RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1040-MR
MARK CHRISTOPHER APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, SPECIAL JUDGE1
ACTION NO. 25-CI-00179
CITY OF WILLIAMSTOWN,
KENTUCKY; MAYOR DAVID
HENSON; CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF WILLIAMSTOWN,
KENTUCKY, AND ALL
INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL MEMBERS;
DAVID HENSON, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS COUNCIL MEMBER; GINA
SMITH; JAYSON PAYNE; JOHN
COLEMAN; KIM CRUPPER; AND
RONNIE MAINES APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
1
The circuit judge of the Grant Circuit Court recused from hearing this case. Judge Schrand of the 54th Judicial Circuit (composed of neighboring Boone and Gallatin counties) is the Chief Regional Administrative Judge for the region including Grant County and was assigned to preside over this case.
BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.
EASTON, JUDGE: This appeal challenges the Grant Circuit Court’s order
affirming the decision of Appellee City Council (Council) of the City of
Williamstown (City) to remove Appellant Mark Christopher as the Mayor of the
City. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2022, Christopher was elected2 Mayor of the City. His term began
on January 1, 2023, and would have expired on December 31, 2026. When
Christopher took office, Vivian Link (Link) was the City Clerk. Link and
Christopher worked together successfully until her retirement in June of 2024. The
results of an audit for the fiscal year when Link retired indicated no financial
problems for the City. All reports and Council meeting minutes were current when
Link left.
After Link’s retirement, Christopher appointed Alex Cummins
(Cummins) to the City Clerk position with the approval of Council. Cummins had
been hired as a deputy clerk several months prior to this promotion. As Mayor,
Christopher was Cummins’s supervisor. Cummins had limited clerk experience
and had difficulty adjusting to her tasks. Christopher was made aware by Council
2
According to the official returns with the State Board of Elections, Christopher was elected by a margin of four votes in a close, three-way race with the vote totals at 367, 363, and 342.
-2-and other City employees that Cummins was behind in her duties. He spoke to her
about her failure to keep up with the work but extended grace for these deficiencies
because she was new to the position. Unfortunately, more than mere inexperience
came to light.
From July of 2024 until Cummins’s resignation in February of 2025,
the City’s financial accounting records were largely neglected. Cummins failed to
make necessary entries in the City’s electronic budget tracker system. Checks
drawn on City accounts were returned for insufficient funds. Deposits were not
recorded. Payroll accounting entries were not made. Purchase orders were not
paid. Minutes of the Council meetings were not timely prepared. Financial reports
were late.
Even worse, Cummins paid overtime compensation to herself and to
the City’s Fire Chief. But neither Cummins nor the Fire Chief was entitled to
overtime pay because they were employees exempt from that benefit. It was later
revealed that Cummins and the Fire Chief were having an affair. In addition,
Cummins also gave herself a $3.00-per-hour raise. And Christopher, as Mayor and
supervisor of the City Clerk, approved and signed all executive orders authorizing
these improper payments.
By early 2025, Christopher learned about the bank account overdrafts
and discussed the problem with the bank manager and with Council. Then, after
-3-learning about the affair with the Fire Chief, Christopher gave Cummins the option
of either resigning or being fired. She resigned on February 19, 2025.
Link then returned to work in the City Clerk’s office to help clean up
the budgetary issues. Assistant Clerk Lisa Clifton (Clifton) was appointed as the
Interim City Clerk. It was during this time when Link and Clifton were trying to
catch up with accounting and reporting duties that the full extent of Cummins’s
misconduct was discovered.
While the City was experiencing these financial problems, members
of Council began complaining to other City employees about the lack of
information they received concerning the City’s finances. Council members were
not receiving financial reports, presumably because Cummins had not been logging
entries in the budget tracker system used to generate such reports. And Council
was accustomed to receiving monthly financial reports and minutes during Link’s
tenure. Council was also aware of individual reports that the City’s bills were not
being paid on time and that checks had been returned for insufficient funds.
As a result, tension developed between Christopher and Council.
Chistopher would later testify he felt Council, the legislative body, was trying to
usurp his authority as the City’s executive. The depth of the tension was revealed
in a text exchange between Christopher and Cummins. When asked how Cummins
should respond to Council’s inquiries, Christopher responded with a vulgar and
-4-profanity-laced diatribe, essentially telling Cummins not to respond to inquiries
and to direct questions to him. If the Council members wanted information,
Christopher said that they could just file open records requests.
As a result of these problems, Council held a special meeting on
March 18, 2025. Council went into closed session after directing Christopher to
leave. Members of Council then consulted with independent legal counsel (which
Christopher complained they had no right to do). Council also held a special
meeting on April 1, 2025, when it passed the Resolution charging Christopher with
willful neglect pursuant to KRS3 83A.040(9) and authorizing the special meeting
for a removal hearing on April 21, 2025.
Christopher promptly filed suit in the Grant Circuit Court (Action No.
25-CI-00127) for injunctive relief to set aside these preliminary actions, arguing
various violations of the statutes governing procedure for conducting special
meetings and passing resolutions. On the day of the removal hearing, the circuit
court denied injunctive relief.
The removal hearing on April 21 was open to the public and held at
the Grant County Courthouse with retired Circuit Judge Stephen Bates4 presiding.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
Judge Bates began his service as a district judge for the 15th judicial district (composed of Grant, Owen, and Carroll counties) in 1986. He went on to serve as a circuit judge for the same counties from 1999 until his retirement in 2015.
-5-Written notice of the meeting was posted on April 18, 2025, in the Grant County
Justice Center, the Williamstown City Building, and on the City’s social media
platforms. But the notice was not posted in the Grant County Courthouse.
The removal hearing addressed the April 1st charging document,
which alleged Christopher had acted with willful neglect in the performance of his
duties when (1) he refused to provide Council with information about financial
obligations and problems encountered by the City, and (2) when he permitted
overtime payments to be made to persons ineligible for overtime payments, and did
so without consulting or informing Council.5 A third allegation, that Christopher
failed to provide minutes from Council meetings to the public, was removed from
consideration at the hearing because that allegation had not been listed in the April
1st Resolution authorizing the hearing.
Christopher, Link, and Clifton testified at the hearing. A review of
the video recording indicates the public hearing was well attended and included
media representatives. After the conclusion of testimony and arguments of
counsel, the members of Council went into a closed session to deliberate the
charges. Significantly, Christopher did not object at that time. No one else
objected. The Council deliberated for nearly two hours. They ultimately found
against Christopher on both counts of willful neglect and ultimately voted to
5
Trial Record (TR) at 84 and 144.
-6-remove Christopher as Mayor. They returned with a signed Resolution
promulgated in the closed session to remove Christopher as Mayor.
The Resolution was delivered to Judge Bates, and he read it into the
record. Only when the closed deliberations did not go as he had hoped did
Christopher object to the closed deliberations, arguing that Council’s action should
have been taken in public and not behind closed doors. Judge Bates then polled
each member of Council in public to affirm their decision. Christopher objected
again, arguing the action taken behind closed doors could not be ratified by simply
restating Council’s decision in the open. The objections were noted for the record,
and the meeting was adjourned without further action.
Christopher then exercised his statutory right to appeal his removal by
filing this second action in the circuit court. Christopher filed an Emergency
Motion for Injunctive Relief pursuant to CR6 65 et seq., and To Void Illegal
Actions of the Williamstown Kentucky City Council Members pursuant to KRS
61.848 et seq. Christopher also filed a Motion for Order Setting Aside the Illegal
Findings and/or Order from the April 21, 2025, Removal Hearing. He sought
attorney’s fees and court costs pursuant to KRS 61.848(6) for the Council’s alleged
violations of KRS 61.823.
6
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-7-Christopher served subpoenas on two members of Council to testify at
a hearing on his motions, which Council challenged. The circuit court did not
receive additional testimony from the Council members. A transcription of the
April 21st hearing was created, and both the video record and transcript were
submitted into evidence for the circuit court’s review.
The circuit court conducted a hearing on July 7, 2025, and ultimately
affirmed Christopher’s removal. In a well-reasoned opinion, the circuit court
reviewed each of Christopher’s many challenges, finding substantial compliance
with Kentucky’s Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.848(5), and sufficient evidence to
support the removal charges. The circuit court did not void the Council’s decision.
This timely appeal followed.
BRIEFING FAILURES IMPACT OUR REVIEW
The Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure govern briefs filed with
this Court. RAP7 32(A)(4) mandates that an appellant’s brief “shall contain at the
beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing
whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.”
Christopher’s appellant brief does not comply with this rule. In his first argument
about the closed session issue, Christopher does repeatedly refer to the video
record of the Council’s public hearing. In the later arguments, references to the
7
Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
-8-record trail off to nothing. But no actual preservation statement is made as directed
by the rule.
On the other hand, Council failed to file a timely appellee brief. This
Court denied a motion to allow a late filing of this brief. A motion to reconsider
that denial has been “passed” to this merits panel.
Then, even though the appellee brief had not yet been allowed,
Christopher filed a reply brief. This brief was also non-compliant. It was too long
and did not contain a word count certification in violation of RAP 31(G)(1) and
(2)(b).
So, before we get to the merits of the case, we must decide what to do
about Christopher’s failure to properly note preservation, rule on Council’s
reconsideration motion, and, if an appellee brief is allowed, what to do about the
non-compliant reply brief. Then we can determine the parameters of our review.
Instead of striking the appellant’s brief or dismissing the appeal as
permitted by RAP 10(B)(3) or (5), we may consider other options. RAP 10(B)(6).
We have a specific lesser option when preservation is not properly made. We may
review for palpable errors and reverse if manifest injustice is shown. CR 61.02.
We note that Christopher argues palpable error by the circuit court throughout his
brief which would be consistent with a request for such a review in the absence of
preservation.
-9-As our following analysis will reveal, our decision on this question of
standard of review resulting from the appellant brief is somewhat academic. As
we will explain, we find no error, palpable or otherwise, to justify reversal.
Certainly, no manifest injustice has occurred.
As to Council’s failure to file an appellee brief, we can sympathize
with the situation presented for its attorney. Basically, the attorney noted the
wrong date on his calendar for the due date of the brief. He says that has never
happened to him in decades of practice. From a search for appellate filings by this
attorney, we have no basis to dispute this. But as the order which denied the
motion originally noted, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that such a mistake
is not the neglect which the rule allows as a basis for a late brief. St. Joseph
Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 731 (Ky. 2014). We deny
the pending Motion for Reconsideration to allow this late brief and will do so by a
separate order to be entered with this Opinion.
We have several options when an appellee brief is not filed. Under
RAP 31(H)(3) we “may: (a) accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues
as correct; (b) reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to
sustain such action; or (c) regard the appellee’s failure as a confession of error and
reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.” As the word
“may” indicates, any such action is within our discretion.
-10-The RAPs have been in effect now for a few years. Common
failures under the applicable rules prior to the RAPs continue. We grow weary of
the frequent non-compliance with them. Yet we see the importance of the issues
presented by this case. An elected official was removed from office, and the
public’s right to know what its government is doing has been implicated.
Also, appellate judges are to analyze the applicable law without being
limited to a “spoon feeding” of it by the contents of the briefs. We have carefully
reviewed the entire record regardless of the problems with the briefs. We can
ascertain Council’s arguments from its successful argument to the circuit court.
We have analyzed the applicable law. As we have indicated previously, we find
no error to justify reversal. Basically, Christopher’s brief alone, when examined
with the record, does not reasonably appear to justify reversal.
The absence of an appellee brief renders moot the need to address the
non-compliant reply brief further. We will proceed with our review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Open Meetings Act determinations are reviewed by this Court de
novo.” Webster County Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin, 392 S.W.3d 431, 434-35 (Ky.
App. 2013) (a case relied upon by Christopher which is distinguishable because it
does not relate to the process of removing a mayor from office). Similarly, we
review de novo whether the facts supported by substantial evidence are sufficient
-11-to meet the statutory, legal requirement of “willful neglect” to justify removal of a
mayor.
If certain violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) have been
shown, the circuit court must decide whether to void the action taken by the public
body. “Whether such formal action should be voided is the plaintiff’s burden to
prove through a showing of prejudice and equity.” Bradshaw v. Capital
Community Economic/Industrial Development Authority, 727 S.W.3d 684, 702
(Ky. App. 2025). We review a voiding decision for an abuse of discretion. Id.
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
ANALYSIS
Christopher raises nine issues. We will address the issues in the order
they were presented in Christopher’s brief, although this was not necessarily the
order in which the issues arose as the events unfolded.
Christopher’s first three challenges concern whether it was proper for
Council to adjourn into an “executive” or closed, non-public session to discuss and
decide his removal as Mayor. For consistency, we will refer to the non-public
session as a “closed” session, which is the accepted terminology in the OMA itself.
Christopher also contends that Council violated the OMA when it adjourned into a
-12-closed session without a motion or vote to go into such a session. The Council also
came out of the closed session to resume the public hearing without a motion or
vote to return to an open session. KRS 61.815(1)(a) and (b). Christopher also
argues Council violated KRS 61.815(1)(c) when it promulgated a Resolution,
voted on the Resolution, and signed the Resolution removing him from office
while in the “illegal” closed session. We reject each of these contentions as a basis
for reversal.
Council removed Christopher from office pursuant to KRS
83A.040(9), a specific statute outside of the OMA, which controls the removal of
elected officers. Our duty is to harmonize statutes. See Osborne v. Keeney, 399
S.W.3d 1, 22 (Ky. 2012). We are called upon to harmonize KRS 83A.040(9) with
the OMA. KRS 83A.040(9) provides, in pertinent part:
[A]ny elected officer, in case of misconduct, incapacity,
or willful neglect in the performance of the duties of his
or her office, may be removed from office by a
unanimous vote of the members of the legislative body
exclusive of any member to be removed, who shall not
vote in the deliberation of his or her removal. No elected
officer shall be removed without having been given the
right to a full public hearing.
(Emphasis added.)
Note the difference between hearing and deliberation. Christopher
was given a full public hearing on April 21, 2025. After hearing all testimony and
arguments of counsel related to the alleged willful neglect of duties, Council
-13-discussed whether to remove Christopher from office while in a closed session and
unanimously voted to remove him. Christopher insists Council should have
discussed their decision to remove him in a public session pursuant to the OMA.
We disagree.
The legislative intent of the OMA is found in KRS 61.800 and
provides that the “formation of public policy is public business and shall not be
conducted in secret.” (Emphasis added.) Exceptions are strictly construed. KRS
61.810 provides a list of limited exceptions under which a Kentucky public agency
may conduct closed discussions or hearings. As related to this appeal, KRS
61.810(1)(f) provides as follows:
(1) All meetings of a quorum of the members of any
public agency at which any public business is discussed
or at which any action is taken by the agency, shall be
public meetings, open to the public at all times, except
for the following:
(f) Discussions or hearings which might lead to the
appointment, discipline, or dismissal of an
individual employee, member, or student without
restricting that employee’s, member’s, or student’s
right to a public hearing if requested. This
exception shall not be interpreted to permit
discussion of general personnel matters in secret.
(Emphasis added.)
-14-Christopher argues that, although he is clearly an elected officer
subject to KRS 83A.040(9), he is neither an employee nor a “member” under KRS
61.810(1)(f), and thus it was improper for Council to discuss any action related to
his removal in a closed session. We determine that a mayor is a member of a
public agency and is a person contemplated by KRS 61.810(1)(f).
In Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.
1997), the Kentucky Supreme Court explained that the express purpose of the
OMA is to maximize notice of public meetings and actions. The failure to comply
with this law in conducting meetings of a public agency violates the public good.
But our high Court also acknowledged there are certain narrowly defined
exceptions, such as those found in KRS 61.810(1)(f). The courts of the
Commonwealth must narrowly construe and apply these exceptions to avoid
improper or unauthorized closed meetings. Id. at 923 (citations omitted).
Under the personnel exception described in Subsection (1)(f), a public
agency may enter a closed session only for “discussions or hearings which might
lead to the appointment, discipline, or dismissal of an individual employee,
member, or student.” KRS 61.810(1)(f) (emphasis added). These groups of
individuals present the only personnel matters a public agency may discuss in
closed sessions. Discussions on any other matters, such as general personnel
matters, are expressly precluded.
-15-Kentucky courts have held that the personnel exception did not cover
discussions of a school superintendent’s resignation because a voluntary
resignation is not a “dismissal,” see Carter v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 421 (Ky.
2012) (a case upon which Christopher relies but which is also distinguishable).
The personnel exception does cover discussions concerning whether to renew a
contract to work as an employee, because the decision not to renew a contract was
the equivalent of a dismissal. Bradshaw, 727 S.W.3d at 704.
And although not binding authority, we find persuasive the reasoning
of our unpublished decision in Arnett v. City of Stanton, No. 2007-CA-000266-MR, 2008 WL 4091014, at *5-6 (Ky. App. Sep. 5, 2008). There, we held that any
discussions Council members may have had among themselves involving the
discipline of a mayor fell within the KRS 61.810(1)(f) exception to the OMA.
We also note here the different treatment of deliberations under the
OMA, while again pointing out that the removal of a mayor is governed by a
statute outside of the OMA. KRS 83A.040(9) includes the term “deliberation.”
The exceptions of the OMA repeatedly exempt deliberative actions. KRS
61.810(1)(a), (b), and (j).
Even though the removal proceedings here were the actions of a
public agency, the whole proceeding resembled a jury trial with the Council
members as the finders of fact to decide guilt of charges submitted to them. We
-16-have constitutionally open courts for the public to watch the presentation of
evidence, but we do not let the public or anyone else to go into the jury room. The
decision is publicly reported with the chance to poll the jury for public assurance
of their verdict. Likewise, here, Council had the right under KRS 83A.040(9) and
KRS 61.810(1)(f) to privately discuss among themselves whether Christopher, who
is a member of a public agency, should be disciplined by removal from office.
There was no error in Council’s deliberating this issue among themselves in a
closed session.
We also reject Christopher’s argument that the Council’s action
should have been voided because Council did not make a formal motion or vote to
move in and out of a closed session. KRS 61.815 sets forth requirements for
conducting closed sessions and includes notice of the general nature of business to
be discussed in them. KRS 61.815(1)(a). No matters may be discussed in such a
session other than those publicly announced prior to convening the session.
61.815(1)(d). No final decision may be made in such a session. KRS
61.815(1)(c).
If we assume that the Council proceeding under KRS 83A.040(9)
should have gone through the formality of these OMA actions before deliberating,
we find no reason to compel a voiding of the decision made. After all testimony
was completed and counsel for both parties made closing arguments, the hearing
-17-officer informed Council they could meet privately to discuss the case. There was
no contemporaneous objection, and there was no confusion as to the nature of the
business to be discussed in this closed session. Everybody in the room understood
what was happening, including the media present. This was sufficient notice to
satisfy the purpose and spirit of KRS 61.815(1)(a) and (d).
Proper procedure still requires members of Council to make a formal
motion and majority vote to move into a closed session, even once proper notice of
the nature of closed session business has been provided. Final actions should be in
public. In our effort to harmonize KRS 83A.040(9) and the OMA, we need to
make clear what should have happened here. There should have been a motion to
go into a closed session for the purpose of deliberation. Then the open session
formally should have resumed. And it would have been best if a formal motion
and public vote had been made in the public session to remove the Mayor.
KRS 61.815(1)(b) provides that closed sessions may be held only
after a formal motion is made and carried by a majority vote in open, public
session. KRS 61.815(1)(c) provides that no final action may be taken in a closed
session. But strict compliance with these mandates will not void Council’s actions.
Rather, KRS 61.848(5) specifically provides that any decision of a public agency
without substantial compliance with KRS 61.815 shall be voidable.
-18-Christopher did not challenge Council’s private deliberations until he
learned he had lost. There was no objection raised to Council’s failure to make a
formal motion and vote to move from the open to closed session and back.
Christopher’s real objection is to Council’s vote in the closed session. Yet that is
how deliberation works. The hearing officer then polled all members of Council to
affirm their unanimous decision in the special, public session. We conclude that in
the context of a hearing under KRS 83A.040(9), any issue with the vote here does
not require voiding the decision.
The deliberations properly occurred in a closed session as permitted
by the KRS 61.810(1)(f) exception to the OMA. There were actual notice and
clear understanding of the nature of the discussions in the closed session. While
Council should have moved in and out of closed session and voted on removal by
formal motions and votes, the affirmation of votes and recording of the final action
of removal occurred in a public session. The purposes of the mandates in KRS
61.810, 61.815, and 61.823 were satisfied. Even if the actions were not in
substantial compliance, voiding of the decision was not required. There was no
abuse of discretion by the circuit court affirming the removal.
Christopher’s fourth challenge concerns whether Council violated
KRS 83A.040(9) when it voted to remove him from office without substantial
evidence that he committed acts of willful neglect. Evidence is substantial if “it
-19-has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
[people].” Blankenship v. Lloyd Blankenship Coal Co., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 62, 64
(Ky. 1970). We find substantial evidence to support Christopher’s removal.
Our review of both the written and electronic record in this case
confirms the well-articulated reasoning of the circuit court. Christopher was
required to supervise all departments of City government and the conduct of all
City officers and employees under his jurisdiction. He failed to do so. Christopher
failed to provide Council with information regarding misconduct in the handling of
Williamstown’s finances. His argument that he only had to report annually ignores
the reality of what was occurring, which compelled more frequent reporting.
In August 2024, Christopher noticed that budget tracker entries were
not being made by Cummins or provided to Council. Cummins paid overtime to
herself and the Fire Chief, with whom she was in a relationship. Cummins gave
herself a $3.00-per-hour raise, and Christopher signed the executive orders
authorizing both her improper increase in pay and the improper overtime
payments.
While Christopher argues he was unaware of Cummins’s conduct
because he trusted his staff and relied on them to do their jobs without being
micromanaged, the duty to supervise staff in the processing, accounting, and
expenditure of public funds is an important role of a mayor – a duty in which
-20-Christopher failed. Christopher chose to neglect this managerial duty at his own
peril. And refusing to provide City financial information to members of Council
during a time the City was experiencing bounced checks and unpaid financial
obligations was further evidence of willful neglect.
The dismissive and profane text instructing an employee to ignore
Council supports the conclusion of willfulness in Christopher’s actions. The
evidence as a whole has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable people that Christopher willfully neglected his duties as
Mayor. There was sufficient, substantial evidence to support Council’s final action
in removing Christopher from office. The evidence supported the charges.
Council’s actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Christopher’s fifth and sixth challenges concern whether Council
committed error at the meeting held March 18, 2025, when it hired independent
legal counsel, and on April 1, 2025, when it took formal action charging
Christopher with neglect of duties and setting the removal hearing. We find these
errors are not properly before us in this case, regardless of the briefing deficiencies.
As we recounted earlier, Christopher filed a prior civil action. There,
he sought injunctive relief to set aside the actions Council took on March 18, 2025,
and April 1, 2025. The circuit court addressed the challenges to these hearings,
denied injunctive relief, and allowed the removal hearing to proceed. Christopher
-21-failed to appeal the order entered in this first case. Instead of filing an appeal, he
proceeded with the removal hearing and when Council rendered an unfavorable
decision, filed the instant appeal in circuit court to challenge his removal. Any
attempts to relitigate matters arising from the special meetings held March 18th or
April 1st are now waived. Also, for reasons we have stated in this Opinion, the
arguments, even if proven, would not have justified voiding Christopher’s removal.
Christopher’s seventh challenge concerns whether Council violated
KRS 61.823(4)(c) with respect to the notice requirements for the special meeting
held April 21, 2025. Technically, it did. This statute requires that notice of a
special meeting, such as the one involved in this case, must be posted in a
conspicuous place in the building where the special meeting will take place and in
a conspicuous place in the building which houses the headquarters of the agency.
The notice shall be posted at least 24 hours before the special meeting.
Here, notice of the removal hearing was posted on the doors of the
Justice Center (originally the planned location of the April 21st meeting), City Hall
(building which houses the headquarters of the agency), and on the City’s social
media sites. During arguments before the hearing officer and the circuit court,
Council advised that on Good Friday, April 18, 2025, members were told the
special meeting’s location was being changed from the Justice Center to the Grant
County Courthouse. This information was also communicated to Christopher and
-22-his legal team. Council acknowledged they did not post another notice in the Grant
County Courthouse building over the holiday weekend or even on the morning of
the removal hearing. The Grant County Courthouse was closed and locked due to
the holiday.
Despite Christopher’s objection to the special hearing for failure to
strictly comply with notice requirements, the special meeting was allowed to
proceed. Clifton testified that no one visited the City Clerk’s office on April 21st
to inquire as to the change in location. And, as we have previously observed, the
meeting was well attended by both the public and the media.
Council points out that KRS 61.848(5) requires only substantial
compliance with the notice statute. Christopher argues strict compliance is
required. Council is correct. KRS 61.848(5) specifically allows for substantial
compliance with the notice requirements of KRS 61.823. Even when substantial
compliance is absent, the circuit court must look at what happened to determine if
voiding should occur.
In addition, we also find Christopher suffered no prejudice because of
the notices posted in this case. There is no evidence that either party failed to
receive notice of the last-minute change in the removal hearing’s location, or that
Council had control over the last-minute change in location, or that any witnesses
-23-were unavailable due to the change. More importantly no member of the public
complained about any lack of notice.
Here we take the time to comment again on the purpose of the OMA.
It is primarily for the public’s benefit, although it also assures individuals that
actions against them will not take place without public oversight. But, it is not
intended to serve as a cudgel for a public official justifiably removed from office
for neglect of duty to invalidate that decision on technicalities of public notice.
The record contains no complaint from any member of the public who failed to get
notice because of the single failure to have notice posted in the Grant County
Courthouse. The presence of dozens of people and the media belies the complaint
that the public was injured by any non-compliance here.
Christopher’s eighth challenge concerns whether Council violated the
OMA by using an improper presiding official. Christopher argues that Council
erred in utilizing retired Judge Bates as a hearing officer to oversee the April 21st
removal hearing. He maintains that KRS 83A.130(5) requires that the mayor (or,
if provided by local ordinance, a council member) preside over a city council
meeting. There is no provision for a third party to do so.
Council argues in response that the mayor’s removal hearing is
governed more specifically by KRS 83A.040(9), which places no restrictions on
how to conduct a removal hearing. Council also argues Christopher suffered no
-24-prejudice because of Judge Bates’s involvement in the hearing. Council is correct
on this issue as well.
KRS 83A.040(9) articulates no other procedure on how to conduct a
removal hearing other than requiring (1) a unanimous vote (2) after a full public
hearing. Both of those things occurred here, even if the deliberations after the
public hearing were not subject to public view.
While KRS 83A.130(5) requires the mayor, or a council member, to
preside over city council meetings generally, mayors have no statutory right to
oversee their own removal hearing. Nor is the process necessarily served well if a
Council member must act as the presiding officer having voted to issue the
charging document. A neutral presiding officer gave assurance of a fairer process
for Christopher. It is axiomatic that, when interpreting a provision of a statute, a
court should not interpret a provision in a manner that brings about an absurd or
unreasonable result. Schoenbachler v. Minyard, 110 S.W.3d 776, 783 (Ky. 2003).
We also note that Christopher failed to object to Judge Bates’s serving
as the hearing officer at the removal hearing. At the start of the record, Judge
Bates disclosed he was serving by agreement of the parties, and that attorneys
often refer to him as “Judge” but that was really more of a nickname, given his
retirement from that post. He further explained that the removal hearing was not a
judicial proceeding, but rather, a statutory proceeding under KRS Chapter 83A.
-25-Because the removal statute is somewhat vague as to procedure, the parties not
only agreed to the selection of the hearing officer, but to the applicability of the
Kentucky Rules of Evidence as well. It is disingenuous now for Christopher to
challenge Judge Bates’s service as the hearing officer as statutorily impermissible.
Finally, we view Christopher’s ninth argument, that the circuit court
erred in determining any errors were “harmless,” to be without merit. The circuit
court found substantial compliance with the procedural mandates governing the
removal proceedings and the OMA. To the extent non-compliance was shown,
nothing required voiding the Council’s action. We view any remaining,
miscellaneous contentions of error to be moot or without merit.
CONCLUSION
The Grant Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
void the removal of Christopher as the Mayor of the City of Williamstown and is
AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
-26-BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES.
Greg D. Voss
Covington, Kentucky
Jeffrey Otis
Florence, Kentucky
-27-