing. I was getting woozy and I couldn’t
breathe. That’s what happened.
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Tr. 221-222. T.H. further testified that Loyd did not say anything while she was attacking
him.
{¶ 5} After the police arrived, T.H. realized that his cell phone was missing and alerted
the police officers about his missing phone. The police officers obtained T.H.’s phone
number, called his phone, and discovered that the phone was in Loyd’s pocket. T.H. never
gave Loyd permission to take his phone. According to T.H., he did not know Loyd, did not
interact with her earlier that day, and did not receive $20 from her to purchase items from
the Sunoco gas station. Although T.H. had visited the Delta Road Apartments in the past,
he had not visited them earlier that morning.
{¶ 6} The police officers had an emergency medic physically examine T.H. The
medic allowed T.H. to go home without any further medical treatment. The State introduced
into evidence photographs showing the physical injuries T.H. suffered due to Loyd’s attack.
{¶ 7} Springfield Police Officers Luke Bartlam, Collin Matt, Aaron Rippley, and
Andrew Johnson testified about what they discovered when they arrived at the scene of the
attack on May 24, 2025. Officer Bartlam responded to a dispatch that two people were
fighting, and he was the first to arrive at the scene. He noticed that T.H. was bleeding from
the mouth, was disoriented, had lots of burst capillaries in his eyes, had scrapes and cuts,
and had a ripped shirt. Photographs were taken of T.H.’s injuries. Officer Rippley testified
that T.H. showed signs of having been strangled.
{¶ 8} Officer Matt arrived immediately after Officer Bartlam and ordered Loyd to stop
walking away from the scene. Loyd misidentified herself as Stephanie Lewis and provided
a false date of birth. Once Officer Rippley arrived, he immediately recognized Loyd. As a
result, the officers discovered that Loyd had an active warrant for her arrest.
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{¶ 9} Loyd told Officer Matt that she had given T.H. $20 to go to the Sunoco gas
station and buy two cheeseburgers and a pop for her grandchildren. Officer Rippley noted
that the Sunoco gas station did not sell ready-made cheeseburgers but sold frozen
hamburgers. According to Officers Johnson and Rippley, T.H. stated that he did not have
any money or a wallet with him.
{¶ 10} While Loyd was being questioned, she was holding a phone. One of the
officers took the phone from her and placed it on the sidewalk. Loyd was then arrested.
Before she was placed into a police cruiser, Officer Rippley patted her down and discovered
a second phone in her pocket. According to Loyd, it was her phone, and it was not working.
However, the police officers subsequently called T.H.’s phone number, which caused the
phone in Loyd’s pocket to ring. Despite this, Loyd continued to maintain that it was her
phone in her pocket.
{¶ 11} At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Loyd moved for a dismissal of
count two of the indictment (strangulation in violation of R.C. 2903.18(B)(2)) pursuant to
Crim.R. 29. The trial court agreed with Loyd and dismissed count two of the indictment.
The trial proceeded with the defense’s case.
{¶ 12} Kadesha Crockran testified that she lived at Delta Road Apartments and knew
Loyd for over five years. On May 24, 2025, Loyd asked to borrow $20 from her, and she
met Loyd at the Delta Road Apartments, which was not far from the Sunset Apartments
where Loyd lived. Crockran testified that T.H. was in the hall of the Delta Road Apartments
when she gave $20 to Loyd. Both Crockran and Loyd stated that they were not allowed to
enter the Sunoco gas station because of past problems they had there, so T.H. agreed to
take the $20 and get some food, chips, sandwiches, and something to drink for Loyd and
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her granddaughter. Crockran noted during her testimony that she had been accused of
stealing from Sunoco and that she had prior convictions.
{¶ 13} Loyd testified in her own defense. She lived in the Sunset Apartments, and
her daughter lived in the Delta Road Apartments. On May 24, 2025, she went to her
daughter’s apartment and called Crockran to borrow $20. Loyd explained that she had to
call from her daughter’s apartment because her phone needed Wi-Fi, which Loyd did not
have at her own apartment. When she met Crockran to get the $20, she noticed that T.H.
was in the hallway as well. She knew T.H.’s first name but did not know his last name.
Loyd noted that she had seen T.H. “here and there, once or twice, every other week.”
Tr. 406. Loyd testified that she asked T.H. to go to Sunoco for her because she was not
allowed to go there due to a past altercation with one of the employees. Loyd asked T.H.
to get her two cheeseburgers, chips, and a two-liter of soda pop for her and her
granddaughter.
{¶ 14} After giving T.H. the money, Loyd waited for a while. When T.H. did not
return, Loyd started walking toward the Sunoco looking for him. She noticed him walking
away and started yelling at him. Loyd caught up to T.H. and confronted him. She
discovered that he did not have the items she requested and refused to return her $20.
According to Loyd, T.H. pushed her and she pushed him back. They both fell to the ground
and began wrestling. She estimated that the fight lasted five or ten minutes. After the fight
ended, Loyd noticed a phone on the ground as she walked away. She picked it up and put
it in her pocket. Loyd testified that she assumed the phone on the ground was her second
phone, which had run out of pre-paid minutes and was not working at the time.
{¶ 15} The police arrived as Loyd was walking away from T.H. She was crying and
coughing. Loyd conceded that she lied to the police about her name and her date of birth,
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but she did so because she feared that there was a warrant for her arrest. When she was
being patted down before being placed in a police cruiser, she told the police officer that the
phone in her pocket was hers and was not working. When the phone rang in her pocket,
she assumed that the pre-paid minutes had been rolled over and her phone was working
again. She testified that she later realized the phone in her pocket was not her phone when
she called her daughter from jail and her daughter explained that Loyd had left a phone on
the charger at her daughter’s apartment.
{¶ 16} The jury found Loyd guilty of robbery and assault, the lesser included offense
of strangulation. The trial court sentenced Loyd to an indefinite sentence of four to six years
in prison for robbery and 180 days in jail for assault. The court ran the sentences concurrent
with each other. Loyd appealed from the trial court’s judgment.
II. Loyd’s Robbery Conviction Is Supported by Sufficient Evidence and Is Not
Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 17} Loyd’s first two assignments of error focus on her robbery conviction and
state:1
THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE
EVERY ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ROBBERY, O.R.C. 2911.02(A)(2)
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY WAS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 18} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a
conviction is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Groce,
1. Loyd does not raise any arguments relating to her assault conviction. Therefore, we affirm her assault conviction without further discussion.
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2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7, citing In re J.V., 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. “To resolve a sufficiency
challenge, we must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 325,
quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. An
appellate court does not engage in a determination of the witnesses’ credibility when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Goff, 1998-Ohio-369, ¶ 86, citing State
v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Nor does an appellate
court assess whether the evidence admitted at trial should be believed but, rather, if
believed, whether the evidence “would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. “We will not disturb
the verdict unless we find that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by
the trier of fact.” State v. Treesh, 2001-Ohio-4, ¶ 91, citing Jenks at 273.
{¶ 19} In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, the weight of the evidence concerns the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one side of the issue
rather than the other. State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 24, citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “A reviewing court considering a manifest-weight claim ‘review[s]
the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, [and] considers the
credibility of witnesses.’” State v. Group, 2002-Ohio-7247, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A case should be reversed as being against the
manifest weight of the evidence “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting Martin at 175.
{¶ 20} Loyd was convicted of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2), which
provides: “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense or in fleeing
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immediately after the attempt or offense, shall do any of the following: . . . (2) Inflict, attempt
to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on another.” “Theft offense” is defined in
R.C. 2913.01(K)(1), which provides that it is a violation of one of the listed statutes, including
R.C. 2913.02.
{¶ 21} The culpable mental state for robbery is satisfied if the State proves the mens
rea element of the theft offense. State v. Tolliver, 2014-Ohio-3744, ¶ 18.
R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) provides, in part: “No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of
property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or
services in any of the following ways: (1) Without the consent of the owner or person
authorized to give consent.” Therefore, the mental states for theft in R.C. 2913.02(A)(1)
include both “purposely” and “knowingly.”
{¶ 22} R.C. 2901.22 defines “purposely” and “knowingly” as follows:
(A) A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to
cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against
conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to
accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct
of that nature.
(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person
is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a
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high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
R.C. 2901.22(A) and (B).
{¶ 23} Loyd contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her robbery
conviction because there was no evidence of an attempt to commit a theft offense.
According to Loyd, “[t]here is no indication that Ms. Loyd even knew that [T.H.] had a cell
phone or demanded the phone or anything else. In viewing the evidence in the light as
presented by the State there was an assault and in the aftermath of the assault a phone was
picked up.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 10. Further, Loyd argues that “[t]he State failed to
establish the mens rea element of theft as necessary to justify a conviction of Robbery and
therefore the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. at 12.
{¶ 24} The State notes that Loyd does not argue whether she inflicted physical harm
upon T.H. and that the evidence clearly established that she did. Moreover, the State
contends that the evidence showed that Loyd knowingly took T.H.’s phone without his
consent. The State points out that Loyd admitted to lying to the police officers and that the
jury was free to disbelieve her story that she accidentally took T.H.’s phone. Therefore, the
State argues that Loyd’s robbery conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 25} The evidence was sufficient to establish that Loyd knowingly obtained or
exerted control over T.H.’s phone without his consent and with the purpose of depriving T.H
of his phone. T.H. testified that Loyd, a stranger, attacked him unprovoked from behind
and physically injured him. According to T.H., he did not know Loyd prior to the attack.
After the attack, T.H. discovered that his cell phone was missing. He testified that he had
not given Loyd permission to take his phone. The police found T.H.’s phone in Loyd’s
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pocket. Loyd conceded that she intentionally picked up what turned out to be T.H.’s phone,
put it in her pocket, and told the police that it was her phone even after it rang when the
police called T.H.’s phone number. Loyd claimed that she thought it was one of her two
phones when she picked it up. Apparently, the jury chose not to believe Loyd’s testimony
that she took T.H.’s phone by mistake. Notably, Loyd admitted at trial that she had lied to
the police about her identity and her date of birth, which likely hurt her credibility in the eyes
of the jury. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony is
a matter for the trier of facts, the jury here, to resolve. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, at
paragraph one of the syllabus. The jury, as the trier of fact, was able to judge the credibility
of the witnesses and was “free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness
appearing before it.” State v. Grant, 2020-Ohio-3055, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Wright,
2002-Ohio-4279, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 26} The testimony of T.H. and the police officers, along with Loyd’s testimony that
she intentionally picked up and kept the phone that ultimately belonged to T.H., is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). Further, this
case is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
{¶ 27} Loyd’s first two assignments of error are overruled.
III. Loyd’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Failing to Challenge the
Indictment
{¶ 28} Loyd’s third assignment of error states:
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
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{¶ 29} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). State v.
Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 95. “To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance
of counsel, it must be demonstrated that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that his errors were serious enough to create a reasonable
probability that, but for the errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v.
Mitchell, 2008-Ohio-493, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), citing Strickland at 688.
{¶ 30} This assignment of error involves count one of the June 3, 2025 indictment,
which states:
That on or about May 24, 2025, at Clark County, Ohio, MATTIE CHANTE
LOYD . . . in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section
2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or
offense, did inflict, attempt to inflict, or threaten to inflict physical harm on
another, in violation of Section 2911.02(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.
{¶ 31} Loyd contends that her defense counsel was ineffective by failing to object to
the “defective” June 3, 2025 indictment. Loyd argues, “The indictment clearly failed to
establish a mens rea element of either the Robbery or the underlying theft offense that is
necessary for the commission of the Robbery offense. The indictment simply references
the theft statute and does not spell out the elements of the theft offense.” Appellant’s Brief,
p. 15.
{¶ 32} The State responds that “[w]hile the indictment lacks a mens rea, courts across
the state have held that it does not need one.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 10. According to the
State, “it has been recognized that ‘[b]ecause the [robbery] statute incorporates the mental
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state required for commission of the underlying theft offense, no additional mens rea is
required.’” Id. at 11, quoting State v. Smith, 2018-Ohio-2756, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 33} “The purposes of an indictment are to give an accused adequate notice of the
charge, and enable an accused to protect himself or herself from any future prosecutions for
the same incident.” State v. Buehner, 2006-Ohio-4707, ¶ 7, citing Weaver v. Sacks, 173
Ohio St. 415, 417 (1962), and State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 170 (1985).
Crim.R. 7(B) states that the indictment shall “contain a statement that the defendant has
committed a public offense specified in the indictment.” Moreover, Crim.R. 7(B) provides
that this statement “may be made in ordinary and concise language without technical
averments or allegations not essential to be proved” and “may be in the words of the
applicable section of the statute, provided the words of that statute charge an offense, or in
words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all the elements of the offense with which the
defendant is charged.”
{¶ 34} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “when an indictment fails to charge a
mens rea element of the crime, but tracks the language of the criminal statute describing the
offense, the indictment provides the defendant with adequate notice of the charges against
him and is, therefore, not defective.” State v. Horner, 2010-Ohio-3830, ¶ 45, citing
Buehner. Further, “[a]n indictment that tracks the language of the charged offense and
identifies a predicate offense by reference to the statute number need not also include each
element of the predicate offense in the indictment.” Buehner at syllabus.
{¶ 35} The robbery count in the June 3, 2025 indictment tracked the language of
R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and referenced the predicate theft offense defined in R.C. 2913.01.
This served both stated purposes of an indictment by giving Loyd adequate notice of the
charge against her and by enabling her to protect herself from any future prosecutions for
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the same incident. The State provided additional notice to Loyd when it filed the June 23,
2025 bill of particulars in which it identified Loyd’s May 24, 2025 attack and strangling of
T.H. and the fact that she was found in possession of T.H.’s phone. Therefore, the
indictment was not defective.
{¶ 36} Our conclusion is consistent with State v. McCain, 2009-Ohio-1959 (2d Dist.).
There, the defendant asserted that the indictment was defective because it did not allege a
culpable mental state for the crime of aggravated robbery. Id. at ¶ 9. We noted that the
indictment referred to the theft offense as defined in R.C. 2913.01(K), which required the
element of knowingly. Therefore, we held that the indictment was not defective. Id.;
accord Smith, 2018-Ohio-2756, at ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 37} Given our conclusion that the June 3, 2025 indictment was not defective, Loyd
cannot establish that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the indictment
was defective. The third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 38} Having overruled the assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
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